Urban policy by Pill, M. & Rogers, D.

Australian Politics
and Policy
Senior Edition

Australian Politics
and Policy
Senior Edition
Edited by Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C.
Motta and Marija Taflaga
First published 2019 by Sydney University Press
This is version 1.1
© Individual authors 2019
© Sydney University Press 2019
Sydney University Press
Fisher Library F03
University of Sydney NSW 2006
AUSTRALIA
sup.info@sydney.edu.au
sydneyuniversitypress.com.au
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Share Alike 4.0 International
License. A copy of this license is available at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
A catalogue record for this book is available
from the National Library of Australia.
ISBN 9781743326671 pdf
ISBN 9781743326688 epub
ISBN 9781743326800 paperback
Cover design by Miguel Yamin.
A project of the Australian Political Studies Association
Contents
viiiAcknowledgments
  1Introduction
3Introduction
Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, Peter J. Chen, David Clune, Ian Cook,
Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga
18A short political history of Australia
Marija Taflaga
32Australian political thought
Nicholas Barry
51Institutions
53Executive government
Marija Taflaga
70Parliaments of Australia
Tracey Arklay and Neil Laurie
87Electoral systems
Jill Sheppard
106The Australian party system
Zareh Ghazarian
124The public sector
Isi Unikowski and John Wanna
143Media and democracy
Mary Griffiths
v
163Courts
Grant Hooper
183Federalism
185Commonwealth–state relations
Alan Fenna
202Australian Capital Territory
Robin Tennant-Wood
212New South Wales
David Clune and Rodney Smith
233Northern Territory
Robyn Smith
245Queensland
Paul D. Williams
265South Australia
Rob Manwaring, Mark Dean and Josh Holloway
281Tasmania
Richard Eccleston, Dain Bolwell and Mike Lester
296Victoria
Nick Economou
314Western Australia
Narelle Miragliotta, Sarah Murray and Justin Harbord
331Local government
Roberta Ryan and Alex Lawrie
351Political sociology
353Gender and sexuality in Australian politics
Merrindahl Andrew
373Government–business relations
Michael de Percy and Heba Batainah
390Indigenous politics
Diana Perche and Jason O’Neil
412Multicultural Australia
Juliet Pietsch
429Pressure groups and social movements
Moira Byrne
Australian Politics and Policy
vi
452Religious communities and politics
Marion Maddox and Rodney Smith
470Voter behaviour
Shaun Ratcliff
487Young people and politics
Philippa Collin and Jane McCormack
501Policy making
503Making public policy
John R. Butcher and Trish Mercer
522Communication policy
Jock Given
541Economic policy
Alan Fenna
559Environmental policy
Brian Coffey
580Foreign and defence policy
Thomas S. Wilkins and Nicholas Bromfield
603Health policy
Ian McAuley
624Immigration and multicultural policy
Andrew Parkin and Leonie Hardcastle
647‘Law and order’ policy
Garner Clancey and Brenda Lin (with Brendan Delahunty)
669Regional policy
Fiona Haslam McKenzie
688Social policy
Greg Marston and Zoe Staines
708Urban policy
Madeleine Pill and Dallas Rogers
724Work, employment and industrial relations policy
Susan Ressia, Shalene Werth and David Peetz
Contents
vii
Acknowledgments
The Australian Politics and Policy Open Textbook project is made possible by the
financial backing of Sydney University Press (SUP) and the University of Sydney
Library. The editorial team would like to acknowledge the support of Professor
Stephen Garton (Chair of the SUP Advisory Board); Professor Adam Bridgeman
(Director of Educational Innovation at the University of Sydney); Lisa McIntosh
(Director of Access Services at the University of Sydney Library), and Susan Murray
(Manager, Scholarly Publishing at SUP).
The contents of the volumes are the result of the good will of the chapter
authors and reviewers. This includes several independent researchers who freely
provided their time and expertise to contribute to this book.
Centred on the customisable web interface, we benefited from web design
expertise of Deepak Chandran, Savio Barretto, Anirudha Shinde, Mahadev Jadhav,
Santan D’souza, Joseph D’souza, Arup Barman, Milan Bishwakarma, Govind Satpute
and Richard Pipe.
Symmon Natour, Pat Norman and Michelle Harrison kindly assisted the
project with the development promotional video material, which Student Ambass-
ador Salina Alvaro generously volunteered to appear in as the face of our project.
Production of the volume is the result of the hard work of Chelsea Sutherland
and John Mahony, and the editors thank them for their invaluable support in
finalising the text and layout of the volume. Dr Agata Mrva-Montoya, the Pub-
lishing Manager at SUP, served as our project lead, advocate, and linchpin at SUP.
The editors thank her for all her work in in realising this project.
viii
Introduction

Introduction
Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, Peter J. Chen, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier,
Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga
Australia is a ‘small’ nation of 25 million people occupying a large geographic space.
It is the 53rd most populous country and has the 13th biggest economy in the world.1
Australia continues to play an important role in geopolitical affairs, particularly in
the South Pacific. Importantly, it is home to one of the world’s oldest continuing
Indigenous peoples; these peoples carry wisdom with which to contribute to re-
thinking our conceptions of politics, political subjectivity and sovereignty.
This book is a broad introduction to Australian politics and public policy. This
field of study is important for Australians to understand the exercise of political
power, their history and the scope for change. It is also important for analysts
outside Australia looking for comparative cases. Within this volume are diverse
topics and perspectives, demonstrating that the study of Australian politics and
policy is not ‘fixed’. Rather, it is a contested field of academic scholarship. Indeed,
the volume’s editors do not all agree on the content of this introduction!
Viewed from outside, Australia’s political and policy landscape is both familiar
and unusual. Like many former British colonies, Australia retained Westminster
traditions after it gained independence. Australia’s trajectory was like other
Commonwealth countries: from direct military administration to advisory ‘upper
house’ legislative councils, to expanded councils with partial elected representation,
to expanded elected representation and ‘lower house’ legislative assemblies, and,
finally, to the acquisition of full ‘responsible government’ and the shift of authority
from colonial governors to premiers. As with many settler-colonial states, Australia’s
Barry, Nicholas, John R. Butcher, Peter J. Chen, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh,
Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga (2019). Introduction. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 World Bank 2018.
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history is predicated upon genocidal policies, logics and practices2 that attempted to
erase a people and a culture. Indigenous sovereignties were not ceded, and issues of
sovereignty, history and reconciliation continue to be important and contested fields
of politics.3
Looking at political debate in Australia over the last half-century, there is
much that would be familiar to international observers: particularly the growth and
contraction of the welfare state, economic deregulation and global integration, and
the changing status of women and sexual and ethnic minorities. Australia hews
close to the policy and political currents of those nations with which it shares
strong political and cultural ties within what has been referred to as the political
‘Anglosphere’4: a sphere of interaction wherein history and shared language
increases the tendency for direct policy comparison, learning and transfer. More
recently, Australia’s diverse society has tempered this Anglo-Celtic linguistic and
cultural dominance with influences from the continuing presence of Aboriginal
ways of life5 and from an increasing number of migrants from non-Western nations
arriving after the end of the ‘White Australia’ policy in the 1960s.
Australia was a leader in the development of the welfare state at the turn of the
20th century6 and in undertaking radical re-engineering of public service delivery
as the century came to a close.7 The latter changes, broadly informed by what
some call ‘neoliberal’ public administration, continue to fuel debate.8 Democratic
values, such as universal suffrage, took early root in colonial Australia.9 While
there is a commitment to broad British liberal traditions, nationhood saw the
importation of political ideas from the USA, leading to the creation of an Australian
Federation.10 Yet, there have been enduring social conflicts over who gets to come
to Australia and who gets to participate politically, as seen in the political exclusion
of Indigenous peoples and specific ethnic groups during much of the 20th century
and the countervailing tendencies of ongoing ‘racialisation’ – creation and policing
of racial categories – in the Australian settler state and society.
2 This perspective is contested by some working outside of Indigenous/decolonising political
theories and even within the editorial team itself. Although a number of the policies and practices
of colonial and Australian governments (including state and territory administrations) can be
interpreted as ‘genocidal’ within the meaning of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide (UNOHCHR 2019), their portrayal as ‘genocide’ is not universally
accepted.
3 Harrison et al. 2017.
4 Gulmanelli 2014.
5 Watson 2014.
6 Castles and Uhr 2007.
7 Halligan and Wills 2008.
8 Spies-Butcher 2014.
9 Pickering 2001.
10 Maddox 2000.
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The study of politics and policy
The study of politics and public policy in Australia embodies diverse approaches, with
different underpinning objectives and methods for making knowledge claims.
Some of the earliest studies concentrated on the formal institutions that are
the most visible sites of political practice:11 parliaments, bureaucracies, political
parties, unions and businesses. This has been matched in recent decades by the
study of other structures of collective action, such as pressure groups and social
movements.12 While the study of institutions first emphasised the way strict rules
and laws shaped organisational practices, over time it has come to accommodate
more sociological views of how organisations operate, accounting for organisational
norms and culture.
Australian political science increasingly recognises that government power is
becoming distributed throughout society. In some cases, this has been the result
of deliberate choices by politicians and legislatures, such as the outsourcing of
previously state-provided services to charities or private companies. In other cases,
political scientists recognise that the capacity to influence how state power is
realised exists in places that are ‘in between’ formal institutions.
Those who conceive of political power as ‘distributed’ see politics and policy not
simply as government activity, but as the more expansive process of ‘governance.’
A governance perspective focuses on the way power is distributed across different
networks of social actors and organisations, shaping the nature of the policies that
emerge (such as the study of young people’s use of new media to influence politics).13
Governance considers a range of relationships (involving regulation, economic
exchange and collaboration) and often views elected officials as people who are
engaged in ‘steering rather than rowing’ to achieve their objectives, and not in
exercising top-down power.14
The recent National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is a good example.
Originally developed under Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard (2010–13), it aims
to ensure that Australians with significant disabilities receive care aligned with their
personal needs. Importantly, the development and implementation of this policy
was not something that a federal government could do alone. The financing and
provision of these services spans federal, state and territory governments, requiring
collaboration and co-funding. This made the policy highly political, involving the
influence of the prime minister, her Cabinet, her party and its allies, but also of a
grassroots campaign by people with disabilities and their supporters to encourage
leaders in the states and territories to sign on to the plan.15 Rather than establish
a centralised bureaucracy to deliver standardised care, an expanded ‘market’ of
11 Crozier 2001.
12 Boreham 1990.
13 Vromen 2017.
14 Rhodes 2016.
15 Al-Alosi 2016.
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commercial and non-profit providers was fostered to compete to provide services.16
Thus, while key ‘institutions’ were critical in initiating the policy, its implementation
sits in the world of politics and governance, with multiple actors influencing and
shaping the eventual welfare model, which was crucial to the lives of over 450,000
Australians.
Australia also has a longstanding tradition of study of individual and group
political behaviour that is less concerned with the role of institutions and
organisations. This ‘behaviouralism’ has asked questions about how individual
citizens conduct themselves as political actors (expressing themselves, voting,
joining organisations), how people are ‘socialised’ into political knowledge and
practices, and how political knowledge and opinion changes over time. Often, this
asks: how do people come to know and express their individual and collective
interests in the political world? This approach to the discipline has interests in
culture, media and the study of public opinion.
The study of Australian politics also has a rich tradition of ‘critical’ analysis.
This broad school includes an array of feminist political theorists,17 Marxist political
economists18 and, more recently, decolonial and indigenising perspectives.19 These
traditions question common assumptions about the political order. Thus, for
example, instead of assuming the inevitable existence of the liberal nation-state and
market economy, they ask about the historical formation of these structures. Critical
scholars are often associated with ‘action research’: not simply analysis, but
developing theory with the subjects of the research, with the aim of empowering
these communities to change the social and political order. These approaches
commonly focus on questions of race, class, gender and intersectionality (where
interlocking systems of power affect individuals and communities).
Politics and the study of power
Politics is commonly defined as ‘the science or art of political government’.20 This
definition highlights the importance of politics as the acquisition, use and effects of
social power across a range of settings. Underlying this simple definition, however,
are at least three different ‘meta’ (high level) concepts of power that are employed
in understanding Australian politics.
The first perspective conceives politics as a practice that both expresses and
explains political conflict and co-ordination as the result of incentive structures that
shape the behaviour of individuals and groups. Individuals, like groups, have their
own preferences, interests and goals that they pursue. But often they are unable to
solve their problems due to barriers to collective behaviour. In this view, human
16 Foster et al. 2016.
17 Pateman 1990; Plumwood 1993; Salleh 2017.
18 Humphreys 2019; Meagher and Goodwin 2015.
19 Harrison et al. 2017; Maddison and Brigg 2011; Motta 2016; Strakosch and Macoun 2012.
20 Macquarie Dictionary 2018.
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nature tends towards individualistic rational calculation. Power is the ability to
explicitly or implicitly shape the behaviour of organisations and groups of people.21
As such, the prospect of the few dominating the many can only be prevented by
broad-scale participation or through contestation between competing elites with
different goals and objectives.
This perspectives sees the ‘public good’ as a by-product of the participation of
and competition between many citizens and groups in the political process, and sees
political institutions as either sites of conflict (consider the famous nickname of the
New South Wales parliament: ‘the bear pit’) or the enduring outcome of previous
battles that provided spoils to the winners.22 While this perspective can be seen
very negatively, it can be argued that, in all its imperfection, competitive politics in
open societies ‘works’ in that it delivers participatory government through which
individuals can act to protect their interests from the risk of an authoritarian state.23
The second view of politics focuses on the role of groups or collectives engaged
in mutual adjustment to act in concert and restrict social conflict, without which
human society would amount to little more than a war of ‘all against all’.24 Conflict is
not seen as automatically constitutive of politics; rather, agreement and compromise
are necessary to achieve any significant objectives and humans are seen as fun-
damentally social creatures.25 Within this conception humans are viewed as able
to engage, in the right contexts, in truly co-operative forms of decision making
to achieve common goals and objectives. This approach tends to assess the extent
to which political practices facilitate or impede collaboration and treats poor
government performance as stemming from failures of decision making, consensus
formation and collaboration.
The third perspective examines how dominant political structures, logics and
rationalities determine who has the capacity to control their lives and futures. It
historicises and critiques the form of organising politics, sovereignty and political
community. In this critical reading, the liberal nation-state and market economy
structurally reproduce systematic exclusions along lines of race, gender and class.
One key example of this critical reading of politics is the indigenising–decolonising
perspective. This perspective challenges taken-for-granted conceptualisations of
politics that can devalue, elide and invisibilise Indigenous and colonised peoples’
epistemologies, ethics and modes of organising political and social life.
Understanding public policy
These perspectives on politics address debates about human nature and about how
political power is organised, acquired, maintained and deployed. Studying politics
21 Dahl 1957.
22 Machiavelli 2014 [1531].
23 Crick 1992.
24 Hobbes 2014 [1668].
25 Arendt 1958.
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without considering the programs and policies of government, however, reduces it
to ‘sport’: calculating winners and losers without ever asking ‘What is at stake?’ The
study of public policy adds an understanding of the outputs of the political process
and asks questions about the historical foundations and reproduction of exclusions
and inequalities.
Just as we can discern different perspectives on politics, we can also identify
different ways of thinking about policy. For some, public policy reflects the dis-
tribution of resources in a society. For others, it reflects wider cultural norms that
tell us a lot about what a society truly values.
A ‘materialistic’ view of public policy sees policy as a set of decisions, rules
and institutions that allocate benefits (and costs) within society. As with news
reporting on the federal budget (‘This year’s winners and losers!’), policy can be
seen as choices about who gets the ‘spoils’ of political victories. Often policy is
about the provision of direct material resources (e.g. industry subsidies), but it
can also include less tangible benefits such as favourable laws or regulations. By
way of example: the rise of the labour movement at the end of the 19th century
saw a corresponding increase in policy designed to redistribute resources towards
the working class (via mechanisms like welfare and progressive taxation systems),
as well as the first significant industrial relations laws regulating the relationship
between employers and employees. From this perspective, policy can be evaluated
in instrumental terms (Did the allocation of resources effectively achieve the
program goals?), and in terms of power (Who benefits from this policy?).
Alternatively, a ‘values’ view of public policy is less concerned with accounting
for the distribution of public resources and more concerned with the social
meaning of policy. Mark Considine highlights the role that the values of voters
and officials play in directing government action. For him, ‘a public policy is an
action which employs governmental authority to commit resources in support of a
preferred value’.26 This recognises that the material aspects of a policy may be less
important than its ‘symbolic’ meaning.
A good example of this view is the heated debate over the implementation of
LGBTIQ+27 education programs in Australian schools. The ‘Safe Schools’ initiative
provided teaching materials to help schools reduce instances of bullying of students
who do not identify with heteronormative standards. From a strictly rationally
calculating perspective, this program represented an infinitesimally small part of
education budgets, yet it became a contentious political issue due to its explicit
acceptance of gender and sexuality as non-binary. It became a lightning rod for
social conservatives and a point of principle for program advocates, who saw
recognition as important in ensuring the physical and psychological wellbeing of
LGBTIQ+ young people.28 While the materiality of the program was small, its
26 Considine 1994.
27 Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer/questioning.
28 McKinnon, Waitt and Gorman-Murray 2017.
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existence represented a strong statement of values as to what type of people were
seen as worthy of societal care.
‘Critical’ perspectives look at policy in terms of its impact on extending or re-
mediating systemic power inequalities and exclusions. An example is an indigenising-
decolonising perspective, which interrogates core settler-colonial state structures and
their underlying logics in economic, social, cultural or public order areas. In doing so,
it demonstrates their deeply racialised (as well as gendered and classed) nature and
the role of policy in the (re)production of exclusions, dehumanisation and racialised
interventions.29 A second strand of this research focuses on alternative practices,
processes and understandings of decision making and sovereignty, demonstrating
their survival despite historical and continued attempts at erasure and control, and
raising questions about the possibility of thinking differently about sovereignty,
authority, political subjectivity and political decision making.30
What do Australians think about ‘politics’?
On the surface, it would appear that we know a lot about what the public thinks
about politics. Australia’s political journalists are quick to refer to public opinion
polls to explain the daily currents of political debate and elite behaviour. Polling has
become a near real-time process surveying public attitudes, feeding reports about
‘what the public thinks’ back into political discourse.31 Political elites are quick to
refer to the currents of public opinion to justify their actions (when it suits them)
and to downplay polling in favour of ‘true leadership’ (also, when it suits them).
At the most fundamental level, there is considerable uncertainty about whether
the ‘average’ Australian knows very much about core aspects of the political system,
history and the debates of the day. Rodney Smith has called the average Australian’s
knowledge of the political system ‘sketchy’, at best,32 a problem partially exacer-
bated by the complexity of our three-level political system.
The Australian Electoral Study, a survey of Australian voters undertaken at
each federal election, has found that the public remains comparatively interested in
politics, with 77 per cent reporting they have a ‘good deal’ or ‘some’ interest.33 But
the survey also found that voters may have only partial levels of ‘hard facts’ about
the Australian political system. Indeed, less than half of voters can answer specific
questions about the Constitution and the composition of parliament (see Table 1).
The lack of knowledge with respect to these very specific questions relates to
a broader debate about the ‘competence’ of citizens: to what extent can the public
identify policy issues that are of significance to them and act collectively to put
29 Maddison and Brigg 2011; Motta 2016.
30 Harrison et al. 2017
31 Goot 2018.
32 Smith 2001.
33 Cameron and McAllister 2018.
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Table 1 Australian political knowledge, 2016
Correct Incorrect Not sure/
don’t know
Australia became a federation in 1901 76.5% 2.7% 20.9%
There are 75 members of the House of Representatives 45.9% 22.9% 31.2%
The Constitution can only be changed by the High
Court
40.4% 27.0% 32.6%
The Senate election is based on proportional
representation
49.5% 13.3% 37.2%
No-one may stand for federal parliament unless they
pay a deposit
25.1% 34.8% 40.0%
The longest time allowed between federal elections for
the House of Representatives is four years
26.5% 56.7% 16.8%
these on the political agenda (either through voting behaviour or political activities
outside of the electoral cycle)? Evidence on this question is mixed and complex,
demonstrating that the public is sensitive to economic conditions, and acts accord-
ingly, but can be ‘led’ by political elites on other issues (e.g. immigration).34
Importantly, Australians appear to be increasingly cynical about politics. How-
ever, Evans et al. see them as conflicted; many maintain positive views of Australia’s
democratic system in broad terms but question the integrity of many of its core
players (political parties, media and organised interest groups) and the policy
outcomes it delivers.35
Whether or not greater knowledge about the realities of the Australian political
system, its actors and its policy – the type of information contained in this volume
– would positively or negatively affect Australians’ attitude to politics remains an
open and contested question. However, Smith et al. identify a strong normative
argument that links improved political knowledge with enhanced political efficacy
(efficacy is the sense that you have the power to control your life and make
meaningful decisions).36
Conversely, the extent to which any representation of Australian politics and
policy speaks to those who have been excluded and misrepresented, and whether
34 Dowding and Martin 2016.
35 Evans, Halupka and Stoker 2017.
36 Smith et al. 2015.
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it reflects the knowledges and contributions of those on the political and
epistemological margins, are of ethical importance to critical political analysts and
frameworks. From these perspectives, the validity of political analysis and theory
derives from its capacity to be useful to those in movements and communities
struggling for social justice, inclusion and decolonisation.
About the open textbook
The volume you are reading is a customised textbook created from a collection of
chapters on the topic of Australian politics and public policy. This collection was
initially created by a team of 60 authors and editors. To ensure quality, each chapter
has been subjected to peer review, a process in which chapters are anonymised and
evaluated by other scholars who are experts in the field.
The purpose of the project is to:
• enhance the understanding of Australian politics and public policy with an
extensive, well-written, and comprehensive contribution to teaching materials
in Australia
• provide, with a no-cost option, access to high-quality teaching materials to
students of Australian politics
• develop a system for the delivery of bespoke textbooks customisable to the
needs of instructors.
Accessing more materials from this project
This book is only one small part of a larger collection of available materials. The
Australian Politics and Policy website (tiny.cc/australianpolitics) allows you to
access all the available chapters in the project’s database (see Table 2).
Creative commons licencing of this content
All the chapters in this open textbook project are subject to the Attribution-
NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) Creative
Commons licence. Under the conditions of the licence, you may:
• freely redistribute the content in this open textbook at no cost
• revise, update, transform and build upon the material.
A full copy of this licence and its conditions is available at
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
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Table 2 Complete contents of Australian Politics and Policy
Section Chapters
Introduction
A short political history of Australia
Introduction
Australian political thought
Executive government
Parliaments of Australia
Electoral systems
The Australian party system
The public sector
Media and democracy
Institutions
Courts
Commonwealth–state relations
Australian Capital Territory
New South Wales
Northern Territory
Queensland
South Australia
Tasmania
Victoria
Western Australia
Federalism
Local government
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Section Chapters
Gender and sexuality in Australian politics
Government–business relations
Indigenous politics
Multicultural Australia
Pressure groups and social movements
Religious communities and politics
Voter behaviour
Political sociology
Young people and politics
Making public policy
Communication policy
Economic policy
Environmental policy
Foreign and defence policy
Health policy
Immigration and multicultural policy
‘Law and order’ policy
Regional policy
Social policy
Urban policy
Policy making
Work, employment and industrial relations
policy
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Non-Indigenous peoples have occupied land in Australia for 230 years, bringing
different ways of life and forms of government to those of the Indigenous peoples
they displaced. Today, Australia is one of the most multicultural societies in the
world, and its politics focuses on securing high living standards for a diverse
population. But before the Second World War, Australia was overwhelmingly white
and Anglo-Celtic. As a settler society, political conflicts were dominated by disputes
over the distribution of natural resources and, later, political power. Politics in the
colonial and Federation eras established institutions, rules and norms that continue
to shape national government and politics in Australia.
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From Dreamtime to European settlement
Indigenous people first arrived in Australia over 60,000 years ago. They brought
with them customs and law. While Indigenous customary laws varied across tribal
groups, there were some common aspects. Customary law was part of the oral
tradition and reflected Indigenous peoples’ religious beliefs and their connection
with the land. These laws were passed down the generations, from elders to
children.
Indigenous laws were sets of rules enforced through social norms and sanc-
tions. They included internal and external mechanisms for maintaining order and
managing disputes. These laws considered kinship relations and stipulated rights
and responsibilities according to individuals’ roles within the community. Decision
making was often collective and deliberative. Customary law shaped Indigenous
lives, from when and how to get married to when and how tribes should go to war.
At the time of first contact Indigenous societies were governed by these laws.1
However, neither Indigenous claims to land nor their laws were recognised
by the British when the First Fleet arrived in 1788. The colony was established
on martial lines and was dominated by men, both in the militia and as convicts.
London was nine months away by ship. This degree of isolation effectively rendered
the governor a dictator.
When New South Wales (NSW) was established, British politics was influenced
by ‘enlightened’ interests that argued (naively) for colonial expansion with minimal
violence. Thus, Indigenous peoples were present in early Sydney, and attempts to
‘gift’ Christian civilisation to Indigenous peoples were simultaneously exercises of
good will and coercion. While early governors often acted as a force for restraint,
the steady expansion of pastoral interests saw the spread of both sanctioned and
unsanctioned violence against the Indigenous population. Indigenous peoples
continued to resist the occupation of their lands and disproportionately suffered the
consequences of war, massacre and disease.2
Politics in NSW was dominated by its governor, the militia and conflicts
between free settlers and emancipated convicts over access to land. The problematic
links between the militia and government manifested in the Rum Rebellion (1808),
after Governor Bligh attempted to break the militia’s illicit alcohol trade. In
response, London sent Governor Macquarie and replacement troops to restore
order. Macquarie (1810–21) perhaps did the most to develop early NSW. He built
major public works and introduced the first bank and a currency. Macquarie was
also sympathetic to the former convicts (emancipists) and granted them lands,
which upset the free settlers, many of whom were also members of the militia.
Macquarie’s eventual dismissal highlighted London’s important role in colonial
governance.
1 Law Reform Commission 1986.
2 Reynolds 1987.
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Self-government and gold
By 1820, European settlers numbered only 33,000. NSW’s nascent (male-dominated)
civil society generated demands for representation. Naturally, the model for govern-
ment was based upon the British concept of responsible government and developed
in stages. In 1823, an appointed seven-member Legislative Council was created to
advise the governor. Seven elected councillors were added in 1828. The Council was
expanded in 1842 with more appointed members. In 1850, the British parliament
legislated for limited democratic self-government in the Australian colonies.
By contrast, South Australia (SA) was established as a free colony in 1834.
Enshrined in its enabling Act were principles of political and religious freedom,
reflecting the settlers’ determination to develop without convict labour. The settlers
used land sales to fund passage for free skilled labourers and guarded against
dictatorial government by dividing political rule between the governor and the
‘Resident Commissioner’. This experiment quickly broke down, and the SA
parliament developed in stages, along similar lines to NSW. However, SA was a
beacon of democratic innovation. In its constitution (1856), it adopted universal
suffrage for all men (including Indigenous men) and low or no property qualifi-
cations to sit in parliament. It continued to innovate, granting propertied women
the right to vote in 1861. In a British Empire first, SA legalised trade unions in 1876
and granted all (including Indigenous women) the right to vote and to stand as a
candidate for elected office in 1894.
Victoria became a separate colony from NSW in 1851. That same year, large
deposits of gold were discovered, sparking a gold rush. Keen to secure a share of
this wealth, Victoria introduced a much-hated mining license. Resentment against
the licence fee grew on the Ballarat goldfields, resulting in the celebrated ‘Eureka
Stockade’. Under the Eureka flag, a brief pitched battle was fought between miners,
asserting their claimed rights and liberties, and police in December 1854. The result
was 22 deaths. Later, Melbourne juries refused to convict the rebels. This popular
feeling infused Victoria’s self-government debate with a democratic flavour.
However, the most important impact of the discovery of gold was on the
development of Victoria itself, tripling its population between 1850 and 1860. By
the 1880s, ‘Marvellous Melbourne’ was Australia’s largest city. Gold became one of
Australia’s key exports (alongside wool and wheat), and both the revenues and the
influx of young working-age men expanded the economy and fuelled Australia’s
first long economic boom, which lasted until the 1890s crash.
Dividing resources and allotting rights
At the time of self-government, politics in the Australian colonies was shaped by
high levels of immigration of English and Scots. These immigrants were steeped in
the working-class culture of ‘the people’s charter’ and the early union organisation
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of Britain’s ‘hungry 1840s’. This brought an early form of social-democratic politics
and ideas of utilitarianism (a strand of ethical thought emphasising the promotion
of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people) to Australia.
The division of the continent’s natural resources was at the heart of colonial
politics. These political battles were important for establishing the institutions and
principles that Australian democracy would continue to follow.
The British Crown owned all the land and could choose how to distribute it.
Australia’s natural grasslands precipitated the pastoral industry’s rapid expansion
and the rise of ‘squatters’ – illegal occupants of vast grazing estates, who pushed out
the frontier well ahead of the colonial surveyors. Squatters rapidly became wealthy
and powerful ‘wool kings’.
As the numbers of free settlers increased, conflict arose about the distribution
of land. The squatters were eager to secure legal rights to their occupied lands.
Opposing them were the ‘selectors’ – free colonists wanting a farming life on a
‘selection’ of land. Although the following describes NSW, similar events repeated
themselves across the colonies. Squatters used their existing clout to shape suffrage
provisions in several colonies. Voting rights were based on property ownership, and
the squatters successfully locked out ordinary colonist from the upper chambers of
colonial legislatures by setting high property qualifications.
In NSW, the squatters’ liberal-minded opponents were able to dominate the
lower chamber almost from the beginning of self-government. Liberals wanted
to break up the ‘squattocracy’ and release this land to prospective selectors. They
petitioned London to extend voting rights (suffrage) to all men paying a £10 per
year rent. This was an expensive rent in the UK and would safely exclude the
working classes. However, in high-inflation, gold rush Australia, this price was the
norm. The result was that the British legislated near-universal male suffrage in the
Australian colonies in 1855.3
Thus, a wide franchise, a hostile governor and the policy preferences of the
London Colonial Office saw the squatters’ privileges curtailed and some of their
pastoral holdings broken up. Liberal forces were also successful in securing Britain’s
agreement to end transportation during the 1850s (SA never accepted convicts,
while Western Australia [WA] continued taking them until 1868). These changes
illustrate the continued influence of Britain in Australia’s political life during the
19th century.
Australia’s economy was overwhelmingly rurally based, and squatters success-
fully kept the best lands for themselves. Land given to ‘selectors’ was too small
and unprofitable. The resulting rural poverty saw the rise of bushrangers such as
Ned Kelly. In 1891, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was formed, centring on the
mining and shearing industries. That year, it succeeded in winning four seats in SA
and 35 seats in NSW. The ALP was the union movement’s political wing, providing
3 Hirst 1988.
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parliamentary representation for its working-class base. It was the first labourist
party in the world to win power – for a week in Queensland in 1899 and for four
months at the federal level in 1904.
Setting the rules of the game: Federation to the world wars
The decades surrounding Federation in 1901 saw Australians willing to engage in
creative democratic experimentation. Events and decisions made at this time would
shape Australian politics until the 1980s.
The Federation debates
The push for Federation was the result of changing economic and geopolitical
circumstances. The depression of the 1890s – more severe than the Great Depression
– incentivised the creation of a single economic market. Another argument was that
a nation would be better able to defend the mostly empty continent.
Through two constitutional conventions, debate focused on how to manage
so large a land mass while balancing the interests of more and less populous
colonies. Heated debates occurred around the exact powers of the proposed Senate,
ultimately resolved by granting the Senate near equal powers (except the ability to
introduce money bills) to those of the proposed lower house. A bill of rights was
debated but not introduced.4
The final model drew on the bicameral UK, but with significant (federal)
elements adapted from the USA and Switzerland. Narrowly approved on its second
attempt, Australia federated in 1901. But the debate excluded working men, the
Labor Party, virtually all women and all Indigenous people. Indeed, Indigenous
peoples were not counted in the Census until 1967.
Electoral innovation and women’s suffrage
Elections in the 19th century were violent affairs. Winning often depended upon
bribery and the copious provision of alcohol. Australia was no different, until it
pioneered the adoption of the secret ballot (or ‘Australian ballot’) and banned
alcohol. These interventions transformed elections from wild affairs to safe and
dignified ones – socially acceptable events for women to participate in.
SA was a leader on women’s suffrage. WA followed suit in 1899. Federation
was predicated on accepting existing voting rights in the colonies, and this proved
pivotal to granting all white women voting and candidacy rights at federal elections
from 1902. Yet women’s representation was persistently low. The first woman
elected to any Australian parliament was Edith Cowan in WA in 1921. Women
4 Galligan 1995.
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did not enter federal parliament until 1943 (Enid Lyons [Liberal] in the House of
Representatives and Dorothy Tangney [ALP] in the Senate).5 In 2010, Julia Gillard
became Australia’s first female prime minister.
Solidification of the party system
At the time of Federation, politics was split between three political forces: the
Victorian-based ‘Protectionist’ liberals, the somewhat mislabelled conservative
‘Free Traders’ and the working-class ALP. Both the liberal and conservatives forces
were loose coalitions rather than formal parties. They struggled to compete with
the ALP’s discipline – the result of ‘the pledge’, which bound ALP parliamentarians
to vote along party lines on pain of expulsion. At the time, politicians were not paid
and working-class Labor representatives could be easily induced to switch sides.6
At the federal level, three voting blocs produced several short-lived minority
parliaments before 1909. This frustrated politicians like Alfred Deakin (a Protec-
tionist and three-time prime minister) who were used to the two-party politics
of colonial legislatures. Deakin termed this ‘the three cricketing elevens’, implying
it was ill-suited to Westminster-style politics. Deakin and the Free-Trade/Anti-
Socialist leader Joseph Cook choose to ‘fuse’ their parties to oppose Labor. Deakin
rejected Labor on the grounds of its illiberal ‘pledge’, which offended his belief in
individual conscience. The fusion of 1909 has proved long-lasting, as forerunner of
the Liberal Party of Australia.7
Social laboratory
In the decade after Federation, Australia was considered a leading social and
democratic laboratory. In addition to women’s suffrage, Australia was also at the
forefront in social policy, including the aged pension, child endowment, the
industrial arbitration system and the indexed living wage for male workers. These
payments cemented the idea of Australia as the ‘working man’s paradise’, but they
also placed women at a disadvantage. The living wage was designed for a man to
support a wife and three children in a ‘dignified’ manner, but this standard justified
legislated lower wages for women and stymied attempts at parity until 1969.
At Federation, the Australian economy was in the doldrums because of shifting
global economic conditions and the devastating Federation drought, which de-
pressed the rural sector.8 Population growth slowed and politics focused on
maintaining high wage levels, which saw the extension of the state into areas of
public health and welfare, but also measures to lock out ‘cheap’ Asian labour.
5 Sawer and Simms 1993.
6 Loveday, Martin and Parker 1977.
7 Brett 2003.
8 McLean 2013.
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Advocacy for the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) was led by the ALP,
but the Act was supported by all parties.9 It drew on earlier colonial practices,
instigated in reaction to the influx of Chinese miners during the gold rushes.
Support was underpinned by racist and nationalist sentiment linked to Anglo-
Australians’ self-identification as subjects of the British Empire and members of the
‘British race’. Under the Act, customs officers could apply a ‘dictation’ language test
to screen out racially, and later politically, undesirable people. This system ended
plantation-style sugar farming in north Queensland, which depended upon the
importation (but often kidnapping and enslavement, known as ‘blackbirding’) of
indentured labour from the Pacific. It also restricted the flow of Asian immigration
until the policy was moderated from the mid-1960s and then formally repealed in
1973.
First World War
When the First World War broke out, Labor Prime Minister Andrew Fisher
declared that Australia would support Britain ‘to the last man and the last shilling’.10
Thousands of volunteers joined up to fight for the ‘mother country’. However,
opponents also mobilised; former suffragists such as Vida Goldstein formed peace
movements. As the war continued, conditions on the home front deteriorated,
including industrial conflict over low wages and shortages. Those that protested
often fell afoul of the punitive War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth), which saw many
activists jailed for public dissent.11
Conflict over whether to introduce conscription became protracted, eventually
splitting the governing Labor Party. Disagreement within the government about
conscription stemmed from religious and ethnic divisions between Protestant
Anglo-Saxon Australians desirous of supporting the Empire and Irish Catholic
Australians hostile to Britain over the issue of Irish independence. Billy Hughes, a
Protestant, led a breakaway group of Labor MPs to join forces with the conservatives,
forming the Nationalist Party. Hughes, as prime minister, attempted twice to
introduce conscription via referendums in 1916 and 1917. Both were defeated.
These bitter campaigns entrenched existing sectarian divisions in Australia between
Catholic pro-Labor and Protestant anti-Labor supporters that would persist until the
mid-1950s.
Australia was devastated psychologically and economically by the First World
War. The nation was disproportionately impacted by the war’s effects on British
Empire trade – unable to sell its exports or import the manufactured goods it
required. Many of the men who died during the war were young and well educated.
9 Dyrenfurth 2011.
10 Murphy 1981.
11 Wright 2018.
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Australia took on loans, on top of an existing heavy debt burden, to finance the war,
and this retarded economic recovery into the 1920s.12
Between the wars
In the interwar period, Australia turned away from the world, attracting few
immigrants and raising tariffs to protect its manufacturing sector. Many Australians
were frightened of the political forces unleashed by the war: namely socialism,
communism and Irish nationalism (Fenianism). The optimism that characterised
the Federation decades was replaced by deep mourning. The Returned Services
League became a major force in politics. Their advocacy of solider settlement
schemes often proved disastrous as inexperienced farmers were given marginal
farming lands with little support.
These interwar years saw major political developments. First was the creation
of new parties on the right: the Country Party (1919; now called the Nationals), the
Nationalist Party (1911–31) and the latter’s successor, the United Australia Party
(UAP) (1931–45). The formation of the Nationalist–Country Coalition in 1922
instigated a century of co-operation between the parties of the right. Second was
the introduction of compulsory voting for federal elections in 1924. Third was
the High Court’s successive rulings in favour of centralising power in the federal
government, as cases were brought to clarify constitutional powers.13
During the interwar years, Labor endured opposition at the federal level until
finally winning government on the eve of the Great Depression. The Scullin Labor
government was quickly overwhelmed and, in 1931, the party split over how the
government should respond. Labor Cabinet minister Joseph Lyons defected and
took up the leadership of the new UAP, winning the 1932 election. The Great
Depression was particularly severe in Australia, with unemployment peaking at 32
per cent in 1932. This laid the foundation of a post-Second World War consensus,
predicated on the principles of full employment and the ‘fair’ distribution of wealth.
War and reconstruction
The Second World War ushered in a new political era. To fight the war, the federal
government asked the states to temporarily withdraw from collecting income tax.
The states lost their challenge in the High Court, which ruled that the Common-
wealth held priority over income tax. In 1946, the Chifley federal government
announced that it would continue ‘uniform taxation’ in exchange for reimbursing
the states for their forgone income tax revenue. These decisions are the origins of
contemporary political conflicts in Australia, where the states are responsible for
the provision of services such as health, education and transport, but the federal
12 McLean 2013.
13 Galligan 1995.
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government has more of the revenue needed to fund them. Although the High
Court’s decision was reversed in 1957, it proved too difficult to change existing
arrangements, despite multiple attempts by state premiers and even prime ministers.
The war was fought on the principle that a new social compact would follow;
postwar reconstruction would see a more equal society and a bigger state. The
Curtin and Chifley Labor governments attempted to deliver on this promise by
continuing the wartime command economy (a government-planned economy) to
direct labour into needed public works. Labor attempted to cement this extension
of the state’s role in the Constitution with the ‘14 powers referendum’ in 1944,
which would have enabled the introduction of a European-style welfare state. Like
its attempt to nationalise the banks, this referendum was defeated.14
In foreign policy, the war remade the geopolitical map, split between the
capitalist West and the communist East. Even before the Cold War, Australia had
shifted towards the US alliance, as a war-exhausted Britain could no longer
guarantee Australia’s security. Japan’s military aggression during the Second World
War had highlighted the vulnerability of a thinly populated Australia. Labor also
required more workers to fulfil its postwar reconstruction plans. This provided
the impetus to commence large-scale immigration in 1947. Attempts to induce
British migrants with assisted passage were not sufficient, and Labor responded by
recruiting from among the millions of refugees in Europe. The initial arrivals were
carefully managed, selecting only young, blond and mostly male migrants to allay
community unease.15 By 1973, nearly three million migrants, including 170,000
refugees, had immigrated to Australia.16
After 1945
The long postwar economic boom made Australia more equal; both the Chifley
Labor and Menzies Liberal governments broadly implemented policies that reduced
relative income inequality and maintained ‘full employment’. At this time, federal
governments exercised substantial powers to manage the economy. Elected in 1949,
Robert Menzies’ Liberals favoured a regulated and subsidised private sector. The
Liberals took risks on extending federal funding to Catholic schools and opening up
trade with Japan, as these had the potential to split the party’s own base. Menzies’
rejection of the Vernon report in 1965 also signalled that Australia would not
increase technocratic economic planning, which dominated practice in Western
Europe. Broadly, Liberal governments supported the status quo and Australia’s links
with Britain.
14 Macintyre 2015.
15 Persian 2015.
16 Jupp 2002.
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Politics at this time was shaped by the threat of communism at home and
within Asia. Abroad, Australians fought in Korea (1950–52), Malaysia (1964–66)
and Vietnam (1962–72). At home, Menzies failed to ban the Communist Party in
a referendum in 1951 but was able to capitalise on the defection of Soviet attachés
Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov in 1954, winning the subsequent snap election. Inside
the ALP, tensions between communist and anti-communist organisers in the union
movement exploded. The ALP’s organisational wing operated on a delegate model,
with unions accounting for the largest share of delegates. The rival groups fought
for a controlling influence over the party and the result was ‘the split’ in 1955. The
split saw a breakaway party of Catholic anti-communists emerge, the Democratic
Labor Party (DLP), mostly concentrated in Victoria.17
The DLP came to hold the balance of power in the Senate, capitalising on
the switch to a proportional voting system in the upper house in 1949. This was
the beginning of the end for governments’ expectation that they could rely on
a majority in the Senate. This shift was also important to the Senate’s increasing
tendency to utilise its full set of powers.18 The DLP influenced the outcome of
successive elections, advising its supporters to give their second preference to the
Liberals rather than the ALP. This helped to keep the Liberals in power at the
federal level for 23 years.
The Whitlam government
During the 1960s, the economic and social foundations of the postwar consensus
began to corrode, ushering in the political debates we recognise today. The Whitlam
government’s (1972–75) slogan ‘It’s Time’ both encapsulated and prefigured political
forces arising from the women’s and gay liberation, and environmental, ethnic and
Indigenous social movements. Whitlam led a chaotic but transformative govern-
ment, enacting universal health care (Medibank), free university education, multi-
culturalism and equal pay for equal work, establishing the family court, introducing
no-fault divorce and tariff reduction, returning the Wave Hill Station to the Guringdi
people and attempting to legalise abortion, to name a few. The pace of change was
breakneck and the rate of spending ruinously inflationary.
The Liberal Party, unused to opposition, attacked the legitimacy of the govern-
ment, using its Senate majority to force it to an early election in 1974. The Liberals
continued to press the government, and a year later the now scandal-ridden
Whitlam administration was locked in a game of chicken with the Senate over
its budget. The ‘Dismissal crisis’ emerged when Whitlam attempted to break the
deadlock by seeking an election from the governor-general, Sir John Kerr. But
before Whitlam could ask for a new poll, Kerr sacked him. Despite the outraged
crowds – typified by those who witnessed Whitlam’s famous quip ‘Well may we
17 Costar, Love and Strangio 2005.
18 Taflaga 2018b.
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say “God save the Queen”, because nothing will save the Governor-General’ – the
Liberals, led by Malcolm Fraser, went on to win the 1975 election by the largest
majority in postwar history.19
Indigenous rights
Indigenous Australians have persistently advocated for their people since first
contact. Indigenous peoples defended their lands by force, petitioned Queen
Victoria and government authorities, organised advocacy leagues in the 1920s and
undertook freedom rides (a form of protest where Indigenous and white activists
travelled around regional NSW to survey and bring to public attention the everyday
racial discrimination faced by Indigenous peoples) in the 1960s.20 In 1967,
Australians voted overwhelmingly to remove the prohibition on the federal
parliament legislating with respect to Indigenous people and to count Indigenous
Australians in the Census. The referendum was not about granting voting rights –
Indigenous people could already vote at federal elections if they held the right at the
state level.21
Indigenous people continued to advocate for land rights and greater autonomy
over their lives. Two landmark High Court cases, known as Mabo22 and Wik,23
overturned the doctrine of terra nullius. The latter found that pastoral leases did
not extinguish native title claims. These decisions paved the way for Indigenous
groups to seek native title over their land. However, the High Court’s decisions also
produced a backlash, particularly in regional Australia. The Howard government
responded with its ‘Wik 10 Point Plan’, which curbed the scope of the decision and
affirmed pastoral leaseholders’ and miners’ existing rights.
Australia in a globalised world
Liberal Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser represented a transition in Australian
politics between the long boom consensus and the new politics of monetarism,
deregulation and globalisation. Fraser retained, or could not unwind, most of
Whitlam’s reforms,24 with the notable exception of Medibank, which was privatised.
Fraser actively extended and cemented Australia’s commitment to multiculturalism
and antiracism, accepting tens of thousands of Vietnamese refugees. While Fraser
19 Hocking 2012.
20 Curthoys 2002.
21 Attwood and Markus 2007.
22 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23 (Mabo).
23 Wik Peoples v State of Queensland and Ors; Thayorre People v State of Queensland and Ors [1996]
HCA 40 (Wik).
24 Dowding and Martin 2017.
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set Australia on the path towards economic reform, it was the Labor Hawke–Keating
government (1983–96) that truly grasped the nettle.
In the 1980s, Labor governments relinquished control over several economic
levers (such as the exchange rate) to open the Australian economy to global
competition. They also came to a series of ‘Accords’ with the union movement
over wages. In exchange, these Labor governments extended the welfare state,
introducing the universal health scheme Medicare. Labor navigated a ‘third way’
between the socialism of the postwar left and the neoliberalism of the ‘new right’
in the 1980s. The ALP finally succeeded in winning more than two terms in a row
at the federal level, but at a cost. By 1996, many of the party’s left felt that Labor’s
socialist credentials had been betrayed.25
Labor embraced postmaterial politics, adopting progressive positions on wo-
men, the environment, gay rights, Indigenous affairs and multiculturalism. By the
1990s, reform fatigue had set in. John Howard’s Liberals harnessed a community
backlash with their 1996 campaign slogan ‘For All of Us’, which rejected the politics
of ‘the elites’ in favour of ‘ordinary Australians’. Howard argued for a ‘relaxed and
comfortable’ Australia that celebrated the nation’s history and culture. This was the
forerunner of today’s ‘culture wars’.26
The Howard government (1996–2007) embarked upon major reforms in its
early years, introducing a goods and services tax, industrial relations reforms and
strict gun control. Two events in 2001 came to dominate the government’s later
years. The first was the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York, which led
Australia to join the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq. The second was
the Tampa crisis, where the Australian government became involved in a standoff
with a cargo ship that had rescued asylum seekers from a sinking vessel. The
Tampa incident brought to a head a crisis in the immigration detention system,
which had been established by the Keating government. The eventual result was
the beginning of the offshore detention system. The Tampa crisis transformed
immigration into a contestable political issue, where previous attempts in the 1980s
and 1990s invited strong censure as racist.27 Today, both major parties are advocates
of offshore detention and boat turn-backs (despite the Rudd Labor government’s
brief liberalisation).
Finally, the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1970s crystal-
lised into political action and party formation, first in Tasmania in 1972 and later
federally in 1992.28 Global warming was first raised as a political issue in the 1980s.
Given Australia’s access to cheap coal and its position as an exporter, the Howard
government resisted joining global efforts to combat climate change. The issue has
25 Bongiorno 2015.
26 Brett 2003.
27 Taflaga 2018a.
28 Jackson 2016.
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continued to plague Australian politics, playing a role in the downfall of successive
prime ministers on both sides of the aisle since 2007.
Conclusions
Contemporary Australia’s colonial and post-Federation political history begins with
the displacement of its Indigenous peoples. The mode of politics reflects, first, the
adaption of British, and the development of unique Australian, institutions. These
institutions have set the ‘rules of the game’ and helped Australia to peacefully
manage the division of natural and political resources among its non-Indigenous
settlers. Second, as Australian society has changed, either through immigration or by
accommodating the demands for access to the public sphere by successive groups,
it has continued to adapt its institutions in order to cope with new challenges and
demands without serious political strife or collapse.
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Australian political thought
Nicholas Barry
Key terms/names
conservatism, labourism, liberalism, nationalism, race, social democracy, socialism,
utilitarianism
Ideas are central to politics. Individuals and groups have different ideas about which
values are most important, what kind of society we should live in, how the world
works and what role the state should play. This is what political scientists often
refer to when they use the term ‘ideology’. Ideological disagreements often underpin
disagreements over the laws and policies that should be adopted. For this reason, a
full understanding of politics and public policy in Australia requires an awareness of
the major ideas and ideologies held by Australian citizens, politicians and activists.
In the past, an influential line of thought held that political ideas were relatively
unimportant to Australians. James Bryce, for example, noted that ‘[t]he matters
which occupy the mind of the nation in all classes are … its material or economic
interests – businesses, wages, employment, the development of the country’s re-
sources. These dominate politics.’1 This picture of Australian citizens and politicians
as atheoretical and practical was also present in a number of other influential early
works on Australia.2 Related views were also expressed in the postwar period, with
Barry, Nicholas (2019). Australian political thought. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds.
Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 Bryce 1921, 244.
2 See, in particular, Hancock 1930.
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Loveday claiming that ‘[p]olitical thought in Australia has never been shaped into
coherent and well-established bodies of doctrine which the parties guard, expound
and apply’.3
A closely related, but more nuanced, view was put forward by Hugh Collins.4
In an influential essay, he noted that politics everywhere tends to be concerned
with the pursuit of interests. What is distinctive about Australia is that interests
dominate ‘unashamedly with little resort to ideals and ideas to clothe their naked
intent’.5 This is not because Australia is devoid of political ideas, but because a
particular doctrine – utilitarianism – has been so influential. Although there are
different forms of utilitarianism, it essentially holds that individuals and govern-
ments should act so as to promote ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’.
Decades earlier, this view was captured in Hancock’s famous claim that ‘Australian
democracy has come to look upon the State as a vast public utility, whose duty it is
to provide the greatest happiness for the greatest number’.6 In other words, citizens
expected the government to adopt policies that would maximise the wellbeing of
the population, helping them satisfy their preferences. On Collins’ interpretation,
utilitarianism thereby helped to legitimise the idea that politics is essentially about
the pursuit of interests.
These views of Australian political thought have been challenged by other
scholars, who have suggested that they are oversimplifications of Australian polit-
ical history.7 Australian politics is not dominated solely by utilitarianism or conflict
over material interests, but has been shaped by a range of ideas and ideologies,
often resulting from engagement with and adaptation of the ideologies that have
shaped politics in other parts of the world, particularly Europe and North America.
Although there is not space in this chapter to provide an exhaustive overview, the
chapter focuses on some of the dominant ideas and ideologies that have animated
Australian politics, considering, in turn, conservatism, liberalism, socialism, social
democracy and labourism. The sixth section of the chapter concludes by high-
lighting some of the exclusionary ideas about nationalism, race, gender and the
environment that cut across many of the ideologies discussed in this chapter, and
the ways activists and political thinkers have sought to combat these ideas by
challenging and refashioning these ideologies.
3 Loveday 1975, 2.
4 Collins 1985, 155.
5 Collins 1985, 155.
6 Hancock 1930, 72.
7 See, for example, Clark 1980 [1956]; Edwards 2012; Hirst 2001; Rowse 1978; Sawer 2003; Walter
2010.
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Conservatism
Conservatism has been a major ideological influence in Australian politics. The
core of conservatism is maintaining past traditions while accommodating small but
gradual social change. In general, conservatives have ‘an essentially pessimistic view
of human nature’.8 They tend to focus on the limits of human reason, given the
complexity of the world and the impact of ‘non-rational appetites’.9 This means they
believe that human beings need stability, hierarchy and tradition to thrive. They
are sceptical about the desirability of rapid social change, believing instead that
there is an accumulated wisdom in traditional customs and social institutions and
that these beliefs and practices should generally be preserved.10 The most famous
expression of this view was Edmund Burke’s critique of the French Revolution,
Reflections on the revolution in France, which warned of the dangers of radical
social and political change in the pursuit of abstract universal ideals.11 Conser-
vatives also tend to emphasise the importance of religion and religious authorities
in guiding individual behaviour. These features of conservatism all have important
implications for the role of the state, and they mean that the state may be justified in
passing laws that restrict individual freedom in order to preserve traditional beliefs
and practices.
British conservatism, which has been a particularly important influence on
Australian conservatism, was traditionally associated with a belief in the importance
of maintaining the power and prestige of the monarchy and the aristocracy. Although
they generally supported representative government, in the 18th century and part of
the 19th century there was also conservative hostility to expanding the franchise to
working-class men.12 Many British conservatives supported a role for the parliament
in restraining the power of the Crown, but this was not because of a commitment
to political equality so much as a commitment to a parliament that was made up of
an aristocracy whose rights would be protected against the Crown.13 Conservative
thinkers such as Burke believed that society would function best if it were ruled
by a ‘national aristocracy’ of talented leaders, which, for the most part, overlapped
with the hereditary aristocracy, although there should be opportunities for talented
outsiders to join its ranks.14 Although modern conservatives support democracy,
some continue to draw attention to its drawbacks, including the tendency to neglect
the long-term interests of the community, giving priority to ‘the living and their
immediate interests over past and future generations’.15
8 Heywood 2004, 22–3.
9 Heywood 2004, 22.
10 Ball and Dagger 2004, 88–9. See also Edwards 2013, 34–5.
11 Ryan 2012b, 619–34.
12 Ball and Dagger 2004, 98–9.
13 Walter 2010, 56–7.
14 Ball and Dagger 2004, 94–5; Ryan 2012b, 629.
15 Scruton 2001, 45–8, quotation at 47.
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Another strand of conservatism is concerned primarily with preserving the
cultural traditions of the community. In Britain in the early 1800s, this ‘cultural
conservatism’ was originally concerned with protecting the traditional English way
of life against the Industrial Revolution and the rise of materialism, which many
believed was undermining traditional cultural practices and loyalties.16 Cultural
issues, including the effect of free market capitalism on human relations, continue
to concern some conservatives.17 But greater concerns, particularly among religious
conservatives in the USA, have been the movement away from the traditional
heteronormative family structure, challenges to traditional gender roles, a more
permissive attitude towards sex and the rise of the welfare state, all of which are
perceived to have led to an erosion of personal responsibility.18
Transplanting conservatism to the Australian context inevitably involves some
variations from the British model because of key differences between Britain and
Australia. Most notably, in Australia, there were no existing European political
institutions to preserve, prior to the British invasion (the customs and traditions of
First Nations people were not understood and were violently opposed), and there
was no equivalent to an aristocratic class with landed estates. Nonetheless, in the
colonial period, conservative ideas were often espoused by many members of the
military corps and ‘free settlers’, who often viewed themselves as more virtuous
than members of the colonies who had been transported as convicts as a result of
crimes committed in the UK. This attitude was reflected in proposals to establish
an Australian aristocratic class, drawing on this group of ‘respectable’ settlers who
would come to wield power and influence in the colonies:
there is no time to be lost, in establishing a body of really respectable Settlers –
Men of real Capital, not needy adventurers. They should have Estates of at least
10,000 acres, with reserves contiguous of equal extent. Such a body of Proprietors
would in a few years become wealthy and with the support of Government
powerful as an Aristocracy.19
Later, as the push for democracy gained momentum, some conservative opponents
drew explicitly on the French Revolution to warn of the dangers of democracy and
the rights of man:
When the meeting Wednesday last was told of the ‘indefeasible rights of man’, a
doctrine was put forth equally dangerous, untrue and revolutionary; a doctrine
which if pushed to its practical consequences would unhinge the fabric of social
life, subvert the foundations of religion, order and morality, and substitute for the
16 Ball and Dagger 2004, 98.
17 For example, Scruton 2001.
18 Ball and Dagger 2004, 107–10.
19 John Macarthur, cited in Walter 2010, 40–1.
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pure flame of rational freedom, the strange and unhallowed fires of a relentless and
licentious anarchy … The terrible example of the French Revolution, the example
of that nation which ‘got drunk with blood to vomit crime’, should teach all men
the dangers of these monstrous doctrines.20
These quotations starkly illustrate the commitment to a society structured around
hierarchy rather than equality and the suspicion of democracy and inalienable rights.
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that conservatives during the colonial
period did support the need for checks on the power of the unelected governors
who ruled the colonies. In fact, John Macarthur led the ‘Rum Rebellion’, which
saw the overthrow of a ‘tyrant’, New South Wales Governor Bligh, in 1809.21 Most
conservatives came to support the principle of responsible government, but many
remained sceptical of democracy, supporting a number of measures that were
designed to limit the democratic character of the system. Property restrictions on
the franchise were one example of this – they were designed to restrict voting rights
to those with property. There was also another proposal to establish an Australian
nobility – derided as a ‘bunyip aristocracy’ by its critics – who would be the only
candidates eligible to run for election to the upper house.22
Some have also argued that a kind of Burkean conservatism shaped the
attitudes of many of the delegates attending the 1890s Federation conventions
that designed Australia’s Constitution.23 Although many of the delegates may have
rejected the label of ‘conservative’, the debates in which they engaged demonstrated
‘a strong ideological predisposition … to see that institutions should evolve out of
existing arrangements rather than being manufactured or constructed, a crucial
Burkean argument’.24 Broadly speaking, this was associated with the idea that
Australia’s constitutional arrangements should be closely aligned to the British
model, which was believed to be characterised by flexibility rather than rigidity, but
with pragmatic institutional adaptations to reflect Australian conditions.
Conservatism has continued be a significant ideological force in Australian
politics since Federation. In parliament, the Liberal Party and its predecessors
have often been strongly influenced by conservative ideas (although, as its name
suggests, liberalism is also an ideological influence on the party, as will be discussed
in more detail in the next section). Liberal Prime Minister John Howard was a
staunch monarchist and drew on the ideas of Edmund Burke to argue against
Australia becoming a republic:
I take an unashamedly Burkean view. I do not support change because I am
unconvinced that a better system can be delivered … Changing the Constitution
20 Editorial, Australian, 22 February 1842, cited in Walter 2010, 47.
21 Walter 2010, 40.
22 Walter 2010, 48–9.
23 See, for example, Chavura and Melleuish 2015.
24 Chavura and Melleuish 2015, 516.
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in such a fundamental way is not a play-thing of the ordinary cut-and-thrust of
Australian politics. We are dealing here with institutions affecting the long-term
political health and stability of the nation.25
More generally, the desire to preserve political and cultural ties to Britain
has been one of the abiding features of Australian conservatism.26 For example,
one of the most controversial decisions made by Tony Abbott during his prime
ministership was the decision to introduce knighthoods in Australia and to award
one of these knighthoods to Prince Philip.27 This decision reflected a conservative
desire to reintroduce an honours system based on the British model; a belief in
the value of hierarchy, apparent in the desire to establish a system of titles; and a
conservative attachment to the Crown, seen in bestowing the award on a member
of the royal family.
Conservative ideas have also figured prominently in debates over a range of
social issues and policies. For example, until the final decades of the 20th century,
Australia had a particularly strict censorship regime that aimed to place limits on
the literature and films that citizens were able to access to protect ‘Anglo-Saxon
standards’.28 The conservative viewpoint also came through strongly in debates over
the introduction of no-fault divorce and the decriminalisation of homosexuality.
More recently, the major opposition to marriage equality came from conservative
politicians and religious organisations. For example, former Prime Minister Tony
Abbott advocated a ‘no’ vote in the 2017 marriage equality plebiscite on the grounds
that it was ‘[t]he best way of standing up for traditional values, the best way of
saying you don’t like the direction our country is heading in right now’.29 Since
the late 1990s, conservative ideas have also been central to the ‘culture wars’, with
conservatives opposing a variety of trends that they believe are undermining the
dominance of Christian values in Australia, particularly multiculturalism, cultural
engagement with Asia, and more critical accounts of Australian history that draw
attention to the violence of colonialism and its ongoing effects. The idea that it
is important to preserve Christian values in Australia was reflected in former
Liberal–National Coalition Prime Minister John Howard’s comment that ‘the life
and example [of Jesus Christ] has given us a value system which remains the
greatest force for good in our community’.30
25 Howard, cited in Irving 2004, 95.
26 Melleuish 2015.
27 Safi 2015.
28 Moore, cited in Errington and Miragliotta 2011, 121.
29 Abbott, cited in Karp 2017.
30 Howard, cited in Johnson 2007, 199.
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Liberalism
Liberal ideas have also been highly influential in Australia. In fact, liberalism has
sometimes been viewed as the dominant ideology in Australian politics.31 There
are major differences between varieties of liberalism, but they are all committed
‘to individualism, a belief in the supreme importance of the human individual,
implying strong support for individual freedom’.32 Linked to this, liberals are
opposed to the ideas of hereditary aristocracy and natural hierarchy that have often
been associated with conservatism. Rather, the liberal view is that citizens have an
equal moral status, meaning they are entitled to an equal set of rights.
A variety of implications flow from this core idea. First, liberals are opposed to
absolutism.33 The authority of the state – its right to exercise coercive power – is
not natural or the result of religious decree but only justified to the extent that it
has beneficial consequences for the lives of citizens. This idea, which most famously
found expression in John Locke’s Two treatises of government (1689), means that
state power is only justified to the extent that it ‘enable[s] the society to achieve
those limited goals that a political order enables us to achieve – the security of
life, property and the pursuit of happiness’.34 In the liberal tradition, this view has
often been explained with reference to the idea that there is a (hypothetical) social
contract between citizens and the state. Although the idea of the social contract has
taken a variety of forms, it is usually understood to be a thought experiment that
begins by imagining what life would be like in the state of nature – a world without
the state apparatus. A flourishing and orderly society is assumed not to be possible in
the state of nature; hence liberals believe that individuals would agree to give up their
absolute freedom in the state of nature and establish the institution of government
(what we would now refer to as the state). This establishes the basis for citizens’
agreement to respect the state’s authority. In return, the state is obliged to maintain
order and protect citizens. However, under liberal forms of the social contract, there
are limits to the state’s authority: it must respect the core rights of citizens, and, if it
fails to do so, it loses its legitimacy and revolution may be justified.35
Linked to this is another core liberal idea: opposition to theocracy and support
for the concept of freedom of conscience.36 Throughout history, religious and
political authority have often been closely entwined, and it has been considered
legitimate for the state to force individuals to follow particular religious beliefs and
practices. Liberals are opposed to this idea, drawing a distinction between church
and state and emphasising the importance of freedom of conscience.37 This is often
31 For example, Rowse 1978.
32 Heywood 2004, 29.
33 Ryan 2012a, 28–30.
34 Ryan 2012a, 28–9.
35 Ryan 2012b, 488–91.
36 Ryan 2012a, 30–3.
37 Ryan 2012a, 31.
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linked to the concept of toleration, which holds that one should not interfere ‘with
beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable” such
that they should not be prohibited or constrained’.38 For example, the majority
of people in a community might regard a particular individual’s religious beliefs
as wrong and offensive. However, that individual should be free to practise their
religion without interference from the majority.
Although early liberals such as Locke defended relatively limited notions of
toleration by contemporary standards, subsequent liberal thinkers expanded the
scope of this principle. Most famously, in On liberty (1859), John Stuart Mill went
beyond freedom of religion and freedom of conscience, arguing for a more expansive
understanding of freedom of speech and freedom of action that was encapsulated by
the ‘harm principle’. This principle held that ‘[t]he only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is
to prevent harm to others’.39 In the 20th century, liberals further developed these ideas
to argue against a raft of laws that were designed to enforce customary morality in
areas such as sexuality and censorship.40 As a result, contemporary liberals generally
think that a much wider range of practices should be tolerated.
Although most liberals endorse human rights and individual freedom, there
is great diversity in how different liberals understand these concepts. One of the
major distinctions is between classical liberalism and social liberalism.41 Classical
liberalism is generally associated with a belief in rights to life, liberty and property.
There should also be minimal government intervention in the economy, with the
emphasis instead on freeing up the market forces of supply and demand. This
means that the state should, for the most part, let producers and consumers make
their own economic decisions without the restrictions associated with heavy
government regulation, taxation, tariffs or other forms of interference. Key liberal
thinkers such as John Locke and Adam Smith are often viewed as falling within the
classical liberal tradition.42
In the 19th century, a different form of liberalism began to emerge, described
variously as ‘social liberalism’, ‘new liberalism’ or ‘modern liberalism’.43 Associated
with the work of J.S. Mill, L.T. Hobhouse and T.H. Green, social liberals drew
attention to the problem of poverty and argued that the state was justified in
assuming a more expansive role in the economy, intervening to provide more
benefits and services for citizens to help ensure that they are able to obtain the basic
necessities of life and to bring about equality of opportunity. This was justified with
reference to the liberal commitment to individualism and individual freedom. The
idea was that for individual freedom to be meaningful, individuals needed more
38 Forst 2017.
39 Mill 1978 [1859], 9.
40 For example, Hart 1963; Dworkin 1977.
41 Heywood 2004, 29–30; Ryan 2012a, 23–6; Sawer 2003, 9–30.
42 Ryan 2012a, 24.
43 Edwards 2013, 42–6; Heywood 2004, 29–30; Ryan 2012a, 25–6; Sawer 2003, 9–30.
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than the absence of external interference with their actions; they needed a certain
level of material wellbeing to give them autonomy (i.e. control over their lives)
and the means to fully develop their capacities. This form of freedom has been
described as positive freedom, in contrast to the negative freedom (i.e. freedom as
non-interference) that was associated with classical liberalism,44 and it provided a
justification for the emergence of the welfare state.
In the second half of the 20th century, another strand of liberalism emerged
that became known as ‘neoclassical liberalism’ (or ‘neoliberalism’). Linked to the
work of F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman, among others, this approach argues
against the growing size of the welfare state on the grounds that it is undermining
self-reliance and individual responsibility, as well as distorting the market.45
Rejecting the positive account of freedom associated with social liberalism,
neoliberals argue that liberals should return to their classical roots, advocating
minimal government and the free market.
These strands of liberalism have all had – and continue to have – a major
impact on Australian politics. During the colonial era, there was support for liberal
ideas, particularly in urban areas and among emancipists. Liberals often worked
alongside radicals, including those involved in the Chartist movement, to oppose
conservative proposals for the ‘bunyip aristocracy’ (see above) and push democrat-
isation through measures such as universal manhood suffrage.46 Liberal ideas of
equal citizenship were drawn upon in these debates. For example, as Daniel
Deniehy put it, ‘a just law no more recognises the supremacy of a class than it
does the predominance of a creed … [T]he elective principle is the only basis upon
which sound government could be built.’47
The division between different types of liberalism was also important in the
development of the Australian party system in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
The two largest ‘parties’ (or perhaps more accurately, ‘groupings’, given their
relatively loose organisational structures) in the first federal parliament were the
Protectionists and the Free Traders. As their name suggests, the Free Traders, led
by George Reid, were strongly influenced by the free market ideas of classical
liberalism.48 Reid associated free market liberalism with the idea of individual
freedom. He thought the free market was essential to economic and social progress
because it encouraged competition: ‘the great destiny of humanity lies in allowing
the genius for competition, for striving, for excelling, for acquiring, to reach its
uttermost latitude consistent with the due rights of others’.49
In contrast, the Protectionists held that the federal government should put
tariffs on goods being imported into Australia in order to protect local industries,
44 Berlin 1969.
45 Friedman and Friedman 1980; Hayek 2001 [1944]; Heywood 2004, 211–2.
46 Walter 2010, 44–54.
47 Cited in Walter 2010, 45.
48 Edwards 2013, 63–4; Walter 2010, 24, 97–9.
49 Reid, cited in Walter 2010, 98.
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giving them an advantage over international competitors. This went alongside
support for a range of other forms of government intervention in the economy that
were designed to prevent poverty and improve the lives of citizens.50 As the most
influential figure in the Protectionists, Alfred Deakin, put it:
Liberalism would now inculcate a new teaching with regard to the poorest in the
community, that all should have what was their due. By fixing a minimum rate of
wages and wise factory legislation, wealth would be prevented from taking unfair
advantage of the needy, and the latter would be saved from living wretched and
imperfect lives.51
Ultimately, the position advocated by the Protectionists won out. With the
support of the Australian Labor Party (ALP), tariffs were introduced, along with
a range of other policies, including compulsory wage arbitration, which ultimately
meant that workers’ wages were relatively high compared to other countries. These
policies (along with other measures such as the White Australia policy, discussed
below) later became known as ‘the Australian Settlement’ and remained in place for
much of the 20th century.52 There were still major disagreements between political
actors over the extent of government intervention in the economy, and in the
postwar period some critics argued that the Australian welfare state was relatively
underdeveloped, having fallen behind other countries. Nonetheless, the broadly
interventionist approach associated with Deakin’s social liberalism had become
institutionalised, going on ‘to dominate Australian society and politics for the first
70 years after Federation’.53
By the 1970s, this approach came under challenge as neoliberal ideas became
increasingly influential in Australia. A variety of think tanks argued that the welfare
state had become too large and that there was a need to reduce government
intervention in the economy through tariff cuts, financial deregulation, industrial
relations deregulation, tax cuts and privatisation.54 The Australian economy was
perceived to be underperforming as it faced problems with stagflation (the
combination of stagnant economic growth and high inflation). The interventionist
economic ideas embedded in the existing framework, reflecting social liberalism,
were seen to have failed, and a broadly neoliberal approach was believed to offer
the solution.55 These ideas did not fully reshape public policy in Australia until
50 Edwards 2013, 68–9.
51 Deakin, cited in Walter 2010, 100.
52 Kelly 1992. Although the idea of ‘the Australian Settlement’ has been highly influential in both
academic and popular discussions of Australian politics and public policy, the existence of such
a settlement, and Kelly’s presentation of its content, has also been challenged. See, for example,
Stokes 2004.
53 Cook 1999, 180.
54 Bell 1993; Pusey 1991.
55 Painter 1996.
Australian political thought
41
the Hawke–Keating Labor government held office (1983–96), bringing in a range
of policies that were heavily influenced by neoliberal ideas. It moved to phase out
tariffs, open the economy up to market forces by deregulating the financial system
and privatise major government assets. During this period, the Liberal Party, which
was in opposition, was racked by internal division between social liberals (known as
‘the wets’) and neoliberals (known as ‘the dries’) over the ideological direction of the
party. Ultimately, the dries won out on economic questions;56 the vast majority of
Liberal Party MPs now subscribe to a broadly neoliberal approach to the economy.
Beyond the economy, liberal ideas have also been important in a range of
other domains. In particular, a number of the major social reforms that occurred
in Australia in the postwar period, including the introduction of no-fault divorce,
the decriminalisation of homosexuality and a loosening of the highly restrictive
censorship regime, were influenced by Mill’s ideas about individual freedom. The
political system has also been shaped by liberal ideas about limited government,
with a variety of mechanisms – including an entrenched Constitution, judicial
review, strong bicameralism and federalism – in place to disperse the government’s
power and reduce the risk that it will infringe citizens’ rights.
Socialism and social democracy
Socialist ideas have also been important in Australia. Socialism is a particularly
difficult ideology to define because of the many different types of socialism that
exist; nonetheless, most accounts of socialism reflect a commitment to principles
of egalitarianism and community.57 The socialist commitment to egalitarianism
involves a more radical understanding of equality than the idea of equal citizenship
or equality before the law, requiring a higher degree of equality in the standard of
living individuals enjoy (going as far as equality of outcome on some accounts). The
commitment to community (or solidarity) reflects the idea ‘that people care about,
and, where necessary and possible, care for, one another’.58 As both these principles
suggest, a socialist society is supposed to lack the social division and competition
that tends to characterise life in a liberal capitalist society.
Despite the importance of egalitarianism and community in socialist thought,
the most influential socialist thinker, Karl Marx, did not explicitly draw on these
ideas in his mature work. Instead, Marx put forward a ‘scientific’ account of
socialism based on the idea that politics and history are driven by the conflict
between different classes, with this conflict in turn reflecting the nature of the
economy and its level of technological development. In a capitalist economy, the
central conflict is between the bourgeoisie (the capitalist, property-owning class)
56 Brett 2003.
57 Cohen 2009.
58 Cohen 2009, 34–5.
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and the proletariat (the working class who are forced to sell their labour to survive
because they do not own property). In contrast to the positive view of the market
associated with classical liberalism, which tends to view workers as free and equal
in a capitalist society, Marx argued that the proletariat are, in reality, exploited
by the bourgeoisie because they are not paid the full value of their labour.59 This
leads to the impoverishment of the working class. Over time, wealth will become
increasingly concentrated and the proletariat will increase in size. This ultimately
makes it possible for the proletariat to take control of the state and overthrow
capitalism.60 In its place, they will institute a transitory socialist stage, and ulti-
mately communism, which marks the final stage in human history. Marx did not
provide a detailed account of what communism would entail, but it would involve
the abolition of private property and freedom from exploitative market relations
and wage labour. Society would operate on the principle of ‘from each according
to his ability, to each according to his needs’.61 Marx believed that this account of
history was ‘scientific’ and that communism was inevitable, in contrast to the many
alternative, ethically driven accounts of socialism, which he derided as ‘utopian’.
What unites Marx’s account of socialism with these ‘utopian’ variants is a shared
opposition to the dehumanising effects of free market economies on human beings
and support for ‘the idea of production for social purposes’.62
Socialists have also disagreed over how the transition to socialism is likely to
occur. Revolutionary socialists believed that a revolutionary takeover of the state
was necessary to overthrow the bourgeoisie. Other socialists believed that reform
could occur through democratic means if democratic socialist or social-democratic
political parties could contest elections, win government and then use the power of
the state to institute socialism. Although the term ‘social democracy’ was originally
used to refer to political parties advocating the democratic route to socialism, over
time it has come to be associated with a much less radical approach. Instead of
winning government to overturn capitalism and bring about full-blown socialism,
social democracy now generally means a capitalist economy with a strong welfare
state in place that provides a generous level of benefits and services to citizens
(such as unemployment benefits and universal health care), thereby ensuring a high
level of social protection for workers (and others), a higher degree of equality of
opportunity and a lower level of inequality in income and wealth. In other words,
‘it stands for a balance between the market and the state, a balance between the
individual and the community’.63
Both socialism and social democracy have been longstanding influences in
Australian politics. In the late 19th century, key socialist works by Marx and Engels
59 Ryan 2012b, 786–8.
60 Cohen 2000.
61 Marx 1978 [1872], 531.
62 Ryan 2012b, 883.
63 Heywood 2004, 308.
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and by ‘utopian’ socialists such Edward Bellamy, William Morris and others were
being read by both workers and the urban intelligentsia.64 There were also reading
groups to discuss Marx’s Capital, and socialist newspapers and journals. This climate
contributed to the development of the ALP in the 1890s, although the relationship
between the ALP and socialism is complicated and controversial. Key figures within
the Labor Party certainly endorsed socialist ideas and used the term, while making
clear that it should be achieved through electoral victory and gradual reform rather
than revolution. As Labor MP (and later prime minister) Billy Hughes said in 1910:
The belief that socialism can be achieved by any coup … can only be entertained
by those who fail utterly to understand not only what Socialism is, but what those
factors which make for change are … Socialism will replace individualism because
it is fitter to survive in the new environment.65
This comment reflects the commitment to the electoral route to socialism
and the sense that history was on the side of socialism. However, the kind of
socialism that most figures within the Labor Party endorsed fell short of the Marxist
ideal. This is reflected in the qualified nature of the Socialist Objective the Labor
Party adopted as part of its platform in 1921, which committed the party to ‘the
socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange’, but not if this
property was ‘utilised by its owner in a socially useful manner’.66 Labor’s commit-
ment to socialism was perhaps best seen in its support for government ownership,
at least until the 1970s and 1980s, but this fell well short of major government
control of all key industries. Often Labor’s policies in office seemed to be closer
to the goals of social democracy in its more moderate form, which focused on
building the welfare state to provide greater security for citizens and to reduce
levels of inequality. These more moderate social-democratic objectives overlap to a
significant extent with social liberalism, so it is not surprising that Labor was able
to work effectively with the Protectionists in the early years after Federation to put
in place core elements of the Australian Settlement, including wage arbitration.
Socialist, particularly Marxist, ideas have also had a powerful influence on
political thinkers and organisations outside parliament. The most obvious example
was the Communist Party of Australia; however, there are other groups, such as
the Socialist Workers Party and more radical trade unions, that have also had an
important presence as socialist activists. Socialist writers and academics have a
long history in Australian intellectual life and have often been influential critics of
the policies and ideas put forth by Australia’s major political parties. One of the
recurring criticisms in this literature has been of the Labor Party for remaining
64 Water 2010, 70–6.
65 Cited in Walter 2010, 108.
66 Cited in Bramble and Kuhn 2011, 43. See also Dyrenfurth and Bongiorno 2011, 68–9.
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committed to capitalism and adopting policies that benefit businesses more than
the working class.67
Labourism
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge another distinct – and perhaps distinctively
Australian – ideological influence on Australian politics. This is the ideology of
‘labourism’, which ‘in its traditional guise, sought a Labor government charged with
the duty of managing the economy for the benefit of wage earners’.68 Labourism
does not draw its inspiration from socialist ideas, even in the watered-down way that
modern social democracy does. It is broadly supportive of a market economy and
electorally pragmatic, focusing on making sure that Labor governments are elected
and that they are able to bring in policies that are in the interests of the working
class, ‘making the market work more efficiently and fairly’.69 Up until the late 1960s,
this meant support for ‘industry protection, restrictive immigration policy, and
compulsory arbitration’.70 Labourism also differed from social democracy in
supporting a smaller welfare state, emphasising targeted and means-tested forms of
welfare support rather than the universal forms of social provision that are often
associated with social democracy. Labourism has been a major influence on the ALP
throughout its history, and although it has moved away from many of the traditional
labourist policies in recent decades, an emphasis on electoral pragmatism, a broadly
supportive attitude towards a market economy and support for targeting and means-
testing welfare payments remain important to contemporary Labor.
Nationalism and exclusion
Australian politics has also been influenced by a number of other ideas that cut
across and interact with many of the ideologies discussed above. Foremost among
these is nationalism. A nation is an ‘imagined community’ into which one is born,71
and often those who belong to such a community are believed to share certain
characteristics. Nationalism is the idea that ‘people who share a common birth –
who belong to the same nation – should also share citizenship in the same political
unit, or state’.72 The development of Australian nationalism is generally traced to the
second half of the 19th century. It was associated with a growing sense that there
was a distinctive Australian identity characterised by egalitarianism, mateship and
67 For a recent example, see Bramble and Kuhn 2011.
68 Manning 1992, 14.
69 Manning 1992, 14.
70 Manning 1992, 14.
71 Anderson 1983.
72 Ball and Dagger 2004, 14.
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distrust of authority.73 This sense of nationalism was linked to the growing desire
for greater independence from Britain and to the ‘progressive’ policy measures
associated with the Australian Settlement, which were supported by social liberals
and the labour movement, particularly labour market regulation.
However, the egalitarianism and mateship associated with Australian national-
ism for the most part applied to white men. Australian national identity embodied
‘a specific model of masculinity – the Lone Hand or Bushman’ – that excluded
women.74 First Nations people were also excluded, being denied the formal rights
and status associated with equal citizenship until well into the 20th century, and
migration was restricted to ‘white’ races through the White Australia policy. The
latter policy was a core part of the Australian Settlement, enjoying support across
the mainstream ideological spectrum. Speaking on the Immigration Restriction Bill
1901 (Cth), which introduced the policy, Alfred Deakin famously stated that ‘[t]he
unity of Australia is nothing if it does not imply a united race’.75 The 1905 federal
Labor Platform called for ‘[t]he cultivation of an Australian sentiment based on the
maintenance of racial purity’.76 Thus, although nationalism was linked to relatively
progressive policies in some areas, it was also infused with both sexist and racist ideas.
It is important to emphasise that racism predated the emergence of Australian
nationalism. In fact, it has been at the heart of Australian politics since 1788. Britain
colonised Australia without the permission or authorisation of the First Nations
people, who had occupied the land for tens of thousands of years and whose own
ways of life and systems of government were violently displaced. One of the ideas
underpinning this colonisation and violence was racial hierarchy – the idea that
some races are inherently superior to others.77 Indigenous peoples were treated and
depicted in dehumanising ways by the colonists, and the idea that they were the
‘lowest race in the scale of humanity’ appears to have been very influential.78 In the
second half of the 19th century, Social Darwinism emerged as the dominant way of
thinking about race, linking racial hierarchy to the idea that there was a constant
conflict between races and that ‘the fittest and the best’ would ultimately survive,
while the others would die out.79 The legacy of these ideas was policies of violence
and oppression towards First Nations people, and assimilation, which assumed
that First Nations cultures would eventually die out. These ideas also shaped the
development of Australian nationalism. As Marilyn Lake has put it, ‘The project
of progressive reform was imbued with settler colonialism’s “regime of race”, which
informed the ascendant politics of “whiteness”’.80
73 Brett 2003, 203; Ward 1958.
74 Lake 1997, 42.
75 Deakin, cited in Brett 2017, 265.
76 Dyrenfurth and Bongiorno 2011, 43.
77 Reynolds 1987, 110–1.
78 Byrne, cited in Reynolds 1987, 110–1, quotation at 110.
79 Reynolds 1987, 116, 119.
80 Lake 2019, 5 (references suppressed).
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The dominance of sexism and racism in Australian political thought was
challenged by women, First Nations people and people of colour. Key thinkers
challenged their exclusion from accounts of Australian national identity and called
on ‘progressive’ thinkers to apply their ideas more consistently. For example, suff-
ragists such as Rose Scott appealed to Australian patriotism to argue that the right
to vote should be extended to women,81 while later feminist activists drew on the
‘enabling state of social liberalism’ in their fight for gender equality.82 First Nations
thinkers have also drawn on social liberal ideas, calling for equality and freedom to
be extended to all people. An early example of this was the Australian Aboriginal
Progressive Association, which formed in 1924 to fight for equal citizenship for
First Nations people.83 These ideas played a role in helping achieve equal citizenship
(at least in a formal sense) for women and First Nations people and an end to a
racially discriminatory immigration policy. However, there are also significant and
ongoing disagreements among these groups over political ideas. In particular, many
thinkers have argued that there is a need to move beyond a liberal framework to
achieve gender equality for women84 and justice for First Nations people.85 It is
also clear that, although mainstream politicians now (generally) profess to support
gender equality and racial equality, this is not always reflected in their policies or
rhetoric, as illustrated by Australia’s treatment of (primarily non-white) refugees
who arrive by boat, the demonisation of Muslims and scare campaigns against
African migrants. Combined with the persistence of violence against women, First
Nations people and people of colour, this highlights that sexism and racism remain
major problems in Australia.
Before concluding, it is important to note another, different type of bias that
is held by most of the ideologies explored in this chapter. For the most part, these
ideologies all operate within a broadly materialist and anthropocentric paradigm.
In other words, they focus on the wellbeing of human beings, often to the exclusion
of non-human animals and of environmental sustainability. One of the marked
features of public life in Australia in the last few decades is the way in which
Green political thinkers have drawn attention to this bias and brought new issues
onto the mainstream political agenda. As one of the key figures in the Australian
environmental movement put it:
Green politics does not accept the philosophical dualism which underpins modern
industrial society (mind/body, humanity/nature, boss/worker, male/female) nor
that of the traditional left (class struggle and class war leading to a classless
81 Lake 1997, 41.
82 Sawer 2003, 165.
83 Lake 2019, 238–41.
84 Lake 2019, 238–41.
85 For example, Moreton-Robinson 2015.
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society). Instead, it presents the goal of a society where people live in harmony
with each other and with nature.86
Australian activists and political thinkers have also challenged the animal/human
dualism, questioning the human tendency to treat animals as mere instruments
for advancing human wellbeing. The work of Australian ethicist Peter Singer has
been particularly influential in this area.87 Singer’s argument for animal liberation is
based around the idea that what ultimately matters is whether an animal is sentient
– not the species to which they belong. Promoting the happiness and preventing the
suffering of any sentient being should be our primary ethical concern. This means
that human beings need to radically rethink their treatment of non-human animals.
This represents a further challenge to the assumptions that underpin the political
ideologies that have long dominated in Australia.
Conclusions
This chapter has introduced some of the major ideologies that have shaped – and
continue to shape – Australian politics. It has outlined the Western ideologies of
conservatism, liberalism, socialism, social democracy and labourism, explaining
their key ideas and discussing the ways they have influenced Australian politics.
It has also highlighted some of the common ideas that cut across many of these
ideologies, particularly relating to nationalism, race, gender and human dominance
over the rest of the eco-system. Although much more could be said on each of the
positions discussed here, this brief overview challenges the view that Australian
politics is bereft of ideas and illustrates – for better and worse – the diversity of
Australian political thought.
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Institutions

Executive government
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The executive is one of the three branches of government, alongside the legislature
and the judiciary. As the name suggests, its function is to execute laws and
regulations. In Australia, the executive is the part of government containing the
prime minister, Cabinet, ministerial offices and the head of state, the governor-
general. Thus, while our first thought might be that the executive is ‘the prime
minister’, it is in fact a collection of institutions that are bundled together, with
complementary, and sometimes competing, responsibilities.
In a modern state, the ‘executive’ cannot govern alone – it is bound to other
institutions. Depending on the exact nature of the regime (democratic/authoritarian
or presidential/parliamentarian), the executive may be constrained by some insti-
tutions (e.g. the judiciary), dominant over others (e.g. the bureaucracy) and possibly
even co-equal with some (e.g. the legislature in a presidential system). However,
the principal relationship that defines how political scientists classify regimes is
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the executive–legislative relationship. In this chapter, we will first consider how
executive regimes can be classified across the world and then examine Australia in
depth.
Executive–legislative regimes
Historically, executive power grew out of a monarch’s governing councils and the
administrative machinery through which they ruled. We can still see evidence of
this in the UK, where the lord chancellor – a role that was created 1,400 years
ago to manage the monarch’s correspondence – was the name for the minister of
justice until 2005. Different approaches to tradition and modernisation mean that
the precise organisation of executives can be idiosyncratic, though there are broad
patterns across different executive regimes.
In the modern world, monarchs have either been replaced by presidents
(presidential regimes) or their powers have been displaced and taken up by parlia-
ments (parliamentary regimes). Exactly how monarchical power was translated
into modern (democratic) governance is important for how government insti-
tutions are organised and how decisions are made. These rules matter for how
power is distributed across government and, in democracies, how citizens hold
their governments to account.
In democracies, what makes presidential regimes distinct is the fact that the
legislative and executive branches are separate and receive mandates through
separate elections. Presidents are not directly accountable to their legislatures, nor
do they sit within them. In turn, presidents have limited capacity to directly
influence legislatures, just as legislatures have constrained capacities to limit the
actions of presidents. Once elected, the president selects her executive, who will
help to run her government; members of the executive are usually recruited from
outside of the legislature. The president is also both the head of state and the head
of government.1
By contrast, in parliamentary regimes only one mandate is sought from the
people, when they elect the legislature. The executive (or just ‘the government’)
is then formed from within this legislative pool. The party or coalition of parties
that can command the greatest (or most stable) number of parliamentary seats
has secured the ‘confidence’ of the chamber and forms the government. Members
of the executive in parliamentary systems retain their positions in the legislature;
they are both legislative representatives and ministers of state. They are able to
directly influence, and even dominate, the workings of parliament. But they are
also directly accountable to parliament. In fact, the (executive) government’s very
survival rests on its ability to retain a majority (or confidence) within parliament.
1 Lijphart 1999.
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This distinguishes parliamentary regimes from presidential systems, in which a
government cannot be dissolved with a legislative vote.
While prime ministers may be influential in the selection of ministers, they
may not enjoy an absolute right of appointment. Instead, appointments depend on
a combination of (1) convention, either within political regimes or parties, and/
or (2) raw numbers, such as when a coalition of parties forms government and
ministerial positions must be negotiated between partners. Finally, while the prime
minister is the leader of the government in parliament, she is not the head of state.
Hybrid systems
To make matters more confusing, the executive–legislative systems of some
countries are hybrids: either semi-presidential or semi-parliamentary systems.2
Semi-presidential systems (e.g. France) are similar to presidential systems, but with
some parliamentary characteristics. The president and the legislature are separately
elected, and the parliament appoints the prime minister. In this model, presidents
and prime ministers share executive powers, and the actual practice of politics can
be significantly shaped by whether or not the president’s party has a majority in the
legislature.
Recently, some scholars have argued that we should recognise the existence of
semi-parliamentary systems.3 Semi-parliamentary systems resemble parliamentary
systems, but the way the legislature and the executive relate to each other means
that the upper and lower chambers can pursue different democratic aims. Put
another way, semi-parliamentary systems are executive–legislative systems where
the legislature is divided into two equally legitimate parts, but the survival of the
executive only depends upon the confidence of one part of the legislature. In
Australia, only the lower house must supply confidence for the Cabinet. The Senate,
which has near equal powers, can and does align itself to different democratic
aims.4 This makes it different from parliamentary systems like the UK and Canada.
It also may go some way to explaining why conflicts between the House and the
Senate endlessly circle around whether or not the Senate’s use of its constitutional
powers is legitimate. It is!5
In authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes, we may recognise the insti-
tutional features of the democratic executive–legislative regimes described above,
but the essential practices, norms and beliefs that sustain them may be absent,
changing the nature of governance again.
2 Duverger 1980; Ganghof 2017.
3 Ganghof 2017.
4 Ganghof, Eppner and Pörschke 2018.
5 Taflaga 2018.
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The Australian executive
The fact that Australian states were British colonies ensured that the design of
Australia’s executive governance was lifted from Westminster. The relationship
between the executive and the legislature developed differently in England,
compared with its main European rivals. England’s early development of a taxation
system during the Hundred Years War (1337–1453) and the assertion by the lords
of their rights in the Magna Carta (1215) meant that the English Crown could not
ignore parliament as continental monarchs did. In fact, they needed parliament to
pay for their armies. England’s adoption of Protestantism during the Reformation
further empowered the parliament over the King’s other great rival for power, the
church.
The tension between monarch and parliament became horrendously violent
during the English Civil War (1642–51), and pressure again built up during the
1680s, resulting in the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The Glorious Revolution saw
a dramatic but peaceful rebalancing of power between the Crown and parliament
within England, but led to wars in Ireland and later in Scotland. After the
revolution, the monarch could not raise any taxes without parliamentary consent.
Another unforeseen consequence of this revolution was that the heir to the British
monarchy became the German elector of Hanover, George I. During the reign
of the ‘foreign’ Hanoverians, the role of the monarch’s ‘minsters’ became ever
more important. The effect was to entrench parliamentary government and slowly
transfer the direct application of the monarch’s powers to his ministers, who ran
his government. Yet this transfer was slow because the King and his aristocratic
supporters retained control over access to parliamentary seats until successive
democratic reforms during the 19th century. To this day, the Australian prime
minister and the Australian government derive their authority from the Crown – it
is Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II’s government.6
Responsible government
When the practice of ‘modern’ British government was first described in the 1860s
by the English journalist Sir Walter Bagehot, he characterised the monarchy as the
‘dignified’ part of government and the exercise of partisan power in Cabinet as
the ‘efficient’ part.7 Politics at the time was not dominated by political parties as
we understand them today. Therefore, it was not uncommon for governments to
collapse and new governments to form without an election. If a government should
fall, it was the duty of the premier/prime minister to advise the monarch, or in
Australia’s case the governor, who might be able to form another.
6 Norton 1981.
7 Bagehot 1963.
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When the Australian colonies sought self-government in the 1850s, this meant
‘responsible government’ as practised in Westminster. Responsible government
means that the executive must be formed from within the legislature and is respon-
sible to the legislature. Responsibility is twofold: the executive (the government,
or more specifically the Cabinet) is collectively responsible to the legislature and
each individual minister is also responsible to the legislature. The implication is
that if the executive loses the confidence of the legislature, it must resign. Losing
the confidence of the parliament is not the same as losing a vote on a single
piece of legislation. In that case, it would be up to the government to decide if
it could reasonably continue or run the risk of a failed motion of no confidence.
In contemporary Australian politics, this is rare because of party discipline and
because governments have enjoyed majorities in the House of Representatives.
However, the recent hung parliaments in 2010–13 and 2018–19 have demonstrated
that this institutional design is still potent, despite decades of dormancy.
Modern Australia differs from the UK because at Federation the decision
was made to borrow features from the USA and Switzerland. Australia not only
became federal, it also became meaningfully bicameral, creating a very powerful
second chamber, the Senate.8 These institutional differences have proven important
for shaping how the executive relates to the legislature and what powers it can
exercise. As noted, the Senate has near equal powers to the House. Since the
mid-1960s, governments have had their legislative programs thwarted by the Senate
and, more often, have been forced to adopt changes to their policy programs.
However, loss of confidence by the Senate does not see the defeat of the government
– the government rarely enjoys a majority in that chamber. This is because the
executive is only responsible to, and must retain the confidence of, the House of
Representatives. It is for this reason that some scholars argue that Australia is ‘semi-
parliamentary’ or ‘not parliamentary’.9
The governor-general
The governor-general acts as the Queen’s representative in Australia, as outlined
in sections 61 to 64 of the Constitution. The governor-general and her Executive
Council appear both powerful and dominant. Indeed, you might be forgiven for
thinking the governor-general is the most important institution in the Australian
executive. After all, no election can be held and no law can come into force unless
assented to by the governor-general. The governor-general also has the power to
withdraw the commission and terminate appointment of the government – and
Sir John Kerr did so in 1975. But, in practice, the post is largely ceremonial and
‘dignified’. The powers of Crown authority are now exercised by the prime minister
8 Galligan 1995.
9 Bach 2003.
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and her Cabinet and, by convention, the governor-general is obliged to follow the
advice of her ministers.
The prime minister
First among the monarch’s ministers, the prime minister is not mentioned in the
Australian Constitution. The prime minister is the chief executive who leads the
government in the executive and in the legislature. In the executive, the prime
minister is the head of the Cabinet and can draw on the resources of her own
department (Prime Minister and Cabinet [PMC]). Through her ministers, the prime
minister is indirectly responsible for all the actions of her government. But, as
we shall see, this principle doesn’t translate neatly into practice.10 Finally, prime
ministers have the power to ask the governor-general to dissolve parliament, and in
recent times prime ministers have asserted their power to declare war.
Today, the prime minister is also the leader of a formally organised political
party and, by convention only, drawn from the House of Representatives. The
evolution of political parties and their impact upon legislative politics has influ-
enced the practice of the prime ministership. The prime minister has either large
or total discretion in selecting her Cabinet and has the luxury of relying on strong
party discipline when advancing her program in the legislature. Further, prime
ministers will bring this partisan perspective, and their responsibilities as a partisan
(party) leader, to virtually all aspects of the prime ministerial role.
Powers of the prime minister
We can see that the explicit power and, even more so, the potential influence
of the prime minister extends from the executive and the bureaucracy to the
legislature and to her own party. It is no surprise then that the role of the prime
minister is poorly defined in Westminster systems like Australia. Few specific
rules, laws or handbooks of practice have been written about the role. Instead,
roles and responsibilities are in part a product of tradition and convention and in
part a product of the prime minister’s own creativity. A prime minister’s capacity
to exercise all of this power is influenced not only by the official rules, or even
conventions, but also by other political actors’ perceptions of her power. Strong
prime ministers may expand their role into new domains or appropriate powers to
themselves that were previously executed by other ministers, actors or institutions.
They can do this because the role is not codified and in circumstances where other
actors’ perception of the prime minister’s personal authority is high enough to
overcome internal resistance.
10 Jennings 1966.
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Since the late 1970s, there has been an ongoing debate about the nature of
prime ministerial power. In Australia, as in other Westminster countries, much of
this discussion has focused on the ‘presidentialisation’ of the prime ministership.11
Indeed, there is a growing discussion of the ‘presidentialisation of politics’ more
generally.12 Presidentialisation is centralisation of power in the hands of prime
ministers (or party leaders) and emphasis on leaders over ministerial (or party)
teams. However, given what we have learnt about the nested nature of (semi-)-
parliamentary executives, we might instead want to think about this puzzle in terms
of what powers prime ministers actually exercise. If we compare prime ministers to
presidents, we could conclude that even though presidents may have more formal
(written down) powers, prime ministers in reality have more effective powers.13
After all, prime ministers are meaningfully influential across multiple government
institutions. Presidents may wish they were prime ministers!
Cabinet
Cabinet originates from the King’s ‘Privy Council’, or private group of councillors.
However, as parliamentary power asserted itself over the Crown, the King’s
counsellors also had to hold a seat in one of the parliamentary chambers. At first,
this was a useful means to exert direct influence over the parliament to ensure the
‘right’ outcome, but eventually it became an essential prerequisite for selection into
the monarch’s ‘Cabinet’. The modern prime minister would be the most important
of these monarchical advisers (Cabinet ministers), running the government on
behalf of the Crown. Just like other political institutions Cabinet’s functions and
relative importance have changed over time.
Cabinet is both an administrative and a partisan forum. This team of rivals
(even enemies) is responsible to the parliament but also to their party room. A
key principle of Cabinet government is collective decision making or ‘collective
responsibility’. Cabinet is a deliberative body, where frank discussions about policy
proposals, spending and administrative decisions and political strategies are
undertaken.
As prime ministers have historically served at the pleasure of their parties, it
is essential for prime ministers to meet with their colleagues frequently and for
Cabinet to discuss the most difficult issues facing the government. Once a decision
has been made by the Cabinet, all members agree to support the decision – this
is known as ‘Cabinet solidarity’. In this sense, we might think of Cabinet as a
‘corporate person’ because it collectively comes to a decision and then speaks with
one voice to the parliament and the people.
11 Kefford 2013.
12 Webb and Poguntke 2005.
13 Dowding 2013.
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Cabinet makes up the most senior ministers that are responsible for executing
government decisions. As the size of the state has expanded, so too has Cabinet.
In Australia, both citizens’ increasing expectations of the services that the state
ought to provide and the accrual of powers from state governments to the federal
government has seen the expansion of the size of the federal Cabinet. We can
observe this by considering the nine Cabinet portfolios from 1901, compared to the
legal maximum of 30 (currently 23 in Cabinet, seven in the outer ministry) today
(see Table 1).
To encourage strong internal debate, but also to shield members of the Cabinet
who disagree, all Cabinet deliberations are held in secret. It is for this reason that
Cabinet leaks are considered so serious – they signal disloyal dissent from the heart
of government. It is not the dissent that is disloyal, but the act of exposing private
conversations, undermining the secrecy that keeps Cabinet debates robust. Indeed,
members of the Cabinet that feel they cannot publically support the Cabinet’s
collective decision must resign.14
Like several other aspects of Westminster executives, what happens in Cabinet
is largely governed by convention. Prime ministers chair Cabinet and decide how
it will function. Issues are placed on the agenda and submissions supporting or
opposing a policy idea, spending proposal or line of political attack are circulated
beforehand. Smaller subcommittees of Cabinet may also meet to deliberate on
specific policy domains. Some of these smaller committees, such as the Expenditure
Review Committee, make recommendations on spending in the budget and are
consequently very powerful. Exactly how many and who sits on these smaller
subcommittees is determined by prime ministerial discretion.15
Precisely how submission processes work and how the debate is conducted is
subject to prime ministerial preference. It may seem trivial, but how easy it is to
raise issues, how those conversations are controlled and how welcome discussion is
has important implications for how decisions are made and their overall quality.
Australia has seen many Cabinet configurations and styles, which reflect the
political principles of parties and the personalities of prime ministers. At the
extremes, we have the Whitlam government’s (1972–75) inclusive but unruly 27-
strong Cabinet. This oversized Cabinet was the product of Labor’s long years in
opposition and reflected the party’s democratic ethos. But having so many people in
the room added to the chaotic nature of that government’s administration. Another
extreme relates to workload – Malcolm Fraser’s (1975–83) Cabinet undertook
an exhaustive workload, considering a large number of matters without formal
submissions. One of the reasons Fraser’s Cabinet spent so much time in debate
was that ministers brought more matters to Cabinet for collective decision making,
rather than making decisions themselves. By contrast, the Hawke Cabinet
14 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2018.
15 Weller 2007.
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Table 1 Cabinet portfolios in 1901 and 2019
Cabinet portfolios in 1901 Cabinet portfolios in 2019
Prime Minister and External Affairs
Treasurer
Trade and Customs
Home Affairs
Attorney-General
Defence
Post-master General
Minister without portfolio (×2)
Prime Minister; Public Service
Deputy Prime Minister; Infrastructure and
Transport and Regional Development
Treasurer
Indigenous Australians
Water Resources, Drought, Rural Finance,
Natural Disaster and Emergency
Management
Population, Cities and Urban Infrastructure
Finance
Agriculture
Foreign Affairs; Women
Trade, Tourism and Investment
Attorney-General; Industrial Relations
Health
Home Affairs
Communications, Cyber Safety and the
Arts
Education
Employment, Skills, Small and Family
Business
Industry, Science and Technology
Resources and Northern Australia
Energy and Emissions Reduction
Environment
Defence
Families and Social Services
National Disability Insurance Scheme;
Government Services
Source for 2019 portfolios: Parliament of Australia 2019.
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(1983–90) was known for its strong debating culture, and Hawke was considered a
good chair.
Ministers
As government has become more complex, the number of functions it undertakes
has required more ministers (see Table 1). Menzies split the ministry into the
Cabinet (12 members) and the outer ministry (10) by convention in 1956. Whitlam
at first overturned this practice, but later formalised an ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ ministry
because of the difficulties he faced in managing his oversized Cabinet. The Hawke
government moved to a portfolio system, which made the executive more clearly
hierarchical. Cabinet ministers would oversee large portfolio domains, like defence,
and be assisted by outer (assistant) ministers who would have responsibility for
a specific domain within the portfolio, such as veterans’ affairs. Several ministers
could work within one portfolio because the prime minister would outline their
specific responsibilities in charter letters. Outer ministers would only attend
Cabinet when matters directly relating to their portfolio were discussed. Reforms
in 1987 also added a third tier: parliamentary secretaries (junior ministers), who
support ministers or the prime minister but are not formally sworn in.
Ministers are formally delegated power via the Crown in section 64 of the
Constitution, but in practice via the prime minister. Ministers are responsible for
making decisions and administering their departments. The functions ministers
undertake are varied and include administrative and partisan aspects:
• administering their department
• designing and announcing policies and government decisions
• introducing and shepherding legislation through parliament
• implementing and enforcing legislation, policy programs and regulations
• advocating for and educating the public about government decisions
• managing appointments to government posts and statutory authorities within
their portfolio (e.g. High Court judges, telecommunications ombudsman or
ambassadors)
• making discretionary decisions (e.g. the right of immigration ministers to
overturn visa decisions made by their department)
• establishing inquiries
• submitting to and responding to scrutiny of their and their department’s
activities by parliament, the media, statutory authorities (where relevant) and
the public.
However, in contemporary politics, the prime minister is likely to have a
significant influence over many of the functions listed. In complex policy areas,
multiple ministers may try to co-ordinate their actions across government. Some
functions of the executive are beyond the scope of a single minister, including:
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• the overall co-ordination of government
• designing, shepherding and implementing the budget
• negotiating with the states and managing the Council of Australian
Governments (COAG)
• waging war
• responding to disasters.
Recall that under responsible government, ministers are individually respon-
sible to parliament for the actions of their departments. Ministers may be subject
to questioning in parliament, but this obligation does not extend to parliamentary
secretaries. Ministers can also be held to account through parliamentary committee
activities, statutory authorities such as the Australian National Audit Office,
Freedom of Information requests and, in the most extreme cases, royal comm-
issions. Should a minister lose the confidence of the House due to maladministration
within her department, she may resign. Far worse is losing the confidence of her
party room or her prime minister. In the best case scenario, a minister may be
quietly eased out at the next Cabinet reshuffle; in the worst, she may face the
ignominy of being sacked. Individual ministerial responsibility is a principle
underpinned by norms and practised as convention, and is therefore open to
interpretation. Further issues of accountability are discussed below.
Ministerial selection
Chief executives (in Australia, prime ministers) have a large say in ministerial
selection, but they do operate under constraints. In Australia, the principal
constraints on prime ministers relate to party and strategic considerations. In
other executive–legislative regimes, constitutional considerations, such as the way
prime ministers must negotiate appointments with presidents in semi-presidential
systems, may also be important. Before the election of Kevin Rudd in 2007, Labor
prime ministers were unable to directly select their ministry. Instead, Labor leaders
had the power to allocate portfolios among candidates either elected by the caucus
or approved by a smaller advisory committee. However, even where prime
ministers enjoy full powers to hire ministers, they often consider representational
constraints, such as state (well accommodated) and gender (poorly accommodated)
balance. In Australia, party considerations include factional alignment and an
appropriate balance between parties in a governing coalition. Strong party
discipline, the role of factions, the small selection pool and the emphasis on
relatively even state representation mean that Australian prime ministers are more
heavily constrained than they appear at first glance.16
16 Dowding and Lewis 2015.
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On face value, we might think that prime ministers only want the best
performers as ministers. Yet, strategically, prime ministers need a mix of skills
within Cabinet – some ministers to drive policy agendas, others who can act
as steady hands. Then there are those who cannot be ignored because of their
ambition or other party reasons, even if they lack the skills that make strong
ministers. Some ministers may be appointed solely as a reward, to secure loyalty or
to keep enemies under close observation.
Managing the executive
A minister is a partisan and temporary head of department. Ministers only serve
as long as the prime minister retains their services and their government survives.
By contrast, the bureaucracy is the non-partisan and permanent institution that’s
purpose is to serve the government by offering advice and transforming executive
will into reality.
In short, ministers – the principal actors – delegate their authority to their bur-
eaucracies – their agents. But, in practice, it is not that simple. The principal–agent
problem between ministers (principals) and bureaucrats (agents) is one of infor-
mation asymmetry. Even though ministers are in charge, the bureaucrats that
serve them are often more expert and more experienced; through this information
asymmetry, bureaucrats can have a greater influence on the eventual outcome.17
One reason for this is that opposition is only partial preparation for government,
offering no experience in running a large organisation like a government
department. In cases where information asymmetry is large and a minister is
uncritical, that minister may even be considered ‘captured’ by the bureaucracy.
Politically appointed staff
In Australia, the 1970s saw growing complaints by both major parties that the
bureaucracy was insufficiently ‘responsive’ to the (partisan) needs of ministers.
Similar complaints were repeated in other countries. Politicians identified two
problems. First, governments felt that an overly powerful bureaucracy diluted
ministers’ power to implement the political mandate they had secured at the
election. Ministers were outnumbered in ministerial offices and lacked their own
(partisan) sources of advice. Second, a non-partisan bureaucracy was poorly
equipped to assist ministers with the political aspects of their job, such as advocating
and overseeing the implementation of ideologically compatible policies.18
In 1972, Labor returned to power and appointed large numbers of political staff
to support its ministers due to its long-running distrust of a bureaucracy that had
17 The comedy classic Yes, Minister is replete with amusing examples of this problem.
18 Taflaga 2017.
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served its opponents for 23 years without interruption. This practice was continued
and expanded upon by the Fraser government and given legal form by the Hawke
government in 1984.19
Today, Australia has around 450 political staff at the federal level. Political
staff have become an institutionalised component of executive office. They offer
both partisan and personal support to their ministers. Staff also support ministers’
executive function by undertaking overtly partisan policy work, such as agenda
setting, bargaining and negotiating within government. They also undertake other
policy work that overlaps with the roles of the minster and the bureaucracy, such
as meeting with stakeholders and working with the bureaucracy to ‘deliver’
outcomes.20 However, political staff are not accountable in the same manner as
ministers or senior public servants. They are not required to present themselves
before parliament and cannot be called before parliamentary committees.
Centralisation of power
In recent times, there has been a growing debate about the decline of Cabinet
government and the increasing dominance of the prime minister. Part of the debate
is driven by the establishment and expansion of political institutions supporting the
prime minister. In 1911, the PMC was established. However, PMC’s role was largely
administrative until the prime ministership of John Gorton (1967–70). After this
time, PMC developed the capacity to act as both a co-ordinator across government
and a source of separate, and rival, departmental advice to the prime minister. The
concurrent development of the prime minister’s personal office (PMO), which is
by far the largest and best resourced, has also reinforced and extended existing
information and power (hiring and firing) asymmetries between prime ministers
and ministers.21
Access to advice and additional capacity for oversight has made it possible for
prime ministers with high standing to dominate their governments. John Howard
achieved dominance over his government through the skilful use of the resources of
the PMO and PMC, in combination with his personal leadership qualities and style.
Importantly, however, as government becomes more complex, there is growing
need for oversight and co-ordination across departments. Given that ministers are
responsible to the prime minister and that the prime minister is the head of the
government, centralisation is a pragmatic response to the complexity of governing.
However, we should not make the mistake of crudely translating prime minis-
terial prerogative as strength. Consider the example of Kevin Rudd, who was able
to dominate his Cabinet by usurping the right to hire and fire ministers from the
19 Maley 2018.
20 Maley 2000.
21 Strangio, t’Hart and Walter 2017.
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caucus. Rudd attempted to centralise and control so many decisions that he was
unable to effectively undertake the business of government. Key policy issues were
left to drift and his colleagues began seeking the advice and help of his deputy, Julia
Gillard. Ultimately, Rudd lost the confidence of his party room and was replaced,
partially on the grounds that he was not running an effective Cabinet government.
Rudd failed to use Cabinet as a robust and consultative forum.
Executive government and accountability
Governance relies on delegation. In a (semi-)parliamentary democracy we can
conceptualise delegation as shown in Figure 1. This is a simple model of delegation;
the delegation of the authority to act passes from one principal (e.g. voters) to their
agent (e.g. parliament). Functioning accountability measures are what distinguishes
democracy from non-democratic forms of governance.
However, as we have already discovered, the actual practice of executive gov-
ernance in Australia is more complicated. Agency problems arise across the chain of
delegation. One of these problems may relate to a difference of preferences between
principals and their agents; what voters want and what parliament legislates may be
very different.
The other problem is the result of a lack of information on the part of the
principal. This problem of information comes in two forms. The first is adverse
selection, which relates directly to the quality of representation. Voters may not
have access to enough information or the capacity to choose the representatives
that will serve their interests best. Arguably, political parties, which act as interest
aggregators, have helped resolve the issue of adverse selection by organising around
a party label, which gives citizens ideological shortcuts to help them vote.
The second is moral hazard, where the principal lacks the means or information
to keep their agents accountable and diligent. Party discipline has significantly
diluted the ability of parliament to keep the executive accountable, particularly
when an issue is not central to the survival of the government. However, Australia’s
strong Senate, and its powerful committee system, does provide a legislative
mechanism for executive accountability.22
Agency problems also play out at other stages of the chain of delegation. As
we discussed above, the calculations a prime minister must make when selecting
her Cabinet may not reflect her preferences, and ministers must work with a civil
service that they are not always able to select.
As we have seen, prime ministers and ministers have developed new institutions
– PMC and politically appointed staff – to help them to solve delegation problems
between the prime minister and ministers, and between ministers and the bureau-
cracy. However, these new institutions have also complicated the chain of delegation
22 Strøm, Muller and Bergman 2003.
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Figure 1 The model of parliamentary delegation.
and, in turn, the chain of accountability. Who is responsible in a complex policy
area when something goes wrong? Given the size of government departments, with
thousands of employees, at what point do ministers or even prime ministers become
responsible if they know an issue has arisen? What is the precise role of politically
appointed staff? To what extent can they speak for their minister and in what ways
should they be subject to scrutiny?
In the last 30 years, these issues have concerned scholars and bureaucrats, who
continue to debate whether or not Cabinet government still exists, whether the
chain of accountability still functions appropriately given the new role of politically
appointed staff and whether the balance between ministers, their staff and the
bureaucracy is appropriate to achieve good government.23
Responsible party government
Executive governance in Australia is a set of practices and norms supported by
institutions both within and outside the executive. As we have seen, the executive
is subject to the significant influence of political parties, both within the legislature
and outside the official institutions of government. Outside elections, accountability
to the party room may be more potent than accountability to the parliament. As
outlined above, actors exercising executive roles are partisan, subject to party
discipline and with their eyes always on the next election. Alongside the official
rules and the unwritten conventions of their offices, these partisan considerations
shape executive actors’ choices. Although we officially call our system ‘responsible
government’, currently a better label is ‘responsible party government’ because
power is interpreted and exercised through a party lens.24
Conclusions
Australia’s system of Cabinet government is flexible and open to interpretation. This
has been its primary strength, allowing it to adapt to changing circumstances, such as
the rise of parties, and respond to the needs of creative prime ministers through the
creation of new institutions. However, it has also bred its own problems. These issues
23 Podger 2007; Shergold 2007; Tiernan 2007; Weller 2003.
24 Lucy 1993.
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have come to the fore through inquiry along the accountability chain. The expansion
of the committee system in parliament, the development of statutory authorities like
the Australian National Audit Office, the creation of Freedom of Information laws
and the debate around establishing a national integrity commission are just one set
of responses to constraining executive power and keeping the executive accountable
to citizens. As long as accountability remains a priority of our political system, this
discussion will be ongoing.
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Australia’s new national Parliament House opened in 1988. It is one of the most
recognisable and routinely scrutinised workplaces in Australia. Parliament House
is much more than an impressive building. It is a symbol and a link to history, a
meeting place and a debating chamber. It is the building where our laws are made,
where governments rise and fall, where leaders are made and broken and where the
theatre of Australian politics is played out. It is where compromise and consensus
sit, sometimes uncomfortably, alongside partisanship and power. Parliament is a
place of ideas, ideology, debate and deliberation. It is also a place that provides
checks and balances on political power, including the power to impose taxes and
the power to decide who can become a citizen. Parliament makes policies that affect
all our lives.
The Australian parliament has been the setting for some of the most mem-
orable political events in the nation’s history. It is where the will of the people can
triumph, such as in the 2017 same-sex marriage laws, and where historical wrongs
are officially recognised, as exemplified by the apology to the Stolen Generations.
In short, parliament is an important democratic institution. Yet despite its central
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role, many Australians now have a diminished view of parliament. In part, this is
due to the 24-hour media cycle and the rise of social media that focuses on conflict
and intrigue, emphasising the ‘theatre’ of politics and minimising the substantive.
For some, the parliament is seen as nothing more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for a
powerful executive. Others believe parliaments are in decline, no longer relevant in
the modern era.1 While this chapter’s focus is on the federal parliament, the state
parliaments share many similarities, so much of the discussion is also applicable to
state institutions.
This chapter proceeds with a description and summary of the parliament’s
origins, and then moves to discuss the analytical themes that inform the West-
minster tradition. It explores the role and functions of parliament and provides
an overview of the sources of laws, procedures and practices that at times seem
archaic, but that are fundamental to its workings and need to be understood by its
elected members. After reading the chapter you should have an appreciation of the
parliament’s important role in our democracy and of other institutions’ – electoral
systems, political parties and the media – impact on the parliament in practice.
Parliaments in context
There are nine governments in Australia: one national and eight subnational.2 Each
government has its own parliament – namely the national parliament, the six state
parliaments and two territory legislative assemblies. Most state parliaments have two
houses (the lower and upper houses) and are termed bicameral. Queensland, the
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory governments3 have
one house and are termed unicameral. In a practical sense, the houses of parlia-
ment are the supreme law-making bodies; they combine to oversee governments and
to provide checks on power. The territory legislatures can make laws but can also
have their laws overturned or restricted by the Commonwealth parliament.4 In the
absence of a second chamber, such as in Queensland, the scrutiny of government falls
to the opposition and to parliamentary committees (see below).
The Australian parliament is representative in so far as its members are chosen
through the electoral process by citizens living across Australia’s 150 federal elect-
orates (House of Representatives) and 76 Senate positions (12 from each state and
two from each territory). The influence of the electoral system on the composition
of parliaments is immense. Single-member preferential voting in the lower house
1 Crick 1970.
2 There are also approximately 500 local governments and shire councils across Australia.
3 The two territory governments were created by legislation passed in the Commonwealth
parliament. The ACT is unique in that its one house (the Legislative Assembly) is both a local
government and a subnational legislative body and has no governor or administrator.
4 In 1997, the self-government Acts of the territories were amended to restrict the territories’
legislative power to prevent them making laws about euthanasia.
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has ensured that major parties (Labor, Liberal and National) dominate.5 This is
why ‘hung’ parliaments or minority governments are historically rare events.
Nonetheless, there is a high level of bicameralism evident in the Australian
parliament. The Senate is rarely dominated by the government of the day because
of the electoral system used. The proportional voting system provides a greater
likelihood of independents and minor parties being elected.6 For details on the
different systems operating across Australia, refer to Table 1.
The origins of the Australian parliament
The parliamentary system in Australia was modelled on the ‘mother of Parliaments’,
located at the Palace of Westminster in England. This enduring legacy contributes
to its traditions, practices and conventions. Independence from Britain began in
the Australian colonies in the mid-19th century. Each colony’s parliament was
established on Westminster principles, characterised by governments formed from
those elected to the lower house. Ministers are appointed from the government side
and are responsible to parliament for their actions. Because the operation of the
Westminster parliamentary system was well understood, there was little in the way
of written constitutions and significant reliance on tradition or convention. While
all Westminster jurisdictions share similar traditions, each has adapted their system
of government to suit their own unique circumstances.
Compromise and pragmatism were needed in order to get each of the colonies
in the 1890s (which later became the states) to overcome their parochialism and
deep-seated suspicion to join together as one nation in 1901. The Australian
parliament met in Melbourne until 1927, when its original building, now called
‘Old Parliament House’ and operating as a museum, was built in Canberra.
While remaining rooted in the British tradition, Australia’s system of government
also reveals influences from other places. Government in Australia combines West-
minster principles of responsible government with a federal structure, consisting of
the six states, with federal responsibilities set out in the Commonwealth Constitution.
The Constitution limits the areas in which the Commonwealth parliament has
exclusive jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction with the states.7 The Senate was
envisaged by the drafters of the Constitution as a state house, providing each state
with an equal number of elected members, rather than a proportion based on
5 The lower houses in the states and territories generally have one member per seat. In Tasmania
and the ACT, five members represent each state seat. This is an example of multi-member seats,
known in Australia as the Hare-Clark system.
6 Federally, the House of Representatives is elected using the full preference, transferable
single-member constituency vote, while the Senate is elected by a system of proportional
representation.
7 The Commonwealth Constitution preserves the parliamentary powers and the laws in force in
each of the states, but provides that where a state law is inconsistent with a Commonwealth law,
the Commonwealth law prevails (to the extent of the inconsistency).
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Table 1 Parliaments in Australia: a summary of composition, electoral system and term
Parliament Number of
Members
Voting system Term Sovereign’s
representative
or other
constituting
part of
parliament
Commonwealth Governor-
general
House of
Representatives
150 Single-member
electorates. Full
preferential voting.
Up to three
years.
Senate 76 12 for each state and
four for two
territories. Single
transferable vote.
Proportional
representation.
Election every
three years for
half of the
Senate. Six year
terms.
NSW Governor
Legislative
Assembly
93 Single-member
districts. Optional
preferential voting.
Up to four
years
Legislative
Council
42 Single transferable
vote system. Entire
state is one electorate.
Members are
elected for two
terms (a max-
imum of eight
years), with half
elected at each
general
election.
Vic. Governor
Legislative
Assembly
88 Single-member
districts. Preferential
ballot in single-
member seats.
Fixed four-year
terms.
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Parliament Number of
Members
Voting system Term Sovereign’s
representative
or other
constituting
part of
parliament
Legislative
Council
40 Eight multi-member
electorates, known as
regions, each of
which returns five
members. Single
transferable vote.
Proportional
representation.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Qld Governor
Legislative
Assembly
93 Single-member
constituencies.
Preferential voting.
Fixed four-year
terms.
WA Governor
Legislative
Assembly
59 Single-member
constituencies.
Preferential voting.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Legislative
Council
36 Multi-member
constituencies.
Proportional
representation.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Tas. Governor
House of
Assembly
25 Hare-Clark voting
system of multi-
member proportional
representation. Five
members elected
from each of the five
divisions.
Up to four
years.
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Parliament Number of
Members
Voting system Term Sovereign’s
representative
or other
constituting
part of
parliament
Legislative
Council
15 Single-member
electoral division.
Preferential voting.
Three elect-
orates elected
each year, on a
six year cycle.
SA Governor
House of
Assembly
47 Full-preference
instant-runoff voting
system. Single-
member electorates.
Fixed four-year
terms.
Legislative
Council
22 22 councillors elected
for the entire state.
Single transferable
voting system (with
optional preferential
voting).
Fixed eight-
year terms.
ACT Nil
Legislative
Assembly
25 Hare-Clark voting
system of multi-
member proportional
representation.
Fixed four-year
terms.
NT Commonwealth
Administrator
Legislative
Assembly
25 Single-member
electorates. Optional
preferential voting.
Fixed four-year
terms.
population size. This was to ensure every state had an equal say in decisions and could
block laws that disadvantaged them. The Senate has rarely acted in this way, largely
because of the dominance of political parties. Its powers, which include the ability to
block finance, have led some scholars to argue that it moves Australia away from the
Parliaments of Australia
75
British notion of responsible government. The term ‘Washminster’ refers to the way
Australia has combined elements of the UK and US systems of government.8
Parliament – the Australian adaptation
In practice, our system of government has distinct elements that form part of the
Westminster ‘chain of responsibility’. At the top, formally, is the head of state –
the monarch – represented by the governor-general or, for the states, the governor
– offices that largely play no role in politics or policy making. Parliament in the
UK was formed as a way to control the powerful monarch in the Middle Ages by
allowing other opinions and views to be represented.
In Australia, parliament gradually became more representative as those elected
were chosen from a broader base and the electoral franchise was extended to include
more people (women, Indigenous peoples). In keeping with British tradition, the
prime minister, who is constitutionally lower-ranked than the head of state, leads the
government. The three branches that form what is called a ‘chain of responsibility’
are the legislature (parliament as a whole), the executive (ministry) and the judiciary
(High Court). As the executive, which is formed by the political party that wins
the majority of seats in the House of Representatives, is both part of the parliament
and accountable to the parliament – the separation of powers that you might hear
mentioned does not fully exist in Westminster systems. The only distinct and
important operational separation of powers is between the judiciary and the other
two branches. So while we have an elected Senate like the USA, our prime minister
(unlike the US president) is not separate from the parliament and is answerable to it.
While the Senate is established in the Constitution, other legacies, such as the
notion of responsible government, are conventions handed down from Britain.
In theory, responsible government means accountable government. Ministers are
responsible individually for the departments they manage and collectively for what
the government does as a whole. During question time in parliament, they ‘must
meet other members face to face, answer their questions, and explain, defend or
excuse their own policies and the actions of the public servants under them’.9 In
practice, ministers almost never resign for departmental blunders or for decisions
they make. The increasing complexity of government makes it almost impossible
for a minister to be held accountable for the actions of their department. Likewise,
as an increasing number of policy and other decisions are made by Cabinet,
ministers shelter behind collective responsibility. While collective responsibility
may be a longstanding convention, it could also be seen as a pragmatic realisation
that ‘if we do not hang together, we will surely hang separately’.10
8 Thompson 2001.
9 Parker 1976, 179.
10 Weller 2015.
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Case example: Australian variance from the UK parliament – upper houses
The UK parliament is a bicameral parliament with an elected lower house (the House
of Commons) and a hereditary or appointed upper house (the House of Lords). The
Queensland parliament abolished its appointed upper house, the Legislative Council,
in 1922, thus becoming the only state to be unicameral. The other states have ensured
that their upper houses are elected, not appointed. The Commonwealth parliament’s
Senate is elected and designed to represent the interests of each state.
In the UK, it was accepted convention that the House of Lords should not reject a
budget passed by the House of Commons. In 1911, legislation made this convention
law, following the rejection of a budget by the House of Lords and a constitutional
crisis in 1909. In Australia, where upper houses are elected, this convention has not
been universally accepted.
Functions of parliament
There is no exhaustive list of the functions of each parliament. While one of their
most important functions is to make laws, the parliaments are not just legislatures.
Their chief functions are representation, forming government, making laws, author-
ising budgets, confidence, raising grievances and scrutiny.
Representation
Members of parliament in the lower house have competing interests. They are
charged with representing the people from the electorate that voted them into
parliament, while at the same time considering the national (or state) interest. As
most belong to a political party, they usually remain loyal to the policies, objectives
and goals of that party. There are a variety of interests and many different types of
people that a member of parliament hears from. These groups often have different
perspectives on what needs to be done about a particular issue, producing tensions
that sit uneasily at times.
Uhr and Wanna describe parliament as a ‘theatre of action … involving a
wide variety of actors who interact around political issues’.11 While a degree of
bipartisanship usually exists around national interest policies, the parties often have
differing views on how these policies are best achieved. One of the most famous
speeches regarding representation comes from Edmund Burke who told his electors
in Bristol in 1774 that:
You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not the
member of Bristol, but he is a member of parliament. If the local constituent should
have an interest, or should form an hasty opinion, evidently opposite to the real
11 Uhr and Wanna 2009, 12.
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good of the rest of the community, the member for that place ought to be as far, as
any other, from any endeavour to give it effect. [Emphasis in original.]12
Forming government
After an election, the political party that secures the most votes in the House
of Representatives is asked to form government. An essential characteristic of
the Westminster system is that the government must be able to maintain the
support of parliament (particularly the House of Representatives) on issues of
money and confidence. The requirement for governments to retain the support of
the parliament explains why very close elections that result in a hung parliament
or minority government are particularly problematic. In that case, it is incumbent
upon the government to advise the governor-general that they have the support
of the parliament – which effectively means that they would survive votes of no
confidence and would be able to get their budget passed.
Historically, at the federal level, Australia has had very few hung parliaments
or minority governments. The first occurred in 1940 and the second happened 70
years later, when Julia Gillard’s Labor managed to win government on the back of the
support of three independents and the Greens Party.13 In 2018, the Liberal–National
Party (LNP) lost the Wentworth by-election. Until the 2019 federal election, the
Morrison-led federal government held only 75 of the 151 seat House of Repres-
entatives. This made its relationship with the crossbench (the independents and
minor party members) crucial, as every piece of legislation the government wanted
passed had to be negotiated. Smaller parliaments with fewer members are more
likely to have minority governments, as are parliaments where the lower house has
multi-member seats.
The 2015 Queensland election result brought into focus the workings of the
largely dormant constitutional mechanisms for forming government, as outlined
below. It is significant to note the calm approach of the governor in awaiting the
declaration of seats before inviting anyone to become the new premier.
Case example: appointing a government in a ‘hung parliament’
The Queensland state election held on 31 January 2015 resulted in some significantly
unusual outcomes. Firstly, neither major party secured a majority in its own right.
Secondly, the premier going into the election, Campbell Newman, lost his seat, and
thus the premier advising the governor after the election was no longer a member
of the state’s only house, the Legislative Assembly. Thirdly, the results in some seats
were close and it took some time to determine the outcomes in those seats.
12 Burke 1986.
13 Before the formation of the party system, most governments did not hold majorities.
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Immediately after the election, it appeared that the governing party, the LNP,
had won 42 of the 89 seats in the Legislative Assembly, three seats short of a majority.
It also appeared that the Australian Labor Party (ALP) had won 44 seats, one short
of a majority. Two members of Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) and one independent
were also elected.
The Queensland constitution, like the constitutions for the Commonwealth
and other states and territories, does not detail how governments are formed. The
Queensland governor, Paul de Jersey, had to rely on custom and convention to
determine who to ask to form government.
On 5 February, the independent member, Peter Wellington, publicly pledged
his support for the ALP on votes of confidence and supply, with certain caveats.
The two KAP members did not formally declare support for either major party.
However, results in some seats were still uncertain and close.
On 10 February, Campbell Newman tendered his resignation as premier, to take
effect upon the appointment of a successor premier. Later on 10 February, the leader
of the ALP, Annastacia Palaszczuk, called on the governor and advised that she
had secured the support of the independent, Wellington, and that she had obtained
independent legal advice supporting her claim to form government, should she be
invited to do so. The governor advised Palaszczuk that he would await the poll
declaration before commissioning a new premier.
On 13 February, the Electoral Commission of Queensland declared the results
of the final seats, confirming that the ALP had obtained 44 seats and that Palasz-
czuk, with the support of Wellington, could guarantee supply and confidence. The
governor then asked Palaszczuk to become premier and establish a government.14
Law making (legislation)
One of the principal functions of parliament is making laws. Laws are the guide for
what we can and cannot do in our day-to-day lives. While the process of making
new laws is technical, it is also often acrimonious and heated. For example, in 2017
the Victorian parliament passed laws to allow assisted dying, but not before more
than 100 hours of debate occurred over various clauses of the Bill.15 The process
of making laws begins when Bills are introduced, debated, amended and passed
by each house or chamber or, in unicameral parliaments, by the single chamber. If
the Bill is passed, it is given assent by the sovereign’s representative (the governor-
general or governor) and, at that time, converted to an Act – a new law or an
amendment to an existing law.
The legislative power of parliament extends to delegating legislative power
to other bodies, such as the Governor-General in Council, so that those bodies
can make laws called subordinate or delegated legislation. Regulations, by-laws
14 de Jersey 2015.
15 Edwards 2017.
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and ordinances are all examples of subordinate legislation. The parliament, as a
precondition to the delegation of legislative power, provides mechanisms by which
subordinate legislation is monitored and, if a house decides, ‘disallowed’.
Financial appropriation
Just as we have to juggle to pay our bills, so too do governments. But, unlike us,
governments need to seek authorisation from parliament first. They need to pass
their budget in order to continue to pay for the services they are expected to deliver
in areas such as health, education, police, defence and the upkeep of roads, for
programs like the National Disability Insurance Scheme, or to provide drought relief
or disaster assistance to suffering communities. Much of this money is collected
through our ongoing taxes. To ensure it will be spent wisely, all governments need
to inform and seek general approval from the parliament first.
One of the most essential constitutional legacies inherited from Westminster is
the lower house’s control of public finances. The laws and controls can generally be
summarised as follows:
• Tax cannot be levied without the consent of parliament through legislation.
• The executive cannot borrow money upon the public credit without legislative
authority.
• While money raised by taxation and other revenue vests in the executive
(usually the Crown), no money can be paid from the money collected without
a distinct authorisation of parliament.
• Revenues collected are deposited in a single fund usually called the Consolid-
ated Revenue Fund.
A Bill approving expenditure to be deducted from the Consolidated Revenue Fund
is called an Appropriation Bill. There are usually also laws providing for the audit
and account of public expenditure, including a requirement that at the end of each
financial year the treasurer must forward a statement of all transactions of the
Consolidated Revenue Fund and details of appropriation paid to each department
to the auditor-general for certification.
If the parliament decides to block a government’s budget (this can be played
out for an extended period of time as budget Bills bounce back and forth between
the two chambers), the government will fall or a double dissolution trigger will
be pulled. The most famous example of this process occurred during the Whitlam
government’s term of office in the 1970s.16
16 Parliament of Australia n.d.
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Case example: 1975 – a failure to secure supply
In October 1975, the opposition in the Commonwealth parliament, led by Malcolm
Fraser, determined to block supply by deferring consideration of Appropriation
Bills in the Senate. The opposition coalition had an effective majority of 30 to 29
in the Senate. The opposition’s tactic was to deny the government supply to either
force the prime minister to call a general election or cause the governor-general to
dismiss the government and issue writs for a general election. Supply – the funding
for government – would run out on 30 November. The Whitlam government was
determined to advise the governor-general to call a half-Senate election in order to
try and obtain a majority in the Senate.
On 11 November 1975, with supply still not passed, the governor-general
dismissed Whitlam and his government and appointed Malcolm Fraser as prime
minister on the condition and assurance that he could guarantee supply and would
then advise the dissolution of the parliament and a general election.
Later that day, the Senate passed the Appropriation Bills and they received royal
assent, and so supply was ensured. In the lower house, the House of Representatives,
the new Fraser government suffered defeats, including a vote of no confidence and a
motion instructing the speaker to advise the governor-general to dismiss Fraser and
reappoint Whitlam. However, the governor-general dissolved parliament and writs
for a general election were issued.
The dismissal of the Whitlam government remains one of Australia’s most
controversial constitutional and political events for a number of reasons. The
Whitlam government retained the confidence of the House of Representatives, and
the newly appointed Fraser government obviously did not have the confidence of
that house, as the subsequent motions indicated. The convention that the upper
house would not block supply had also not been followed.17
Confidence
A successful vote of no confidence means that the parliament no longer has
confidence in the government. It is the parliament’s ultimate expression of power to
withdraw its support for the government. Once support is withdrawn the govern-
ment usually falls or an election is triggered.
Inquisitorial
Each house is able to inquire into all instances of alleged abuse or misconduct and
institute inquiries with coercive powers in order to perform any of its functions
and bring about reform. In practice, the inquisitorial function of each house is
usually exercised through its parliamentary committees. Committees are made up of
a specified number of members delegated a responsibility by the house and provided
17 Kelly 1983.
Parliaments of Australia
81
powers and immunities to conduct inquiries and report back to the house. In modern
parliaments, committees are increasingly used to review legislative proposals, scrut-
inise the budget and conduct inquiries into areas that may need law reform.
Case example: New South Wales, 1999 – a minister fails to produce documents to the
house
On 24 September 1998, the Legislative Council of the New South Wales parliament
passed a resolution directing the government to produce by 29 September all
documents relating to the contamination of Sydney’s water supply. On 29 Sept-
ember, the clerk of the Council received a letter from the director-general of the
Cabinet Office, stating that, after advice from the crown solicitor, the government
would not table some documents on the grounds of legal professional privilege and
public interest immunity.
On 13 October, a further resolution was passed, again demanding that all
documents be produced but providing that those that the government claimed
were subject to immunity on the above grounds be made available to members of
the Council only and not published or copied without an Order of the House. If
any member disputed the government’s claim, an independent arbiter would be
appointed to adjudicate and report back to the house.
Significantly, under this resolution, a document that was claimed and identified
as a Cabinet document would not be made available to Council members. Rather,
the claim would be subject to a right of appeal to an independent legal arbiter.
The government once more refused to comply. Therefore, on 20 October, the
treasurer and leader of the government in the upper house, Michael Egan, was
suspended for five sitting days and removed from the house by the usher of the
black rod. Egan disputed the Council’s power to order the production of documents
subject to either legal professional privilege or public interest immunity, or to deter-
mine the validity of such claims. The courts upheld the power of the Legislative
Council on the basis that its power to suspend Egan was a necessary incidence of
responsible government.18
Debate and grievances
An extremely important function of each house of parliament is to act as a forum to
enable members to represent their constituents and allow the views and grievances
of their constituents to be aired. The tabling of petitions is an example of this
function, as is the time allowed for individual members’ statements at adjournment
or other debates.
18 Griffith 1999.
Australian Politics and Policy
82
Scrutiny or accountability
Another important function of the parliament is scrutinising the policies and
actions of the government of the day. This role is largely facilitated through an
adversarial process whereby the lower house recognises an official opposition that
puts counterproposals to the government and questions the government’s policies
and administration. Procedures such as questions with or without notice to
ministers and institutions such as the parliamentary committee system assist the
parliament in its scrutiny role. The great paradox of the Westminster system of
government is that because government is formed in the lower house based on it
usually having a majority in that house, the lower house becomes less effective in
making government accountable.
Procedures of parliament
Politics is a high stakes game. It is about power, and parliament is the foundation of
that power. While a government needs to maintain support, part of the rules of the
game, well understood by those in the parliament but less obvious to outsiders, is
the adversarial nature of politics. Effectively, this means a key objective is to make
life as difficult as possible for the other side. The other side, be that the government
or the opposition, is after the same thing – to remain or become the government at
the next election. The opposition enjoys formal status and power as the alternative
government. It has equal time in parliamentary debates and in question time, it
can seek meetings with the public service at certain times, and it receives public
funding to resource offices and generally perform in its role.19 Thus the parliament is
where government members stick together in a show of solidarity while opposition
members do their best to highlight the government’s flaws.
The procedures are rules and customs that control how business is conducted
and govern the behaviour of members. News reports on parliament tend to focus
on question time which is where the theatre of politics is on display. The important
thing to remember as you read through the various functions discussed in this
chapter is that politics is about the fight and the procedures are about keeping the
fight fair.
There are many procedures that set out the rules for how members should act
towards one another. In each house the presiding officer (speaker or president),
judges whether the rules have been broken. The speaker or president is assisted by
a clerk, who is a permanent, non-partisan officer with a deep understanding of the
rules and how they should be applied.
There are five sources of laws and rules that govern how the parliament goes
about its work:
19 Rhodes 2005, 149.
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• Statutes, which determine the powers and composition of each house, and its
rights and immunities.
• Standing Orders, which lay down the most important source of procedures –
although they can be dispensed with by granting ‘leave’ or permission for the
house to deal with something in an informal way, or to set them aside through
a motion to ‘suspend’.
• Sessional Orders enable the House to do certain things that are not covered
by Standing Orders. For example, Sessional Orders are passed on the first day
of business of each session, setting out matters such as the days and hours of
sitting, the order of business and time limits for debates and speeches.
• Rulings are made by the chairs of each house (the speaker in the House of
Representatives or the president in the Senate). They are often interpretations
of the Standing or Sessional Orders.
• Custom and practice provide the rules the house applies when there are no
rules set down; for example, the rights of the opposition to ask first questions,
address in reply and respond to a government’s budget (budget reply).
Privilege
Each house of parliament has certain powers, rights and immunities that are
essential for it to operate effectively. These are often referred to as ‘parliamentary
privilege’. The powers, rights and immunities include:
• the power to regulate the house’s proceedings through standing rules and orders,
which have the force of law
• the right of free speech in parliament without liability to action or impeach-
ment for anything spoken therein, including immunity of members from legal
proceedings for anything they say in the course of parliamentary debates
• the power to call for persons, papers and things and to delegate such powers to
committees of the house
• immunity of parliamentary witnesses from being questioned or impeached for
evidence given before the house or its committees
• the power to punish for contempt those that improperly intrude on its privileges
or fail to follow its orders
• the power to regulate the conduct of its members, including the power to sus-
pend or expel them for misconduct.
Case example: Western Australia, 2018 – member resigns before he is expelled
On 8 May 2018, the Procedures and Privileges Committee of the Legislative
Assembly of Western Australia reported that a member of the house, Barry Urban,
had committed a ‘gross and aggravated contempt of parliament’ and had misled the
house on five occasions, and recommended that he be expelled. The committee, in
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summary, found that Urban had misled the house about his right to wear medals,
his educational qualification and his previous work history. Shortly after the report
was tabled, Urban resigned from the Legislative Assembly.20
Conclusions
The national and eight subnational parliaments in Australia have all adopted and
adapted the Westminster system of government. Some Australian parliaments are
unicameral. All are much smaller than the UK parliament, some having less than 25
members. All have different procedures for common mechanisms such as questions
to ministers, petitions and the passage of legislation.
Despite their variations, the two most fundamental characteristics of Westmin-
ster government – responsible government and the ability of each house to ensure
responsible government – remain at their core. Ministers are members of parliament
and are responsible to the parliament for the matters that they administer. Cabinet,
comprising the prime minster, premier or chief minister and other ministers, is also
collectively responsible to the parliament. Each house of parliament has the power
necessary to ensure that the executive remains accountable and employs devices
such as estimates examinations, questions to ministers, orders for documents and
general committee inquiries to achieve that accountability.
Parliament sits at the apex of our system of government. It is where the collective
will of the people, expressed through elections, decides who governs us. It is where
laws are made and the pros and cons of public policies are debated. While parliament
is steeped in tradition, it is also an evolving institution, a reflection of who we are
and what we wish Australia to be at a given point in time.
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Electoral systems are a centrally important aspect of any polity. In the Australian
context, the electoral system explains much of the country’s stability, centrist policies
and conservative political culture. This chapter introduces electoral systems broadly,
with particular focus on the Australian context. How we vote is shaped by three key
features of the electoral system: what ballot papers look like; how ballot papers are
counted and legislative seats allocated; and when, where, and why we vote.
Electoral systems need to balance many different, and often competing, goals.
The system we use to choose members of a legislature – that is, to elect legislators –
largely dictates how many parties we have to choose from, the kinds of people who
stand for election, the kinds of people who get elected and the kinds of policies they
produce once elected. There is no aspect of any political system that is not deeply
influenced by the fundamental electoral system.
In Australia, we take much about our electoral system for granted. We vote on
Saturdays, so most voters do not have to take any time off work. The lines to cast
a vote are short, compared to other countries’ elections. Election days are – for the
most part – enjoyable rituals. And if we do not want to vote on election day, we
Sheppard, Jill (2019). Electoral systems. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
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have ample opportunity to vote beforehand, either in person or by post. Both the
prime minister and the opposition leader are often ideologically centrist; this is a
fundamental feature of Australia’s electoral system. While we may change prime
ministers, our underlying political system is stable and strong. And we have our
electoral system to thank.
The sections in this chapter take the following format. First, the chapter will
discuss compulsory and voluntary voting. Australians are socialised into accepting
and even embracing compulsory voting; that phenomenon will be examined here.
Second, the chapter will consider the major types of electoral systems, focusing
on consensual and majoritarian systems. It will discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of each, using contemporary examples.
Compulsory and voluntary voting
Eligible Australian voters are required by law to both enrol to vote and cast a ballot in
all federal and state elections. In 1924, the parliament of Australia amended the Com-
monwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) to make voting compulsory and allow the federal
government to penalise enrolled voters who fail to cast a ballot. In 1924, the penalty
for non-voting was £2 (or approximately $160 in 2018); in 2019, the penalty is $20.
Among other clauses, the 1924 amendments that introduced compulsory
voting state that:
1. It shall be the duty of every elector to vote at each election.
2. The Electoral Commissioner must, after polling day at each election, prepare
for each Division a list of the names and addresses of the electors who appear
to have failed to vote at the election.
3. ... within the period of 3 months after the polling day at each election, each
DRO [Divisional Returning Officer] must:
A. send a penalty notice by post; or
B. arrange for a penalty notice to be delivered by other means to the latest
known address of each elector whose name appears on the list prepared
under subsection (2).1
This legislative measure was passed to address declining voter turnout in general
elections – fewer than 60 per cent of registered electors cast a ballot at the 1922
Australian federal election. At a recent federal election (in May 2019), turnout was
92 per cent of the registered voter population, with the highest number of enrolled
voters on record.2
1 Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, section 245.
2 AEC 2019a.
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Figure 1 Response to the question ‘Do you think that voting at federal elections should be
compulsory, or do you think that people should only have to vote if they want to?’. Source:
Cameron and McAllister 2016.
As it compels voting, the Australian government has consistently legislated
to make it as easy as possible. This has included weekend (Saturday) election
days, expansive access to voter registration (although limited to a deadline of one
week prior to an election), ample polling locations and short queues at polling
booths. Recent reforms have expanded voters’ opportunities to cast a ballot before
election day, either by mail or in person. By convention as much as legislative
or institutional design, the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) has worked
to lower the burdens of voting within the constraints of maintaining electoral
integrity (which explains its the reluctance to introduce election-day registration
opportunities, for instance).
Australian Election Study data since 1967 reveals remarkably high levels of
support for compulsory voting within Australia. Early iterations of the study found
that in 1967 and 1969 three-quarters of the population believed ‘compulsory voting
is better’ than allowing people to vote if they want. By 1979, that number had
fallen slightly, but 69 per cent of Australians still preferred compulsory to voluntary
voting. In 1987, 33 per cent of Australians ‘strongly favoured’ compulsory voting,
31 per cent ‘favoured’ it, 3 per cent did not mind either way, 13 per cent favoured
voluntary voting and 20 per cent ‘strongly favoured’ voluntary voting. Since that
time, support for Australia’s compulsory voting laws has remained remarkably high
(Figure 1).
How ‘compulsory’ is compulsory voting?
While the vast majority of eligible voters in Australia fulfil their legal obligation
to vote at each election, there are two means of easily abstaining from casting
a valid vote. The first method is to attend a polling booth, either on or before
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election day (or to request a postal ballot paper), receive a ballot paper and deposit
that paper in the ballot box (or return it via post) without writing a valid vote
on it. Many Australians do this intentionally, either leaving their ballot blank or
marking the paper in ways that do not constitute a valid vote. Others cast a spoiled
ballot unintentionally; Australia’s comparatively complex ballot paper makes voting
formally particularly difficult for voters with poor literacy or English-language
proficiency.
The extent to which the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 commands voters to
(or to attempt to) cast a valid ballot is not entirely clear. Some commentators and
political actors believe that voters only need to attend a polling booth (or request a
postal ballot paper) and have their name marked off by an AEC employee; we will
call this the ‘attendance only’ argument. Others argue that the law requires voters
to place a ballot paper into a ballot box (or return a postal ballot paper to the AEC),
whether it contains a valid vote or not – the ‘blank ballot’ argument. Others still
argue that the legislation requires voters to intend to cast a valid vote (the ‘valid
vote’ argument) – that the ‘duty of every elector to vote’ extends to expressing their
preference for certain candidates over others.
The ‘attendance only’ argument is driven by the reality that, per the Act, the
Electoral Administrator collects the names of enrolled voters who have not
attended a polling station and had their attendance noted by AEC staff. These
individuals are then subject to penalties for non-voting. The AEC has no means of
penalising Australians who have their names marked off, walk to the polling booth
and destroy their ballot paper without depositing it into the ballot box.3 However,
five separate instances of judicial review have found that the Commonwealth
Electoral Act 1918 requires voters to deposit a ballot paper into the box.4
The legality of submitting a blank ballot paper to fulfil the duty to vote in
Australia federal elections is less clear. A strict reading of the Act suggests that
‘to vote’ requires a voter to mark their ballot paper in such a way as to reflect
a preference for some candidates over others.5 Again, however, the secrecy of
the voting process means that voters who cast a blank (or otherwise informally
marked) ballot paper are not able to be penalised. In practice, then, the ‘blank
ballot’ argument stands; it is legal to submit a blank ballot paper in Australia, in as
much as doing so cannot reasonably be punished under the relevant law. Moreover,
casting a blank ballot is widely viewed as a legitimate form of political expression
in Australia.6 Lijphart notes that ‘the secret ballot guarantees the right not to vote
remains intact’,7 while Twomey argues that the secret ballot and compulsory voting
as defined by the Act are essentially at odds.8
3 See, for example, Twomey 1996.
4 AEC 2019b.
5 Twomey 1996.
6 Hill 2002.
7 Lijphart 1997.
8 Twomey 1996.
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However, individuals suspected of casting a blank ballot paper could be
required to confess to deliberately abstaining from voting and be penalised accord-
ingly under the Act.9 For instance, the Act requires the electoral commissioner to
prepare a list of names of eligible voters who have not voted in a federal election; it
is not far-fetched to imagine the AEC identifying individuals who confess on social
media to deliberately casting a blank or otherwise informal ballot.
As of 2019, the AEC has shown little appetite for such proactive penalisation.
Prior to the 2010 Australian federal election, former Labor leader Mark Latham
publicly announced that he would be casting a blank ballot and urged others to do
likewise.10 The AEC told media outlets reporting on these comments that Latham
did not contravene the Act, either by casting a blank ballot himself or by telling
others that he would do so.
The second means of abstaining is to not enrol to vote. Electoral enrolment is
compulsory under the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. The Act mandates that
eligible voters must register themselves as voters with the AEC and maintain their
enrolment by advising the AEC any time they change their residential address.
Since 2012, the AEC has had legislative power to ‘directly update’ the electoral roll.
This allows the AEC to identify eligible voters using data from other federal and
state government agencies – vehicle registration and driver licencing authorities,
welfare agencies and utility providers, for example – and automatically add them
to the electoral roll. The AEC notifies all individuals who are automatically added
to the roll, and these individuals have 28 days in which to object (although there
are almost no grounds for valid objection, besides the individual’s details being
incorrect).
These new powers have diminished Australians’ ability to ‘hide’ from the AEC
– and from having to vote in elections – by never enrolling to vote. Eligible voters
who are directly added to the roll are not fined for having abstained previously. In
2018, 96 per cent of eligible Australians were enrolled to vote. In 2011, before the
direct update legislation was introduced, only 91 per cent of eligible Australians
were enrolled. Among eligible young Australians (those aged 18 to 25), enrolment
has increased from 73 per cent in 2011 to 85 per cent in 2018. Direct updating
reversed a trend of declining voter enrolments generally, but particularly among
young Australians. At the beginning of 2019, approximately two-thirds of all
electoral enrolment in Australia occurs via direct update of the roll.
Majoritarian and consensual electoral systems
There are many common ways of categorising and describing electoral systems,
but most approaches identify three broad types based on the type of government
9 Twomey 1996, 210.
10 Pringle 2012.
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they produce. Drawing on Norris and Lijphart,11 we can distinguish between three
electoral ‘families’: majoritarian, mixed and consensual. This section will begin
by defining and describing majoritarian democracies and the types of electoral
systems that produce ‘winner takes all’ governments. Next, it will discuss con-
sensual democracies and the electoral systems that produce governments where
two or more parties share power in coalition. Finally, it will discuss democracies
that fall somewhere between majoritarian and consensual.
Majoritarian (or ‘winner takes all’) systems
In Australian federal elections, we vote for candidates standing for two different
houses: the House of Representatives (lower house) and the Senate (upper house).
Whichever party or group of parties wins a majority of seats in the House of
Representatives is, according to the Constitution of Australia and convention since
1901, given the opportunity to form a government. Much more often than not, one
party (or in the case of the Liberal–National Coalition [the Coalition], a formal
alliance of parties) gets to form a government in its own right. Why? And relatedly,
why do the Coalition and Australian Labor Party (ALP) have such a stranglehold
on government in Australia?
The answers lie in Australia’s system of electing one person to represent each
electoral division in the country. In electoral terms, Australia’s House of Represent-
atives has a ‘district magnitude’ of one (i.e. one member per electoral division).
For example, in the seat of Fenner in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the
candidate who wins the majority of the vote is elected. A second-placed candidate –
even if they attract 49.99 per cent of the final vote – wins nothing.
There are two specific electoral systems that produce majoritarian governments.
The first is plurality, or ‘first past the post’, voting. This is the most straightforward
way of voting, both in terms of the voter recording their preferred candidate and for
electoral commission staff counting votes at the end of election day. Used in the UK
and in most US elections, plurality voting requires voters to choose their favourite
among all listed candidates. They do not need to rank candidates; depending on the
jurisdiction they can use a cross, a number ‘1’ or a tick to designate their chosen
candidate. The simplicity of plurality voting helps to include non-native-language
speakers and those with low literacy in the electoral process.
On the other hand, plurality voting results in the most disproportionate
electoral outcomes of any voting system. Imagine an electorate in London in which
50.001 per cent of voters choose one candidate, Jane Smith. In the unlikely event
that all of Jane Smith’s votes were counted first, there would be no need to ever
count the other 49.999 per cent of votes. In an electorate of 100,000 voters, 49,999
votes would not even need to be counted; we could declare the winner based on
the total votes for Jane Smith. Therefore, 49,999 voters would have left their homes,
11 Lijphart 1994; Norris 2004.
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lined up and filled in and cast a ballot, just for it not to have mattered. Such votes are
called ‘wasted votes’ in the political science literature; we regularly assess electoral
systems on the basis of the percentage of wasted votes.
The Australian House of Representatives uses preferential voting, a less common
majoritarian electoral system.12 In a preferential system, voters mark their preferred
candidate but also get to rank the other candidates. Voters’ ability to rank candidates
in order can be seen as offering an alternative: if my favourite candidate (John Scott)
is not popular, then I want my vote to go to my next preferred candidate (Jessica
Shaw), and so on.
When voting closes at the end of election day, electoral staff count up all of
the ‘1’ (i.e. first preference) votes. You might imagine a pile of ballot papers for
each candidate, based on how many voters gave the candidate their number ‘1’
vote. Once this count is finalised, the candidate who received the fewest ‘1’ votes
is eliminated, and their votes redistributed to whichever candidates received the
number ‘2’ votes on these ballot paper. This continues until there are only two
candidates left; you might have heard of ‘two-party preferred’ or ‘two-candidate
preferred’ results – this is exactly that. After unpopular candidates are eliminated
and voters’ preferences distributed, the final two candidates are the ‘two candidates
preferred’.
Preferential voting has one distinct advantage over plurality voting, and one
distinct disadvantage. The advantage is that very few votes are wasted; even if a
voter casts a vote for the least popular candidate in any election, their vote will
transfer to their next favourite candidate, and their next favourite candidate, and
so on. Inevitably, this means that any election comes down to the two candidates
whom voters are least likely to rank last, rather than the candidates they are most
likely to rank first. However, this is quite a complicated electoral system (requiring
voters to place a sequential number next to every candidate or else invalidate
their ballot), which disadvantages voters from non-English-speaking backgrounds
and those with low literacy. This trade-off is an ongoing challenge for electoral
administrators.
In majoritarian systems – whether plurality or preferential – candidates (or
parties) who are ideologically similar usually try to avoid ‘stealing’ votes away
from each other. Imagine, for instance, two socialist-leaning parties nominating
candidates in an American congressional district. If they do not co-ordinate, they
might each win 26 per cent of the vote, leaving a conservative candidate to win
with 48 per cent of the vote. For both socialist-leaning candidates, this is the least
optimal outcome – they lose, and a conservative (i.e. the most ideologically distant)
candidate wins.
12 ‘Preferential voting’ is the commonly used term, while academics and researchers tend to describe
this system as ‘alternative voting’, ‘ranked choice voting’ or ‘instant run-off voting’. These terms all
describe the same system.
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Instead, it makes sense for ideologically similar candidates or parties to work
together. While it might be difficult to imagine political rivals working together –
even if they hold very similar ideas or espouse similar policies – we assume that
over the long term candidates and parties with similar outlooks will work together
to exclude common rivals. ‘Working together’ might mean that one candidate or
party withdraws from an election or decides not to nominate in the first place; it
does not necessarily mean that they openly collaborate or campaign together.
This phenomenon is called ‘Duverger’s Law’, named for political scientist
Maurice Duverger (pronounced Doo-ver-zhay).13 It is as close to a ‘universal law’ as
anything in political science, although it still has exceptions; for example, Canada
consistently has three major parties despite its plurality voting system. But
commonly, Duverger’s Law correctly predicts that majoritarian voting methods
lead to stable two-party systems. The UK, USA and Australia are the most notable
examples. When the loosely formed ‘Tea Party’ collective of conservative politicians
gained prominence in the USA in 2009, the group’s greatest success was (albeit
briefly) pulling the Republican party to the right, rather than becoming a genuine
third force in American politics. Even a group of activists ostensibly opposed to the
policies of the most ideologically similar party is better served by working within
that party than competing against it.
The combination of compulsory and preferential voting has maintained a very
stable two-party system in Australia. The two major parties – the ALP and the
Coalition – have both enjoyed substantial periods in executive government and are
ideologically proximate. At federal elections between 1949 and 2016, only twice has
either major party defeated the other by ten percentage points or more (Figure 2).
Even though many Australians might express dissatisfaction with the closeness of
the parties and the way the political system works generally (and in 2019 political
dissatisfaction is increasing in Australia), we overwhelmingly still turn up to vote,
and we still mostly vote for one of the major parties.
Compulsory voting means voters at the far left and far right of the ideological
spectrum are still incentivised to vote, even though the parties they end up voting
for (after preferences are distributed) are a long distance from their own positions.
This is one reason that the Australian Greens and – to a lesser extent – right-wing
parties like One Nation have emerged in Australia, despite Duverger’s Law. For
many voters on the left, the Greens are a far more palatable electoral option than
the ALP, who – along with the Liberal Party – have converged on the centre of the
left–right spectrum.
The electoral outcomes of majoritarian systems highlight both their major
strength (political stability) and their major weakness (lack of ideological repres-
entation). The other major family of electoral systems – consensual systems –
13 See Riker 1982 for a comprehensive discussion.
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Figure 2 Australian House of Representatives – ‘two-party preferred’ election results, 1949
to 2016. Source: AEC 2016.
have the opposite problem: their key strength is in representing views across the
ideological spectrum, but they often suffer from political instability.
Consensual systems
In almost all of South America, and northern, central and western Europe, voters
elect more than one candidate to represent their electoral division. Instead of one
local member, they might have two, three or more. The number of representatives
in each district is called district magnitude, and while it may seem a small thing,
it has a large effect on electoral outcomes, the number of parties that contest
elections and win seats, the stability of governments and the kinds of policies that
the legislature and government produce.
According to Duverger’s Law, parties with similar ideological positions will
inevitably either merge or withdraw from elections to avoid stealing votes from
each other and allowing ideologically distant parties to win. In multi-member
districts (i.e. where the district magnitude is two or higher), ideologically similar
parties or candidates can both nominate for election and plausibly be elected. They
may still ‘steal’ votes from each other, increasing the total vote share of a common
political opponent, but as the vote share required for winning is lower the chance
of either or both candidates winning at least one seat is higher.
Imagine a local election in which five members are being chosen to represent
one division. There are 20 candidates nominated: five centre-left candidates, five
centre-right candidates, five candidates from the far left and five candidates from
the far right. In a plurality (‘first past the post’) election, the far left and far right
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candidates might withdraw to shore-up electoral support for the centre-left and
centre-right candidates respectively. With five seats up for grabs, however, the more
extreme candidates are more likely to stay in the contest.
In elections for the ACT Legislative Assembly, voters elect five representatives
in each of the five divisions. The legislature is comprised of 25 representatives,
with any party that can control a majority of members given the right to form a
government. In the 2016 election, two divisions elected three ALP members and
two Liberal members. One division elected three Liberal members and two ALP
members. The other two divisions each elected two ALP members, two Liberal
members, and one Greens member.
The final distribution of seats was 12 to the ALP, 11 to the Liberals and two to
the Greens. Accordingly, neither major party was able to form a government in its
own right, as neither had a clear majority of seats in the Assembly. Three plausible
outcomes might have followed. First – and least likely, based on historical trends
– the two major parties could have formed a coalition to govern together, with a
23 to two seat majority over the opposition Greens party. Second, the two Greens
members could have joined the 11 Liberals to form a 13 to 12 seat majority over the
opposition ALP.
Finally, and most likely given their ideological positions, the two Greens
members could join the 12 ALP members to form a 14 to 11 majority over the
opposition Liberals. This is precisely what happened, with the Greens and ALP
leaders signing a formal pact to ensure the stability of the coalition government.
The Greens promised to only support any motion of no confidence against the ALP-
led government in the case of misconduct or corruption, and the Greens’ leader
was rewarded with a ministerial appointment. Similar ALP–Greens coalitions have
governed in Tasmania, which uses an identical electoral system to the ACT.
This kind of electoral outcome, in which no one party wins a clear majority of
seats, and government formation, in which two or more parties must work together
to form a majority coalition, is common throughout much of the democratic world.
Further, it often occurs on a much larger scale. In the 2017 German federal election,
no party won a majority of seats in its own right. Incumbent Chancellor Angela
Merkel’s centre-right Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands/Christlich-
Soziale Union in Bayern (CDU/CSU) party won the most seats (246 of 709), while
the left-wing Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) won the second most
(153 of 709). The third most successful party, with 94 seats, was the far right
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).
Initially, the CDU/CSU attempted to negotiate a coalition agreement with two
much smaller parties, the semi-libertarian Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) and
the left-wing (but environmentally focused) Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Greens).
Negotiations failed when the three parties could not agree on immigration and
energy policy positions. Eventually, the CDU/CSU and SPD formed a ‘grand
coalition’ (the term used to describe the two largest parties governing together),
with 504 of the Bundestag’s 709 seats. This was the third time in the Merkel
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government’s four terms that the two parties had governed together. The parties
share little common ideological ground, with each compromising considerably on
a range of policies in order to produce a workable coalition agreement.
While the ensuing ‘grand coalition’ represents a large portion of the German
left–right political spectrum, we also expect it to be relatively unstable. Either or both
parties might choose to dismantle the coalition (likely causing new elections to be
held), rather than continue to compromise on so many issues and support policies
that are a long ideological distance from their usual position. Where parties are closer
in terms of their ideological and policy preferences, they both (or all, in the case of
larger coalitions) have greater interest in maintaining the coalition and staying in
government.14 We also know from the German case that individuals who had voted
for candidates from ‘grand coalition’ member parties are less likely to vote for those
parties in subsequent elections.15 In other words, they punish parties for entering and
governing in coalitions with other large, ideologically dissimilar parties.
In this way, consensual political systems face the opposite dilemma to
majoritarian systems. They provide high levels of representation by opening up
government and ministerial appointments to more than one party (and often to
parties representing a large range of ideological views). On the other hand, parties
can withdraw from a coalition agreement at any time, causing the government
to collapse and new elections to be held. Accordingly, consensual systems can
see more voters changing their mind between elections, and higher rates of
government turnover and of parties emerging and dying.
While specific forms of majoritarian electoral systems are rather straightforward
and few in number, there are many ways of electing consensual governments, with a
large range of complexity. The most common electoral system producing consensual
outcomes is called party list voting. In party list systems, parties are allocated a
percentage of seats based on the percentage of votes they receive. The closer the
percentage of votes won to the percentage of seats won, the more proportional
a system is. Depending on whether an electoral threshold is used in a party list
system, parties might be required to win a certain percentage of votes before they
are awarded a seat. Further, the means by which ‘remainders’ are distributed (e.g. if
a party wins 38 per cent of votes in a ten-seat division, they will only be allocated
three seats and 8 per cent of the total votes are ‘remainders’) will contribute to system
proportionality. However, these are secondary concerns.
Imagine an electoral division with ten seats vacant. Each party nominates a
list of candidates for election, with a maximum of ten candidates (because, in
the unlikely event that the party wins 100 per cent of the vote, there are only
enough seats for ten candidates). The most successful party, the fictional Centrist
Conservatives, wins 30 per cent of the vote and is awarded three seats. In a closed
party list system, parties determine the order of candidates on the list, meaning
14 Powell and Powell Jr 2000.
15 Banaszak and Doerschler 2012.
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that the Centrist Conservative’s three most preferred candidates are automatically
elected. In closed list systems, parties and their members have a lot of control over
the selection of candidates, and we expect that candidates will react by focusing on
party members at the expense of their constituents (although little evidence exists
to support this hypothesis).
In an open party list system, voters can vote for whichever candidate they like
within a list. Often, open lists are randomised so that parties cannot indicate any
preference for individual candidates. Each vote – despite ostensibly being cast for
an individual candidate – is counted as a vote for the party first and the candidate
second. If the Centrist Conservatives win 30 per cent of the vote, they still win three
seats but the elected candidates are determined by the highest individual vote share.
The result is an outcome that prioritises parties over candidates, but does not give
parties total control over who is elected. Further, it makes elected representatives
accountable to voters, rather than just their parties; a candidate who is a favourite
of party officials will not be elected if voters do not know them or do not approve
of them.
Beyond party-list systems, the other common means of electing consensual
governments is single transferable vote (STV). STV is used to elect the Australian
Senate, and variants of it are used to elect the ACT and Tasmanian governments.
The key feature of STV is that voters can rank individual candidates. Once a
candidate reaches a predetermined quota, any additional votes are transferred to
the candidates ranked second on each ballot paper. In the Australian Senate, the
quota is calculated by:
The number of formal ballot papers cast
(The number of senators to be elected + one) rounded down + one
Votes additional to this quota are transferred at a reduced value, calculated as:
Additional votes
Number of votes for candidate
As with preferential voting in majoritarian systems, the least popular candidate
is eliminated at the end of each round of counting. This candidate’s votes are
transferred to the next ranked candidates at the full value of the original vote (i.e.
one vote = one vote). The form of STV used in the Senate is particularly party-
centric: candidates are grouped by the party that they are representing and listed
in the order predetermined by that party. Voters have the option of either ranking
individual candidates in the order they choose (see Figure 3) or (the much less time-
consuming option) ranking the parties as groups of candidates and automatically
allocating their preferences per the parties’ predetermined candidate ranking
(Figure 4). Independent candidates can nominate for the Senate, and often choose
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to be grouped with other independents in an ‘unaligned’ or similar group in order to
maximise their collective vote share. The unnamed group in Figure 4 is an example.
Hare–Clark systems, such as those used in Tasmania and the ACT, do not give
voters the option of ranking parties. Rather, candidates are grouped by party (or
independent status) on the ballot paper, but voters must rank them individually
(see Figure 5). Moreover, both Tasmania and the ACT use ‘Robson rotation’: the
electoral commission prints as many versions of the ballot paper as there are
candidates in the largest group, with the order randomised and each candidate
appearing at the top of the list as often as every other candidate in their group.
Accordingly, the parties have no power to promote particular candidates via the
ballot paper; as in open party-list systems, candidates need to be known to and
trusted by voters themselves.
Mixed systems
Some jurisdictions have successfully combined elements of majoritarian and
consensual electoral systems. Although German elections have consistently pro-
duced coalition governments, the country actually has a semi-consensual electoral
system. Voters get to cast two ballots: one for their local electoral division (i.e.
a ‘local member’) and one vote for a party. They can vote for a local candidate
representing one party, but cast a party vote for an entirely different party. In this
way, parties are incentivised to provide both strong local representation and a clear,
cohesive vision for the country. New Zealand has a similar system, allowing voters
both an electorate and party vote (see Figure 6). Representatives elected from the
electorate and party lists – with the latter appointed in a closed party list process
– sit together in the unicameral (i.e. one house) legislature. This combination
of systems is commonly called ‘mixed member proportional’, and many political
scientists laud its combination of representation and stability.16
Conclusions
This chapter has explored how electoral systems can affect political stability,
responsiveness, representativeness and citizen satisfaction. It has also examined
compulsory voting, an aspect of Australia’s electoral system that is often taken for
granted, but one that is integral to the country’s political culture, party system and
electoral outcomes. The combination of Australia’s majoritarian electoral system
(in the federal House of Representatives, where government is formed) and
compulsory voting has led to high levels of political stability and the long-term
dominance of the major parties.
16 Shugart and Wattenberg 2001.
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Although compulsory voting is comparatively rare and imposes a small but
important burden on all eligible voters, Australians overwhelmingly support it.
This chapter has described strong public support for Australia’s compulsory voting
laws, the resulting high rates of voter turnout and the ease with which Australians
are able to cast a vote. Finally, the chapter has given an overview of the two
largest families of electoral systems – majoritarian and consensual – as well as
those systems that combine elements of both. While majoritarian systems, such
as plurality and preferential voting, provide political stability, they offer no
representation for losing candidates and relatively little for opposition parties.
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Figure 6 Sample ballot paper from a New Zealand national election, using mixed
member proportional voting. Source: New Zealand parliament.
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The Australian party system
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Political parties are integral to modern political systems. Parties are organised
bodies of individuals that nominate candidates at elections, advancing specific
policy goals.1 They play crucial roles in liberal democratic systems. Parties help
to decentralise power as they compete for electoral support. They provide a link
between government and society and, because they are comprised of ordinary
citizens, advance the notion of government ‘for the people, by the people’.2 Parties
also contribute to the stability of political systems as they aggregate policy demands
and provide alternative policy choices for voters.3 Furthermore, parties are res-
ponsible for selecting candidates for election, forming government and opposition
and ‘promoting and participating in public debates on major issues’.4 Parties are
seen as so important to modern liberal democracies that some have argued that
political systems could not exist without them.5
Ghazarian, Zareh (2019). The Australian party system. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
1 See Ghazarian 2015, 1. See also White 2006, 6.
2 See Parkin 2006, 3–24, and Katz and Mair 1995.
3 Ball and Peters 2000, 97.
4 Mayer 1991, 49.
5 Macridis 1967, 9; Schattshneider 1942, 1.
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Party systems vary across liberal democracies. Party systems are characterised
by the number of parties elected to parliament and forming government.6 England,
for example, can be seen to have a two-party system as the competition for
executive control is between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. The
USA is also an example of a two-party system because of the domination of the
Democratic and Republican parties.7 European polities such as Germany and Italy
have multiparty systems – a range of parties win representation to parliament and
government is the product of parties forming coalitions.8
The electoral system (i.e. the method by which candidates are elected to
parliament) influences the party system.9 In the 1950s, political scientist Maurice
Duverger hypothesised that in a system that elects a single member to represent
each geographic area through a majoritarian electoral method, two parties will
dominate.10 In contrast, Duverger argued that proportional representation would
foster a multiparty system.11
This chapter begins by examining the party system in the Australian House
of Representatives. It explores the major parties that have consistently won
representation in the chamber, highlighting how their origins, policy traditions
and organisation continue to be important in contemporary politics. The chapter
then considers the party system that exists in the Australian Senate. In doing so, it
examines the evolution of the types of parties elected to the upper house.
Party system in the House of Representatives
The Australian Labor Party (ALP) and a series of non-Labor parties have domin-
ated the House of Representatives since Federation.12 In fact, it was not until 2010
that the first minor party won a seat in the chamber at a general election in the
postwar period.13
The party system in the House of Representatives can be seen as an example
of ‘tripartism’ if the Labor, Liberal and National parties are considered as separate
entities.14 While the National Party is numerically smaller than the other major
parties, it has held government positions thanks to its coalition deal with the
Liberals.15 It is therefore considered to be part of the anti-Labor grouping in the
House of Representatives, which means the party system in this chamber is an
6 See Duverger 1967.
7 See Sundquist 1983.
8 Kreppel 2002.
9 See also Riker 1982.
10 Duverger 1954, 217.
11 Duverger 1954, 239.
12 Aitkin 1977; Jaensch 1989a.
13 The Australian Greens won the seat of Melbourne.
14 Duverger 1967, 235.
15 Woodward 2006.
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example of a two-party system.16 The origins, organisation and policy traditions of
the Labor, Liberal and National parties differ and must be examined in order to
understand the Australian party system.
The Australian Labor Party
The ALP is the oldest political party in Australia and one of the oldest trade union-
based parties in the world. Its origins date back to the early 1870s. Labor is a mass
party, which means that it allows ordinary citizens to join as members and, in
theory, influence the party’s decisions. The party’s emergence was underpinned by
unions responding to disputes regarding pay and conditions in the early 1890s.
Concerned by the impact the economic recession of the time was having on their
members, the unions held an Australia-wide strike. This strike, however, was
defeated in every colony.17
Frustrated by these losses, the unions mobilised to create a new political party,
the Labor Party, to stand candidates at elections and win government.18 In doing
so, the unions would gain direct representation in parliament and would be able
to advance the interests of their movement. Labor consolidated its position across
the colonies and succeeded in winning parliamentary representation at the first
federal election in 1901. In 1904, it made history by becoming the first union-
based political party in government as Labor leader John Christian Watson formed
a minority government.
Policy traditions
Three broad policy traditions characterise the Labor Party today. The first is
labourism, which became a prominent feature of the Hawke government during
the 1980s.19 A core characteristic of labourism is managing the economy in order
to benefit salary earners.20 The ALP’s adoption of labourism led to arguments
that it had abandoned its traditional role of advancing the interests of unions in
Australian politics.21 Labourism, however, was a response to changes in society and
the economy that were also apparent in the union movement, which transitioned
from being dominated by blue-collar to white-collar unions.22 Labourism is still a
significant feature of the Labor Party today. It can be seen in the party’s acceptance
that the private sector is critical to creating wealth.23
16 McAllister 1982, 68.
17 Economou 2006.
18 Economou and Ghazarian 2010.
19 See Singleton 1990.
20 Manning 1992, 14.
21 See, for example, Jaensch 1989b.
22 Manning 1992, 27.
23 Manning 1992, 14.
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The second policy tradition is democratic socialism, which regards capitalism
as inherently exploitative. Democratic socialists believe that the primary means
of addressing this exploitation is to allow the government to control economic
resources. In particular, government ownership of private sector companies and
industries (which is often referred to as nationalisation) is sometimes advanced as
a policy goal by democratic socialists.24
The third policy tradition is social democracy, which is also based on the idea
that capitalism can lead to exploitation. Unlike democratic socialists, however, social
democrats are more accommodating of the private sector. They seek to address
the potential exploitation caused by capitalism through policy measures, such as
advancing welfare policies or regulation, rather than through nationalisation.25
These three traditions also underpin the factions in the Labor Party. Factions
are like small parties operating within a larger party. There are two broad factional
groupings in the Labor Party. The right-wing factions tend to adhere to labourism
and social-democratic traditions, while the left-wing factions are more supportive
of democratic-socialist objectives. Just like political parties, factions in the Labor
Party have their own members, organisational structures, leaders and policy
agendas.26 The roles factions play are also similar to those of political parties. While
factions can play a positive role in a party, sometimes the contest between factions
for influence within the party can lead to destabilising power struggles.27
Party organisation
The national conference is the peak decision-making body of the ALP; each state
also has a state conference. The purpose of the state and national conferences is to
direct party policies and platforms. Decisions made at the national conference have
a significant impact on the operation of the party. For example, in 2015 the national
conference decided to aim to increase the number of female parliamentarians in
the party to at least 50 per cent by 2025.28 The Labor Party is hierarchical, however,
in that the national organisation can intervene in and discipline state and territory
branches.
All members of the Labor Party are expected to sign ‘The Pledge’, which is an
oath of loyalty requiring members to work to advance the interests of the party and
never stand against endorsed Labor candidates in an election. Furthermore, when
elected to government, the caucus (the term that refers to the party’s parliamentary
wing) is expected to implement the policies decided by the party’s membership. It
24 Economou 2006.
25 Economou 2006.
26 See Economou 2006.
27 In 2010, for example, the factions withdrew support from Kevin Rudd and supported Julia
Gillard to become prime minister. In 2013, the factions once again shifted their support and
reinstalled Kevin Rudd to the prime ministership.
28 Peatling 2015.
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is expected that Labor parliamentarians will never vote against caucus. If they do,
they can be expelled from the party.29
Labor Party splits and their impact on the party system
While discipline and unity have been the goals of the Labor Party organisation,
the party has undergone three significant splits. These splits affected the Australian
party system, benefiting the non-Labor parties (as will be discussed below).
The first split was in 1916, in the midst of the First World War. Labor Prime
Minister William Morris Hughes planned to introduce conscription through a
referendum. His plans encountered resistance from many within the party, and the
referendum was rejected by Australians. In response, Hughes and 23 of his caucus
colleagues resigned from the Labor Party and joined members from the Fusion
Liberal Party to create a new political force that was called the Australian National
Federation, often referred to as the Nationalists. In doing so, Hughes created the
main anti-Labor Party that would remain in government until 1923.
The Labor Party also split in 1931 over the issue of managing the failing
economy during the Great Depression. The party split between those who
supported Prime Minister James Scullin’s plan to reduce government spending and
those who argued that the government needed to spend on public projects, such as
infrastructure, to stimulate economic activity.
The third split in the Labor Party is often known as the ‘great split’. This came
to a head in the mid-1950s, following several years of instability in the Labor Party
in the aftermath of the Second World War over the issue of the perceived influence
of communist forces in the union movement.30 This deeply divided the party and
contributed to its inability to win government for over two decades.
Labor in government
The first Labor government elected after the ‘great split’ in 1953 was led by Gough
Whitlam. In 1972, Whitlam ended Labor’s 23 years in opposition. The Whitlam
government was characterised by major reforms, including the introduction of
Medicare, free tuition for university students and greater emphasis on Indigenous
land rights, as well as by decisions that offended the union movement, such as
the reduction of tariffs by 25 per cent. The Whitlam government was dismissed by
the governor-general in 1975, following a dispute between the House of Repres-
entatives and the Senate that resulted in the upper house refusing to pass the
government’s budget. The Whitlam government left an important policy legacy on
the ALP as it demonstrated how the party sought to recast itself as one that was
29 See Economou and Ghazarian 2010.
30 See Love 2005.
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responsive to the needs of the broader electorate and not just those affiliated with
the trade unions.
This approach was adopted by the next Labor prime minister, Bob Hawke,
who led the party to government in 1983. Among the Hawke government’s policy
achievements was the Prices and Incomes Accord, which sought to constrain wage
growth in return for government spending on the ‘social wage’ – which included
education and health programs – and promised price restraint. Significant reforms
included floating the Australian dollar, a shift towards privatising previously state-
owned entities, such as Qantas and the Commonwealth Bank, and ensuring that
the level of government spending would not exceed the national economy’s growth
rate. Hawke was replaced as prime minister by his treasurer, Paul Keating, in 1991.
The Keating government emphasised a number of issues that were prioritised
by Prime Minister Paul Keating. In particular, Indigenous affairs, Australia’s
relationship with Asia and moves towards a republic were prominent during this
government’s time in office. The Keating government lost the 1996 election,
marking the end of Labor’s longest period in government. Labor would not return
to government until 2007.
Between 2007 and 2013, the Rudd and Gillard governments were marred by
internal instability. Kevin Rudd became prime minister in 2007 but was replaced
by Julia Gillard – who became Australia’s first female prime minister – in 2010.
Gillard was replaced by Rudd once again in the lead-up to the 2013 election. This
period of government implemented significant reforms, such as the introduction of
the National Disability Insurance Scheme and a short-lived mechanism for carbon
pricing.
The Liberal Party
The Liberal Party is the latest in the line of non-Labor parties that have existed
in Australia since 1901. In the years following Federation, non-Labor parties were
either Free Traders, many of whom were from New South Wales (NSW), or Protec-
tionists who hailed from Victoria. These groups were brittle and loosely organised
coalitions of individual parliamentarians who, unlike Labor, did not have an extra-
parliamentary wing from which to draw support. This instability motivated non-
Labor politicians to find ways of creating a stronger organisational framework to
support their parliamentary campaigns.31
Their efforts were strengthened in the aftermath of the first split in the Labor
Party. William Morris Hughes and his colleagues from Labor joined the opposition
to create the Nationalist Party. The party won the 1917 federal election and
remained in government until 1929. During that time, the Nationalists entered into
a coalition agreement with the Country Party for support in parliament.
31 See Errington 2015.
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The Labor split of 1931 again resulted in ex-Labor parliamentarians joining the
non-Labor force to create a new political party – the United Australia Party (UAP).
The UAP, led by former Labor minister Joseph Lyons, won the 1931 federal election
and started developing extra-parliamentary structures in order to recruit members
and raise money for campaigns. By 1939, however, the brittleness of non-Labor
parties became apparent again. Lyons passed away and was replaced by Robert
Menzies who, at the time, was a polarising figure. The UAP began to collapse when
Menzies became part of Winston Churchill’s British war cabinet in the midst of the
Second World War. Menzies resigned as prime minister in 1941, and the party, led
by William Morris Hughes, suffered a heavy defeat at the 1943 election.
Following yet another failed experiment by the non-Labor side of Australian
politics, Menzies began plans for creating a new party. In weekly radio addresses
throughout 1942, Menzies discussed a range of policy issues.32 In one famous
speech, he highlighted the need for a new political party that was not based around
the union movement or the wealthy. In the ‘forgotten people’ speech, Menzies
argued that the middle class, who he identified as including ‘salary earners’,
professionals and farmers, were not being represented by the existing parties.33
Menzies quickly galvanised elements of the UAP and other non-Labor forces and
held two conferences, one in Canberra and the other in Albury, in order to
construct a new cohesive political force. The modern Liberal Party was launched
in 1944 as the result of these efforts. It would seek to win executive government by
joining forces with the Country Party in a formal coalition.
Party organisation
Unlike the ALP, which has a centralised organisation, the Liberal Party is made
up of autonomous state and territory divisions that are responsible for running
the campaigns and day-to-day affairs of the party.34 The federal division does not
have the power to intervene in the affairs of state divisions. As a result, the Liberal
Party, unlike Labor, cannot have centralised decisions made on matters such as the
number of females in parliament. Another point that differentiates the organisation
of the Liberal Party from that of Labor is that the Liberal Party does not allow
any external entity, such as a union or business group, to join the party. Liberal
parliamentarians also have greater autonomy from the party’s organisation. They
are not required to sign a pledge of loyalty and, in theory, are allowed to vote
according to their conscience without being reprimanded by a central authority.
In practice, however, voting against the party is rare. When it does occur, it is
usually over issues on which the party allows parliamentarians to freely decide how
32 See Brett 2007.
33 For the full speech, see Brett 2007, 21–27.
34 The Liberal and National parties merged in Queensland in 2008.
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to vote, such as same-sex marriage and euthanasia. These are often referred to as
conscience, or free, votes in parliament.
The Liberal Party does not have formal factions, though groupings of like-
minded individuals tend to form. In more recent years, groupings with competing
views on social issues have become prominent. The party has a significant cohort
of members who advance socially conservative positions, such as opposing same-
sex marriage and Australia becoming a republic. They also tend to be sceptical of
unilateral methods for addressing climate change. The party also has members who
tend to favour more socially progressive ideas. This cleft, in addition to concerns
about the popularity of the leader, has been at the core of instability in the Liberal
Party following the defeat of the Howard government in 2007.
Policy making is also different in the Liberal Party in that the decisions made by
the extra-parliamentary wing are not binding on the parliamentary wing. In effect,
the Liberal parliamentary leader has the power to decide the party’s policies. The
power of the party leader, however, is tempered by the fact that they must maintain
the support of their parliamentary colleagues to remain leader. As former Prime
Minister John Howard noted, leadership is a ‘gift of the party room’.35 As a result,
effective Liberal Party leaders must take the policy wishes of their colleagues and
the extra-parliamentary wing into account to maintain support.
The Liberal Party in government
After winning the 1949 election, Robert Menzies led the Liberal Party to consecutive
election victories until his retirement in 1966. Melding conservative and pragmatic
elements was part of Menzies’ repertoire. He committed Australia to supporting the
USA in the Vietnam War and sought to ban the Communist Party of Australia.
Pragmatism was evident in the Menzies government’s approach to issues concerning
economic policy, especially as it implemented protectionist policies to assist
manufacturing and agriculture.36 Menzies was replaced by Harold Holt, who went
missing in 1967 after going for a swim in Portsea, Victoria. The Liberal Party selected
John Gorton to replace Holt. Gorton, in turn, was replaced by William McMahon,
who led the party to defeat in 1972, some 23 years after Menzies’ initial success.
The Liberal Party, along with its coalition partner, returned to government
in 1975, following the dismissal of the Whitlam government by the governor-
general. Led by Malcolm Fraser, the party continued the tradition set by Menzies.
The government was also progressive in other policies, such as supporting
multiculturalism and welcoming Cambodian and Vietnamese ‘boat people’ who
were fleeing the communist regimes in their home countries.37
35 Howard 2006.
36 See Brett 2007.
37 Economou and Ghazarian 2010.
The Australian party system
113
The Fraser government was defeated in 1983 and the Liberal Party spent 13
years in opposition, returning to power under the leadership of John Howard.
Howard’s government was similar to that of Menzies in that it pursued economic
reform while advancing socially conservative policies.38 Much to the chagrin of
many rural and regional voters, the government succeeded in bringing about a
national firearms agreement following the Port Arthur shootings in 1996. In 2000,
it implemented the Goods and Services Tax. The government also introduced
welfare measures, including a first homeowner’s grant and a lump-sum payment
to new parents, known as the ‘baby bonus’. Border and national security became
defining issues for the Howard government, especially in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks in the USA in September 2001.39
The Liberal Party was defeated in 2007 but was returned to power in 2013, with
Tony Abbott as leader. Abbott’s prime ministership combined elements of social
conservatism and economic liberalisation. Abbott sought to reinforce Australia’s
links to Britain, supporting the monarchy by reintroducing knight and dame
honours for Australians. The government also advanced economic liberalisation
measures such as ending subsidies to vehicle manufacturers, which led to the
eventual closure of car-making plants in Australia. The Abbott government
disestablished policies of the previous Labor government, especially those
concerning climate change.40
The Liberal Party demonstrated how the gift of leadership could be taken away
by the parliamentary wing when, in 2015, it replaced Abbott with Malcolm Turnbull.
As prime minister, Turnbull advanced a more socially progressive agenda. One of
the most significant policy changes overseen by the Turnbull government was in
2017, when, after a national public vote, legislation was changed to allow same-sex
marriage in Australia. The parliamentary wing again showed its capacity to choose
leaders at will, replacing Turnbull with Scott Morrison in 2018, following a series of
poor opinion poll results.
The National Party
The National Party (also known as the Nationals), which was originally known as
the Country Party, is Australia’s second oldest political party. It was created with
the aim of representing the interests of rural and regional areas and contested
its first federal election in 1919. The party was originally underpinned by the
primary producers in the agriculture sector, which was responsible for providing a
significant source of export income.
38 See Hollander 2008.
39 See McKay, Hall and Lippi 2017.
40 See Talberg, Hui and Loynes 2016.
Australian Politics and Policy
114
Like the other major parties, the National Party is a mass party and is open
for individuals to join. Similar to the Liberal Party, the National Party comprises
autonomous state divisions, while the role of the extra-parliamentary wing is to
provide financial and campaign support for the parliamentary wing. The extra-
parliamentary wing is also responsible for pre-selecting candidates.41
The party changed its name from the Country Party to the National Party of
Australia in 1982 as it sought to appeal to Australians living in cities. The party has
consistently tried to broaden its constituency as populations in cities have risen.
Since the 1980s, however, the party has focused on contesting provincial and rural
electorates as it has identified these as being its core constituency.
The National Party tends to avoid the divisions over policy goals apparent in
the Labor and Liberal parties. While there is some tension between those primary
producers focused on domestic consumption and those focused on exports, the
party remains united on broad philosophical questions. It does, on the whole,
advance a socially conservative agenda.42 The National Party, like the Liberal Party,
is also highly critical of the role of unions and their impact on economic activity.
The National Party (then known as the Country Party) first agreed to form a
coalition with the Nationalists in 1923 in order to defeat Labor and wield executive
power. Today, the National Party has a formal coalition agreement with the Liberal
Party. As part of the agreement, the Liberal Party leader will be the prime minister,
while the National Party leader will be the deputy prime minister. Another condition
of the agreement is that the Liberal and National parties will not stand candidates
against each other unless the seat in question is vacant or held by another party.
For all its history, the National Party has essentially been a minor party. It
attracts a relatively small proportion of the primary vote and its appeal is limited
to Queensland, NSW and Victoria. Unlike other minor parties, however, it has
been able to consistently win seats in the lower house due to its ability to garner
support in rural and regional areas. In doing so, the National Party has been
integral to keeping its coalition partner in government and has, in turn, been given
opportunities to directly influence national policy.
The Senate party system
While the major parties also win the bulk of the seats in the Senate, the party system
in the upper house, unlike that in the House of Representatives, has undergone
a significant transformation. Changes to the party system coincided with changes
to the Senate voting system. The Chifley Labor government implemented a pro-
portional voting system in 1948, in time for the 1949 election. The party system
41 See Costar 2015.
42 See Costar 2015.
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underwent further changes following additional reforms to the voting system
implemented in 1983.
The early minor parties: products of a major party split
Following the introduction of proportional representation, the Democratic Labor
Party (DLP) became the first minor party to win Senate representation in 1955. It
was created as a result of the ‘great split’ within the Labor Party in the early 1950s.
The party was so focused on stopping the ALP from regaining government that,
once Whitlam won the 1972 election, its reason for existing ceased and the party
collapsed.43
The next minor party elected to the Senate was the Australian Democrats in
1977. Following the 1975 constitutional crisis, there was a growing appetite within
the electorate for alternatives to the major parties. The Democrats emerged in this
climate. The party was led by Don Chipp, a former Liberal minister. Unlike the DLP,
the Democrats sought to reinvigorate the role of the Senate as a house of review by
using their position in the chamber to keep both Labor and the Liberal–National
Coalition (the Coalition) accountable for their performance in parliament.44
This approach resonated with Australian voters, and the party maintained
Senate representation from 1977 and 2007. During this time, it made a significant
contribution to the Australian party system. It was the first parliamentary party to
have a female leader, and it had innovative organisational arrangements, allowing
all members to participate in deciding policy.45 The party, however, appeared
unable to adapt to the competition it was facing from newer minor parties that
would have a significant impact on the Australian party system.
Changes in the Senate party system: electoral reforms and contemporary minor parties
The Senate voting system underwent major changes following the implementation
of the Hawke government’s reforms, which were introduced in 1983 but used
for the first time at the 1984 election. The number of Senators per state rose
from 10 to 12 due to the Hawke government increasing the number of House of
Representatives seats to 148. This triggered the ‘nexus’ provision of the Constitution
(section 24), which states that the number of representatives in the lower house
must be approximately double that in the upper house. This also reduced the
electoral challenges confronting minor parties as the proportion of the vote (or the
quota) they needed to win a seat in an ordinary half-Senate election fell from 16.6
43 The DLP was re-formed and succeeded in winning parliamentary representation in Victoria in
2006 and in 2010 the party won Senate representation. However, the ‘new’ DLP was
qualitatively different to the party that existed throughout the 1950s and 1970s. For further
discussion, see Ghazarian 2013.
44 Ghazarian 2015, 32–5.
45 Ghazarian 2015, 32–5.
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per cent to about 14.4 per cent. A similar fall in the percentage of the statewide vote
needed at full-Senate elections meant that it was now easier for minor parties to
reach the threshold required to win seats in the chamber.
The Hawke government also introduced the group ticket vote (GTV), which
simplified the method of voting for the Senate. Instead of having to number every
box on the Senate ballot paper, citizens could now indicate their first preference
by voting ‘above the black line’. Their preferences would be distributed by the
Australian Electoral Commission as per the instructions lodged by their preferred
party.46 These changes to the Senate voting system coincided with a significant
change to the Senate party system, as shown in Table 1.
As Table 1 shows, there were just three minor parties elected in the 34-year
period between the adoption of proportional representation in 1949 and the last
election before the introduction of the Hawke government reforms in 1983.
Following the implementation of these reforms in 1984, however, 13 minor parties
won Senate representation in 32 years. The parties winning Senate representation
post-1984 have also been qualitatively different to those elected in the period
between 1955 and 1983, as will be discussed below.
‘Green’ parties in the Senate
The first minor party to win Senate representation following the Hawke govern-
ment reforms was the Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) in 1984. The party
opposed the Hawke government’s pro-uranium mining policies and support for the
broad foreign policies of the USA.47 This was significant as it was the first time that
a party advancing a specific policy agenda concerning environmental, conservation
and humanitarian matters won Senate representation.
The party’s candidate in Western Australia (WA), Jo Vallentine, won a Senate
seat, but the party soon collapsed. Vallentine, however, advanced her party’s agenda
in parliament and was instrumental in creating the Vallentine Peace Group, which
then morphed into the WA Greens. The WA Greens, which pursued similar goals
to the NDP, continued to win Senate seats from 1990 onwards but was displaced as
the pre-eminent ‘green’ party by the Australian Greens in the mid-1990s.
The Australian Greens combined a range of conservation movements, espec-
ially from the eastern states, to create a new party. Led by Dr Bob Brown from
Tasmania, the new party was able to win its first Senate seat in 1996. It advanced a
socially progressive agenda and emphasised cosmopolitanism, conservation, social
justice and humanitarian issues.48 By the time of the 2004 election, the WA Greens
(which had been a separate political entity) had joined the Australian Greens
confederation, and the party displaced the Australian Democrats as the third force
46 See Green 2015a.
47 Quigley 1986, 14.
48 See Miragliotta 2006.
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Table 1 Minor parties elected to the Senate since 1949
Minor party Year first Senate seat won
Democratic Labor Party (DLP) 1955
Liberal Movement 1974
Australian Democrats 1977
Nuclear Disarmament Party (NDP) 1984
Vallentine Peace Group 1987
WA Greens 1990
Australian Greens 1996
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 1998
Family First 2004
‘New’ DLP 2010
Liberal Democrats Party (LDP) 2013
Palmer United Party (PUP) 2013
Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party (AMEP) 2013
Hinch Justice Party 2016
Nick Xenophon Team 2016
Jacqui Lambie Network 2016
in the Senate.49 The party has been able to win and maintain representation in
the House of Representatives at general elections since 2010 – something that has
eluded many other minor parties in Australia – especially as it has been able to
attract disenchanted Labor voters.50 The party’s strongest influence has been in
the Senate, where it has often held the balance of power with other non-major
49 Charnock 2009.
50 The Greens won the district of Melbourne from Labor in 2010 and were able to defend the seat
in subsequent elections. See also Bennett 2008.
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party senators. In this role, the party has sought to influence government policy,
especially on issues concerning asylum seekers, environmental conservation and
the provision of state services such as health care and education.
Non-‘green’ parties in the Senate
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party first won Senate representation in 1998. From
the outset, One Nation focused on race and immigration issues.51 One Nation can
be regarded as a populist-right type party – it is led by a charismatic leader and
proposes to solve complex social and economic problems through simple policy
changes.52 At the national level, the party won one Senate seat in Queensland in
1998, attracting the support of disaffected Coalition voters in rural and regional
electorates. But it soon unravelled. One Nation’s organisational structures were
specifically designed so that its leader, Pauline Hanson, and not ordinary members,
had the power to decide the party’s policies. This led to much frustration and
caused many members to leave the party. Pauline Hanson was also sentenced to jail
for fraudulently registering One Nation.53 Hanson soon left the party and contested
subsequent state and federal elections as an independent.
By the time of the 2016 federal election, however, Hanson had rejoined One
Nation. Campaigning on race and immigration matters once more, the party was
able to win a total of four Senate seats (two in Queensland and one each in
NSW and WA) thanks to the lower quota required to win seats in the double
dissolution election (the quota needed to win a seat was half that required at a
general half-Senate election). As in the past, however, One Nation experienced
structural volatility, with some Senators resigning from the party. While Hanson
continued to keep a high public profile in Australian politics, her party’s impact on
the national parliament has been hindered by organisational instability.
Other minor parties from the political right followed One Nation. Family First
was elected to the Senate in 2004 but was only able to win a Victorian Senate seat
because of a series of beneficial preference deals it had organised with other parties,
rather than broad support. Family First positioned itself as an anti-Greens party. It
focused on advancing socially conservative ideals, especially by opposing same-sex
marriage and drug liberalisation. The party originated in South Australia (SA) and
many members had links to Evangelical churches. While Family First could not win
parliamentary representation in 2007 or 2010, the party did return to the Senate
in 2013. The party merged with the Australian Conservatives, created by former
Liberal Senator Cory Bernardi, in 2017.
In 2010, the ‘new’ DLP won Senate representation. The party, however, was
qualitatively different to the version that was in the Senate throughout the 1950s
51 See Ghazarian 2015, 117–8.
52 Economou and Ghazarian 2018.
53 Hanson was released less than three months later. For further discussion, see CMC 2004.
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and 1970s. Like the Family First Party, the ‘new’ DLP was mobilised in order to
advance a socially conservative agenda, especially opposing abortion and same-sex
marriage. And like Family First, the party’s ability to win a Senate seat in Victoria
was due to a series of preference deals that allowed it to reach the quota. The party
was unable to consolidate its Senate representation in subsequent elections.
The Senate party system started to change even more rapidly when, in 2013,
three minor parties won seats in the chamber for the first time. These included the
Palmer United Party, led by businessman Clive Palmer, and the Liberal Democrats.
The Australian Motoring Enthusiasts Party (AMEP) also won Senate representation
in 2013, even though its primary vote in Victoria as just 0.5 per cent. It was able to
win a Senate seat thanks to preference deals it had made with other parties.
The Senate party system continued to diversify in 2016, even though the
Turnbull government made changes to the voting system in response to the 2013
results. The GTV was removed, and voters had to preference at least six parties
above the line or at least 12 candidates below the line. This reform was designed
to stop minor parties that won a very small primary vote from gaining Senate
representation through preference deals.
Despite these changes, three new parties won seats in the Senate, though it
should be remembered that this was a double dissolution election. The Hinch
Justice Party and the Jacqui Lambie Network were joined by the Nick Xenophon
Team, which won three seats in the Senate in addition to the lower house seat of
Mayo in SA.
Accounting for minor parties’ rising support and success
The level of support for minor parties in both houses of parliament has experienced
peaks and troughs, but has been on the rise since 2007. In Senate contests, for
example, the primary vote for minor parties rose from less than 10 per cent in 1949
to the highest rate yet of just under 35 per cent in 2016.54 A key reason for the rise
in support for minor parties is that many new parties have advanced policies that
have responded to changes in society and to the broad policy debate. For example,
the NDP and the Greens attracted the support of voters who felt strongly about
nuclear disarmament, environmental conservation and social justice, while One
Nation attracted the support of those concerned about race and immigration.55
Furthermore, there has been a change in the goals of minor parties contesting
elections. In particular, minor parties that have been able to win seats since the 1980s
have promised to use their parliamentary representation to bring about legislative
change to areas they consider as important. They contrast with minor parties elected
to the chamber throughout the 1950s and 1970s, which were created as a result of
54 See Green 2018, 199.
55 See Economou and Ghazarian 2018; Ghazarian 2015.
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splits in a major party and sought to either stop the Labor Party from regaining
government (in the case of the DLP) or use their position in the Senate to act as
a watchdog on the major parties (in the case of the Democrats). The approach of
contemporary minor parties has resonated with voters, who are willing to support
them and allow them to wield significant power in the legislature.
There has also been a rise in the number of minor parties contesting elections.
In 1984, for example, there were just 18 parties contesting the election, but in 2016
there were 56, most of which were standing for the Senate.56 The proliferation of
new parties also means that voters have even greater choice, which contributes to
the apparent fall in support for the major parties.
Conclusions
There are two distinct party systems in Australia. The first is in the House of
Representatives, which is still dominated by the major parties. The origins of the
major parties show how they were able to attract electoral support (labour
organisation in the case of the ALP, primary producers in the case of the National
Party and conservative-oriented non-labour voters in the case of the Liberal Party).
Their longevity has been underpinned by the voting system used to elect candidates
to the lower house and reflects Duverger’s hypothesis that single-member elect-
orates that use a majoritarian method of electing candidates will produce a two-
party system.
In contrast, the party system in the Senate has undergone significant changes
since the adoption of proportional representation in 1949. Moreover, the type
of minor party elected to the chamber has transitioned – contemporary minor
parties winning seats are advancing specific policy agendas. While the major parties
continue to win a large portion of seats in the Senate, in recent years the use of
proportional representation has contributed to the creation of a multiparty system
that had been hypothesised by Duverger. The rising vote for minor parties shows
that voters are also supporting greater diversity, especially in the upper house.
This changing party system has implications for national policy, especially when
governments must rely on support from these parties to pass legislation.
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Without reading on, try to guess when the following was written:
There is scarcely a single duty of government which was once simple which is not
now complex; government once had but a few masters; it now has scores of masters
… at the same time that the functions of government are every day becoming more
complex and difficult, they are also vastly multiplying in number.1
Does it sound familiar? In fact, these comments were made in a classic of public
administration literature in 1887 by Woodrow Wilson, who would become the US’
28th president. Leaving aside the archaic expression, these comments could have
been made today. It is remarkable how frequently speeches by ministers and public
servants, and academic books and articles, mention the increasing complexity of
the public sector and the demands upon it.
Unikowski, Isi, and John Wanna (2019). The public sector. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 Wilson 1887, 200. Woodrow Wilson was an accomplished practitioner of public administration.
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The contemporary relevance of Wilson’s comments suggests that nothing about
‘the public sector’ is ever settled for very long. There are no issues regarding its
scope, size, reasons for being, ways of working, norms, values and practices that
cannot be and have not been contested and debated since the emergence of the
modern state.
Accordingly, rather than summarising a number of static terms and technical def-
initions that can be found in any standard textbook on the subject, which we would
then have to qualify with caveats, this chapter considers the most important questions
about the public sector and why these keep coming up. It then shows how the answers
to these questions have changed over time, and how they will continue to do so.
What is the public sector?
The question of what differentiates the public sector from the private and comm-
unity, or not-for-profit, sectors lies at the heart of perennial debate around the
world about what governments should be doing and, consequently, how big their
public sectors should be.
The easiest way to start is simply to define the public sector as the outcome of a
set of choices citizens and governments make about two questions:
1. What do citizens and communities want and need in terms of public provision?
2. How should governments respond to these expectations?
The public sector’s role and shape can be seen as a collective approach to the things
governments want to provide or impose, including the allocation of resources,
production of goods, delivery of services and regulation of activity in society.
More specifically, we can view these functions of government in terms of the
economic, political and/or legal purposes they fulfil:
• Economic purposes are achieved by governments performing a rebalancing
function in society by reallocating resources through taxes and charges (e.g.
redistributing from the rich to the poor or aged through social welfare and the
age pension).
• Governments are often required to provide goods and services that the market
has failed to produce or cannot easily produce. Street lights, public roads,
utilities, telecommunication, navigation across air and sea and, historically,
broadcasting and postal services are all delivered by public provision because
private markets will not generally supply goods or services that benefit people
regardless of whether they have paid for them.
• Governments sometimes produce monopolistic goods and services (e.g. water,
electricity and sewerage) because the private sector may not provide them at
a price or at a level of efficiency that is in the public interest. Another reason
for this provision is the long-term investment required and the extensiveness of
the costs associated with supply.
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• Governments are compelled to act as a community protector or insurer of
last resort (that is, providing protection against risks that are too great for
the private sector to handle); for example, dealing with terrorism and national
security, conducting wars, dealing with natural disasters and epidemics and
combatting major crises affecting society, such as financial or economic crises.
• Turning to the public sector’s political purposes, governments respond to
electoral pressures and voter preferences (for more benefits, say, or for extended
services). Political parties channel voter preferences and campaign for office on
policy platforms, with winning parties expected to deliver on their agendas.
• The public sector fulfils important legal functions and provides administrative
services to ensure the rules and stability a functioning society needs are in
place. These include frameworks for the operation and enjoyment of liberty
and property, particularly law enforcement, courts and tribunals and bodies
protecting human rights. They also include regulatory bodies governing matters
such as safety, commerce and consumer protection.
In summary, comments on the role of the public sector that were made two
decades ago by the US organisational theorist Herbert Simon are still relevant
today: ‘At a point in history where cynicism about democracy and distrust of
government are rampant, we need to remind ourselves daily that government
performs a myriad of tasks that are vital to the health and future of our society.’2
Nevertheless, government decisions about what goods and services to supply,
how to do so and how much of particular goods should be supplied are always
contestable, even in the case of core public goods like defence, the courts, the
police, public health, education and so on. These are matters that the political
system determines, just as private markets determine how much of a private good
is produced and sold. Below we will explore some of the ways such issues have been
dealt with in the past.
Public sector governance
The questions of how much control governments can and should exert over the
public sector, to what ends and in what ways have shaped much of the public sector’s
history. The discussions in the following sections of the appropriate size of the
public sector and how its structures and functions have changed over time reflect
the different views and values on which these questions about roles, purposes and
resources turn.
Two important sets of principles provide the norms and conventions that guide
and shape the structures and functions of the public sector. The first may be broadly
referred to as the Westminster tradition of public service. This tradition can be traced
2 Simon 1998, 2.
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back to the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan Report to the British government. This report
essentially established the Westminster tradition of a professional and non-partisan
public service recruited on merit rather than patronage. The Westminster tradition
had a formative effect on the development of the Australian colonial governments at
the time, and, subsequently, on the Commonwealth government.3
The tradition includes the principle that the public service is accountable to
ministers, and ministers are individually and collectively accountable to parliament
and the electorate. The Westminster tradition clearly distinguishes between the
political role of ministers, who ‘have the last word’ on all matters for which they are
responsible, and a bureaucracy that is non-partisan, in that it can only be appointed
and removed according to legislated rules, works loyally for whoever occupies
the ministry, regardless of their political stance, and strenuously avoids active
political participation.4 The principle of ministerial control over the departments
and agencies in their areas of responsibility is a pre-eminent factor in determining
how the public sector is structured, a matter we return to in the next section.
Australia’s federal system provides the second set of norms and principles gover-
ning the public sector. The public sector operates at three levels of government: the
national government, state and territory governments and municipal governments.
Officials work with one another within each of these levels, and across the
Commonwealth–state and state–local levels to develop and implement government
policies and programs, particularly when national policy frameworks are needed
to deliver economic, environmental or other reforms. The federal system shapes
the way policies are designed and implemented by the three levels of government,
including how, when and to what extent the different levels of government engage
with one another, how responsibilities for policy design and delivery are allocated,
how performance is measured and reported and, perhaps most importantly, how the
resources for these functions are collected and distributed.
The structure of the public sector
The relative independence of a public sector organisation from the government
of the day is a fundamental design principle inherited from the Westminster
tradition.5 Within that context, the structures, forms and functions of the public
sector at any time reflect government choices about what public goods and services
to supply, to what extent and in what manner. Accordingly, the way public sector
bodies are set up and function varies considerably along a continuum from the
3 Parker 1978, 349.
4 Rhodes 2005. The risk of politicisation, or even the appearance of such, has become greater in
the age of social media and the erosion of traditional public servant anonymity. The changing
ways in which public officials engage with the distinction between ‘politics’ and ‘administration’
and the blurring between them is explored in Alford et al. 2017.
5 O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna and Weller 1999, 87.
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big, traditional departments that implement government policies in areas like
immigration, transport, the environment and so on, through to ‘corporations’
controlled by governments but largely managed on a commercial basis.
The core public sector consists of departments and agencies that are under direct
ministerial control. They are mainly financed by taxation, which they redistribute
through subsidies, grants and welfare payments. They may also provide a range of
services directly and free of charge (e.g. defence, education, health) or at prices well
below what the commercial market would charge (e.g. subsidised housing).6
Governments may also set up semi-autonomous statutory agencies and corp-
orations for reasons of efficiency, to drive innovative delivery or because the agency
needs to be able to make decisions free of ministerial intervention (such as the
Australian Taxation Office, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commiss-
ion or state government environment protection agencies). In practice, statutory
agencies are still subject to political and financial control by the government of the
day because they depend on the government for their resources, their governing
legislation can always be repealed or amended and individuals who fill statutory
offices are usually appointed by the government.7
Public corporations are agencies that operate independently of government and
may have their own sources of revenue in addition to direct public funding. They
may compete in private markets and make profits. Public corporations include the
Reserve Bank, Australia Post, the National Broadband Network, state government
housing schemes and state-owned bodies that operate power and water supplies.8
Any neat delineation between the public and private sectors is challenged by
increasing collaboration between governments, the private sector and the not-for-
profit sector9 in designing and delivering goods and services. Australian govern-
ments have a long history of relying on the not-for-profit sector, and in some cases
the private sector, to assist with the provision of services and to contribute to their
design. Governments partner with the not-for-profit sector for the delivery of a
range of community, employment, education, health and other services through
contracted networks.
Since 2000, governments have shifted towards this mode of delivering services.
As a result, total government funding for the not-for-profit sector has increased
significantly since 2000. Almost half (46 per cent) of Commonwealth and state/
territory government agencies surveyed in 2010 reported that not-for-profit
organisations made up three-quarters or more of the external organisations
providing services on their behalf.10
6 ABS 2015.
7 Goldring 1980, 355.
8 ABS 2015; United Nations et al. 2009.
9 That is, organisations that are neither commercial nor government bodies, do not earn profits
for their members and perform a range of charitable purposes.
10 Productivity Commission 2010, 300.
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In the private sector’s case, governments transfer risks to companies in return
for financial rewards and incentives, through public–private partnerships for the
delivery of social and economic infrastructure or through contracted delivery of
public programs and services. Withers describes the ‘partnership between market,
state and community in the provision of the foundations of national life [as] the key
to the Australian Way in the institutional construction of the nation’.11
How big should the public sector be?
The size and role of the public sector are logically interdependent. In practice,
however, the two issues are often separated, particularly in criticisms of how much
governments are spending. Consequently, the size and cost of the public sector
is often controversial, even though actual employee numbers have been stable for
many years. The appropriate size of the public sector is regularly tested through
reviews conducted by Commonwealth, state and territory governments, particularly
when incoming governments argue ‘the financial cupboard is bare’.12 Reductions in
the public sector at all three levels of government frequently occur in response to
such reviews and/or to periods of international fiscal crisis. They may take the form
of direct cuts, such as ‘razor gang’ reviews that outsource services to the private
sector, or result from long-term reforms in governance that aim to keep a check
on government size and outlays, such as expenditure review committees, efficiency
dividends and employment restrictions.13
Criticisms of the public sector’s size, in terms of outlays and staff numbers, are
generally based on the effects of government intervention on the economy. These
criticisms are generally based on four key considerations:
• why governments are providing services that the public could choose to pay for
in the private sector
• the requirement for higher taxation and government borrowing to fund public
sector organisations and the goods and services they provide, which may act as
a brake on economic growth
• the possibility of ‘crowding out’ – when businesses find it harder to obtain
finance to invest because government borrowing increases interest rates,
making private borrowing more expensive
• government services are often criticised for being inefficient, such as when
Commonwealth and state government responsibilities overlap in particular
areas of policy.
11 Fabian and Breunig 2018, 236 (emphasis in original).
12 Weight 2014, 5.
13 At the Commonwealth level, an efficiency dividend that reduces funding for departmental
expenses by a factor of between 1 and 4 per cent based on assumed productivity increases has
been in place for 30 years (Horne 2012, 2).
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Figure 1 Jurisdictional composition of public sector employment. Source: ABS 2018.
An overview of trends in public sector employment over the past decade is
provided in Figure 1. This figure shows that there has been an increase overall
in the number of public sector employees, from 1.75 million in 2007–8 to 1.99
million in 2017–18.14 However, as a proportion of the total workforce, public sector
employee numbers declined from 21 per cent in 1990 to 16 per cent by the end of
the 1990s, where they have remained, apart from a slight rise in 2007–11. Public
sector workers currently constitute 15.5 per cent of the workforce.15
The relative proportions of those employed across the three levels of govern-
ment have also remained stable over the decade. However, the compositions of the
Commonwealth and state/territory public sectors are quite different, reflecting the
significantly greater role the state and territory public sectors play in direct service
delivery to individuals, communities and businesses. Only around one-quarter of
the Commonwealth public service works on service delivery.16 Conversely, the
proportion of those in the states and territories working on service delivery tends
to be much larger (around 80–85 per cent), with a correspondingly smaller number
working on policies for these governments.17
At around 36 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), general government
spending in Australia is not large by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) standards;18 this proportion has not changed much over the
preceding two decades. By themselves, however, statistics on the size of and trends
in public sector employment and expenditure tell us very little, compared with how
ideas about the appropriate role for governments change over time and are reflected
14 ABS 2018.
15 ABS 2017.
16 Australian Public Service Commission 2018.
17 Data sourced from state government workforce statistics.
18 OECD 2018. Commonwealth government outlays alone represent around 25.4 per cent of GDP
(Commonwealth of Australia 2018).
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in the public sector’s functions. (We will look at this issue more closely in the next
section.)
As we have noted, the vast majority of public sector employees are engaged in
direct service delivery, particularly through the education, health and police/justice
sectors. This reflects the public’s continuing expectation that ‘the service state’ will
provide a range of services directly, as one component in a ‘hybrid mixture of part
public, part private activities, delivery chains that do not remain in neat boxes or
organisational settings’.19
An overview of recent public sector changes
Developments in how the public sector works reflect the way Australians and
their elected representatives decide the following questions, and how those answers
change over time:
• What are most efficient, effective, equitable and sustainable ways for govern-
ments to design and deliver services and programs that respond to the needs
and wants of their citizens, businesses and communities?
• How should that response involve the private and not-for-profit sectors, and
citizens themselves?
The ‘traditional’ public sector was arguably the dominant model for the public sector
in Australia and New Zealand to the end of the 1980s. This model was characterised
by a number of features derived from the Westminster tradition, including:
• a politically neutral public service controlled by and accountable to ministers
• government departments that directly provide services, with little outsourcing
and competition, integrating policy and operational functions, from the design
of policies through to their implementation and delivery ‘at street level’
• in order to perform these functions effectively and efficiently, departments
organised in standardised managerial hierarchies in which power and authority
are increasingly invested in correspondingly smaller echelons of senior officials
(as distinct, say, from markets and networks)20
• departments largely designed to implement political directions in discrete,
manageable and repetitive tasks, conducted according to prescribed rules and
technical expertise.21
However, during the 1970s and 1980s, governments were increasingly faced with
economic globalisation, demographic pressures, the role of supranational economic
and political institutions and concerns about the size and cost of their public
19 Wanna, Butcher and Freyens 2010, 31.
20 Osborne 2010, 8.
21 Stoker 2006, 45.
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sectors. Consequently, they also questioned their capacity to manage these issues
through traditional bureaucratic structures and methods.22 Perceptions that the
public service had become ‘a self-contained elite exercising power in the interests
of the status quo but without effectively being accountable for its exercise’23 led to
reviews and changes that aimed to restore ministerial control.
The most important set of public sector practices and values that emerged
in the 1980s and 1990s is collectively described as the new public management
(NPM), and is still highly influential today. NPM aimed to make government more
efficient and effective, based on ideas derived from economic theory and business
management techniques. Its proponents called for the public sector’s monopoly
over policy making and service delivery to be removed or at least reduced. (The
Howard government’s minister for administrative services applied a ‘yellow pages’
test: if a business was listed in the business phone directory, the minister argued
that there was no reason why it should be provided by government.)24
Instead, the NPM’s objectives included giving users more choice in the services
they received, making more use of market-type competition, and foreshadowed
a program of widespread privatisations and the separation of service delivery
agencies from their parent policy departments. They called for a greater focus
on financial incentives and transparent performance management in public sector
organisation.25 The classic NPM text Reinventing government26 coined the phrase
‘steering, not rowing’ to advocate less involvement by the public sector in actually
delivering services and more focus on policy making and on the choice and design
of such services.27
A summary of NPM’s characteristics, such as ‘disaggregation, competition and
incentivization’,28 is provided in Table 1. In practice, NPM was not always adopted
for the same reasons and did not always consist of the same policy mix when
implemented.29
22 Other potential explanations of NPM point to more endogenous developments within
bureaucracies themselves, such as the impact of new technologies that allowed work to be
refashioned along private sector lines.
23 Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (1976), quoted in Wanna and
Weller 2003, 87.
24 Aulich and O’Flynn 2007, 160.
25 Hood 1991, 5.
26 Osborne and Gaebler 1992.
27 Denhardt and Denhardt 2015, 11; Osborne and Gaebler 1992, 32; Pollitt 2002, 276.
28 Dunleavy et al. 2006.
29 Dunleavy et al. 2006; Hood 1995; Pollitt 2002; Pollitt 1995.
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Table 1 Comparison of the new public management (NPM) and traditional public
services
Dimensions
of change
under NPM
Under older forms of
bureaucracy
Under NPM
Organisational
disaggregation
Uniform public service-
wide rules; centralised
controls over pay and
staffing
Disaggregation of units in the public sector
to enhance management and focus account-
ability; separately managed, corporatised
units with delegated control over resources;
disaggregation of traditional bureaucratic
organisations into commissioning and
delivering agencies, the latter related to the
‘parent’ by a contract or quasi-contract
More
competition in
the public
sector
Public service
organisations have semi-
permanent roles; unified
organisational chains of
delivery and
responsibility
More use of contracts and outsourcing;
competition within the public sector and
with the private sector
Adoption of
private-sector
management
practices
Emphasis on a distinctive
‘public service ethic’, part-
icularly its non-pecuniary
value set, permanency
and standard national pay
and conditions; citizens
and businesses seen as
clients and beneficiaries
Adoption of private-sector reward systems,
greater flexibility in hiring and rewards; term
contracts, performance-related pay and local
determination of pay and conditions;
emphasis on service quality; citizens and
businesses are rational consumers and
therefore ‘customer responsiveness’ is
paramount
Discipline and
frugality in
resource use
Emphasis on institutional
continuity and stable
budgets
‘Doing more with less’: an active search for
alternative, less costly ways to deliver public
services; reduced compliance burden for
business
Hands-on
professional
management
Emphasis on
‘mandarins’,30 with
traditional skills in
making, but not
administering, policy;
adherence to rules
paramount
‘Let the managers manage’: highly visible
managers wielding discretionary power
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Dimensions
of change
under NPM
Under older forms of
bureaucracy
Under NPM
Explicit
standards and
measures of
performance
Qualitative, implicit
standards and norms
based on trust in a
professional public
service
Tangible and reportable performance
measures and indicators on the range, level
and content of services to be provided; goals,
targets and indicators of success, preferably
expressed in quantitative terms; greater
transparency in resource allocation;
adoption of activity- or formula-based
funding and subsequently accruals
accounting
Greater
emphasis on
output
controls
Public organisations
controlled by top-down
‘orders of the day’, as
determined by senior
management; emphasis
on procedures
Public organisations controlled through
resources and rewards allocated according to
pre-set output measures; emphasis on results
Source: adapted from Hood 1995, Hood 1991 and Pollitt 1995.
The legacy of NPM
In the 1980s and 1990s, the adoption of NPM policies by both Labor and
Liberal–National Coalition governments led to widespread privatisation of govern-
ment assets and services and commercialisation of many of those remaining in
public hands (for instance, some services introduced user charging).31
As Figure 2 suggests, the impact on employee numbers during NPM’s heyday
was more in the order of a redistribution from the Commonwealth to state and
local governments, with only a minor downsizing in total numbers in the 1990s,
from 1.73 to 1.45 million, and then an increase to just under 2 million currently.32
Commonwealth employees declined from 23 to 12 per cent of the total public
sector workforce between 1990 and 2017, while the proportion of state government
employees rose from 67 to 78 per cent.
30 ‘An efficient body of permanent officers … possessing sufficient independence, character, ability
and experience to be able to advise, assist, and to some extent influence those who are from
time to time set over them’ (from the Northcote-Trevelyan Report, quoted in Caiden 1967, 383).
31 Aulich and O’Flynn 2007; O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna and Weller 1999, 66. See Hughes 2003 for an
extended discussion of the rationale for and against the establishment of public enterprises as a
particular segment of the public sector.
32 It is similarly unclear whether outsourcing had a significant effect on public sector expenditure
and employment in other countries (e.g. Alonso, Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2015, 656).
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Figure 2 Public sector employee numbers, June 1990–2017. Source: ABS 2018.
The period of NPM largely replaced the highly centralised state, with its
monopoly over policy design and delivery, with a new set of relationships between
government and other societal sectors and players. These relationships gave
governments a choice between traditional delivery via public sector organisations,
market and quasi-market approaches, and networks,33 and hence greater flexibility
in responding to the demands and expectations of citizens, who had been given
choice and agency as ‘customers’ by NPM.
By the mid-2000s, NPM was losing its status as the predominant paradigm
for public sector organisation. Key elements of NPM had been reversed or stalled,
amidst concerns about the fragmentation of the public sector and its services
and loss of accountability and capability summed up as ‘the hollowed-out state’.34
Criticism of NPM highlighted its narrow focus on efficiency and its implication that
‘the public nature of what governments do is not particularly important’.35
Indeed, NPM’s emphasis on ‘management’ appeared to some analysts to ignore
the profound economic and social changes that had given rise to public sector
reform in the first place. These developments required more fundamental changes
to how political institutions and public expectations interacted and were managed.36
Nevertheless, many elements of NPM are still in place, such as performance
management and budgeting and market-based competition for some services. The
33 Peters and Pierre 1998.
34 Bevir and Rhodes 2011; Dunleavy et al. 2006, 468.
35 Peters 2017, 607. See Halligan 2007 for a discussion of the particular causes of departure from
and reaction to NPM by governments and bureaucracies in Australia and New Zealand.
36 Kettl 2000. See Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, 15 for an overview of the difficulties involved in
assessing the impact of NPM and its successors.
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introduction of market-style mechanisms to procure services via competitive
tendering processes led to greater co-option of the not-for-profit sector in
delivering public policies. The latter is now a major partner of the public sector, to
an extent, Alford and O’Flynn argue, that ‘would have been unrecognizable’ forty
years ago.37
Beyond new public management
No single paradigm of public sector reform has emerged to dominate the early
decades of the new century in the way NPM dominated the closing decades of the
last. Instead, a number of influential and interrelated directions are emerging that
respond to, and in some cases reverse, NPM’s main tenets.
A new model of public sector organisation that Osborne and others have called
the ‘new public governance’ recognises that the complexity of citizens’ needs is
not well handled by NPM’s separation of policy and service delivery agencies and
widespread adoption of contractual service delivery through the private and not-
for-profit sectors.
The ‘whole of government’, collaborative and customer-centric approach that
reponds to these problems forms part of a broader movement towards the new
public governance. This is characterised by the public sector working in partnership
and through networks with other sectors to deliver public services, on the one
hand, and multiple processes allowing for input from interest groups, citizens
and stakeholders to inform policy making, on the other.38 This pluralistic model
encompasses the concept of ‘co-production’,39 in which policy making and delivery
is managed and governed not only by professional and managerial staff in public
agencies but also by citizens and communities.40
Digital era governance harnesses new technologies in service delivery,
administration and communications and the use of social media by bureaucrats
and the public for policy input and service delivery. Proponents of digital era
governance are critical of NPM’s tendency to encourage, as they see it, ‘manage-
ment attitudes obsessed with intermediate organizational objectives rather than
service delivery or effectiveness’.41 Advocates argue that information technology is
transforming the relationship between governments, bureaucracies and the public
through the reintegration of public services; needs-based, simpler and more agile
37 Alford and O’Flynn 2012, 8; Butcher and Gilchrist 2016, 5.
38 Greve 2015, 50; Osborne 2010, 9.
39 Or, in some views, has led to its revival as a cost-cutting aspect of NPM (Nabatchi, Sancino and
Sicilia 2017, 767).
40 Meijer 2016. Although not untroubled, the introduction of Australia’s ‘My Health Record’ and
the role of the Australian Capital Territory’s Citizen’s Jury in devising a new Compulsory Third
Party Insurance Scheme are contemporary examples of such co-production.
41 Dunleavy et al. 2006, 471–2.
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whole-of-client service delivery; and the generation of greater productivity through
digitisation.42
Public value governance (PVG), the third dominant model of public sector
organisation and development, is less about the means by which governments
govern. Rather, it focuses more on the political and institutional processes by which
public values are identified and inform strategy making, performance management
and innovation.43 One of PVG’s most notable advocates argues that the public
sector creates public value in two ways: first, by producing goods and services
that have been prioritised by the political system, and second, by establishing
and operating institutions that are ‘fair, efficient and accountable’, meeting the
expectations of citizens (and their representatives).44
PVG requires public sector managers to do three things: help to identify and
define the public interest; secure support for the creation of new public goods
and services from political and other stakeholders (such as interest groups, clients,
businesses and the general community); and obtain the operational and
administrative resources required for the task.45
Public sector values
No discussion of the public sector is complete without examining the distinctive set
of values and norms that guide its work. It may be useful to think of such public
sector values in terms of why the public sector exists, what it does and how it does
this. Longstanding political and cultural conventions and traditions (derived from
both the Westminster model and the federal system) provide the public sector with
a purpose and justification for its services to the community.
The values that inform what the public sector should do or produce at any time
reflect culturally embedded ‘outcomes values’,46 such as ‘growth’ or ‘diversity’, that
dominate political debate over long periods but do change from time to time. For
example, NPM valued private-sector delivery, while cutbacks to welfare programs
reflected higher values being attributed to private, as opposed to collective,
solutions to income inequality. These values inform the immediate policy priorities
of incumbent governments and serve as evaluation standards or design guides for
particular policies.47
42 Dunleavy et al. 2006, 480; Greve 2015, 51.
43 Rainey 2014, 64; Greve 2015, 50.
44 Moore 2014; Moore 1995, 53. See also Mazzucato’s work on the state’s contribution to public
value through its role in creating and supporting private markets and innovation (Mazzucato
2016; Mazzucato 2013).
45 Alford and O’Flynn 2009, 173. You may be interested in the debate between Rhodes and Wanna
(2007) and Alford (2008) on whether this role is compatible with the Westminster tradition of
ministerial responsibility.
46 Stewart 2009, 27.
47 Bozeman and Johnson 2015, 63.
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A third set of values, often and explicitly linked to the Westminster tradition,48
guides how the public sector carries out its tasks and is managed. These values
apply both to public servants’ personal conduct and to their organisations’ work
as a whole. They may be expressed as rules about responsiveness, impartiality,
procedural fairness, efficiency and ethical behaviour, but may also (controversially)
extend to how public servants should engage with social media.49 These values
are generally set out in enforceable values statements and codes of conduct, which
frequently form part of the relevant public service legislation.
NPM reforms led to some important changes to the relationship between public
servants and ministers. In the Westminster system, this relationship had been
characterised by permanent careers, particularly for senior public servants, im-
partial support for the government of the day and a degree of anonymity that
allowed public servants to advise their political masters freely.50 In the 1980s, these
arrangements changed in a number of Western democracies, including Australia
and New Zealand. Department heads were placed on limited contracts that were
subject to performance appraisal, and the anonymous role of confidential ministerial
adviser was weakened as special ministerial advisers and private consultancies
played an increasing role in advising on developing policy.51
Conclusions
The present context of economic, demographic, social and technological disruption
is generating calls for a profound rethinking of the public sector’s purpose,
dimensions and approaches, in Australia and internationally. Such debates,
informed by the values we have identified above, are integral to the very nature
of the public sector. As Jocelyne Bourgon, a leading Canadian public servant and
public service innovator, sums it up, the task is ‘to rediscover the irreplaceable
contribution of the state to a well-performing society and economy and articulate
a concept of that state adapted to serving in the twenty-first century’.52 As we have
shown, questions about the nature of that task, how it is to be performed and by
whom, remain constant for citizens, governments, and for those, like you, who are
studying the public sector:
• What do citizens and their communities want and need?
• What role should governments play in responding?
• What are most efficient, effective, equitable and sustainable ways for govern-
ments to design and deliver that response?
48 Rhodes, Wanna and Weller 2008, 469.
49 Quirk 2018, 104; Stewart 2009, 29.
50 Hood and Lodge 2006.
51 Hood 2000.
52 Bourgon 2017, 625.
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• How should that response involve the private and not for profit sectors, and
citizens themselves?
• What capacity will governments and their public administrations need to carry
out this work, and what values will the public sector need to display and
champion?
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Media and democracy
Mary Griffiths
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remediation
News media is no longer thought of as a monolithic, homogeneous institution
or actor reflecting the real world from a position of objectivity and authority.
News still strongly determines and anchors public attitudes but the ‘hypodermic
needle’ explanation of communication – which holds that mass media messages are
simply transmitted from a sender to a passive receiver – is no longer persuasive.
Consumers’ characteristics (e.g. age, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, literacy
and so on), as well as the contexts of media consumption, shape audience reception.
For media researchers and students, the key questions endure: who is speaking,
to or for whom, through which conventional formats, on which platforms and for
what purposes?
In transitional times for media, answering these questions is not easy because
the material conditions under which media organisations once operated have
altered with the advent of disruptive technologies. Widespread consumer parti-
cipation, information abundance, hybrid content and converging platforms and
Griffiths, Mary (2019). Media and democracy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
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formats are only part of the picture. Harvesting of consumer data makes the tar-
geting of specific demographics possible, for commercial and political purposes.
Inevitably, political culture and journalism are changing, with questions regularly
arising about Australian media’s democratic role.
This chapter covers the transformation of media and its impact on political
culture. Mediation and the pre-digital democratising communication technologies
– print, radio and television – are the initial topics discussed. The chapter then
maps the Australian media sector. The mixed economy approach that Australia
takes to media policy and regulation is summarised, before the chapter returns to
the free press concept, concluding with an overview of parliamentary media and
the potential problems inherent in journalist–source relations.
Mediation
Mediation is the core of inquiry in media scholarship. It involves analysis of the
whole or of selected aspects of the material processes of production, distribution
and reception of media content, and the construction of specific audiences,
institutions, practices and technology uses.
Mediation theory argues that representations of the world do not unprob-
lematically reflect its realities. Representations are treated as constructs formed
by sets of practices, codes and compositional conventions from which we, as
consumers, actively make meanings. For example, different levels of familiarity
with the basic television news format – authoritative ‘talking heads’ (hard news,
sport, weather), remote vision, voice-overs – veil or partially obscure the myriad
forms of agency and necessary elements that are required to construct a ‘seamless’
flow of news.
Viewers’ cues about potential meanings are derived from camera positions, live
reports versus automated feeds, or editing processes that, for example, truncate
a serious policy announcement to give prominence to an amusing but tangential
moment. News readers’ modes of address are regularly fine-tuned by internal
research on viewer profiles; thus the seemingly inconsequential interactions
between co-hosts help audiences attribute significance to a story.
Mediating processes combine technical, journalistic, political, ethical, editorial,
commercial and platform- or audience-driven elements. Whatever the technology
(print, telegraph, camera, radio, television, satellite, the internet, mobile, smart),
media are never just mirroring reality. Their forms are implicated in the existence
and survival of cultural, economic and political systems. Thus, questions of power
and agency in mediation processes are critical when considering media.
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Mediatisation
Theorists of media argue about the nature and impact of mediation processes, and
about the logics, rituals and patterns evident in what is called the mediatisation
of politics. The concept is complex but useful. It focuses on media and politics as
separate but interrelated domains that are directly and indirectly capable of shaping
major societal change. Mazzoletti and Schulz discuss the usurping of political
power, seeing media as a potential threat to democracy.1 For Strömbäck, media
logics compete with the logics of politics.2 He defines four distinct stages in the
power dynamic between actors. Mediatisation is also being explored by theorists in
relation to other institutions. It requires more analysis than is possible here. Asking
precise questions about how – specifically – media transforms political action is
always useful.3
Technologies: from print to digital disruptions
Communication technology plays a generative role in anchoring normative societal
attitudes in any era. Print technology commanded the flow of political information
through centuries of development in Western democracy, just as, from the mid-20th
century onwards, radio and television helped form mass political literacies – the
ways people understand the world and understand politics. Now, digital and smart
technologies are replacing or colonising heritage media.
The decline of print news
Print newspapers began to lose their advertising revenue, and then their audiences,
to the internet towards the end of the last century. Print news’ dominance has now
gone, along with the shared ritual of reading the paper at set times of the day – a
practice that had helped individual citizens in a nation-state to see themselves in a
‘deep horizontal comradeship’ with others4 and to form civic competencies.
Though many print mastheads vanished,5 some survivors remain politically
influential. The Australian, for example, has a relatively low circulation, compared
to past years, but retains a capacity to influence Australian news and commentary.
Roy Morgan recorded a rise in readerships for cross-platform news for the year
from March 2017.6 Sydney-based news topped the list: The Sydney Morning Herald
and The Daily Telegraph. Melbourne’s The Age and Herald Sun came next, followed
1 Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999.
2 Strömbäck 2008.
3 Couldry 2008, 374.
4 Anderson 1983, 6.
5 Kirkpatrick 2012.
6 Roy Morgan 2018.
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by the two national papers, The Australian (which, with a 4.9 per cent rise, had
increased its Sydney readership) and The Australian Financial Review.
Digital disruptions
The internet changed everything for print and broadcast media. Media and
consumers were finally free of the scheduling limitations imposed by print presses
and analogue technology.
But the digital editions of print mastheads face severe competition for eyeballs
from local, national and global online competitors, and especially from start-ups
with no infrastructure renovation costs. Infotainment, clickbait and ads flourish,
competing with front-page ‘hard news’ – stories on politics or international affairs.
News rooms employ online content producers and use tracking tools to detect even
minute changes in reader engagement, while journalists are decreasing in number.
In hard economic times, investigative journalism is expensive. There are gains and
losses to digital disruption. It can be generative and initiate innovation, but it can
destroy legacy media and its workforces if they cannot rapidly adapt.
Across the hybrid digital platforms, media content is created, repurposed and
often categorised as ‘premium content’ behind subscriber paywalls. Journalists
adapt stories while events are unfolding or compete for a unique selling point after
tracking interest in trending stories. The editorial capacity to add and withdraw
digital content may also be partly responsible for the pressure on journalists to
publish first and amend later. The volume and apparent liquidity of news content
could potentially unsettle a reader’s grasp of the chronology and significance of
events.
Free digital newspapers, on the other hand, have increased the number and
diversity of voices being heard. A tutelary attitude is discernible in the accumulation
of hyperlinks to earlier or complementary news stories, and in reader aids such
as the ‘story so far’ column. ‘Opinion’ writers no longer rely on prior knowledge
or experiences shared with readers, as their arguments can be supplemented by
links to supporting content. Journalists now also self-reference or draw attention to
colleagues’ work.
Hyper-mediation
Information flows 24/7 on free-to-air and subscription-only platforms, viewed in
private on a range of fixed and mobile devices and as the background noise and
vision in public spaces. The intense barrage of connected content (graphics, video,
social media, hypertext) within even one story is inescapable and yet, despite
media’s ubiquity, consumption patterns are not shared as they were in the era
of mass media. Fragmenting media organisations; innovating, inexpensive digital
start-ups; the reduction of media workforces; and the segmentation of audiences
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into ever narrower slices of the total audience ‘share’ are dramatically altering the
landscape.
Individuals are adapting and easily navigating digital media even while mobile,
but their choices are potentially isolating and lack significant points of contact
with others. Governments and political parties, on the other hand, have found
it hard to adjust their communications to hyper-mediation and to social media’s
empowerment of citizen-consumers. The scattergun approach of repetitive mes-
saging across multiple platforms for comprehensive coverage easily backfires, but
so too does data-driven personalised messaging.
Trust, blame, the ‘Canberra bubble’ and ‘toxic politics’
A transforming media is blamed for the toxic nature of contemporary political
culture in Canberra and for undermining trust in democracy. Dissatisfaction with
democracy, as tracked by the Australian Election Study (AES) since 1997, has
reached an all-time high among voters.7 Fairfax reported AES findings, sub-
sequently initiating a reader poll on reasons for the state of Australian democracy.8
Blame was primarily directed at politicians, the electoral system and mainstream
media.
Summarised poll comments from the AES identified four main concerns about
media’s contribution to the state of affairs: a focus on conflict and negativity, parti-
sanship, clickbait and not holding politicians to account. The four concerns seem
indicative of broader public judgement. The two terms ‘Canberra bubble’ and ‘toxic
politics’ are used more frequently since the 2018 Turnbull leadership spill. The first
works as shorthand for a self-interested governing elite perceived to be out of touch
with citizens’ concerns. The second term has become a recurring narrative in hard
news and opinion commentary.
Partisanship
Media organisations are accused of permitting ideological bias to distort news
coverage; of misrepresenting government policy and actions; of being stooges of
or echo chambers for particular parties and politicians; of producing fake news;
of fuelling social divisions; and of crossing the line into political activism. These
assertions are not always supported by substantive evidence and may be put
forward for political reasons, but their repetition contributes to a discourse of
media’s failure to perform its ‘fourth estate’ public interest role. Australian
journalists have been subjected to threats, exclusions, online trolling, police
searches and even violence.
7 Cameron and McAllister 2018.
8 Harris and Charlton 2018.
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Accusations of political activism on the part of sections of the media have
been voiced by, among others, Nine’s chief political reporter;9 the editor-in-chief at
Guardian Australia;10 and former Liberal11 and Labor prime ministers.12 Whether
objective ‘public interest’ journalism, once the mainstay of mainstream news, can
survive without government funding is a newer concern.13
Consumers’ power
Streams of content originating in separate production processes blend at the point
of consumption as end-users control the news feeds they receive, reproduce and
annotate. Consumers become curators when blogs and social media give them the
agency to select and prioritise the content forwarded to newsgroups and niche
publics.
An individual’s power to intervene directly in political debate exists and can
be co-opted. A Facebook user in France posts her frustration about the cost of
living and, 1 million likes later, French protestors, including the gilets jaunes or
‘yellow vests’, tune in to her drive-time live feed. A Twitter or Facebook user may
be regularly annotating and forwarding texts to like-minded groups. Influencers
emerge by remediating content, and the editing process on social networks is rarely
as transparent as Wikipedia’s.
Fake news
Fake news, when it is recognisably sensational clickbait, is familiar to most online
users. ‘Alternative facts’ or covert political bias in a story can be harder to identify.
Well-known individuals and organisations may be regular offenders. Anonymous
content simultaneously emerging across several platforms is another red flag. Other
telling signs relate to missing elements. A professionally produced news story carries
the journalist’s byline and contact details and is date-stamped. Revisions or correc-
tions on subsequent iterations are recorded and disclaimers explain apparent bias
or any other diversion from hard news protocols of even-handedness, such as the
absence of comment from the subject of a critical story.
Fake news rarely carries such markers. Image altering software can make fakes
on social media very convincing, and yet, perversely, content like this is trackable
through reverse image searches or through more expert algorithmic analyses. A
9 Knox 2018. Chris Uhlmann launched a passionate attack on the Liberal–National Coalition
leadership plotters, and included News Corp, Sky News, and 2GB staff, arguing that the latter
were no longer observers but ‘players’.
10 Christensen 2014. In an interview with Mumbrella, Guardian Australia’s editor, Katherine
Murphy, commented on rival News Corp’s approaches to public debate.
11 Elton-Pym 2018.
12 Kevin Rudd has continued forthright attacks on News Corp (Rudd 2018).
13 See ‘Media inquiries’ below for further discussion.
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majority of Australians recognise and make their own choices daily about fake
news.14 In the USA, fake news has had a chilling effect on public trust of news as
the 45th president, with partisan hostility, regularly uses the phrase to attack media
as ‘the enemy of the people’.
Publics
Belonging to a public, or many publics simultaneously, is defined by values, mutual
visibility and shared interests and activities. Publics can be identified by the
communications around an agent, a text or an event. The Institute of Public Affairs’
Twitter feed is an example of a powerful conservative public with a record of
climate change denial and radical commitment to freedom of speech. The operation
of a horizontal public is exemplified by the Guardian’s live blog of the final day
of Australian parliamentary proceedings for 2018. It attracted over 5,500 reader
comments on 6 December.
Disrupters
Anyone who is digitally literate can become a disrupter on social media. The online
interventions by Russian providers of fake news during US elections in 2016 are
regarded as a high-stakes example of state information warfare, although one US
party benefitted from their efforts.
An everyday example of disruption is provided by a user’s response to a sup-
portive tweet sent by Donald Trump’s lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, which contained an
unintended hyperlink – a hackable point for an inventive anti-Trumper, who took
charge of the link, buying a domain. When Trump’s supporters clicked through, they
read unexpectedly negative messages.
Trump’s Twitter feed best illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of a platform
routinely used by Australian politicians and journalists. Social networks give
already powerful politicians and their media advisers even bigger megaphones,
with access to global audiences. Politicians circumvent mainstream media by
speaking directly to those they perceive to be their publics on Twitter, Facebook or
Facebook Live, ignoring journalists and escaping difficult questions.
Regular tweeting can appear to close the distance between government and
governed, but it can cause uncertainty and accountability is limited. When he was
prime minister, Malcolm Turnbull’s Twitter account recorded political events. One
morning he rebutted The Australian’s negative coverage of his post-spill actions.15
Forwarded and receiving attention from other media, the tweet demonstrated
social media’s potential for unsettling dominant media influencers.
14 Park et al. 2018.
15 See https://bit.ly/2mMJTuZ
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Social media participation by politicians, under-resourced parties, activist
groups and individual citizens undercuts, and provides copy for, conventional
reporting of politics and public affairs. Social media is shared space for politics in
action.
The challenges posed by global technology giants
Innovation by end-users is only one way that digital technology is changing
Australian political culture. Mainstream news is also challenged by competition
from non-traditional technology rivals and start-ups in the news and public affairs
marketplace. The social media giants do not pay for the user content that attracts the
growth of their subscription bases and profits, yet some content may be profoundly
damaging to the public good. More importantly, democracy itself can be weakened
by the self-regulated nature and commercial interests of the global platforms.
Calling social media giants to account for the poor quality of the information
distributed on their platforms has proved difficult for nation-states. Governments
have not designed effective checks, of the kind that uphold the civic rights and
responsibilities of a traditional free press, for Facebook and Twitter. The technology
companies do not consider themselves publishers; they are not subject to professional
publishing codes or state regulations governing news and public affairs journalism.
As yet, Facebook has little accountability for the circulation of, for example, hate
speech and fake news on its platform. Like the media organisations discussed in the
next section, the tech platforms track and reward users by employing algorithms to
measure their activity, find ‘lookalikes’ and predict consumer behaviour.16 UK demo-
cracy watchdog Demos, reporting on political marketing, describes the algorithmic
approaches Facebook uses to make audience segmentation more precise through
tracking similarities in user profiles.17 Facebook’s data granularity makes it very
effective and not necessarily a good thing. A cautionary tale is provided by the har-
vesting and exploitation of raw data from millions of unsuspecting Facebook users
by the now-discredited political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica for targeted
messaging in Trump’s 2016 campaign.
In any case, avoiding engagement with different perspectives is detrimental
to democratic openness to rational argument. The social media giants’ operations
encourage new social norms, yet they escape accountability: national legislation
designed to protect users, and democracy, has no jurisdiction over them.18
Many kinds of ‘free’ information offered by social media platforms and by
search engines such as Google come at a transactional cost to users. Data on media
16 Tien 2018.
17 Bartlett, Smith and Acton 2018, 10.
18 Instagram has responded to UK activists, after media reports, by promising to redesign the
automated forwarding of self-harm content to already vulnerable people.
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consumers is premium information. The new political reality is that information
about consumers, the creation of segmented publics or online clusters, and the
adoption of sophisticated tools for managing that information all shape political
parties’ communication choices.
Mapping the Australian media and communications sector
Australia has a mixed economy approach to media – a combination of private and
public enterprise. That said, the concentration of mainstream media ownership is
very high, as the regularly updated maps and other information provided free by
the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) illustrate.19 Every
large Australian city has at least one daily newspaper, available in print and digital
versions. Even in the bush, where broadband access can be patchy, consumers
have a choice of free-to-air commercial channels, public channels and paid digital
television channels, and sometimes community television. Radio is still important
in people’s lives. Local stations, some with small footprints and tiny publics,
broadcast ‘news and talk’ about public affairs in every state and territory.
Commercial media
At the macro level, commercial, public and government media broadly define
the sector in Australia. Dominant cross-media commercial corporations with
significant concentrated holdings and different business emphases compete for
market share. Two of these are based in eastern Australia – Rupert Murdoch’s
News Corp and Fairfax Media Ltd (now owned by Nine) – though both own
media enterprises or interests across the country. Along with Seven West Media,
Kerry Stokes’ holdings and Bruce Gordon’s family-owned assets, they dominate the
commercial media world.
News Corp Australia
News Corp Australia’s claim that it is Australia’s number one media company is
based on market share and diverse market offerings, with 16 million monthly
consumers for its print and digital products.
Their ‘Find your Audience’ webpage is an excellent illustration of the niche
market segmentation tools that advertisers, including political marketers, regularly
use to match delivery of content to user profiles. News Corp advises that it can
connect advertisers to, for example, a group of 1,756,000 consumers labelled ‘Mums,
36, with kids under 18’ or to a market segment of two million ‘Executive Influencers’.
19 ACMA 2018.
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The Australian newspaper is the jewel in the News Corp crown. In terms
of circulation figures, it has a combined print and digital audience of 2,787,000
over four weeks. This almost equals Fairfax’s The Age and is just over half of
the combined monthly totals for The Sydney Morning Herald.20 The Australian,
which uses paywalls for premium content, has no daily national agenda-setting
competitor. The Australian Financial Review, owned by Fairfax Media (see below),
is the only other national newspaper.
News Corp’s potential capacity to set an agenda at the metropolitan level is
indicated by the dominance of The Advertiser, first established by Rupert Murdoch’s
father. It is now Adelaide’s only print daily newspaper. A small subscriber-based
digital independent, InDaily, is the sole local competitor for AdelaideNow, The
Advertiser’s digital version.
News Corp routinely opposes the current proliferation of online platforms
when the opportunity arises to make public submissions. It has argued that the
diminishing revenue streams create redundancies and make public interest
journalism unsustainable.
Fairfax Media
News Corp’s major commercial competitor, Fairfax Media, merged with Nine Enter-
tainment in late 2018, after High Court approval. At the time of the merger, Fairfax
had a comprehensive set of media assets, formats and platforms. Its newspapers
include one of the highest-circulation metropolitan ‘broadsheets’, The Age, and The
Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian Financial Review. Fairfax publishes
regional agricultural papers and community newspapers and has continuously
innovated, developing websites and tablet and smartphone apps. In the Australian
capital, digital paywalls have been instituted for The Canberra Times, once freely
available under Fairfax.
The Fairfax business was the subject of news and comment in 2018. Reports
described massive job losses and business strategy issues. The merger with a
different kind of media business generated concerns about the potential loss of
a 177-year-old news tradition. Print and digital newspaper mastheads remain in
place, with stories now unobtrusively branded by Nine. The impact on public
interest journalism is currently unknown.
Public media: Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC or ‘Aunty’) has a national network
of metropolitan and regional stations and offers a range of digital news,
entertainment, sports and specialist channels, such as those for children’s
20 EMMA 2018.
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programming, youth radio and rural communities. Government funding of about
$1 billion annually makes it a significant national enterprise. Commercial media’s
criticisms of platform proliferation and defence of private enterprise are arguably
thinly veiled attacks on the ease and speed with which the national broadcaster
has embraced the digital. At the ABC and elsewhere, workforce contractions and
a proposed digital transformation project ensure that controversies over
management, funding and direction continue.
A controversial period in 2017–18 ended with the removal of the ABC’s man-
aging director by the board of directors, and then the resignation of the board’s
chair. Its own journalists investigated board struggles in the 4 Corners episode
‘Bitter End’.21
The ABC Charter,22 specifically legislated to safeguard the corporation’s indep-
endence from government interference, sets high standards for professionalism
and fairness. It outlines the broadcaster’s national remit to inform, educate and
entertain, and thus animate democracy. Nevertheless, accusations of bias period-
ically arise. Though the ABC has outspoken commercial rivals and political critics,
it remains one of the most trusted institutions in Australian life, as evidenced by
regular independent polls. It has a strong supporter base and a distinctive culture.
Public media: Special Broadcasting Services (SBS)
SBS is Australia’s multicultural, multilingual channel. It is a ‘hybrid’ public broad-
caster as its funding comes partly from direct grants and partly from advertising
revenue. SBS television attracts 13.1 million people monthly and the downloads
from radio are high.23 The SBS streaming service, On Demand, is available more
widely than that of any other broadcaster in Australia and makes hundreds of
international and Australian movies and programs freely available.
SBS is distinctive in its commitment to Australia’s cultural diversity and
strongly promotes intercultural awareness. In 2013, it merged with the media
company National Indigenous Television (NITV), that’s largely Indigenous staff
produce free-to-air content of local and national interest. Reportage of Indigenous
perspectives has deepened and diversified, for example, on the preservation of
Uluru as a sacred site and on the actions of the first ever Indigenous minister for
Indigenous Australians.
21 First broadcast on November 12, 2018.
22 Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 (Cth).
23 SBS 2018.
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Free press in a democracy
Though media operates under pressure within regulatory safeguards, the dynamics
of the sector might make the ‘fourth estate’ concept seem archaic.24 But, in fact,
it still resonates broadly in the community and powerfully with many journalists,
despite the challenges of redundancies and industry change.25
The ‘fourth estate’ view of media rests on the principle of freedom of speech.
The ‘fourth estate’ view holds that the role of a free media in a democracy is
to inform electorates, interpret political events and speak truth to power. Liberal
democracies place high value on a fair, strongly independent media – free from
censorship or political influence or attack – that willingly acts as a guardian of the
public interest.
An impartial press watches over the operations and probity of other
institutions, often prompting political action. Stories in 2017–18 about customers’
treatment by Australian banks pressured an initially reluctant government into
holding a royal commission into the financial sector. Media pay close attention
to the administrative arm of government, tracking allegations of misconduct. The
Australian’s ‘Teacher’s Pet’ podcast, an investigative account of the cold case of
missing woman Lyn Dawson, might have encouraged new witnesses to come
forward and led to the subsequent arrest of a suspect and the reopening of criminal
and judicial processes. Excessive media attention can, however, damage the
presumption of innocence.26
The important role of a free media is highlighted during election periods.
Choosing a government that best serves citizens’ interests depends on accurate
information being circulated in a timely, transparent and accountable way.
Journalists use a raft of presentation techniques to refresh people’s memories about
the past performances of parties and politicians: slogans, file footage, report cards,
policy chronologies, infographics, interactive maps and, of course, cartoons.
Political cartoonists normally operate outside the defamation framework.
Comment is robust. For instance, ‘Stab…ility’, Matt Golding’s conga line of prime
ministerial backstabbers, encapsulated a decade of unedifying conduct in
Australian politics.27
24 The other three ‘estates’ describe the checks and balances appropriate for democratic
governance. In secular Australian governance, the three powers are the executive, the
administration, and the judiciary.
25 New Beats 2018.
26 Fedor and Cooper 2018.
27 The Museum of Australian Democracy’s annual exhibition is online at https://bit.ly/2lfzV4B
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Limits of press freedom
Absolute freedom of expression for the press does not exist anywhere. Even in
polities considered liberal democracies, there are nuances. Defence of the principle
of free speech was turned into a weapon that several politicians and journalists on
the right of politics used to try to silence opposition to proposed amendments to
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), specifically to section 18C. The proposed
wording aimed to neuter the regulation of racially based hate speech. In 2011,
columnist Andrew Bolt controversially, and unsuccessfully, tested 18C in the High
Court.28
Analysing the fine details of regulatory frameworks and media operational
practices is important when defining a liberal democracy. Details to be considered
include: journalists’ training and citizens’ expectations; security restrictions in
investigating a government, judiciary or administration; freedom of information
processes; defamation law; the existence of legislation protecting journalists; and a
government’s informal practices in dealing with journalists’ dissent. Compared to
regimes where journalists are censored, imprisoned or assassinated, the conditions
for a free press in Australia are generally good, though vigilance is always necessary.
Media inquiries: monitoring the state of public interest journalism
In May 2018, the report of the Senate Inquiry into the Future of Public Interest
Journalism was published. It first assessed changes to news and public interest
journalism since the Finkelstein Inquiry five years earlier, before turning to the
questions of government funding and a new statutory body with oversight of media
– the latter suggestion largely unpopular with media organisations.
The Senate report focused on changes to news caused by the move to a
predominantly digital environment. Since Finkelstein, the Senate report noted, the
pace of change had exponentially accelerated and, despite the proliferation of new
players, the sector’s capacity to fund public interest journalism was being negatively
impacted. Challenges included the collapse of advertising revenues and business
models, and job losses. Despite recognising media’s challenges, government funding
was not recommended. Government thus reaffirmed its reluctance to intervene
directly in the mixed media economy.
State regulators and self-regulation bodies
Government sets the regulatory framework for the media and communications
sector, and various statutory and self-regulation bodies monitor compliance.
28 An ABC report on the High Court decision summarises the case: https://ab.co/31Vv8FT
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Government regulation
The ACMA is the government regulator for broadcasting, the internet, radiocomm-
unications and telecommunications. It recognises the ‘diversity and complexity’ of
the Australian media and communications landscape and describes its remit as
protecting community interests and promoting industry growth.29
In addition to handling complaints and monitoring industry compliance,
ACMA publishes resources about media. It provides infographics and Word
documents showing the ownership of the multiple corporations and organisations
operating in Australia, tracing cross-platform networks of corporate holdings. Its
work informs federal legislation to prevent the formation of media monopolies.
A full list of legislation, other regulatory bodies like the Australian Consumer
and Competition Commission (ACCC) and the Ombudsman, bodies such as the
Press Council of Australia and advocacy groups like the Advertising Standards
Bureau can be found in the guide to media and resources on the parliament of
Australia’s website.30
Self-regulation bodies
The Press Council of Australia, set up in 1976 and funded by volunteer member
organisations, is among the various regulatory bodies dedicated to ensuring that
standards of good practice are upheld, complaints are adjudicated and informed
advice is available on media policy areas. The Media, Entertainment and Arts
Alliance (MEAA), established in 1992, introduces its detailed code of journalistic
ethics by emphasising the rights of the public and journalists’ responsibilities.31
In addition to a strong statement of ‘fourth estate’ purpose, the MEAA website
provides professional codes and resources for media workers and the general
public. The MEAA runs campaigns to protect press freedom, critically engaging
with policy that threatens journalists’ pursuit of the truth.
In one example, members organised a petition against sections of the National
Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Bill 2017
(Cth), proposed by the Liberal–National (Coalition) government led by Malcolm
Turnbull. If passed, the legislation would have criminalised the unofficial receipt
and handling of government information and undermined journalists’ time-
honoured protection of their sources, and even safeguards for whistleblowers.
Journalists were quick to call the proposal an attack on press freedom. In 2019,
chief executives from the ABC, Nine and News Corp united in calling for better
protections for journalists following federal police raids on the Canberra home of a
NewsCorp journalist and ABC offices in June.
29 ACMA 2018.
30 Jolly 2017.
31 MEAA 2018.
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Parliament House: government and media
Hansard is not the only public record of proceedings in the Australian parliament.
Media is ever-present. But there are different kinds and motivating forces. In the
chambers and committee rooms, parliamentary audio-visual recordings are pub-
lished every day without additional interpretation or analysis. Multiple media
organisations operate out of Parliament House; the press watches proceedings from
closed galleries or live feed in media offices. Government ministries and agencies run
policy information campaigns and regularly engage citizens through mainstream and
social media. Party media offices attempt to take control of the news agenda through
press releases, doorstops, supplying talking points and so on.
All this activity and access upholds transparency and accountability. However,
media’s focus and agency are increasingly seen to be tainting politics with the
apparent need to spin and the negative aspects of public relations. The following
section discusses potentially problematic areas.
Controlling the message
Australia’s top political office, Prime Minister and Cabinet, is served by a large
staff dedicated to publishing the government’s good news, burying its bad news,
blocking opposition stories that are seen as ‘cutting through’ with the electorate
and other forms of media management. At party headquarters, staff monitor the
clippings supplied by news aggregators, with circulation figures attached. Talking
points are supplied for spokespeople. Staying rigidly ‘on message’ can be counter-
productive as politicians work from scripts with repeated phrases. Some politicians
leave speech writing, image management and social media outreach to their media-
savvy staff. The rise and fall of governments are shaped through a public relations-
style handing of government information and citizen engagement.
Parliamentary recordings
Details of the business of government are available for forensic scrutiny through
official parliamentary media recordings. Both chambers and committee rooms are
televised, and date-stamped proceedings are viewable online on the Australian
Parliament House website. Strict rules govern what may and may not be recorded in
the private areas of Parliament House. Information on the parliament of Australia
website is available for fair re-use.
The televising of parliament has many critics among older public servants and
political observers. Although its contribution to the transparency of government is
acknowledged, it is also thought to exacerbate some of the worst aspects of politics
– for example, the combative point scoring and insults thrown in question time and
the gradual development of opportunities for representatives to play to the cameras,
rather than pursue the details of policy effects.
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Journalists and sources
The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery
The parliament of Australia makes swathes of information available to watchdogs
(journalists and the general public) and provides offices and services to media
organisations. Journalists are visible everywhere in parliament. Their conduct is
governed by rules and conventions, with the sergeant-at-arms, the usher of the
black rod and officers from Parliamentary Services overseeing compliance and
ensuring media balance.32 Both parliamentary chambers have an enclosed gallery,
where Australian and international journalists photograph, live tweet and write
copy about the day’s events. The Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery offices are co-
located on the second level of Parliament House, on the Senate side. Accredited
journalists number over 250 and, as the official website notes, since the first days
of Federation journalists have shared their resources with colleagues. Despite the
news imperative to break stories first, televised news can often include ‘vision’ –
either footage or stills – gifted to the station by another journalist.33 The phrase
‘Canberra bubble’, mentioned earlier, is used when referring to the shared
assumptions, conventions and shorthand said to be shaping political news
produced by and for an elite separated from the concerns of the public. Rather
than acting independently of politics, in a public interest role, media has been
compromised by its focus on the theatre of emotions, rather than the substance of
policy discussions, or so the argument goes.
Co-location
The working lives of political journalists, elected representatives and media officers
are intertwined and mutually dependent. Journalists are hired as media officers
by politicians or stand for election, and politicians are employed by media
organisations. The National Press Club is a short walk from parliament.
Politicians seek media attention to make themselves and their parliamentary
record known to constituents and other party members, and they use media outlets
to promulgate policy to as wide an audience as possible. From the moment they
nominate for public office, politicians can expect to have every part of their lives
examined. During election periods, they may be subject to a personalised ‘dirty
tricks’ campaign, as Kerryn Phelps and Dave Sharma were, simultaneously, during
the key loss of the Liberal seat of Wentworth in the 2018 by-election. Managing
media coverage of pertinent questions of eligibility and moral fitness to serve
became a particular problem for some MPs and Senators embroiled in the
controversy over dual citizenship in the 2016–19 parliament.
32 Parliament of Australia 2008.
33 Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery n.d.
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Journalists vigilantly stay abreast of dynamic events in order to make sense
of them. Ethical issues arise when career success could depend on being the first
to publish stories that are important to readers. Reporters risk being manipulated
when acting on leaks from staffers or politicians with agendas. Relations between
journalists and politicians often become heated, and payback is known to occur.
Controversial decisions made by journalists in 2018 include revealing details of
Barnaby Joyce’s private life and releasing information that confidential government
documents had been found in a second-hand store in Canberra, while the news
organisation concerned (the ABC) perused the documents, presumably to assess
their news value.
Co-location supports anonymous leaks. Politically motivated leaks, while
sometimes revealing inappropriate activity, have an overall tendency to contribute
to distrust in political processes. They lead to instability, can be vexatious and in
some cases may even be criminal; however, even under legal pressure, journalists
remain reluctant to identify their sources.
Conclusions
Media content creates narrative meanings that are never ‘just what happened’.
Some content is manipulated, other stories fall into conventional narrative patterns;
attempts to change the news agenda may go badly wrong, but sometimes, in the
hands of a media-savvy and quietly angry politician, the opportunities presented
are too good to miss.
When former Foreign Minister Julie Bishop wore red shoes at a press con-
ference outside parliament, she generated media columns during the penultimate
sitting week of parliament in 2018, and, periodically, the red shoes continue to do
so. The following context suggests the significance of the Museum of Australian
Democracy exhibit shown in Figure 1.
After Scott Morrison won the leadership ballot, the new Coalition team
struggled to manage the public’s hostile reactions. Reporters continually speculated
on the details of Turnbull’s removal and persistently questioned why Bishop, the
most popular Liberal politician and a moderate, had not been supported by her
colleagues. On the obvious slight, Bishop was silent, until Julia Banks resigned from
the Liberal Party, fuelling a belief that both women had suffered from sexism. Banks
and Bishop went public with their assessment of the politics – in their different ways
– on the same day.
The chain of events demonstrates that attempting to manage media depends on
skill, judgement and an element of luck. The day began with two senior ministers
starting a ‘presser’, hoping to switch off negative media coverage of the new
government with good news about the economy. During the press conference,
they (and those in attendance) were alerted by mobile phone that Julia Banks was
beginning a resignation speech in the House of Representatives, citing a sexist party
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Figure 1 Julie Bishop’s red shoes displayed at the Museum of Australian Democracy.
Source: author.
room and culture as major reasons for her departure. Press crews captured the
surprise and immediate dispersal that this information occasioned – with some
participants televised running back to the House. News images followed of women
from the backbenches and the crossbench warmly empathising with Banks and
supporting her, confirming the view long held by many that the Liberal Party had a
gender problem, even with its successful, experienced female members.
Bishop’s flamboyant shoes at her own ‘presser’ later that day might be read
as a light-hearted prop chosen by a senior female politician with an interest in
fashion that was familiar to the public. Nothing is so simple. In a disastrous week
for the Coalition, the shoes worked as a complicated sign with fluid (not infinite)
meanings: Bishop’s implicit support for Banks’ struggles; her silent comment on
being marginalised by a sexist Liberal party room; or the West Australian seizing a
pertinent moment to remind her constituency that she remained a potential prime
ministerial candidate, despite receiving only 11 votes during the Turnbull spill.
Bishop’s later tweet about the ‘surprising’ attention the shoes attracted carried a red
heels emoji. Bishop is an enthusiastic emoji user with over a quarter of a million
followers on Twitter, and an excellent manager of her personal ‘brand’.
Turnbull’s tweet direct to The Australian was also a comment on the spill and
on conservative wrath at failing to install a preferred leader. Turnbull used the right
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of reply on a social media platform against a story attacking his reputation and
legacy. Like Bishop, he is not an ordinary citizen. Prior media and public interest in
the senders’ political status was required to give both tweets the significance they
acquired.
This chapter has touched on mediation processes, old and new players, the
challenges of transformation and public concerns. It is encouraging that, despite
the loss of trust in contemporary politics, Australians’ interest in political events
remains strong. Nielsen digital ratings show that time spent reading online news
spiked to 44 per cent more than the daily average on the day of Turnbull’s removal,
24 August 2018, with Australians accessing news across all platforms and devices.34
However, trust in media fluctuates. During the Turnbull spill, Chris Uhlmann’s
accusation that some right-wing journalists crossed the line to become ‘players in
the game’ in the ousting of a prime minister is a compelling and timely warning
against such abuses of the privileges enjoyed by journalists. A perceived focus on
click-worthy political content, rather than policy discussion, is also a legitimate
criticism of media.
References
Anderson, Benedict (1983). Imagined communities. London: Verso.
Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) (2018). ‘Media interests’ snapshot.
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/media-interests-snapshot
Bartlett, Janie, Josh Smith and Rose Acton (2018). The future of political campaigning. London:
Demos. http://www.demos.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-Future-of-Political-
Campaigning.pdf
Cameron, Sarah, and Ian McAllister (2018). Australian election study, 2018.
https://australianelectionstudy.org/interactive-charts/
Christensen, Nic (2014). ‘A crazy act of will’: The Guardian Australia turns one. Mumbrella, May 26.
https://mumbrella.com.au/bold-adventure-guardian-australia-228790
Couldry, Nick (2008). Mediatization or mediation? Alternative understandings of the emergent space
of digital storytelling. New Media and Society 10(3): 373–91. DOI: 10.1177/1461444808089414
Digital Content Ratings (2018). Press Room. Nielsen, 6 September. http://www.nielsen.com/au/en/
press-room/2018/nielsen-digital-content-ratings-august-2018-tagged-rankings.html
Elton-Pym, James (2018). Turnbull says he is optimistic about Morrison government, slams Dutton
in valedictory speech. SBS, 24 August. http://www.sbs.com.au/news/turnbull-s-parting-salvo-
at-the-dutton-and-abbott-determined-insurgency
Enhanced Media Metrics Australia (EMMA) (2018). Readership data: September 1–30.
http://www.emma.com.au/wp-content/uploads/TRW-Newspapers-Total-Audience-Report-
Sep-18.pdf
Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery (n.d.). About us. pressgallery.net.au/about-us/
Fedor, Kelly, and Luke Cooper (2018). Chris Dawson case: ‘pervasive media’ may impact trial, says
lawyer. Nine News, 6 December. https://bit.ly/2ldSvu0
Harris, Lachlan, and Andrew Charlton (2018). The fundamental operating model of Australian
democracy is breaking down. Sydney Morning Herald, 2 April. https://bit.ly/2leO8im
34 Digital Content Ratings 2018.
Media and democracy
161
Jolly, Rhonda (2017). Media and communications resources and information: a quick guide. Canberra:
Parliament of Australia.
Kirkpatrick, R. (2012). Press timeline: 1951–2011. https://www.nla.gov.au/content/press-
timeline-1951-2011
Knox, David (2018). Chris Uhlmann accuses News Corp, Sky News, 2GB of ‘waging war’ on
Turnbull. Tonight TV, 28 August. https://bit.ly/2kMOk8m
Mazzoleni, Gianpietro, and Winfried Schultz (1999). ‘Mediatization’ of politics: a change for
democracy? Political Communication 16(3): 247–61. DOI: 10.1018/105846099198613
Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance (MEAA) (2018). MEAA journalist code of ethics.
http://www.meaa.org/meaa-media/code-of-ethics/
New Beats (2018). Redundancy timeline. http://www.newbeatsblog.com/redundancy-timeline/
Park, Sora, Caroline Fisher, Glen Fuller and Jee Young Lee (2018). Digital news report: Australia
2018. Canberra: News and Media Research Centre. DOI: 10.4225/50/5b21a3c6f196a
Parliament of Australia (2008). Guidelines for filming and photography and general media rules in
Parliament House and its precincts, December 2008. Canberra: Parliament of Australia.
Roy Morgan (2018). It’s official. Newspaper masthead readership is up 3.2% to over 16 million!
https://bit.ly/2kI4eRg
Rudd, Kevin (2018). Cancer eating the heart of democracy. Sydney Morning Herald, 24 August.
https://bit.ly/2wpGKSN
SBS (2019). Our story. https://www.sbs.com.au/aboutus/our-story
Strömbäck, Jesper (2008). Four phases of mediatization: an analysis of the mediatization of politics.
International Journal of Press/Politics 13(3): 228–46. DOI: 10.1177/1940161208319097
Tien, Shannon (2018). How the Facebook algorithm works and how to make it work for you.
Hootsuite, 25 April. https://blog.hootsuite.com/facebook-algorithm
About the author
Dr Mary Griffiths is an adjunct associate professor in the Department of Media
at the University of Adelaide, where she taught courses in media, democracy and
e-participation, while developing media and political internships and sector
engagement. Her published research includes work on citizen–government
relations, the role of the democratic press and smart governance. She is a co-
editor of a collection of studies on digital disruption, Making publics, making places
(2016), and an associate editor of the Electronic Journal of E-Government.
Australian Politics and Policy
162
Courts
Grant Hooper
Key terms/names
appeal, appellate jurisdiction, common law, court hierarchy, jurisdiction, original
jurisdiction, rule of law, separation of powers, statutory law
The courts (also referred to as the judiciary) are a central and critical part of
Australia’s constitutional system. They are one of the three arms of government, the
other two being the legislature (also referred to as parliament) and the executive.
Due to their lack of independent resources and enforcement mechanisms, the
courts are often called the least powerful arm of government.1 Yet this description
belies their actual importance.
The specific and essential role played by the courts is providing binding and
authoritative decisions when controversies arise between citizens or governments,
or between the government and its citizens, regardless of whether the rights in issue
relate to life, liberty or property.2
Australian courts are modelled on their English counterparts, and before
Federation each colony had a separate court system that was ultimately answerable
on questions of law to the Privy Council in the UK. After Australia’s Federation in
1901 the separate state systems continued, but the court hierarchy was modified
by inserting the High Court of Australia between the state courts and the Privy
Hooper, Grant (2019). Courts. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian
Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
1 Stephen 1982, 338.
2 Huddart, Parker and Co. Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357 (Griffith CJ).
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Council. Recourse to the Privy Council was finally removed in 1986, leaving the
High Court as the apex court and, as such, the ultimate arbitrator of the law in
Australia.3
Upon its creation the High Court was also given its own original jurisdiction
by the Australian Constitution (the Constitution). Although not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, this jurisdiction (borrowing from the USA) was assumed
to include the ability to invalidate legislation that is not supported by, or is contrary
to, the Constitution. As a matter of convenience, the Constitution also allowed state
courts and other courts that may be created by the Commonwealth parliament to
be given the ability to exercise federal/Commonwealth judicial power. This has led
to an integrated, albeit complex, court system.4
What decisions do courts make?
Although eluding precise definition,5 the classic starting point for determining
what a court does (i.e. what judicial power is) is the following statement of Griffith
CJ in Huddart, Parker and Co. Pty Ltd v Moorehead:
I am of the opinion that the words ‘judicial power’ as used in sec. 71 of the
Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity
have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects,
whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does
not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative
decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.6
[emphasis added]
This statement can be said to have three key components: controversies, rights and
a binding and authoritative decision.
The controversies that the courts typically decide can be divided into two legal
categories: private law and public law. Private law incorporates disputes between
‘subjects’ or citizens and includes, for example, tort, contract and defamation law.
Public law on the other hand generally involves disputes between government
and its citizens or disputes between governments (e.g. state versus state or state
versus Commonwealth). It typically encompasses constitutional, administrative
and criminal law. However, due to its importance, criminal law is often treated as
its own separate category.
The ‘rights’ that courts adjudicate upon are existing ‘legal rights’ rather than
future rights (the creation of future rights is generally seen as a legislative power).
3 Australia Act 1986 (Cth), section 9; Australian Act 1986 (UK), section 9.
4 Crawford and Opeskin 2004, 21.
5 Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 597.
6 Huddart, Parker and Co. Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330.
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Such rights are found in the common law or granted by the legislature through
statutes.
Perhaps the most essential power of the courts is to provide a binding and
authoritative decision so that the dispute between the parties is finally determined,
at least once any appeal process is completed. Once authoritatively determined,
the decision, whether private or public in nature, can be enforced by the executive
government if it is not willingly accepted by one of the parties.
Although not specifically mentioned in the statement of Griffith CJ quoted
above, other cases emphasise the importance of a fourth feature of the courts’
decision-making process: to adjudicate a controversy by applying ‘judicial process’.7
‘Judicial process’ will be touched upon when discussing the separation of powers
doctrine later in this chapter. It is sufficient for now to observe that ‘judicial process’
is deciding a controversy ‘in accordance with the methods and with a strict
adherence to the standards which characterise judicial activities’.8
Historical development
Australia’s common law system is inherited from England. The term common law
reflects one of this legal system’s theoretical aims: to create a ‘common’ system of
law. That is, a system of law that applies to all, regardless of wealth, station or
political influence. From a practical perspective, common law rules are created by
the courts when they decide a dispute. To explain how it has decided a particular
dispute, the court issues a judgement outlining the rules of law that have been
applied. The rules of law or precedents in these judgements are then developed,
modified or extended by later courts when they decide similar or analogous
disputes. Courts that are lower in the hierarchy must follow the precedents created
by higher courts. The requirement that judges follow the judgements of earlier
courts is referred to as the doctrine of precedent.
In England, the common law has existed since the 12th century, when the
King appointed judges to act as his ‘surrogates’ to dispense justice. The judges were
known collectively as the King’s Court.9 While originating in a time when the King
of England ruled with almost absolute power, the common law was not developed
to only and always benefit the King. Rather, the common law ‘was founded in
notions of justice and fairness of the judges, consolidated by their shared culture,
their professional collegiality, and a growing tradition’.10 Indeed, with the rise of the
common law there also gradually developed a view that the King’s power was not
absolute but was subject to limits. Of course, the King’s power diminished further
7 Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33, [39].
8 R v Spicer; Ex parte Australian Builder’s Labourers Federation (1957) 100 CLR 277.
9 Crawford and Opeskin 2004, 6–7.
10 Crawford and Opeskin 2004, 6.
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over time, while the power of a new institution – parliament – grew. Parliament’s
growth, in turn, saw its rules of law (i.e. legislation) replace the common law as the
most ‘significant source of new rules’.11 Yet parliament’s rise arguably changed the
initial focus of the courts rather than diminished their significance. Their role is
still to decide controversies brought before them by citizens or governments; but
they will now often start with a legislative rule rather than a common law one,
examining precedents to determine how the legislative rule has been and should be
interpreted and how it has been applied by previous courts.
The establishment of courts in Australia
Before the First Fleet left for Australia in 1787, legislation and letters patent allowed
for the creation of a criminal court and civil court respectively in New South Wales
(NSW). These courts were established upon the First Fleet’s arrival but were initially
staffed by military officers. Later, when the first judge was appointed, he was
required to follow any order given by the governor who, for all intents and purposes,
exercised both legislative and executive power. It was not until the passing of the
New South Wales Act 1823 (UK) that the colonial judges obtained the same level of
independence and security of tenure held by their English counterparts.12
The New South Wales Act 1823 also established separate Supreme Courts in
NSW and Tasmania and provided for the establishment of inferior courts – that is,
courts below the Supreme Courts. Ultimately, a similar court system was established
in each Australian colony and continues, with some modifications, today (today the
inferior courts are generally called District, Local or Magistrate’s courts).
On 1 January 1901 the Constitution came into effect and the Commonwealth
of Australia was born. As Blackshield and Williams observe:
The system of federalism created by the Australian Constitution involves two tiers
of government in which power is divided between the Commonwealth and the
States. Each tier has its own institutions of government, with its own executive,
parliament and judicial system.13
Consequently, the colonial (now state) court systems continued, but there would
now also be federal courts and, in particular, the High Court of Australia, created
under section 71 of the Constitution. Under sections 75 and 76 of the Constitution,
the High Court could hear and decide certain matters involving Commonwealth
power – that is, it would hear the matters in its original jurisdiction. Under section
73, the High Court would also hear appeals from the state Supreme Courts and any
federal courts that would be created.
11 Creyke et al. 2017, 9.
12 Crawford and Opeskin 2004, 23–4; Creyke et al. 2017, 45.
13 Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 264.
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It was clear that the High Court of Australia was generally to operate in the
same manner as the English common law courts. However, there was one
significant difference. Because England did not have a written constitution, the
English courts accepted that they did not have a constitutional role, in the sense
that they did not rule on the constitutional validity of legislation. In contrast,
borrowing from the USA, which did have a written constitution, it was assumed
that the Australian High Court would declare Australian legislation (whether state
or Commonwealth) invalid if it exceeded the constitutional power of the enacting
parliament or infringed an express or implied limit in the Constitution.14
The Constitution also provided in section 71 that the Commonwealth parlia-
ment could create other federal courts. Although a Federal Court of Bankruptcy
was created in 1930 and an Industrial Court in 1957, it was not until the 1970s that
a generalised system of federal courts was established. This began with the creation
of the Family Court of Australia in 1975 and the Federal Court of Australia in
1976. As a result of the increasing workload in both the Family and Federal Courts,
in 1999 the Federal Magistrates Court, now called the Federal Circuit Court, was
established.
Court hierarchy
The Australian court system has many different courts with different respon-
sibilities. Each court is regulated by an Act of parliament. The federal courts,
including the High Court, are regulated by an Act of the Commonwealth parlia-
ment. The state courts are regulated by their respective state parliaments. The
Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory courts are also regulated by
their respective parliaments, although they owe their ultimate existence to Com-
monwealth legislation.15
Despite the number and different types of courts, there is a reasonably clear
hierarchy, with the High Court at the apex of what can be described as a unified
system.16 It is a hierarchy in the sense that courts are ranked from highest to
lowest. Figure 1 provides a general overview of this hierarchy. The hierarchy in turn
facilitates the operation of three important characteristics of the modern common
law system:
• the balancing of specialist knowledge with more general legal knowledge
14 This principle is derived from the US decision of Marbury v Maddison (1803) 1 Cranch 137 and,
subject to some modifications, is accepted as ‘axiomatic’ in Australia: see The Australian
Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 262 (Fullagar J).
15 Section 122 of the Constitution enables the Commonwealth parliament to pass laws allowing
for self-government of the territories.
16 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 138 (Gummow J).
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• an appeal or judicial review process
• the doctrine of precedent.17
While providing a general overview, Figure 1 is somewhat of a simplification
for two reasons. First, the division between federal and state courts may give the
impression that state courts only exercise their respective state’s judicial power;
however, they also exercise federal power. Second, while the court system in each
state and territory follows the general structure shown in the figure, in reality each
system is more complex; other, more specialised courts have been created and there
may be slight differences in the appeal processes.
In each state and territory, it is generally accepted that courts lower in the
hierarchy should deal with less important matters (both in monetary value and
seriousness) and that for some types of cases there should be an initial hearing
before a judge with expertise in the particular subject matter before them. In NSW,
for example, the Local Court can hear civil cases with a value of up to $100,000, the
District Court up to $750,000 and the Supreme Court any amount. Similarly, there
are other courts in the state that deal with particular types of matters, and there are
specialist divisions within the Local and Supreme Courts that deal with either civil
or criminal matters. Figure 2 provides an overview of the NSW civil court structure
and Figure 3 provides an overview of the criminal court structure.
Greater integration: the exercise of federal judicial power by state courts
While the US constitution provided much of the inspiration for the drafting of
Chapter III of the Constitution, which deals with the federal court system, there
are two very significant differences that have meant Australia’s court structure is far
more integrated.
The first difference is that in the USA the federal and state court systems are
quite distinct. As the three figures show, in Australia the High Court hears appeals
from federal, state and territory courts. This means that the High Court has been
able to establish ‘one Australian common law’18 rather than overseeing a different
common law in each state and territory and at the federal level.
The second difference is that provision was made in sections 71 and 77(iii)
of the Constitution for the Commonwealth parliament not only to create federal
courts but to also allow state courts to exercise federal judicial power.19
Giving state courts the power to exercise federal jurisdiction generally, rather
than in limited circumstances, was a uniquely Australian development and is
known as the autochthonous expedient.20 Autochthonous means indigenous or
17 Harvey 2017, 74.
18 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563.
19 The Commonwealth parliament has invested state courts with the ability to exercise federal
jurisdiction; see in particular section 39 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
20 R v Kirby; Ex parte the Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 268.
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Figure 1 Generalised Australian court hierarchy.
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Figure 2 Generalised NSW civil court hierarchy.
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Figure 3 Generalised NSW criminal court hierarchy.
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native to the soil and the term expedient acknowledges that it was seen as a
practical measure to both simplify the resolution of disputes that may be brought
before a court under the Constitution, common law or state legislation21 and delay
the need and cost of setting set up a new federal court structure beneath the High
Court.22 Even now that a quite extensive federal court system has been created, the
state courts continue to hear most criminal cases brought under federal law.23
Although not expressly provided for in the Constitution, Australia’s court
system has become even more integrated through cross-vesting legislation passed
by the Commonwealth and by each state and territory, allowing the Supreme
Courts (and to a lesser extent the Federal and Family Courts) to exercise each
other’s jurisdiction. The Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth)
provides, for example, that in civil matters the Supreme Courts can exercise federal,
as well as other states’, jurisdiction. It then provides for the transfer of proceedings
to the most appropriate court. However, while federal jurisdiction can be vested in
state courts, the Constitution does not allow state jurisdiction to be vested in federal
courts.24
Key constitutional principles
There are a number of fundamental doctrines found in the Constitution. They
include ‘the rule of law, judicial review, parliamentary sovereignty, the separation
of powers, representative democracy, responsible government and federalism’.25
While each principle influences how courts operate in Australia, two principles in
particular can be said to be part of the courts’ DNA. These are the rule of law and
the separation of judicial power.
The rule of law
It is commonly accepted that the rule of law is an essential feature or sign of a
healthy democratic society. Yet, despite its importance, what the rule of law actually
means is highly contested. This is because it can be said to be a political rather
than legal concept or an aspirational rather than legal right. Nevertheless, most
conceptions of the rule of law start with the ideal that there should be known laws
that are administered fairly and that everyone is subject to,26 whether they are poor,
rich, weak, powerful, a private citizen, a public servant or a member of parliament.
21 Crawford and Opeskin 2004, 40.
22 Re Walkim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, [200] (Kirby J).
23 Crawford and Opeskin 2004, 43.
24 Re Walkim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511.
25 Aroney 2018, 1.
26 Burton Crawford 2017, 10–11.
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While the rule of law is a cultural commitment shared between all three arms
of government, the courts are, and see themselves as, central to its enforcement
in Australia. The courts enforce the law not only by interpreting it and issuing
authoritative and binding judgements but also by applying a process in which
the parties in dispute can be seen to have received a fair hearing. This process
culminates in written reasons. Written reasons are not only necessary for the
doctrine of precedent to operate effectively, they also ensure that the parties and
others who may be affected by the law know why the decision was reached. This,
in turn, supports the presumption that the law is being administered in an open,
public and ultimately fair manner. Importantly, and entwined with the doctrine
of the separation of judicial power, this judicial process is designed to ensure that
the law is administered as it exists and not as the executive government desires or
believes it should be. In this regard, the High Court has emphasised that ‘all power
of government is limited by law’ and that it is role of the judiciary to enforce the law
and the limits it imposes.27
The separation of judicial power
A separation of powers exists when the power of government is divided between
the legislature, the executive and the courts. Generally speaking:
the legislature enacts laws; the executive applies those laws in individual cases; and
in the event that a dispute arises about the meaning or application of a law, the
dispute is resolved conclusively by the judiciary.28
A strict separation of powers is enshrined in the US constitution, but it has never
existed in England. However, in England parliament has recognised the importance
of an independent judiciary since at least 1701.29 Australia has adopted somewhat
of a middle ground between the US and English approaches. It only applies a strict
separation of power to federal courts (including the High Court) but still provides
the state Supreme Courts with a significant level of independence.
Federal courts owe their existence to the Constitution, which creates a strict
separation of power between the courts and the other two arms of government.
This separation of powers is commonly known as the Boilermaker’s principle and
means that only courts created under, or given power through, Chapter III of the
Constitution can exercise Commonwealth judicial power and that the same courts
are not to be given or to exercise Commonwealth executive or legislative powers,
with some established exceptions.30 Consequently, not only is the independence of
27 Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 33, [46].
28 Creyke, McMillan and Smyth 2015, 313.
29 Act of Settlement 1701 (UK).
30 R v Kirby; Ex parte the Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254.
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a federal court guaranteed, their independence and integrity cannot be undermined
by giving them, for example, a political and potentially damaging function.
State courts, which were created like their English counterparts, are not protec-
ted by a strict separation of judicial power.31 This means that state parliaments can
vest state judicial power in other institutions or require courts to undertake non-
judicial roles. However, as state courts are now part of an integrated court system
under the Constitution and can be vested with federal judicial power, the High
Court has held that there is a limit to what state parliaments can require them to do
as they must continue to bear the essential or defining characteristics of a court. This
is known as the Kable principle.32
The defining characteristics that have been said to be attributable to all courts,
whether federal or state, include not only the ‘reality and appearance of the court’s
independence and impartiality’33 but also important aspects of the judicial process
traditionally applied by the courts in reaching a decision, such as:
• ‘the application of procedural fairness’
• ‘adherence, as a general rule, to the open court principle’
• ‘the provision of reasons for decisions’.34
Political impact of the High Court
As one of the three arms of government, the role of the courts is inherently political.
This is particularly true of the High Court, which is Australia’s apex court and
the final interpreter of the Constitution. The High Court’s judgements can have,
and have had, a significant and lasting impact on the shape of Australia’s ‘political
system and process’.35 Further, as Turner has observed, the High Court ‘is an
important political forum used to advance or stymie political programs’, its
decisions ‘have significant political and societal implications’ and cases may be
brought before it to try and influence government policy.36
Despite the central role it has played and continues to play in Australian
politics, the High Court inevitably seeks to disavow any direct connection between
politics and what it says it is doing in interpreting and applying the law. This is
reflected in Latham J’s classic and often quoted assertion that:
the controversy before the court is a legal controversy, not a political controversy. It
is not for this or any court to prescribe policy or to seek to give effect to any views
31 Clyne v East (1967) 68 SR (NSW) 355.
32 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.
33 French 2012, 5.
34 French 2012, 5.
35 Irving 2009, 116, describing observations of Galligan 1987, 1.
36 Turner 2015, 358–9.
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or opinions upon policy. We have nothing to do with the wisdom or expediency of
legislation. Such questions are for Parliaments and the people.37
This is, in effect, an assertion that law is separate from politics. It is a form of
reasoning typically described as legalism – that is, the court will decide matters
by reference to existing rules and principles, not policy considerations. However,
this form of reasoning can be said to be astutely political in and of itself as it seeks
to insulate the courts from political controversy by downplaying judges’ ability to
make choices when deciding cases.38 While it is true that judicial methodology
provides some important constraints – particularly the appeal system, combined
with the duties to apply precedent and to provide a rational explanation of how a
decision is reached39 – it does not mean there is only one correct answer that can
be reached. There are inevitably judicial choices that lead to different results. These
choices can have significant political consequences. By way of example, how the
High Court’s ‘choices’ have impacted federalism and protected certain rights will be
briefly considered.
Federalism
The Constitution created a federation with a central federal/Commonwealth
government and state governments. To protect the autonomy of the state
governments, the Constitution listed specific subjects that the federal parliament
could pass legislation on, leaving everything else to the states.40 The Constitution
also allowed the states to continue passing legislation on most subjects allocated
to the federal government.41 However, once there was federal legislation, it was to
prevail to the extent that there was any inconsistency with the state legislation.42
As the arbiter of the Constitution, the High Court was responsible for deter-
mining precisely how the constitutional allocation of power between the federal
and state governments would work. In undertaking this task, the High Court, at
first, interpreted the Constitution in a way that intentionally favoured the states. But
then a choice was made to change course, and the interpretation has favoured the
Commonwealth ever since. These choices will be briefly outlined. What will not be
addressed – but is worthy of further study – is whether these choices have played
a pivotal role in emasculating the powers of the states to an extent unforeseen by
the founding fathers43 or whether they are better understood as reflecting broader
37 South Australia v The Commonwealth of Australia (1942) 65 CLR 373, 409.
38 See Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 172.
39 Gleeson 2008, 25–6.
40 See in particular sections 51, 52, 106, 107 and 108 of the Constitution.
41 Some subjects are exclusively Commonwealth, such as those set out in section 52.
42 See section 109 of the Constitution.
43 Allan and Aroney 2008.
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historical changes that, in reality, were responsible for the shift in ‘power and
authority to the centre of Australian governance’.44
The first doctrine or rule developed by the High Court to help explain how
power was to be allocated between the federal and state governments was the
‘implied immunity of instrumentalities’. Inspired by US jurisprudence, this doctrine
was based on the notion that each government was sovereign and, as such, neither
the Commonwealth nor the states could tell the other what to do unless the
Constitution expressly allowed them to do so.45 This meant, for example, that the
states and Commonwealth could not tax each other46 and a union representative for
a state government agency could not be registered under Commonwealth labour
laws.47
The second interpretative tool developed by the early High Court was the
‘reserved state powers doctrine’. As explained by Blackshield and Williams, this
meant that:
the Constitution had impliedly ‘reserved’ to the States their traditional areas of
law-making power, and hence that the grants of law-making power to the
Commonwealth must be narrowly construed so as not to encroach on these
traditional powers of the States.48
This doctrine unequivocally favoured the state governments as it was premised
on the assumption that the states would continue to be the forum in which the
majority of policy decisions were made. Combined with the implied immunity of
instrumentalities, it supported the status quo – the status quo at that time being
powerful state governments with a federal government largely limited to matters of
a genuinely national nature (as the subjects allocated to the federal government in
the Constitution were thought to be).
However, the High Court’s early choice to protect the power of the states
was not universally popular. After the appointment of further High Court justices
and the retirement or death of the three initial judges who had created the two
doctrines, a choice was made to interpret the Constitution in a very different
way. This choice is most clearly seen in the iconic case of Amalgamated Society of
Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd (the Engineers case).49
In the Engineers case the High Court rejected the implied immunity of instru-
mentalities and reserved state powers doctrines. Based on English/Imperial
44 Selway and Williams 2005.
45 Attorney-General (NSW) v Collector of Customs for NSW (1908) 5 CLR 818 (Steel Rails).
46 Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087; D’Emden v Pedder (1904) 1 CLR
91; Deakin v Webb (1904) 1 CLR 585.
47 Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Association v New South
Wales Railway Traffic Employees Association (1906) 4 CLR 488 (Railway Servants’).
48 Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 280.
49 Engineers (1920) 28 CLR 129.
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jurisprudence, it chose to view the Constitution as an Imperial statute (which
it technically was, having been passed by the Imperial parliament in England)
rather than a federal compact. On this view, the Imperial parliament was simply
distributing power between the federal and state governments. The governments
were not in competition with each other, in the sense that the grant of power
to one should not be viewed as diminishing the power of the other.50 While,
strictly speaking, this change in approach did not necessarily favour the federal
government, history has shown that it has. This is because the court has generally
been willing to read the powers given to the federal government expansively, with
the result that the federal government has been able ‘to advance into areas
previously held to be within the powers reserved to the state legislatures’.51
Examples of such advancement include areas where the federal government has
been able to rely on its power to legislate in respect of ‘external affairs’ to:
• pass racial discrimination legislation applying across Australia52
• stop the building of a dam by the Tasmanian government in Tasmania53
• prevent the forestry operations and the construction of roads in Tasmanian
forests54
• impose throughout Australia a minimum wage, equal pay, unfair dismissal and
parental leave.55
The federal government has also been able to rely on its power over ‘foreign
corporations, and trading or financial corporations formed within the limits of the
Commonwealth’ to:
• regulate the trading activities of a corporation even though those activities
only occur within one state and even though another power given to the
Commonwealth only applies to ‘trade and commerce with other countries, and
among the States’56
• pass the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth), which
was intended to apply to up to 85 per cent of the Australian workforce and
fundamentally reshape industrial relations in Australia (it was, however,
repealed when there was a change of government).57
50 Selway and Williams 2005, 480.
51 Selway and Williams 2005, 480.
52 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168.
53 Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Tasmanian Dam).
54 Richardson v Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR 261.
55 Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416 (Industrial Relations Act).
56 Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 468.
57 New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1 (Work Choices).
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Rights protection
Unlike other English-speaking democracies, Australia does not have a constitu-
tional or statutory bill of rights at the federal level. This omission was intentional.
With the exception of a few express protections,58 Australia’s founding fathers
wanted to limit the ability of the courts to interfere with legislative decisions on
policy issues, such as, for example, the ability to discriminate on the basis of race
as reflected in the since abandoned White Australia policy. Further, the omission of
a bill of rights can be said not only to reflect a political decision as to where most
policy decisions should be made (the legislature) but also to provide an indication
of what type of rights are likely to be protected (those favoured by the voting
constituents, who were, at the time of Federation, predominantly white males).59
Yet, despite the judgement at Federation that the legislature(s) was primarily
responsible for determining the type of rights that were worthy of protection
and those that may be compromised for the greater good, decisions of the High
Court have nevertheless limited some of the choices available to the legislature.
As discussed, the High Court’s interpretation of the Constitution has meant that
Australian legislatures are unable to pass legislation that takes away the defining
and essential characteristics of the courts. Maintaining these characteristics – such
as the court’s ability to provide natural justice or procedural fairness – not only
protects the ongoing existence of the courts but also has a derivative effect in that it
helps ensure that when a claim is brought before a court, whether by the executive
against an individual or an individual against the executive, the individual receives
a fair hearing (or at least a base level of fairness).
The courts’ role in enforcing the rule of law and, in particular, ensuring that
the executive government complies with the law also saw the High Court at the
beginning of the 21st century introduce a new implication derived from the
Constitution.60 That implication was ‘an entrenched minimum provision of judicial
review’ over executive decision making. It effectively means that the legislature
is unable to pass legislation that prevents the courts from deciding whether the
executive has acted within the law. While the implication helps to ensure that
the courts continue to operate as part of a system of checks and balances against
arbitrary power, it also has the derivative effect of providing a limited form of rights
protection. This protection is found in the fact that an individual will ordinarily
be able to challenge the legality of any executive decision that is made specifically
about them. However, it is a limited protection as the absence of a bill of rights
means the legislature can still pass laws that restrict an individual’s substantive
rights, making it more likely that adverse executive decisions will be lawful.
58 Such as sections 80, 92 and 116 of the Constitution.
59 Galligan and Morton 2017.
60 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476 (Plaintiff S157). This
implication was extended to state Supreme Courts in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales
(2010) 239 CLR 531.
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Perhaps most controversially, and in what can be termed the second major
period of constitutional transformation (after the Engineers case and the cases
that immediately followed it),61 the High Court has more recently found in the
Constitution an implied freedom of political communication62 and an implied right
to vote.63 In effect, the High Court has recognised and enforced a constitutional
commitment ‘to certain fundamental freedoms or democratic values’.64
The High Court’s commitment to such values has seen it find numerous pieces
of legislation invalid. It has, for example, held legislation invalid when it:
• imposed a criminal penalty for publicly criticising the workings of government65
• limited political advertising while also establishing a system of free political
advertising that favoured the established parties66
• prevented prisoners subject to relatively short periods of imprisonment from
voting67
• reduced the period in which voters could enrol to vote after an election had
been called68
• capped political donations and limited electoral campaign spending.69
However, as interpreted by the High Court, the commitment to freedom of political
speech and the right to vote is not without limitations. This is evident in a number
of cases where the High Court has chosen not to hold legislation, or the regulations
made under legislation, invalid even though political communication or the right
to vote was or may have been impeded. The court justified these decisions on the
basis that, in the particular circumstances faced, the legislation was a proportionate
or ‘appropriate and adapted’ means of achieving legitimate legislative goals. Such
goals have included:
• protecting the safety of the public70
• enabling electoral rolls to be up to date prior to the opening of polling71
• providing limitations on the ability of property developers to make political
donations.72
61 Roux 2015, 1.
62 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Nationwide News
Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1.
63 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.
64 Williams, Brennan and Lynch 2018, 1328. See also Patapan 2000.
65 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1.
66 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106.
67 Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.
68 Rowe v Electoral Commissioner (2010) 243 CLR 1.
69 Unions NSW v New South Wales (2019) HCA 1; Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 252
CLR 530.
70 Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579.
71 Murphy v Electoral Commissioner (2016) 334 ALR 369.
72 McCloy v New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178.
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Perhaps somewhat ironically, it is in the cases in which legislation has been upheld
that the inherently political nature of the High Court’s role in formulating and
applying the freedom of political communication and the right to vote is most clear.
This is because in applying the ‘appropriate and adapted’ test the High Court judges
are openly balancing the policy goals that the legislature has sought to achieve
against their own assessment of the effect on, and value of having, an ability to vote
or freedom of political communication.
Conclusions
While the courts’ role in Australia can be simply described as interpreting and
applying the law, in reality it is far more complex. This complexity is due to the
myriad controversies that the courts must adjudicate upon, necessitating a
combination of generalist and specialist courts that all sit within a hierarchy in
which they are ultimately answerable to the High Court. It is also complex because
choices may be made, particularly by the High Court when interpreting the
Constitution, that have far reaching repercussions. These repercussions can extend
to a change in the balance of power between state and federal governments or the
protection of some rights from legislative encroachment.
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Federalism

Commonwealth–state relations
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One of the defining features of Australian government and an important factor in
Australian politics is the country’s federal system. Like other federations such as the
USA, Canada, Switzerland, Germany and India, Australia has two constitutionally
defined levels of government: the Commonwealth and the states. Each is
accountable to the citizens and empowered to make and implement policy. This
distinguishes Australia from unitary countries such as the UK, New Zealand,
France, Sweden and Indonesia, where all sovereign power is held by one national
government.1
Federations also differ greatly from one another, with some, such as Canada,
preserving a quite decentralised character while others, such as Australia, have
experienced considerable centralisation over time.2 The Commonwealth govern-
Fenna, Alan (2019). Commonwealth–state relations. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds.
Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 Hueglin and Fenna 2015. Such unitary states may have significant regional governments – as the
UK has had since ‘devolution’ created parliaments in Scotland and Wales – however, those only
exercise authority delegated to them by the national parliament.
2 Fenna 2019; Lecours 2019.
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ment plays a far broader role in Australian governance than it did a century ago or
than was envisaged when the Constitution was written. This means that Australian
federalism functions not only in a more centralised way, but also in a way that is
messier and more opaque to the public. With both levels of government operating
in many policy fields, who does what and who should be held accountable is often
not at all clear.
Understanding the day-to-day functioning of Australian federalism and the
periodic issues and conflicts that arise means understanding the constitutional
framework; the way that framework has been interpreted over the years by the High
Court; the way financial resources are shared between the Commonwealth and the
states; the attitude of the political parties to the federal system; and the network of
intergovernmental relations that has evolved in response to growing overlap and
entanglement between the Commonwealth and the states.
Today, Australia struggles with how the two levels of government should fund
themselves and co-ordinate their respective roles and responsibilities. Those
challenges, in turn, lead to a set of underlying questions about the costs and benefits
of federalism: what advantages does a system of divided jurisdiction provide
Australia and do those outweigh any disadvantages?
Origins and design
Australia is a classic example of an aggregative or ‘joining together’ federation,
where a group of independent territories decide that they would be better off in
some kind of union. Delegates from Britain’s Australian colonies met in a series of
constitutional conventions during the 1890s to design a federal system that would
create a new overarching government – the Commonwealth – but leave the states
with the bulk of the responsibilities they had exercised as self-governing colonies. A
draft Constitution was eventually produced, put to the voters in colony-by-colony
referendums and, once approved, sent to London to be passed into law by the
British parliament.3 Australia’s federal system is still composed of the six original
states, though there are now also two territories. While the Australian Capital
Territory and the Northern Territory (NT) sometimes participate in the day-to-
day operation of the federation like states, both remain under the authority of the
Commonwealth and have no independent constitutional status.4
Federation
By 1890, all of the Australian colonies except Western Australia (WA) had enjoyed
self-government under their own constitutions and through their own parliaments
3 Hirst 2000; Hudson and Sharp 1988; Irving 1997; La Nauze 1972.
4 Statehood for the NT is mooted from time to time; see Harwood, Phillimore and Fenna 2010.
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for more than a generation. They could have continued in that fashion, eventually
achieving full independence from Britain, but they decided to pursue a federal
union instead. There was no pressing need to do so, but a combination of growing
national sentiment, a sense of economic advantage and a desire for greater strategic
clout provided sufficient motivation. A Constitution was soon drafted, but enthus-
iasm waned, and it was not until the end of the decade that a final text was agreed
upon. After passage by the British parliament as the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act, it came into effect on 1 January 1901.
This created a system in which two levels of government, the Commonwealth
and the states, have constitutionally guaranteed status. A provision was made for
the territories (section 122). Local government was not mentioned at all; thus, as
explained below, local governments were left entirely as subordinate entities of their
respective state governments. Periodic attempts are made to give local government
constitutional status; however, so far these have come to nought.5
The division of powers
Key to the federal system that the framers envisaged was the division of powers.
Which tasks would be assigned to the Commonwealth and which left to the states?
The general consensus was that almost all functions internal to the operation of
each state should remain the responsibility of the states. The Commonwealth was
assigned primarily those powers necessary for cementing the union and managing
relations with the outside world.
Following the American example, which they drew on extensively, the framers
decided to accomplish this by creating, in section 51, a single list of areas in which
the Commonwealth was permitted to legislate and simply leaving the states with
an open-ended grant of unspecified powers (section 107). Thus, section 51 was a
limited list of powers intended to confine the Commonwealth to a set range of tasks.6
Moreover, section 51 deliberately did not make the powers of the Commonwealth
exclusive. Unless otherwise indicated, the Commonwealth’s powers are held
concurrently with the states. However, another clause, section 109, was inserted
to give the Commonwealth paramountcy in regard to those concurrent powers.
And elsewhere in the Constitution a handful of powers were made exclusive to the
Commonwealth. Among those was the authority to ‘raise or maintain any naval or
military force’ (section 114) and to ‘coin money’ (section 115).
The framers intended that any power not mentioned in section 51 would be
entirely the responsibility of the states. These included a wide range of important
government functions, such as: land management; environmental protection; edu-
cation, social services and health care; transport and infrastructure; law enforce-
ment; and local government.
5 Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Local Government 2011; Grant and Drew 2017.
6 Aroney 2009, 276.
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In summary, then, there was a handful of exclusive Commonwealth powers; a
larger list of concurrent powers, with the Commonwealth enjoying paramountcy;
and an open-ended set of implicitly exclusive state powers. The idea was that the
two levels of government would operate, for the most part, in their own spheres,
with minimal overlap and thus minimal need for co-ordination. It was envisaged
as a relationship between what pioneering federalism scholar K.C. Wheare
characterised as ‘distinct and co-ordinate’ governments.7
Safeguards
A division of powers is not, in itself, a guarantee that the two levels of government
will respect each other’s jurisdiction. The framers included other components to
assist in that task – three most importantly. One was a powerful upper house
(inspired by the US example), the Senate, where the states would have equal
representation. A second was an ‘umpire’ of sorts: the High Court of Australia. The
High Court is empowered to strike down legislation by either level of government
that transgresses the division of powers, and its decisions are ‘final and conclusive’.
A third was a procedure for altering the Constitution that prevents the Common-
wealth from changing the rules unilaterally. Although only the Commonwealth
parliament, and not the states, may initiate an amendment, section 128 requires
that any such proposal be approved by a majority of voters in a majority of states in
a referendum.
That demanding amendment procedure has proven a very effective safeguard,
with 36 of 44 attempts at amendment being rejected at referendum. Not all of those
were proposals to alter the federal balance, but many were. Australians have only
endorsed a clear transfer of authority to the Commonwealth on two occasions:
in 1946 voters supported the proposal to give the Commonwealth authority to
provide a wide range of social service benefits (section 51[xxiiiA]) and in 1967
voters agreed to strike out the prohibition on the Commonwealth makings laws for
‘the aboriginal race in any State’ (section 51[xxvi]).
The other two safeguards have, by contrast, proven feeble. By virtue of being
popularly elected, the Senate has always functioned as a second chamber for contest
between the political parties, rather than as a ‘house of the states’, and has played
little or no role in safeguarding the federal system. Meanwhile, the High Court
has been anything but a safeguard. Rather, judicial review has provided a ‘great
corrective’ to the rigidity of the Constitution represented by section 128.8 We turn
to that now.
7 Wheare 1963, 2; Zines 1986, 79.
8 Menzies 1967, 152. See also Allan and Aroney 2008.
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The courts and the Constitution: judicial review
Under the Constitution, criminal and civil law are both matters of state jurisdiction;
no authority in respect of either was assigned to the Commonwealth. Thus, the
states have their own criminal codes and their own court systems. However, the
Constitution also provides in Chapter III for ‘a Federal Supreme Court to be called
the High Court of Australia’ and whatever federal judiciary the Commonwealth
parliament decides to create. Under section 73, the High Court is empowered
to hear appeals from state Supreme Courts, thus creating a unified legal system.
And under section 74, the High Court is implicitly given jurisdiction to settle
constitutional conflicts between the Commonwealth and the states.
Although the High Court is tasked with being the ‘umpire’ of Australia’s federal
system, it was not made entirely neutral. Under section 72, the justices of the
High Court are ‘appointed by the Governor-General in Council’ – which effectively
means the prime minister. In other words, appointment is controlled not just by one
side to possible disputes, the Commonwealth, but by the executive branch of that
side alone. Here, the framers departed from the American example, where Supreme
Court appointments have to be approved by the Senate.
How to interpret a constitution?
Constitutions are but words on paper; quite what those words mean, and how they
apply in varying situations, is open to interpretation. Interpretation is particularly
tricky in the case of constitutions because such ‘founding documents’ have a special
status, often seen as providing guarantees of lasting application to preserve the
terms of the original agreement. One approach to their interpretation, then, is to
go beyond what a constitution says on face value and take into account what was
originally intended (originalism). A quite different approach is to reject attempts at
reconstructing original intent and assume that it was up to the framers to articulate
their vision through words that will speak for themselves, as literally read. And even
further from the approach of originalism is the view that constitutions must be fit
for purpose and that their clauses should be interpreted in whatever reasonable way
best suits current needs.
Judicial reasoning
Even presuming that there is consensus on which approach to take, abundant scope
remains for differing views about how any particular clause should apply in any
given situation. Legal reasoning relies heavily on stare decisis, or ‘precedent’: the
rules established in previous judgements.
The appellate structure of the judiciary has long been fundamental to the pro-
vision of consistent and wise justice in our system. Cases typically begin in lower
courts and can be appealed to higher ones, perhaps to the very highest one. In
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the process, a uniform or ‘common’ law is produced, since anomalies in any one
judgement will be overturned at the next level. The High Court occupies a privileged
position in this hierarchy since its judgements cannot be appealed; its decisions
are final. This gives the High Court a unique ability to defy – and thus change –
precedent, should the judges so decide. This happened very dramatically in Australia
when the High Court decided in the 1992 Mabo case that the legal doctrine of terra
nullius should no longer be accepted as valid.9 As a consequence, Australia had to
start recognising some form of land rights for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people.10 This, in turn, had a direct impact on Commonwealth–state relations since it
meant that the states had to defer to the Commonwealth over land-rights claims.
The absence of further appeal means that the High Court carries a heavy
burden, being expected to ‘get it right’. Under existing legislation, the High Court
is made up of seven judges and operates on a ‘majority rules’ basis. Cases may be
decided 7 to 0, 6 to 1, 5 to 2, or 4 to 3. There is a chief justice, but he or she holds
only an ordinary vote, like any of the others. Dissenting opinions – that is, those
in the minority in any given decision – may well have a significance of their own if
they express views that are ahead of their time and that later provide the intellectual
basis for a switch in the court’s stand.
Centralisation and judicial review
The High Court has been resolving disputes about the division of powers since
it commenced operation in 1903. For the first decade or more, the court was
made up of leading figures from among those who had drafted the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, an originalist mode of interpretation prevailed, emphasising what
the framers had intended. Most importantly, this meant defending the states’
jurisdiction against Commonwealth encroachment and maintaining the ‘federal’
character of the Constitution, as the judges knew was intended. In the process,
the court developed doctrines such as those of ‘implied immunities’ and ‘reserved
powers’, asserting that even if the Constitution did not explicitly protect the states,
its federal nature required and implied such protection.11
All of this changed in 1920, with the watershed decision in the Engineers case.12
In this case, the court declared that interpretation had to rely on the words of the
Constitution alone, read like any other statute. Implications were out. Because the
Constitution was not fortified with explicit statements about its federal character,
this new approach opened the door to an expansive interpretation of Common-
wealth powers that has prevailed ever since.13
9 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Mabo); Russell 2006.
10 Brennan et al. 2015; Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
11 Aroney 2017, 53.
12 The Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd. (1920) 28 CLR 129
(Engineers).
13 Aroney 2017, 54.
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Key cases
Soon after Engineers, the Commonwealth discovered that it could intervene in
areas of state jurisdiction by offering the states cash grants with conditions attached
(see below). This was challenged by the states in the Roads case, but the High
Court decided that the Commonwealth’s power to impose conditions on the states
when making grants was incontestable under section 96 of the Constitution.14
Section 96’s enormous centralising potential was made evident in the Uniform
Tax case of 1942, when the court decided that the Commonwealth could use that
power to take personal and corporate income tax from the states.15 A condition of
receiving further grants was that the states entirely cease from levying income tax
on their residents, and the court ruled that this was constitutional under section
96’s sweeping terms. As discussed below, this gave the Commonwealth a tre-
mendous financial lever in its relations with the states.
In the Racial Discrimination Act case of 1982 and Tasmanian Dams case of 1983,
the court decided that the Commonwealth’s power to legislate for ‘external affairs’
(section 51[xxix]) meant that it could override the states on any domestic matter
that had become subject to international treaty.16 This allowed the Commonwealth’s
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and its natural heritage protection initiatives
to trump state laws in respect of land use. In the WorkChoices case of 2006, the court
decided that the ‘corporations’ power (section 51[xx]) allowed the Commonwealth
to enact wide-ranging laws in respect of industrial relations.17
Fiscal federalism
Much – though not all – of what government does requires money, sometimes large
amounts of it. Having constitutional licence or even responsibility to do something
is not the same as having the capability to do that thing. Governments need financial
resources to fulfil their responsibilities and to enjoy an autonomous existence. One
of the principles of federalism is that the different governments have a degree
of financial independence that allows them to make their own decisions and be
accountable for those decisions to their own voters. This operates vertically and
horizontally. In the vertical plane, does each level of government have access to
resources commensurate with its responsibilities? In the horizontal plane, are there
measures in place to ensure a common standard of capability in all the different
14 The State of Victoria and Others v Commonwealth (1926) 38 CLR 399 (Roads), where the issue
was interference in state decisions about new roads. Section 96 declares that ‘the Parliament
may grant financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament
thinks fit’.
15 The State of South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373 (Uniform Tax).
16 Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 (Racial Discrimination Act); The Commonwealth
of Australia v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Tasmanian Dams).
17 New South Wales v Commonwealth of Australia (2006) 229 CLR 1 (WorkChoices).
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states? As it turns out, in Australia the answer to the first question is ‘no’ and the
answer to the second question is ‘yes, but there can be conflict’.
Controlling the revenue
The Constitution gives both levels of government full access to all revenue sources
except ‘duties of customs and of excise’ (section 90). Customs and excise were made
exclusive to the Commonwealth to ensure that Australia enjoyed the economic
benefits of internal free trade.18
However, things turned out a bit differently. First, the High Court started
interpreting the prohibition on state ‘excise’ taxes in a way that covered any sales
tax, depriving the states of a major and quite economically efficient revenue base.19
Then, in 1942, the High Court endorsed the Commonwealth’s takeover of personal
and corporate income tax in the Uniform Tax case. Since then, the Commonwealth
has enjoyed a stranglehold over revenue in the federation. This is why, in contrast
with the situation in Canada or the USA, Australians pay no state income tax
and no state sales tax. It is also why the states impose socially and economically
inefficient taxes, such as stamp duty, and it helps explain why they are generally so
willing to condone gambling.
The result is a high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VFI), where the
Commonwealth collects far more in tax than it requires for its own purposes and
the states have expenditure needs far in excess of their tax revenue. This lead to the
states being dependent on annual transfers from the Commonwealth for roughly
half of their revenue. Occasionally, proposals are made to restore some financial
balance to the federation, but so far none have generated any momentum.20 In
1999, the Commonwealth and the states did agree that the proceeds from the
Goods and Service Tax (GST) that the Commonwealth was introducing would go
to the states.21 However, this merely replaced one set of Commonwealth transfers
with another.
Commonwealth grants
The Commonwealth could simply hand back to the states the surplus revenue
it collects, and, indeed, a substantial amount is transferred in that way (GST
revenues). However, it was not long before Commonwealth governments realised
that by making grants to the states for certain defined purposes, or with certain
conditions attached, they could start to influence or even control what the states did
18 For an overview of the dilemmas faced by the founders, see Saunders 1986.
19 Culminating in the decision in Ha and Another v The State of New South Wales and Others
(1997) 189 CLR 465, which prompted the Commonwealth to compensate the states by
hypothecating the total net revenue of the proposed GST to them. Saunders 1997.
20 Fenna 2017.
21 A New Tax System (Commonwealth–State Financial Arrangements) Act 1999 (Cth).
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in their own areas of jurisdiction. By such means, they would be able to circumvent
the limitations imposed by the federal division of powers. Since the early 1970s,
these specific purpose payments, or ‘tied grants’, have proliferated and made possible
the expansion of Commonwealth power across a wide range of policy fields, the
largest being health and education. Today, just over 50 per cent of Commonwealth
transfers to the states come in the form of unconditional revenue from the GST and
just under half come in the form of grants for specified purposes. Reforms have
occurred, but it is not clear how profound they have been.
Reform and regression in the grants system
Recognising the distortions this tangle of conditional grants imposed on Australian
federalism, the newly elected Rudd Labor government introduced a suite of reforms
in 2009. These collapsed almost a hundred conditional grants, some of them highly
prescriptive, into a handful of block grants, each allocated to a broad policy domain.
The idea was that instead of answering to the Commonwealth for various require-
ments attached to each grant, the focus would shift to expectations about how much
the states would accomplish in those fields.22
But for this to work, there had to be a way of measuring how much the states
were accomplishing and how much their performance was improving over time.
The states and the Commonwealth agreed to assign this task to a joint body that
would benchmark the performance of each state across the wide range of policy
fields covered by the new system of block grants.23 The Council of Australian
Governments (COAG) Reform Council made a brave effort, but it was an ambitious
undertaking, requiring methodical work, and progress was slow. In 2014, after only
a few years of operation, the council was abruptly and unilaterally terminated by
the incoming Abbott Coalition government. It had also become clear that although
the existing tangle of conditional grants had been pruned back, there was nothing
to stop new ones appearing.
The equalisation system
All federations are torn between the principle that each of their constituent units
has some responsibility for its own economic and financial success and the
principle that citizens should receive a comparable quality of public services
regardless of where in the country they live. In Australia, the latter principle has
dominated. A highly developed system of horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE)
allocates GST revenues to each state according to their respective needs and
capabilities.24
22 Department of the Treasury 2009; Fenna and Anderson 2012; Federal Financial Relations Act
2009 (Cth).
23 Fenna 2012.
24 Commonwealth Grants Commission 2017.
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The Commonwealth Grants Commission uses a complex formula to make
recommendations to the federal treasurer for GST distribution each year. That
formula takes into account the particular spending needs of each state and territory
– a jurisdiction with proportionally larger disadvantaged populations, for instance,
will have greater spending needs. And on the other side, the formula takes into
account each jurisdiction’s revenue-raising capacity. As long as the differences are
not great, the system works reasonably well. However, when, as in the last decade,
they have widened and shifted, conflicts arise.
Conflict and compromise in the equalisation system
Historically, the two big states, home to most of Australia’s population and manu-
facturing industry, have been the ‘donor’ jurisdictions. New South Wales and
Victoria have long received slightly less than their per capita share of the uncon-
ditional transfers so that the smaller and less advantaged states and territories could
be subsidised. It was generally a small price to pay. When the mining boom began
in the early 2000s, WA’s huge increase in royalty earnings caused it to join the
ranks of the donor states. Because its population was so much smaller, however, the
reduction in WA’s GST allocation was proportionally much greater. By the time the
mining boom had ended, the Grants Commission’s calculations left WA eligible for
only 30 per cent of its per capita share.
Inquiries into GST distribution have been launched twice in recent times,
but finding a compromise acceptable to the Commonwealth, the donor states
and the beneficiary states and territories is inherently difficult.25 Eventually, the
Commonwealth agreed to ameliorate the situation by establishing a ‘floor’ under
which a state’s per capita GST share would not be allowed to fall and promising an
injection of Commonwealth funds, with legislation being passed in mid-2018.26
Who stands up for federalism?
These centralising developments remind us that, to stay intact, any set of institu-
tional arrangements needs powerful friends. For a long time, Australian federalism
could count to a reasonable extent on the Liberal Party. In part, this was because
of the affinity between the Liberal Party’s ideology and federalism. Federalism’s
division of powers and constitutional constraint went hand-in-hand with liberalism’s
belief in the rule of law, individual rights and limited government. More importantly,
though, Australia’s federal system provided a bulwark against the Labor Party’s
ambitions for activist or interventionist government. At key moments in the 20th
25 GST Distribution Review 2012; Productivity Commission 2018.
26 Treasury Laws Amendment (Making Sure Every State and Territory Gets Their Fair Share of GST)
Act 2018 (Cth).
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century, Labor was prevented from pursuing its policies by the limits on Common-
wealth government jurisdiction.27
However, this was never going to translate into a consistent, principled, defence
of states’ rights and the federal system. When in government in Canberra, the
Liberal Party itself inevitably has national policies it wants to introduce, policies
that will often involve an expansion of Commonwealth influence.28 Labor’s hostility
to federalism eventually diminished as their interventionist ambitions declined and
tied grants increasingly proved themselves an effective work-around.29 The Liberal
Party’s support for federalism accordingly also declined – to the point where two
successive Liberal prime ministers (John Howard and Tony Abbott) were openly
critical and decidedly centralising.30 This disdain was consistent with the growing
impatience big business was showing towards the inconveniences of federalism
as more firms came to operate across states and the Australian economy became
increasingly integrated. Their call was for a ‘seamless economy’.31
Intergovernmental relations (IGR)
Almost a century now of centralisation since the Engineers case has left Australia
with a federal system where, instead of operating in their own spheres, the two
levels of government are deeply entangled. The states have retained most of their
original responsibilities, but the Commonwealth now plays a role in almost all of
those areas. There are now education, health, local government and social service
departments, as well as environmental protection agencies, at both levels of
government although each of those was originally state jurisdiction. As we have
seen, this high degree of overlap has resulted, most importantly, from the
Commonwelath’s financial superiority and the ability that gives the Commonwealth
to provide conditional grants to the states. In such a deeply entangled system,
mechanisms for co-ordination and collaboration between the two levels of
government are essential. The general term for this is co-operative federalism –
meaning that ongoing co-operation is required, but not meaning that it is achieved
without conflict.
Australia’s IGR system
Since 1991, in particular, Australia has developed a sophisticated network of co-
operative mechanisms. At the apex is COAG, the Council of Australian Govern-
ments. COAG is a periodic meeting of the Commonwealth and the state and
27 Galligan 1987.
28 Sharman 2001, 287.
29 Galligan and Mardiste 1992; cf. Parkin and Marshall 1994.
30 Hollander 2008.
31 For example, Business Council of Australia 2008.
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territory heads of government (along with the president of the Australian Local
Government Association) where major intergovernmental issues are considered.
Answering to COAG are a clutch of ministerial councils bringing together all
the responsible ministers in the main portfolio areas from across the country. In
addition, a number of statutory agencies have been established to administer joint
programs or oversee joint policies. Many of the new and complex relationships
between the two levels of government in different policy fields are regularly
formalised in intergovernmental agreements. While legalistic in style, these are not
legally binding or enforceable.
COAG, it must be remembered, is only a brief and occasional meeting held
when the prime minister decides, and the Commonwealth dominates. For a few
years, there was an organisation through which the states tried to co-ordinate
joint action and positions on national issues: CAF, the Council for the Australian
Federation.32 Joint action by the states would have provided some counterweight
to that Commonwealth dominance. However, such joint action has proved very
difficult to maintain.
Co-operative federalism
The formalisation of Australia’s longstanding practice of summit meetings between
the prime minister and the premiers as COAG in 1991 was the beginning of a
new and much more active period in Australian intergovernmental relations. Since
then, co-operative federalism has waxed and waned. Through the 1990s, Australian
governments worked more closely and sometimes collaboratively in an effort to
make Australian federalism operate more effectively and efficiently.33 Enthusiasm
for co-operative federalism faded somewhat under the Coalition government of
1996–2007, in part because of partisan differences with Labor governments at the
state level. However, it surged to a new highpoint with the election in 2007 of the
Rudd government, when, for a brief time, it was ‘wall-to-wall’ Labor governments
across the country. COAG met frequently and the two levels of government worked
energetically to improve the functioning of Australia’s federal system.
Generally, a well-functioning system of executive federalism is seen as a good
thing. However, questions are sometimes raised about the extent to which it
removes political decision making from the purview of the people’s representatives
in parliament.
32 Phillimore and Fenna 2017; Tiernan 2008.
33 Painter 1998.
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The future of Australian federalism
Despite the enormous change that has taken place in Australian federalism over the
past century, the states still play a large role, particularly in delivering public services.
State governments manage their respective hospital and government school systems,
plan and construct transport infrastructure, manage their state’s energy utilities, and
control most of the policing and criminal law. However, they are dependent on
Commonwealth funds for a good part of that and carry out those tasks in ways greatly
influenced by Commonwealth policy decisions. The result is a system that is anything
but ‘distinct and co-ordinate’. The entanglement of the two levels of government
regularly elicits criticisms and complaints of overlap and duplication, blame- and
cost-shifting, blurred lines of accountability and inefficiency. It raises the question of
whether Australia should rehabilitate, re-engineer or retire its federal system.
What’s the use of federalism?
Federalism came into being in Australia and elsewhere not because it was seen as
conferring any special benefits, but simply because it allowed pre-existing regional
communities to retain a degree of autonomy while gaining the advantages of being
part of a larger entity. Since then, the case has often been made that federalism is
desirable in itself and should be preserved as much as possible. This is particularly
relevant in the Australian case since the Australian states are not distinct cultural or
linguistic communities that require the autonomy federalism provides – as is often
the case overseas.
One argument is that by creating multiple governments, federalism multiplies
the opportunities for democratic participation and engagement.34 Another is that
by imposing limits on actions of the respective levels of government, federalism
provides enhanced protection for individual rights.35 A third is that federalism
allows for variation in public policy across the country instead of a ‘one-size-fits-all’
approach. Another concerns competitive federalism: state governments are subject to
pressure to perform since their citizens can compare across jurisdictions and even
move out of state if they are sufficiently unhappy. And another is that federalism
allows for experimentation and learning in public policy, with opportunities for new
ways of doing things to be tried in any of several jurisdictions. In effect, policies
can thus be ‘tested’ before being adopted more widely, hence the term laboratory
federalism. All these possible benefits of federalism require that the states retain a
substantial degree of autonomy and policy independence.
All of them are also, however, merely propositions, and the extent to which
federalism actually does deliver these benefits is an open question. In addition, critics
often emphasise disadvantages to federalism. These include the tendency for overlap
34 Galligan 1995, 38–53.
35 Galligan 1995, 142–7.
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and duplication between the levels of government and for ‘blame-shifting’ and ‘cost-
shifting’. With the Commonwealth having extended its role, activity and influence
into so many areas of state jurisdiction, overlap and duplication are unavoidable.
Sometimes it might be wasteful and inefficient; sometimes, though, it may provide a
double protection that citizens appreciate.36 Similarly, the extent to which blame- and
cost-shifting are serious problems is also very much an open question.
Another limitation of federalism is that, although it allows for subnational
autonomy in political systems, it only does so for territorially defined communities.
Federalism offers little for groups in society that are dispersed rather than
territorially concentrated. With the occasional exception such as Nunavut in
northern Canada, indigenous people are thus rarely in a position to achieve the
kind of autonomy and degree of self-determination that federalism offers.37
Where to now?
Numerous inquiries and commentaries have suggested that Australian federalism
be ‘reformed’ by rationalising the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of
government. Ideally, overlap and duplication would be minimised and each level
of government would take responsibility for the tasks to which it is best suited.
There has even been suggestion that Australia should return to a simpler age of
a more co-ordinate style where clearer lines of division between the two levels
of governments are re-established.38 In 2014, incoming Coalition Prime Minister
Tony Abbott announced a high-level and comprehensive inquiry into the matter.39
That inquiry got as far as releasing a preliminary report but was terminated by
Abbott’s replacement before the process could finish.40 This typified the start–stop
experience with federalism reform in Australia, a process that is heavily constrained
by the dominant position of the Commonwealth.41
Conclusions
The union of Britain’s six Australian colonies in 1901 created a federal system where
a constitutional division of powers allocated much of the work of government
to the states while assigning certain specific functions to the Commonwealth.
That system exists to this day, but has changed significantly in its operation. The
Commonwealth has taken on new responsibilities and extended its influence into
a wide range of areas that were originally exclusive to the states. As a consequence,
36 Hollander 2010.
37 Hence the growing interest in potential modes of ‘non-territorial autonomy’; see Coakley 2016.
38 For example, NCA 2014; NCA 1996.
39 Prime Minister 2014.
40 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2015.
41 Fenna 2017; Tiernan 2015.
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Australian federalism has been transformed from the original model, in which the
two levels of government operated independently of each other, to one where there
is endemic concurrency.
The Constitution lays out the legal architecture of Australia’s federal system.
This is most notable in section 51, enumerating the Commonwealth’s powers;
section 90, prohibiting the states from levying duties of customs or excise; section
96, allowing the Commonwealth to make conditional grants; sections 107 and
108, guaranteeing the states their continued existence and authority; section 109,
establishing the superiority of Commonwealth law within its assigned jurisdiction;
section 74, making the High Court the umpire of the federal system; and section
128, requiring support in a majority of states for constitutional change.
Although Australian federalism has changed greatly over the last century, with
a couple of notable exceptions, it is not because these key provisions have been
changed. Indeed, section 128’s strict requirements have helped ensure that very
little has been altered in the Constitution itself. Rather, change has occurred as a
consequence of the way some of those provisions have been used and the way they
have been interpreted by the High Court. Since the Engineers decision of 1920, the
High Court has followed an interpretive approach supporting an expansive reading
of Commonwealth powers. This has facilitated assumption of fiscal dominance by
the Commonwealth, which, in turn, has given it enormous financial leverage over
the states.
Whether it be in education, housing, health care, environmental protection,
infrastructure or a range of other areas of governance that were originally state
matters, the two levels of government are now inextricably intertwined. In tandem
with that development has come the rise of co-operative federalism, where the
Commonwealth and the states work to negotiate over policy and co-ordinate their
actions. At the apex of that system of intergovernmental relations is COAG.
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It is paradoxical that the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), as the national capital
and seat of the federal parliament, should have the least political representation
of any state or territory jurisdiction in the country per capita. Despite having
a population similar to that of Tasmania, the ACT currently has two federal
electorates, two senators and a 25-member Legislative Assembly. Tasmania, by
comparison, has five federal electorates, 12 senators, a 25-member lower house and
a 40-member upper house, as well as 29 local government areas.
This chapter will explores the ACT’s history and process of government – what
can be described as Australia’s only ‘city state’.1 In doing so, it asks a number of
questions. Given the disparity in representation, is the ACT more or less effectively
governed than other jurisdictions? Is its relationship with the Commonwealth
government different from that of other states and territories? Situated within New
South Wales (NSW), what is its political and policy relationship with that state? Are
Tennant-Wood, Robin (2019). The Australian Capital Territory. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John
R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 Halligan 2015, 6.
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there constitutional provisions for its government? What level of autonomy does
the ACT possess for policy?
Historical context
The ACT is a creature of Australia’s adoption of federalism in 1901. At Federation
there was no officially proclaimed national capital. The first federal parliament met
in Melbourne while the government decided on where to locate the capital to
provide it with security and also not ‘favour’ either Sydney nor Melbourne. The
search for a suitable place was narrowed down to a spot mid-way between the two
rival cities, and the site for Canberra – on the land of the Ngunnawal people – was
chosen in 1908. The territory was formally ceded to the Commonwealth by NSW in
1909. Work on the city was interrupted between 1914 and 1918 by the First World
War, and parliament finally moved into its ‘temporary’ Parliament House in 1927; it
would remain there for a further 61 years before the permanent one opened in 1988.
As a planned city that embraced modern concepts like private car ownership
and suburban living, Canberra was always intended to be a showpiece – the nexus
of national government in a garden city. It is the site of various national institutions
and monuments, as well as the instruments of government: government dep-
artments, agencies and related bodies. During the construction of the city, most
of the public service departments remained in Melbourne, but as Canberra was
completed, stage by stage, the departments moved to the seat of government. This
process explains why, even today, many peak bodies and lobbying organisations
are still headquartered in Melbourne.2 The post–Second World War years saw a
very rapid increase in population with the expansion of the departments and the
associated construction of housing and city amenities. Between 1955 and 1975, the
population of the ACT increased by 50 per cent every five years.
During the 1970s, the population of the ACT increased to 224,0003 and there
was a growing push for self-government. According to Halligan and Wettenhall,
there were largely two schools of thought regarding this proposal: self-government
advocates believed that Canberrans, with no state or territory level of government,
did not have the same democratic rights as other Australians; opponents to self-
government ‘preferred to trade these rights for the financial benefits that came from
being a federally protected and heavily subsidized enclave within the nation’.4
In 1978, an advisory referendum was held for ACT residents on self-
government. Voters were given three choices on the ballot form: retain the current
arrangements; self-government; or a local council arrangement with legislative
2 Fitzgerald 2006.
3 ABS 2012.
4 Halligan and Wettenhall 2000.
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Table 1 Results of the 1978 advisory referendum on self-government
Proposal % Votes
Self-government 30.54 33,480
Local government 5.72 6,268
Present arrangements 63.75 69,893
Source: ACT Legislative Assembly 2015.
and executive responsibility. The result of the referendum was overwhelmingly in
favour of retaining Commonwealth administration (see Table 1).
By the late 1980s, however, the ACT population had grown to almost 300,000,
and the Commonwealth, despite the results of the referendum, decided that the
ACT should become a self-governing jurisdiction. This required four separate Acts
of the Australian government:
• Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth)
• Australian Capital Territory (Electoral) Act 1988 (Cth)
• Australian Capital Territory (Planning and Land Management) Act 1988 (Cth)
• Australian Capital Territory Self-Government (Consequential Provisions) Act
1988 (Cth).
These Acts were signed into law on 6 December 1988. The first of these is essentially
the constitution of the ACT and sets out the framework for government and
the system of governance. The Australian Capital Territory (Planning and Land
Management) Act 1988 oversees the ACT Plan and the Spatial Plan, which set out
the development provisions for the ACT, and comes under the auspices of the
National Capital Authority.
Self-government in the ACT
Today, the ACT is governed by a unicameral 25-person Legislative Assembly,
elected under the Hare-Clark electoral system (see below). The ACT does not have
its own police service; instead, general policing is carried out by the Australian
Federal Police.
The government of the ACT is a hybrid organisation.5 Like a state government,
it is responsible for developing and implementing policy across the normal
5 Halligan 2015.
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territorial responsibilities: finance and economy, justice, environment, education,
health, housing and development, transport and employment. In addition, it has
responsibility for municipal functions: waste management, sportsground main-
tenance, kerbing and guttering, development applications, and parks and gardens.
Developments in self-government
The first ACT election was held on 4 March 1989. It was conducted under a
modified d’Hondt (party list) electoral system, the whole of the ACT comprising
one 17-member electorate. The election was contested by 117 candidates, repre-
senting 22 political parties and independents.
A measure of the somewhat jaundiced view of residents towards self-government
in 1989, and also reflecting the results of the earlier referendums, was that the parties
contesting the election included the Surprise Party, the Sun-Ripened Warm Tomato
Party and the Party! Party! Party! Further, the first House of Assembly included eight
representatives from anti-self-government parties: No Self-Government, the Abolish
Self-Government Coalition and the Residents Rally Party. It took almost two months
to finalise the counting of votes, and the final result was a minority Labor government
led by Rosemary Follett.
While Follett’s government managed to navigate the first tentative steps of
government, a key player in the transition to self-government was William Harris,
the secretary of the Chief Minister’s Department. Harris was the architect of the
ACT’s first budget, a ‘task that involved identifying all federal government spending
on the territory by dozens of departments and agencies, and then overseeing the
design and establishment of a purpose-made public service to operate at both state
and municipal levels’.6 Over time, the ACT has managed to navigate autonomy well,
consolidating its administrative functions and moving to a more stable electoral
system.
Until the 2016 election, the Assembly had 17 members elected from three
electorates: Molonglo, Ginninderra and Brindabella. In 2013, ACT Electoral Com-
missioner Philip Green held a review of the size of the Assembly. This was
motivated by the expanding population, and because the ministerial respon-
sibilities of minority government members had expanded, reducing the degree to
which ministers could undertake all their duties. The report recommended that:
• the ACT Legislative Assembly be increased to 25 members at the 2016 election,
with five electorates each returning five members;
• the Assembly be increased to 35 members at the 2020 election, with five
electorates each returning seven members.7
6 Cooke 2016.
7 ACT Reference Group on the Size of the Legislative Assembly 2013.
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The government accepted the first recommendation, and, in 2015, a redistribution
of electoral boundaries was held, increasing the number of electorates to five, each
electing five members.
Electoral system
The modified d’Hondt system under which the first Assembly was elected was
superseded by the Hare-Clark system. The Hare-Clark system is also used to elect
the Tasmanian lower house, and is a proportional representation system using a
single transferable vote (STV), where the vote transfers from candidate to candidate
according to the preferences of the voter. In a five-member electorate, voters must
number a minimum of five squares on the ballot paper.
The ballot form itself follows the Robson rotation system, meaning that the
candidates’ names in the party lists on the ballot form are rotated so no single
candidate is listed at the top of every form. The 2016 election, the first with the
extended Assembly, attracted 10 registered political parties and a total of 141
individual candidates. The result was a minority Labor government supported by
two Greens members.
Intergovernmental relations
Commonwealth–ACT relations
With slight representation in the national parliament, the ACT has a complex and
often fraught relationship with the federal government. Self-government saw the
ACT better able to participate in Australia’s system of federal intergovernmental
relations, through inclusion in the peak intergovernmental relations body, the
Council of Australian Governments (COAG). But the ACT suffers from ‘co-
location’, being both Canberra-as-national-capital and Canberra-as-distinctive-
entity in its own right.8
Upon self-government, the National Capital Development Commission was
superseded by the National Capital Authority (NCA). The NCA is an agency of the
federal government with responsibility for the ongoing development of Canberra.
This authority extends to land to be released for development, the preservation of
the Burley Griffin plan for the city and the maintenance of the historical integrity
of the capital. The ACT government, therefore, must operate under the auspices of
the NCA for all planning and development decisions.
Complicating the relationship between the ACT and federal governments is
the fact that the Parliamentary Triangle comes under federal control. This area
8 Wettenhall and Warrington 1998.
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(the apex of which is Parliament House, and which is bounded by Commonwealth
and Kings Avenues and the northern shore of Lake Burley Griffin) contains Old
and New Parliament House, the National Library, Science Centre, Art Gallery and
Archives, the High Court and several major public service buildings (including
Treasury and Department of Finance, and the Australian Electoral Commission
offices). It is positioned close to the centre of the city, which has considerable
implications for territory planning. The ACT government has no jurisdiction
within this area, with the exception of the delivery of municipal services.
ACT–NSW relations
NSW surrounds the ACT on all sides. As such, the territory must retain working
relations with that state to deal with a variety of cross-boundary issues (Canberra is
increasingly a conurbation that includes the town of Queanbeyan in NSW). As the
largest metropolitan area in its region, Canberrans also see large numbers of people
from the surrounding state using its services.
In 2016, the two jurisdictions signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
Regional Collaboration to provide a structure for the joint development and
implementation of policy (including co-operative consultation with stakeholders)
for the region.9 This builds on structures set up over recent decades, such as the
NSW Cross Border Commissioner in 2012.
Policy issues of salience in the ACT
With a highly educated and comparatively wealthy population,10 the ACT is
generally held to be socially progressive.11 It has led the way in recognising same-
sex partnerships, waste minimisation policies and renewable energy initiatives.
Greens members have been elected to the ACT parliament consistently since 1995.
Except for one term (2004–08), the ACT has always had minority governments,
dependent upon minor parties and independents for support in the Legislative
Assembly to pass legislation and retain confidence. While tending to support Labor
in government, the presence of the Greens has been significant in promoting
socially and environmentally progressive policies, reflecting the ACT Greens’
origins in wider social justice issues.12
The ACT’s progressiveness in pursuit of public policy, however, has often been
at loggerheads with more conservative federal administrations due to the
subordinate position of territories in Australian federalism. The Australian
9 ACT and NSW 2016.
10 ABS 2017.
11 Stewart 2014.
12 Miragliotta 2012.
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Constitution is unambiguous in handing the right to make laws for the territories
to the Commonwealth:
The Parliament may make laws for the government of any territory surrendered
by any State to and accepted by the Commonwealth, or of any territory placed
by the Queen under the authority of and accepted by the Commonwealth, or
otherwise acquired by the Commonwealth, and may allow the representation of
such territory in either House of the Parliament to the extent and on the terms
which it thinks fit.13
Two recent policy disputes – one now resolved, one ongoing – illustrate this limit
to territorial self-government.
Same-sex marriage and civil unions
In March 2004, the ACT proposed legislation to enable civil unions for same-
sex couples. The legislation, which would permit civil unions to be conducted
by marriage celebrants and would give same-sex couples the same legal rights
and standing as heterosexual married couples, was vigorously opposed by the
then federal government under Prime Minister John Howard. The attorney-general
wrote to ACT Chief Minister Stanhope saying that, while the Commonwealth
considered the status of same-sex relationships to be within the jurisdiction of the
states and territories, it opposed any altering of the ‘status of marriage’.14 Stanhope
responded by amending his proposed legislation so that civil unions could not
be performed by marriage celebrants, but the federal parliament, fearing that the
ACT’s legislation was a step towards legalising same-sex marriage, promptly
blocked it by amending the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) so that the definition of
‘marriage’ changed from ‘a union between two consenting adults’ to ‘a union
between one man and one woman’.
In 2013, under Chief Minister Katy Gallagher, the ACT passed the Marriage
Equality Bill 2013 (ACT) in defiance of the Commonwealth.15 At the time, the chief
minister stated that:
We would prefer to see the federal parliament legislate for a nationally consistent
scheme, but in the absence of this we will act for the people of the ACT. The
Marriage Equality Bill 2013 will enable couples who are not able to marry under
the Commonwealth Marriage Act 1961 to enter into marriage in the ACT. It
will provide for solemnisation, eligibility, dissolution and annulment, regulatory
requirements and notice of intention in relation to same-sex marriages.16
13 Constitution of Australia 2010, section 122.
14 Zanghellini 2007.
15 Karvelas 2013.
16 Gallagher, quoted in Karvelas 2013.
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Attorney-General George Brandis announced that the Commonwealth would
appeal in the High Court to have the legislation overturned, but the ACT’s Act came
into force on 7 December 2013. Over 30 couples immediately married under the
new law before, a week later, the High Court ruled in the Commonwealth’s favour
on the grounds that the ACT law contradicted the federal marriage legislation
and was therefore unconstitutional. While this ended the progressive experiment
in same-sex marriage, the conflict did much to put the issue on the national
agenda and placed pressure on successive national governments to expand access
to marriage.
The right to die: euthanasia
The Northern Territory paved the way for euthanasia laws in 1995, when it became
the first Australian jurisdiction to legalise assisted suicide for the terminally ill. The
ACT was to follow suit until the Commonwealth passed legislation overriding any
move by either territory to pass euthanasia laws in 1997.
In December 2015, Liberal Democrat Senator David Leyonhjelm proposed
the Restoring Territory Rights (Assisted Suicide Legislation) Bill 2015 (Cth), with
senators of all parties being given a conscience vote. The purpose of the Bill was
to repeal the Commonwealth’s prohibition of the territories legislating for assisted
suicide. Leyonhjelm is an outspoken supporter of both the rights of the territories
to determine their own laws, and the rights of the terminally ill to choose to die.
The debate, therefore, was as much about territory rights as it was the rights of the
terminally ill.
The Bill went to a second reading in 2016; however, it lapsed at prorogation of
the parliament in the lead-up to the election and was not reinstated to the notices
until later in 2016. It finally went to its second reading debate in February 2018.
After several months of debate, it went to a vote on 14 August 2018. The Bill was
expected to pass the Senate with a narrow margin; however, last minute lobbying
on the part of those opposed to the Bill changed the votes of enough senators to see
it defeated by two votes.
Conclusions
The government of the ACT is in a unique position, being the jurisdictional
authority over the territory wherein resides the federal government. It faces a
number of challenges: administering a territory whose core ‘industries’ are
government and (predominantly publicly funded) education; providing municipal
services for a rapidly growing city; providing health, education and public transit
services for a growing population; maintaining a healthy and productive rel-
ationship with the NSW government and the local government authorities of the
‘Australian Capital Region’; and maintaining both its character and integrity while
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forging a good working relationship with the federal government, regardless of
which political party is in power.
The expanded Assembly should ensure a better coverage of the issues and
more equitable representation of the population. It is not known whether the ACT
government will act on the second recommendation of the Reference Group on the
Size of the Legislative Assembly and expand the Assembly to 35 members in the
future.
Given the demographics and political inclination of the ACT’s population, it
is likely that the ACT government will remain progressive in its policy outlook;
however, the issue of territory rights remains unresolved.
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New South Wales
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New South Wales (NSW) politicians tend to see their state as ‘the premier state’,
a claim once emblazoned on NSW vehicle number plates. This contentious claim
of pre-eminence rests on two main strands. One strand is cultural centrality: in
1788, the convict colony in NSW initiated the ‘defining moments and symbols’
of the later Australian nation.1 One version of this idea incorporates stories of
colonial politicians successfully pressing for self-government, public works and land
development, the great strikes of the 1890s, the founding of the Labor Party (ALP)
and, most recently, Sydney’s rise as a global city – ‘the quintessential Australian city,
raffish, hedonistic, where old wealth means nothing and new wealth is admired and
ostentatiously displayed’.2 A more critical version of the idea of cultural centrality
sees the colony’s founding on ‘Australia Day’ as emblematic of unresolved conflicts
and inequalities between the colonisers and Indigenous Australians.
Clune, David, and Rodney Smith (2019). New South Wales. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John
R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 Hirst 1998, 464.
2 Hirst 1998, 464–5.
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The second strand has to do with the size of NSW. Although it is not physically
the largest of the six Australian states, NSW has the biggest population, the greatest
wealth and the most government activity. In 2018, NSW had 7.95 million people
(1.52 million more than Victoria, the next most populous state) and generated 32.7
per cent of Australia’s gross domestic product (compared with Victoria’s 23.4 per
cent). In 2016, NSW became the first quarter of a trillion dollar state economy in
Australia. The NSW public sector employed 473,000 workers, almost twice as many
as the Commonwealth (241,000) and over 100,000 more than Victoria.
NSW’s potential to dominate national politics, as well as the fears this potential
has generated in other parts of the country, have been clear since the Federation
debates over the Australian Constitution. NSW has played a major role in national
politics and is often seen as the state that is politically closest to the national centre.
It sends about one-third of the members to the House of Representatives (currently
47 out of 150) and has provided almost half of the country’s prime ministers (14
of 30). The state’s citizens have identified more closely with the centre and have
possessed weaker state loyalties than citizens of other states.3
Perhaps for this reason, NSW has rarely been a leader of the states in
Commonwealth–state conflicts and has not been particularly innovative among the
states in developing new directions and approaches in public policy.4 As Elaine
Thompson comments in her survey of NSW governments, ‘Pragmatism seems
to be the order of the day rather than bold visions from either the Left or the
Right’.5 Politics within NSW has been dominated by practical problem-solving
administration, tinged with anxiety about whether the performance of the state’s
government and public sector match its claims to premier status.
The constitutional framework
Over a period of a century or so after 1788, NSW developed a pattern of represent-
ative and responsible government – including strong bicameralism, entrenchment
of key constitutional provisions and judicial review – that later helped to form
expectations about the Australian Constitution.6
Until 1823, all legislative and executive authority in the British colony of NSW,
which covered most of the continent of Australia, resided in the governor. The Legis-
lative Council was established in 1823 to give the colonists token involvement in
the legislative process. An Executive Council was formed in 1825 to advise the
governor in his administrative capacity. Both were nominated bodies consisting of
officials and leading colonists. This was the beginning of the process of establishing
3 Holmes and Sharman 1977, 34–59; Smith 2001, 281–2.
4 Deane 2015; Hughes 1984; Nelson 1985a; Twomey 2012.
5 Thompson 2007, 361.
6 Sharman 1989.
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representative government in NSW. A Supreme Court with full judicial independ-
ence was created in 1823, providing legal protection against government action.7
In 1843, the Legislative Council became Australia’s first elected legislature, with
the majority of its members directly elected, albeit on a restricted franchise. There
was growing pressure within the colony for NSW citizens to be given the same
rights, including self-government, as existed in Britain. The British government’s
philosophy was to grant self-government to colonies when they were ready and
it agreed to do so in NSW.8 Under the guidance of the colony’s pre-eminent
statesman, William Charles Wentworth, the NSW Legislative Council drafted a
constitution. After some amendments by the UK government, this draft became the
Constitution Act 1855 (NSW).9
In 1856, the NSW parliament assumed the bicameral shape it has today. The
Legislative Council became an upper house along the lines of the British House
of Lords. Members of the new lower house, the Legislative Assembly, represented
geographic districts and were elected on a broad manhood suffrage. Governments
and individual government ministers were responsible to the parliament, holding
office only while they had the support – ‘the confidence’ – of the popularly elected
Assembly. Public funds could only be expended with parliamentary approval. Fin-
ance Bills had to originate in the Assembly. The governor acted on the advice of
ministers. The Executive Council, consisting of the ministry and the governor, was
the formal mechanism by which Cabinet decisions were given official legitimacy.
The legality of government actions could be tested in the courts.
Ministers exercised considerable patronage in appointments at all levels of the
growing public service until the 1890s, when the creation of the Public Service
Board established a model of independent recruitment, promotion and deployment
of staff that continued until the 1980s. After 1988, ‘new public management’ reforms
included the abolition of the Public Service Board, decentralised public service
recruitment and greater ministerial control over senior public servants. A system
of elected local councils developed from the 1840s; however, the existence, funding
and powers of local government bodies have never been entrenched in the NSW
constitution and local councils remain subject to the control of the government.10
The Legislative Assembly
The 19th-century Legislative Assembly was not dominated by disciplined political
parties. Governments often rose and fell in the house, rather than at elections, as
premiers gained and lost support from other members of the Legislative Assembly
7 Clune 2010; Melbourne 1963.
8 Clune 2011; Melbourne 1963 [1934].
9 Melbourne 1963 [1934]; Twomey 2004.
10 Clune and Griffith 2006; Golder 2005; Parker 1978; Twomey 2004.
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(MLAs) (see Table 1). The Assembly occupied a more central position in the
democratic process than it ever would again. In the early 20th century, Labor and
non-Labor parties began to control the Assembly. The house’s deliberation and
scrutiny functions atrophied as governments gagged debate and rushed legislation
through.11
The main exception to majority party control of the Assembly occurred after
the 1991 election, which left the Liberal–National Coalition government of Nick
Greiner in a minority. In return for support from three independent members,
Greiner implemented a charter of reform that led to a revival of the Assembly’s
deliberative and scrutiny processes.12
With the return to majority government at the 1995 election, the Assembly
reverted to government dominance, a situation that remains today. The Assembly
does, however, exercise partisan scrutiny of the executive through attempts by the
opposition to score points, for example, at question time.13
The Legislative Council
After 1856, the appointed Legislative Council was intended to be a house of review
and a conservative check on the popularly elected Assembly. Until 1934, members
of the Legislative Council (MLCs) were appointed by the governor. From 1934 until
1978, all MLCs were elected by members of both houses of parliament.14
The advent of Labor governments from 1910 saw an increase in conflict between
the lower and upper houses, as the Council treated Labor’s legislative programs more
harshly than those of non-ALP administrations. Between the 1920s and the 1960s,
Labor governments made several unsuccessful attempts to abolish the Council.15
In the 1970s, Labor Premier Neville Wran was determined to reform a Council
he could not abolish. After much negotiation, the opposition agreed to a reform
proposal that was then overwhelmingly passed by a referendum in 1978. It provided
for a house of 45 members elected by proportional representation on a statewide
basis. One-third retired at each general election.16
Further change came under Liberal Premier Nick Greiner. In 1991, the Council
was reduced to 42 members and the term of office reduced from 12 to eight years,
with half the MLCs ending their terms at each election. The quota required for
election was consequently lowered, increasing the opportunities for minor party
and independent representation. No government has controlled the upper house
11 Clune and Griffith 2006.
12 Clune and Griffith 2006; Smith 1995.
13 Clune and Griffith 2006; Smith 2012b.
14 Clune and Griffith 2006; Turner 1969.
15 Clune and Griffith 2006; Turner 1969; Twomey 2004.
16 Clune 2017.
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since 1988, during which time the Council has largely exercised parliament’s roles
of reviewing legislation, scrutinising the executive and holding it accountable.17
The electoral framework
The questions of who should vote and be eligible to stand for the NSW parliament
were largely settled by the early 20th century. In 1858, all males aged 21 and
over who were British subjects resident in the colony for three years and not in
receipt of charity were enfranchised. A requirement, abolished in 1893, that a voter
had to reside in his electorate for six months disqualified many potential voters,
including large numbers of itinerant workers. Women had to wait until 1902 to
gain the vote, until 1918 to be able to stand for the Legislative Assembly, and
until 1926 to be eligible for the Legislative Council. Indigenous people have always
had the same formal voting rights as others in NSW, although the residential and
charity disqualifications led to much Indigenous disenfranchisement. Compulsory
enrolment was introduced in 1921 and compulsory voting in 1928. The voting age
was reduced to 18 years in 1973.18
Methods of electing representatives have been subject to greater variation,
as governments have sought to gain electoral advantage or reverse an advantage
enjoyed by their predecessors. Until 1910, NSW had used plurality (‘first-past-the-
post’) ballots in single-member districts to elect the Assembly. Rapid experiment-
ation took place from 1910 to 1928, with second round ‘run-off ’ elections,
proportional preferential voting in multi-member electorates, optional preferential
voting (OPV) in single-member electorates and, finally, full preferential voting
in single-member electorates. The latter system was retained until 1979, when
the Wran Labor government provided for OPV in single-member districts. This
method has continued since, allowing voters to allocate preferences to as many or
as few candidates as they wish.19
Since 1978, Legislative Council elections have used OPV, with ‘above-the-line’
or ‘group ticket’ voting introduced from 1988 to simplify the process. The rules
about upper house preferences have been altered over time to reflect changes in the
size of the Council and to prevent minor parties with little support being elected.20
The boundaries of individual Assembly seats have long been drawn indepen-
dently of governments. Legislation in 1893 instituted an Electoral Commission,
consisting of public servants, to draw up the electoral boundaries. It also created
a regular process to review them. In 1928, the position of electoral commissioner
was established to head the Electoral Office. The electoral commissioner replaced
17 Clune and Griffith 2006; Smith 2006; Smith 2012b.
18 Clifford, Green and Clune 2006; Parker 1978; Twomey 2004.
19 Clifford, Green and Clune 2006; Smith 2003.
20 Green 2012.
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parliament as the final consent authority for redistributions in 1949. Currently,
the commissioners for a redistribution are a judge of the Supreme Court (past or
current), the electoral commissioner and the surveyor-general. Redistributions are
automatically triggered after every second general election, if more than a quarter
of electoral districts do not have an equal number of voters or if there is a change in
the number of members of the Legislative Assembly.21
As in most other states, for many years non-Labor and Labor governments
alike used zonal systems to attempt to maximise their chances of election by
manipulating the numbers of votes required to elect a representative from Sydney,
regional areas around Sydney and rural areas. Reforms by the Wran ALP govern-
ment in 1979 abolished the long-term over-representation of rural voters in the
Assembly. In 1991, the government’s right to call an early election was replaced by
a fixed four-year electoral term, with elections held every four years on the fourth
Saturday in March. These changes were entrenched in the NSW constitution, so
they cannot be repealed without a referendum.22
Until the 1980s, election candidates raised their own campaign funds and were
not required to reveal who had provided them with funding. In 1981, NSW passed
the first laws in Australia providing for public funding of elections and public
disclosure of political donations. Within a few years, public funding of candidates
winning 4 per cent or more of the vote proved relatively uncontroversial.23 By
contrast, public disclosure of the sources and sizes of election donations has
become an increasingly contentious and complex issue over the past decade. The
controversies began with claims that some donors and candidates had used
loopholes in the rules to disguise their funding arrangements, or had simply broken
the rules without detection or punishment. Recent efforts by a series of NSW
governments to ban contributions from particular types of donors, including
property developers, to cap contributions from other donors and to restrict the
amount that candidates can spend on campaigns have been highly contentious and
subject to legal challenges. How much influence election donations buy and how
such donations should be regulated are ongoing questions in NSW.24
The political contest
The political contest in NSW since the advent of representative and responsible
government in 1856 can be divided into five broad eras: faction politics in the
early colonial period; a late colonial period dominated by Free Traders and
Protectionists; an unstable contest between Labor and anti-Labor parties from the
21 Clifford, Green and Clune 2006; Parker 1978; Smith 2003.
22 Twomey 2004.
23 Turner 1985.
24 Gauja 2012.
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1900s to the 1940s; a Labor versus Coalition contest from the 1940s to the 1980s,
dominated by Labor; and a period from the late 1980s when Labor versus Coalition
competition has been modified by minor party and independent challengers.
The colonial period
At the first popular elections in 1856, the political contest was between liberals and
conservatives. In the ensuing decades, the conservatives disappeared as a political
force. Almost all politicians labelled themselves ‘liberal’, which became a diffuse,
diluted creed. Competition for government was between loose factions gathered
around dominant political leaders, such as Charles Cowper, John Robertson, James
Martin, Alexander Stuart and the greatest of them all, Henry Parkes, who still holds
the record as NSW’s longest-serving premier, completing a cumulative term of 11
years and nine months (see Table 1).25
A two-party system emerged in the 1880s between Free Traders and Protection-
ists. As a major trading centre, Sydney was a Free Trade stronghold. Protection was
supported by manufacturers and farmers who wanted tariffs to safeguard them from
imports from overseas and from other colonies. Federation made the fiscal issue
irrelevant in NSW, as the Australian Constitution entrenched free trade between the
new states and gave power over tariffs to the Commonwealth government. The Free
Traders became the Liberal Party and the Protectionists became the Progressives.26
The Labor Party changes the contest
A stronger challenge to the colonial pattern of political competition came from the
formation of the Labor Party. In January 1890, the NSW Trades and Labor Council
decided to elect representatives to parliament to protect and further its interests.
The initial platform was a practical, down-to-earth document, mainly concerned
with matters such as industrial, electoral, land, educational and social reform. The
new party drew support not only from the urban working class but also from small
farmers, shopkeepers and intellectuals. It had socialist elements but these were
never predominant. From its inception, Labor was committed to the parliamentary
road to reform.27
Labor did well in the 1891 poll, winning 29 per cent of the primary vote. As a
third party holding the balance of power, Labor’s approach was to support the party
that offered to advance its agenda the most.
Labor constructed its organisation on the innovative basis of grassroots control.
In practice, these democratic ideals were often subverted by dominant factions that
ruled with an iron fist. The early electoral successes of the Labor Party pushed non-
Labor forces together into a single party, the Liberal Party, in the 1900s, creating
25 Loveday and Martin 1966.
26 Loveday, Martin and Parker 1977.
27 Nairn 1973.
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Table 1 Elections, premiers, Assembly support and government status in the colonial
period
Election* Premier/s
between
elections**
Main support in Assembly Government
status
1856 Stuart Donaldson
Charles Cowper
Henry Parker
Charles Cowper
Independents
Cowper faction
Independents
Cowper–Robertson faction
Minority
Minority
Minority
Minority
1858 Charles Cowper Cowper–Robertson faction Minority
1859 Charles Cowper
William Forster
John Robertson
Cowper–Robertson faction
Independents
Cowper–Robertson faction
Minority
Minority
Minority
1860 John Robertson
Charles Cowper
James Martin
Cowper–Robertson faction
Cowper–Robertson faction
Martin and Forster factional coalition
Minority
Minority
Minority
1864 James Martin
Charles Cowper
James Martin
John Robertson
Martin and Forster factional coalition
Cowper–Robertson faction
Parkes and Martin factional coalition
Cowper–Robertson and Forster
factional coalition
Minority
Minority
Minority
Minority
1869 John Robertson
Charles Cowper
James Martin
Cowper–Robertson and Forster
factional coalition
Cowper–Robertson and Forster
factional coalition
Martin and Robertson factional
coalition
Minority
Minority
Minority
1872 Henry Parkes Parkes faction Minority
1874 John Robertson
Henry Parkes
Robertson faction
Parkes faction
Minority
Minority
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Election* Premier/s
between
elections**
Main support in Assembly Government
status
John Robertson Robertson faction Minority
1877 John Robertson
James Farnell
Henry Parkes
Robertson faction
Independents
Parkes and Robertson factional coalition
Minority
Minority
Majority
1880 Henry Parkes Parkes and Robertson factional coalition Majority
1882 Alexander Stuart
George Dibbs
Stuart–Dibbs–Jennings faction
Dibbs–Jennings faction
Minority
Minority
1885 John Robertson
Patrick Jennings
Henry Parkes
Robertson faction
Dibbs–Jennings faction
Free Trade
Minority
Minority
Minority
1887 Henry Parkes
George Dibbs
Free Trade
Protectionist
Minority
Minority
1889 Henry Parkes Free Trade Minority
1891 Henry Parkes
George Dibbs
Free Trade
Protectionist
Minority
Minority
1894 George Reid Free Trade Minority
1895 George Reid Free Trade Minority
1898 George Reid
William Lyne
John See
Free Trade
Protectionist
Progressive
Minority
Minority
Minority
*Year of first day of voting if voting occurred on multiple days.
**The first premier listed next to each election date is the first leader who secured office as
a result of the election. Premiers who continued to govern for short periods after losing an
election until a successor was sworn in are not included.
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the Labor versus Liberal dynamic of party politics that has dominated NSW politics
ever since.28
In 1910, Labor formed its first NSW government; it was re-elected in 1913.
This level of success proved impossible to repeat throughout the next few decades,
with Labor only governing for two-fifths of the period from 1910 to 1941 (see Table
2). Although Labor governments had some important achievements to their credit
in this period, they were repeatedly brought undone by internal divisions.
The party split when Labor Premier W.A. Holman defied Labor policy and
supported conscription in the First World War. Holman and most of his Cabinet
left Labor in late 1916 and combined with their former enemies to form the
Nationalists. The conscription split reinforced the belief within the unions and the
party machine that Labor politicians could not be trusted and needed to be kept
under strict control. Jack Lang, who became Labor leader in 1923, plunged the
party into an internal war; his inflammatory style as premier led NSW close to
major civil disorder. In 1932, Governor Sir Philip Game used his reserve powers
to dismiss Lang. At the ensuing election, Labor suffered a crushing defeat and
remained in the wilderness for much of the next decade.29
In the period after 1910, the major non-Labor party went through two
realignments, absorbing the Labor conscription defectors to become the National
Association of NSW (the Nationalists) in 1917 and then reforming as the United
Australia Party (UAP) in 1932. Although electorally more successful than not, the
Nationalists and UAP were both organisationally weak parties, heavily reliant on
strong parliamentary leaders. Disastrous election losses in the early 1940s led to the
UAP’s dissolution.30
Apart from facing Labor’s challenge, the Nationalists had to deal with farmers,
graziers and rural business people who were angered by what they saw as the
Nationalists’ neglect of ‘the bush’. Disaffected conservative rural politicians ran under
the Progressive banner at the 1920 election, winning 11 seats in rural NSW. A split
among the Progressives over how closely to support George Fuller’s Nationalists
led to the formation of the NSW Country Party in 1922. A workable relationship
between the conservative parties of town and country was not resolved until after the
1927 election, when the Country Party won 13 seats and negotiated five ministries,
including the deputy premiership, as junior partner in a Nationalist–Country
Coalition government. This established the long-term pattern of Coalition relations
whenever the major non-Labor parties governed in NSW.31
28 Hagan and Turner 1991; Nairn 1973.
29 Hagan and Turner 1991; Nairn 1986.
30 Hancock 2007; Watson 1979.
31 Aitkin 1972; Davey 2006.
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Table 2 Elections, premiers, Assembly support and government status from Federation
to the Second World War
Election Premier/s
between
elections*
Main support in Assembly Government status
1901 John See
Thomas Waddell
Progressive
Progressive
Minority
Minority
1904 Joseph Carruthers Liberal Minority
1907 Joseph Carruthers
Charles Wade
Liberal
Liberal
Minority
Minority
1910 James McGowen
William Holman
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1913 William Holman Labor then Nationalist Majority
1916 William Holman Nationalist Majority
1920 John Storey
James Dooley
George Fuller
James Dooley
Labor
Labor
Nationalist–Progressive Coalition
Labor
Minority
Minority
Minority
Minority
1922 George Fuller Nationalist–Progressive Coalition Majority
1925 John Lang Labor Majority
1927 Thomas Bavin Nationalist–Country Coalition Majority
1930 John Lang
Bertram Stevens
Labor
United Australia–Country Coalition
Majority
Minority
1932 Bertram Stevens United Australia–Country Coalition Majority
1935 Bertram Stevens United Australia–Country Coalition Majority
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Election Premier/s
between
elections*
Main support in Assembly Government status
1938 Bertram Stevens
Alexander Mair
United Australia–Country Coalition
United Australia–Country Coalition
Majority
Majority
*The first premier listed next to each election date is the first leader who secured office as a
result of the election. Premiers who continued to govern for short periods after losing an
election until a successor was sworn in are not included.
Postwar Labor dominance
William McKell, who replaced Lang as Labor leader in 1939, won a landslide
victory in 1941. Labor would dominate NSW politics over the following eight
decades, governing for more than two-thirds of that time, over three lengthy
periods: 1941 to 1965, 1976 to 1988 and 1995 to 2011 (see Table 3).
McKell and many of his colleagues had been scarred by the Lang years and
were determined to create a new style of Labor government. McKell’s emphasis
was on internal unity, political moderation and efficient administration. During his
two terms, he implemented significant social, industrial and environmental reforms
and established a model of negotiated compromise between the ALP machine and
Labor governments that continued under his successors. This model, along with
political skill and continuous prosperity in the long postwar boom, helped Labor to
retain office until 1965.32
Labor won the 1976 election under Neville Wran, who was premier for the next
decade. As well as maintaining the McKell model, he took account of the emergence
of new policy issues concerning quality of life and equality of opportunity. Wran was
re-elected with record majorities in 1978 and 1981, and less easily in 1984.33
Bob Carr led Labor back to office with a narrow victory in 1995, before winning
easily in 1999 and 2003. Economic efficiency and environmental sustainability were
the key elements of the Carr model. He became the longest continuously serving
NSW premier, remaining in office for 10 years and four months. Carr’s premiership
was followed by a period of instability and rapid leadership change. The ALP’s
organisational wing clashed with the government over electricity privatisation. The
influence of back-room figures such as Eddie Obeid, who was subsequently
imprisoned for corruption, was a major issue. At the 2011 election, Labor suffered its
worst defeat since 1904, winning just 36 per cent of the two-party preferred vote.34
32 Clune 1988; Cunneen 2000.
33 Bramston 2006; Chaples, Nelson and Turner 1985; Steketee and Cockburn 1986.
34 Clune 2005; Clune and Smith 2012; Dodkin 2003; West and Morris 2003.
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Table 3 Elections, premiers, Assembly support and government status since 1941
Election Premier/s
between
elections*
Main support in Assembly Government status
1941 William McKell Labor Majority
1944 William McKell
James McGirr
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1947 James McGirr Labor Majority
1950 James McGirr
John Cahill
Labor
Labor
Minority
Minority
1953 John Cahill Labor Majority
1956 John Cahill Labor Majority
1959 John Cahill
Robert Heffron
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1962 Robert Heffron
John Renshaw
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1965 Robert Askin Liberal–Country Coalition Majority
1968 Robert Askin Liberal–Country Coalition Majority
1971 Robert Askin Liberal–Country Coalition Majority
1973 Robert Askin
Thomas Lewis
Eric Willis
Liberal–Country Coalition
Liberal–Country Coalition
Liberal–Country Coalition
Majority
Majority
Majority
1976 Neville Wran Labor Majority
1978 Neville Wran Labor Majority
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Election Premier/s
between
elections*
Main support in Assembly Government status
1981 Neville Wran Labor Majority
1984 Neville Wran
Barrie Unsworth
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
1988 Nicholas Greiner Liberal–National Coalition Majority
1991 Nicholas Greiner
John Fahey
Liberal–National Coalition
Liberal–National Coalition
Minority
Minority
1995 Robert Carr Labor Majority
1999 Robert Carr Labor Majority
2003 Robert Carr
Morris Iemma
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
2007 Morris Iemma
Nathan Rees
Kristina Keneally
Labor
Labor
Labor
Labor
Majority
Majority
Majority
Majority
2011 Barry O’Farrell
Michael Baird
Liberal–National Coalition
Liberal–National Coalition
Majority
Majority
2015 Michael Baird
Gladys Berejiklian
Liberal–National Coalition
Liberal–National Coalition
Majority
Majority
*The first premier listed next to each election date is the first leader who secured office as a
result of the election. Premiers who continued to govern for short periods after losing an
election until a successor was sworn in are not included.
Why was NSW Labor so dominant after 1941? Part of the answer lies in the
sheer extent of the NSW UAP’s collapse in the early 1940s and the difficulty of
establishing a competitive Liberal organisation. The NSW division of the Liberal
Party, formed in 1945, had a similar structure to the UAP, except that it controlled
its own finances, rather than relying on shadowy business interests. Liberal head
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office under General Secretary John Carrick developed a more co-ordinated
statewide organisational structure than the UAP had achieved or even desired.35
The Liberal Party suffered from several long-term problems. Its leaders were
no match for able ALP premiers like Joe Cahill. The parliamentary party was
internally divided and was often in conflict with the machine. Relations with the
Country Party were poisonous. Like others in the NSW Liberal Party, Carrick’s
main emphasis was the national contest, where the party quickly showed it could
defeat Labor. The NSW Party finally found a successful leader in the long-serving
and popular Robert Askin (deputy leader 1954–59; opposition leader 1959–65;
premier 1965–75). His government was initially innovative, establishing a Law
Reform Commission, Ombudsman and Consumer Claims Tribunal. However, it
became noticeably lethargic in its final years.
Subsequently, the Liberals have struggled to find leaders who have been able to
dominate NSW politics for long periods in a similar way to Labor Premiers Wran
and Carr. Recurrent factional conflicts within the party since the 1980s have added
to these difficulties.36 These problems have dogged the Liberals in office, although
relations between the Coalition partners have been stable.
Since their landslide election win in 2011, the Liberals have had three premiers,
with the transitions being smoothly managed. Barry O’Farrell (2011–14), after
a capable and reformist beginning, was forced to resign over a minor scandal
involving a gift. His successor, Mike Baird (2014–17), for a time the most popular
premier in Australia, retired from politics after less than three years because of a
backlash over decisions to ban greyhound racing and amalgamate local councils.
His replacement, Gladys Berejiklian (2017–) halted the government’s sliding
fortunes in 2019 and became the first woman to lead a party to election victory in
NSW.
The previous period of Liberal-led government (1988–95) saw the premiership
of Nick Greiner (1988–92) cut short following an ill-advised government appoint-
ment.37 While Liberal premiers have certainly helped to reshape NSW politics and
public policy – Greiner was the driving force behind the sweeping public sector
microeconomic reforms that later came to dominate Australian approaches to
government38 – they have generally had less impact than their Labor counterparts.
Throughout the postwar period, the ‘country’ partner in the NSW Coalition
has proved remarkably resilient in the face of a declining rural economy, long-
term population drift to urban centres and periodic challenges from independents,
minor parties and even its Liberal ally. This resilience has been due to a mix of
adaptation – the most obvious sign of which was a name change from the Country
35 Hancock 2007; Starr 2012.
36 Nelson 1985b; Smith 2012a; West 1965.
37 Hancock 2013.
38 Laffin and Painter 1995.
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Party to the National Party in 1982 – and continued assertion of the need for a
distinctively rural voice in the parliament and in government.39
The postwar vote share of Country/National Party candidates in Assembly
elections has remained stable, and the party’s share of Assembly seats has fluctuated
within a narrow band (12.9 to 19.4 per cent). Its lowest Assembly seat return
occurred at the 2003 election but the party bounced back to record its highest
postwar share of seats at the 2011 election.40
The ability of the Nationals to fend off demographic and political challenges
has meant that coalition agreements have persisted, with Nationals continuing to
hold the deputy premiership and other key ministries in Coalition governments.
The Queensland option of merging the Liberal and National parties has not been
seriously entertained in recent decades.41
Minor party and independent challenges since the 1980s
The electoral support of Labor and the Coalition parties has softened since the
1980s. As noted earlier, the Coalition was forced into minority government between
1991 and 1995 with the support of several independents. More recently, independ-
ents, the Greens and the Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party (SFFP) have all won
Assembly seats.
Single-member districts make winning Assembly seats difficult for minor part-
ies. The proportional representation system used for Legislative Council elections
provides minor parties with more encouragement, since they only need to win
a relatively small vote across the state to win a seat. Since the democratisation
of the Council, 10 minor parties have won Council seats and minor parties now
command one-quarter of the vote at every Council election (see Table 4). The
longest standing of these parties is the socially conservative Christian Democratic
Party (CDP), whose leader, Fred Nile, first won a seat in 1981, when the party
was named Call to Australia (CTA). CTA was frequently opposed in the Council
by the socially and environmentally progressive Australian Democrats, with both
parties critical to the passage of government Bills at different times between 1988
and 1995.42
After 1995, other minor parties became important players in the Council
at various times. Of the minor parties currently represented in the Council, the
Greens have the strongest organisation. The CDP relies on support networks within
the churches, the SSFP mobilises through gun clubs and hunting associations, and
the Animal Justice Party has strong connections to animal rights groups. Pauline
39 Aitkin 1972; Davey 2006.
40 Green 2012; Smith 2003.
41 Davey 2006.
42 Smith 2006.
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Table 4 NSW Legislative Council elections: vote and seat shares
Election First preference votes (%) Seats won (n)
Labor Liberal–National Other Labor Liberal–National Other
1978 54.9 36.3 8.2 9 6 0
1981 51.8 33.8 14.4 8 5 2 (CTA; AD)
1984 46.9 42.6 10.5 7 7 1 (CTA)
1988 37.5 46.2 16.3 6 7 2 (CTA; AD)
1991 37.3 45.3 17.4 6 7 2 (CTA; AD)
1995 35.3 38.5 26.2 8 8 5 (CTA; AD;
Gns; SP; BFC)
1999 37.3 27.4 35.3 8 6 7 (CDP; AD;
Gns; PHON;
RLS; UP; ORP)
2003 43.5 33.3 23.2 10 7 4 (2 Gns; CDP;
SP)
2007 39.1 34.2 26.7 9 8 4 (2 Gns; CDP;
SP)
2011 23.8 47.7 28.5 5 11 5 (3 Gns; CDP;
SP)
2015 31.1 42.6 26.3 7 9 5 (2 Gns; CDP;
SP; AJP)
2019 26.7 34.8 38.5 7 8 6 (2 Gns; 2
PHON; SP; AJP)
Source: Australian Politics and Elections Database, University of Western Australia.
http://elections.uwa.edu.au/.
CTA = Call to Australia (later renamed Christian Democratic Party [CDP]); AD =
Australian Democrats; Gns = Greens NSW; SP = Shooters Party (later renamed Shooters
and Fishers Party and then Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party); BFC = A Better Future
for Our Children; CDP = Christian Democratic Party; PHON = Pauline Hanson’s One
Nation; RLS = Reform the Legal System; UP = Unity Party; ORP = Outdoor Recreation
Party; AJP = Animal Justice Party.
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Hanson’s One Nation Party (PHON) won two Council seats at the 2019 election
with former federal Labor leader Mark Latham as its lead candidate.
The continued success of minor parties has changed the dynamic of NSW
electoral and parliamentary politics. The Labor Party now competes with the
Greens for left of centre votes, while the Coalition parties face electoral challenges
from right of centre minor parties such as the SFFP and PHON. Governments still
initiate almost all legislation that is passed by the NSW parliament; however, they
often need to take the views of minor parties into account to prevent contentious
Bills being defeated by a combination of opposition and minor party MLCs.43
Conclusions
NSW has a well-established set of formal political institutions that have adapted to
changing pressures over two centuries. This adaptability is perhaps best illustrated
by the development of the Legislative Council from an appointed to an elected
house of review. The institutional framework of NSW politics currently appears to
be relatively settled; however, the major political parties face challenges to adapt
their traditional outlooks and operations to new circumstances. Recent revelations
by the Independent Commission Against Corruption of political corruption
involving both the Labor and Liberal parties point to integrity and transparency
as key concerns for future governance in NSW. NSW Labor is yet to overcome
the legacies of the post-Carr era, while the Coalition government has staked its
reputation on a massive infrastructure spending program. This program is intended
to address Sydney’s growth and the economic development of regional NSW. Even
if the government succeeds in completing the promised roads, rail lines, stadiums
and so on, it may face a legacy of unresolved issues, such as population growth,
overdevelopment, environmental damage, the merits of private versus public
provision of services, lack of consultation and disruption to local communities.
A key question is whether the old laws of NSW politics – when the ‘pork barrel’
ruled – still apply or whether NSW is moving into an age in which tolerance,
sustainability, quality of life and access to social capital are more central to citizens’
perceptions of what it means to live in the ‘premier state’.
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Northern Territory
Robyn Smith
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1888 (SA), Northern Territory Representation Act 1922 (Cth), Northern Territory
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The Northern Territory (NT) comprises one-fifth of Australia’s land mass and
has a population of 244,300,1 of which one-third is Aboriginal. Representative
government is a relatively recent phenomenon for residents of the NT, who endured
government from afar until the 1970s and, to a certain extent, still do.
Like other parts of the country lying north of the Tropic of Capricorn, it has
fleeting moments at the top of the national political agenda – most notably at times
of disaster – before resuming its status as a somewhat awkward remote irritant.
The NT Legislative Assembly is a unicameral parliament, established after the
Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) (Self-Government Act) of the
Smith, Robyn (2019). Northern Territory. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
1 ABS 2016. Note that the population has been in decline since then as mining projects have been
completed. Further, there is a significant ‘fly-in, fly-out’ (transient) workforce on mining projects.
233
federal parliament conferred limited self-governing powers on the NT. The Ass-
embly is comprised of 25 representatives of single-member electoral divisions; each
division has an average 5,140 electors.2
History
The NT was part of the colony of New South Wales (NSW) from 1849 until 1863.3
It then became part of South Australia (SA) until 1911,4 making it part of SA at
Federation in 1901.
Under the Northern Territory Representation Act 1888 (SA), the NT was a single
electoral district that elected two members to the SA House of Assembly and, propor-
tionately, membership of the Legislative Council. From 1901 until 1911, NT residents,
who had been extended full adult suffrage,5 voted for the six senators representing SA
and, from 1903, the NT was included in SA’s federal division of Grey.6
In 1911, the NT was ceded by SA to the Australian government. Under this
regime, the NT had no representation at all in the federal parliament and no
state-like legislature. It is arguable that this disenfranchisement was the result
of the White Australia policy, enacted in 1901, because the non-Indigenous NT
population was overwhelmingly dominated by Asians,7 which would inevitably
have resulted in non-white representation in the federal parliament.8
In preparation for the change to Commonwealth control, the federal parliament
enacted the Northern Territory (Administration) Act 1910 (Cth), which provided
for government in the NT headed by an administrator appointed by the governor-
general.9
After bitter objections from NT residents, a single member of the House of
Representatives was granted by the Northern Territory Representation Act 1922
(Cth). That representative had no vote. In 1936, the NT representative was granted
a vote, but only on ordinances setting down laws for the NT.
Legislative Council
A 13-person Legislative Council was established in 1947. The Commonwealth
retained absolute control by providing for the election of six members and the
2 Redistribution Committee 2019.
3 State Archives of New South Wales n.d.
4 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xi.
5 This included Aboriginal people – possibly as an administrative oversight – although they were
unaware of their right and not at all familiar with the electoral process.
6 National Archives of Australia n.d.
7 Principally Chinese, engaged in mining and commerce, but also Japanese, engaged in the
pearling industry, and Malays, Filipinos and Indonesians, engaged in fishing enterprises.
8 See, for example, Egan 2017, 27, 43.
9 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xi.
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appointment of seven members. The Council had the power to make laws for
the ‘peace, order and good government of the Territory subject to assent by the
Administrator and/or the pleasure of the Governor-General’.10 The Council met for
the first time in 1948.
Disaffection with the lack of autonomy remained, and, in April 1958, all six
elected members of the Council resigned in protest. All were re-elected, five
unopposed, in June 1958.11 In the same year, the NT’s member of the House of
Representatives was allowed to vote ‘on any proposed law or matter relating solely
or principally to the Territory’.12
The following year, the composition of the Legislative Council was changed
to eight elected members, six official members and three non-official members.
Commonwealth control was retained by appointing the administrator to be the
president of the Council with two votes, a deliberative and a casting vote.13 At
the same time, an Administrator’s Council was created as an advisory body and
comprised two official (appointed) members and three elected members.
In 1965, the administrator was replaced as a member and president of the Legis-
lative Council. The president was, for the first time, an elected member of the Council.
In 1968, composition was changed again: non-official appointed members were
replaced by elected members, resulting in 11 elected members and six appointed
members. For the first time, the Legislative Council was under NT control. In that
year, the NT’s member of the House of Representatives was granted full voting rights.
Legislative Assembly
On 20 November 1974, the first fully elected Legislative Assembly, comprising 19
members, convened. This resulted in the NT’s first executive. In 1977, the federal
parliament enacted the Self-Government Act. On 1 July 1978, the NT became self-
governing and the NT government was given authority and responsibility for the
finances of the territory. In 1982, membership of the Legislative Assembly was
increased to 25.
Limitations of self-government
When the Commonwealth ceded control of the NT to the Legislative Assembly,
certain state-like powers were not transferred. These were: Aboriginal land rights,
industrial relations, national parks and uranium mining. Those limitations remain.
10 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xii.
11 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xii.
12 Jaensch and Smith 2015, xii.
13 This anomaly was carried over at the time of self-government. The speaker of the Legislative
Assembly, unlike speakers of other parliaments, has two votes: a deliberative and, in the event of
a tied vote, a casting one.
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This situation, however, is fluid. The NT’s Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995
(NT) (ROTI), passed by the Legislative Assembly in May 1995, was overturned by
the federal parliament’s Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth),14 which amended the Self-
Government Act by inserting section 51A to prohibit laws in relation to voluntary
euthanasia. ROTI has never been repealed by the Legislative Assembly and remains
an impotent instrument in the statutes of the NT. Statehood was first mooted for the
NT during the 1975 federal election, but this amendment to the Self-Government
Act resulted in a grievance to the Australian parliament and an invigorated debate
about the NT’s inequality within the federation.
Similarly, the federal parliament’s Northern Territory National Emergency
Response Act 2007 (Cth) (the Intervention) allowed for a federal ‘invasion’ of the
NT and the suspension of some NT and federal laws. The $587 million emergency
response followed publicity arising from the Little children are sacred report,
commissioned by Chief Minister Clare Martin in 2006, and was an initiative of
the Howard government in the lead-up to the 2007 election, at which it was
defeated. The Intervention suspended federal laws in relation to discrimination,
social security, taxation and Aboriginal land, and NT laws in relation to alcohol
and pornography, removed customary law and cultural practice considerations
from bail applications and sentencing in criminal trials, and introduced mandatory
health checks for children. Directed at Aboriginal communities, the haste with
which it was introduced allowed ‘little time for consultation with Indigenous
communities’ and it included ‘army troops being deployed to Indigenous
communities in the Northern Territory’.15
Neither action could happen in a state because state constitutions provide
entrenched powers and legislative independence from the federal government. The
NT is without a constitution; in its absence, the Self-Government Act is effectively
the constitution.
Financial arrangements and economy
The NT has been funded as a state by the federal government since 1988.16 Funding
arrangements apply:
on the principle of ‘horizontal fiscal equalisation’ meaning that funding is provided
on the basis of what it costs to deliver a service per person in the NT. Distance
is factored in to the Commonwealth’s formula, often to the chagrin of the more
populous states.17
14 Also known as ‘the Andrews Bill’ because it was sponsored by the Member for Menzies
(Victoria) Kevin Andrews MHR.
15 Castan Centre, Monash University n.d.
16 Smith 2013, 25.
17 Smith 2013, 93.
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Funding for Aboriginal disadvantage, however, has been a contentious matter
since self-government was established in 1978. Speaking at the 2017 Garma Festival
of Traditional Culture, former Chairman of the NT Grants Commission and former
Coordinator-General Bob Beadman said that while the reason for the dearth in
funding is multifaceted, a fundamental reason is that ‘The Commonwealth Grants
Commission carve-up provided no catch-up to address the infrastructure deficit
dump passed to the NT at the time of Self-Government’.18
Because of the small population, there are limited revenue-raising opportunities
for NT governments. Taxation revenue is limited to payroll, motor vehicle registration
and stamp duty–type revenue. The boom and bust nature of the NT’s resource-based
economy means there is some income from mining royalties, but these are subject to
minimisation by the companies concerned and don’t contribute a great deal to the NT
budget.19 Thus the NT is heavily reliant on federal government funding.
Notwithstanding that 30 per cent of the population is Aboriginal, the NT is
losing ‘Indigenous funding’ to other states because increasing numbers of people
in those states are identifying as Aboriginal. This is complicated by the Common-
wealth Grants Commission’s failure to assess relative need between Aboriginal
populations in Australia20 since its creation in 1933.
The enduring lack of comprehensive federal policy in relation to northern
Australia has been lamented by Megarrity21 as the ‘politics of neglect’ based on
viewing the nation’s north as an economy rather than a society, and failing to
consider intellectual contributions from a range of community members. Historical
neglect, he noted, means that the north is still considered a wild, frontier land for
which visions of wealth and splendour are a product of east coast metropolitan
‘white fella Dreaming’.
Political parties
There are two dominant political parties in the NT: the Country Liberal Party
(CLP) and the Australian Labor Party (ALP). The CLP was formed in 1974, when
the Liberal Party, which was concentrated in Darwin, and the Country Party, which
was concentrated in regional bush centres, merged to become the sole conservative
force. The NT branch of the ALP was formed in 1973 and has traditionally been
regarded as ‘weak’ because:
18 Beadman 2017.
19 See Northen Territory Government 2019.
20 For example, there is no distinction between the remote community of Papunya in Central
Australia and Parramatta in urban NSW so the same ‘loading’ applies to both communities. See
also Beadman in Productivity Commission 2017.
21 Megarrity 2018, 183.
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The small size of the urban centres and the almost total lack of any large-scale
industrial development has meant that the Labor party has no ‘natural’ base of
membership and money. [Additionally,] organization of an industrial wing and
a branch structure was made difficult by the vast distances, the poor communi-
cations and the costs of transport.22
This difficulty was well demonstrated when the CLP held power in the NT from
1974 until 2001, when the ALP experienced its inaugural victory.
Aboriginal representation in the Legislative Assembly
Electoral laws applying at the 1974 and 1977 elections provided for voluntary
enrolment of Aboriginal people, although, if enrolled, voting was compulsory.
By the 1980 election, enrolment and voting were compulsory for all qualified
residents. Prior to 1980, remote Aboriginal people were obliged to use the postal
vote system; however, this was replaced with mobile polling booths in remote
communities23 and candidates identified both by name and photograph on ballot
papers, recognising that English was a second or subsequent language in many
communities. This more inclusive practice remains the case.
Aboriginal electoral enrolment is comparatively low,24 particularly in remote
regions. The reasons are complicated and include language difficulties, relevance
of the electoral system, electoral roll accuracy and the logistical difficulties of
undertaking remote enrolment drives.
There has been Aboriginal membership of the Legislative Assembly since 1974,
although membership of more recent Assemblies better reflects the NT’s 30 per
cent Aboriginal population. There have been several Aboriginal ministers – men
and women – in NT governments.
Elections
Four-year fixed-term elections were introduced in the NT in 2009. Table 1 lists the
results of each general election since the Legislative Assembly was created in 1974.25
22 Jaensch 1981, 64.
23 Jaensch and Smith 2015, 62–3.
24 See, for example, James 2016.
25 More detailed results and those relating to by-elections can be found at Jaensch and Smith 2016,
73–81, or on the NT Electoral Commission website.
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Table 1 Northern Territory general election results, 1974–2016.
Election Enrolment Seats won Leaders Government
Ind/
Other
ALP CLP ALP CLP
1974 39,027 2 (Ind) 0 17 NA Goff Letts CLP
1977 43,284 1 (Ind) 6 12 Jon Isaacs Paul
Everingham
CLP
1980 53,218 1 (Ind) 7 11 Jon Isaacs Paul
Everingham
CLP
1983 62,178 0 6 19 Bob Collins Paul
Everingham
CLP
1987 74,633 2 (Ind)
1 (Nat)
6 16 Terry Smith Steve Hatton CLP
1990 82,261 2 (Ind) 9 14 Terry Smith Marshall
Perron
CLP
1994 95,007 1 (Ind) 7 17 Brian Ede Marshall
Perron
CLP
1997 101,886 0 7 18 Maggie
Hickey
Shane Stone CLP
2001 105,506 2 (Ind) 13 10 Clare Martin Denis Burke ALP
2005 111,954 2 (Ind) 19 4 Clare Martin Denis Burke ALP
2008 119,814 1 (Ind) 11 13 Paul
Henderson
Terry Mills ALP
2012 123,805 1 (Ind) 8 16 Paul
Henderson
Terry Mills CLP
2016 135,506 5 (Ind) 18 2 Michael
Gunner
Adam Giles ALP
Source: ntec.nt.gov.au
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Land rights
During the 1960s, Aboriginal political activism accelerated. The Yirrkala Bark
Petitions, protesting against the granting of mining leases over Yolŋu land without
consultation, were presented to the federal parliament in 1963. Vincent Lingiari
led the historic Wave Hill walk-off in 1965 to press for equal wages for Aboriginal
stockmen. A 1967 referendum, which sought a mandate to remove sections of the
Constitution that discriminated against Aboriginal people,26 was supported. Prime
Minister Gough Whitlam introduced a Bill for the Land Rights Act and, after the
Whitlam dismissal in 1975, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
1976 (Cth) (ALRA) was passed by the federal parliament with bipartisan support
in December 1976.
The Self-Government Act is at loggerheads with ALRA, however, because:
very little thought was given back in 1978 to what legal and institutional relation-
ships needed to exist between the new government, land councils and traditional
owners to allow for a smoothly functioning polity. Those relationships remain
confused and ill-defined.27
At issue is the fact that 51 per cent of the NT’s land mass is designated Aboriginal
land over which the NT government has no control. Equally, Aboriginal people
have limited control over their land because power in relation to decisions about
Aboriginal land is vested in Aboriginal land councils28 to act in the interests of
traditional owners. This, said Parish, has resulted in a ‘largely unplanned system of
separation of powers’, with no constitutional foundation, between the federal and
NT governments.
The two largest land councils – the Northern (NLC) and Central (CLC) – are
often criticised for not representing the wishes of some or all traditional owners. In
a 1998 review of ALRA by John Reeves QC, the Act was found to have ‘generated
internal disputes by concentrating benefits in the hands of individuals’ and resulted
in ‘selected individualism’ that also affected royalty distributions. The absence of
a more productive partnership, he said, was ‘to the detriment of … Aboriginal
Territorians’.29
Most recently, these land councils have been criticised for entering into a
memorandum of understanding with the chief minister in relation to treaty nego-
tiations. Groups such as the Yolŋu of Arnhem Land, represented by the indepen-
dent member Yingiya Guyula, claim to have been left out of the process.
26 Note that the referendum did not confer voting rights on Aboriginal people. The federal
parliament provided for Aboriginal people to vote in 1962.
27 Parish 2018.
28 There are four land councils in the NT: the Northern Land Council, Central Land Council, Tiwi
Land Council, and Anindilyakwa Land Council.
29 Brennan 2006, 3.
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The Self-Government Act and ALRA are products of the Australian parliament
over which the NT has no control.
Federal representation
Section 122 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) provides
the NT with two senators and two members of the House of Representatives. This
has been the case since 1975; however, ‘the legislation to enable this representation
was the subject of great rancour, only passing the Commonwealth parliament
following affirmation at a joint sitting of the two houses and subsequently surviving
two High Court challenges’.30
The rancour, Michael Sloane says in his paper on representation of the
territories in the Senate, was caused by the potential ‘Constitutional imbalance’ it
would unleash on the Senate. He points out that the Constitution preserves the
rights of ‘original States’ and stipulates that changes to Senate representation, which
in turn affect House of Representatives numbers, must ‘maintain parity in the
representation of the original states’.
Statehood
The issue of whether the NT should be admitted as the seventh state of the
Australian federation has been contentious for a variety of reasons, including the
relatively small population, negotiations with the federal government on terms and
conditions of admission31 under section 106 of the Constitution32 and internal
wrangling within the NT about whether statehood is a priority, the mechanics of
how to proceed and, at a very local level, whether residents will lose open speed
limits and their annual cracker night – two issues that were identified in NT-
wide surveys undertaken by the Statehood Steering Committee. The latter concerns
resulted in a dedicated fact sheet33 explaining that these matters are not subject to
Commonwealth laws and are the responsibility of the NT government.34
The Legislative Assembly appointed a Select Committee on Constitutional
Development in 1985, which was superseded by a Standing Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs. Following the overturning of ROTI in 1997, the impetus
for statehood was invigorated.
A constitutional convention was held in 1998, but Aboriginal people and some
trade union representatives walked out in protest. Aboriginal people held their own
30 Sloane n.d.
31 Including Senate representation (see also federal representation).
32 Horne 2008.
33 Northern Territory Statehood Steering Committee 2005.
34 It is the case, however, that the Commonwealth government made abolition of open speed
limits a condition of federal funding. The NT complied.
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conventions in the same year, which resulted in two statements: the Kalkarindji
Statement of August and the Batchelor Statement of December. The message from
both statements was clear: there would be no discussion about statehood unless
Aboriginal Territorians were consulted and included in negotiations.35
Meanwhile, a referendum on statehood was held on 3 October 1998 and
narrowly lost, with a 51.31 per cent ‘no’ vote. Aboriginal people voted in a solid
bloc against the proposition. Three questions had been recommended by the
constitutional convention, but Chief Minister Shane Stone rolled them into this
single question, as Smith describes:
Now that a constitution for a state of the NT has been recommended by the
statehood convention and endorsed by the NT parliament, do you agree that we
should become a state?
The ‘constitution’ referred to in the referendum question provided for the
Premier to sack the Governor, which would render a Governor little more than
a public servant and would potentially establish the state of the NT as a benign
dictatorship.36
The ALP resurrected the idea in 2003, after its election in 2001, with bipartisan
support. Despite considerable expense and an extraordinary amount of work, the
matter lapsed in 2016 after political wrangling about the timing of an election for
a fresh constitutional convention. Chief Minister Adam Giles raised the issue at
the Council of Australian Governments in 2016, when the idea was supported in
principle and the onus returned to the NT to formulate a proposal. The matter has
not seriously resurfaced since.
Conclusions
The NT enjoys a peculiar position in the Australian federation, but essentially
functions as a state to the extent that the Self-Government Act allows. Friction
arises – usually resulting in debates about ‘states rights’ – when the Commonwealth
intervenes in NT matters, as was the case with the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 and
the Intervention.
The NT is characterised by intergenerational Aboriginal disadvantage, giving
rise to complex social problems requiring considered and enduring policy res-
ponses, which, in turn, require significant funding. Principal among these are
generations of Territorians suffering from foetal alcohol spectrum disorder.
Commonwealth funding arrangements, particularly in the area of Aboriginal
disadvantage, have been contentious since the advent of self-government. Similarly,
35 Smith 2008, 265.
36 Smith 2008, 264. See also Smith 2013, 27.
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Goods and Services Tax distribution between the states under Grants Commission
relativities is regarded as inadequate.
Whether or not the NT becomes Australia’s seventh state is a matter for
residents, the NT and federal governments. Key among the issues to be resolved
is representation in the Australian parliament. At a broader level, recognition of
Aboriginal people as the first inhabitants of the NT is a matter for both the NT and
federal governments and will be crucial to any negotiations in relation to statehood.
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Queensland
Paul D. Williams
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Given that Queensland’s 1.85 million square kilometres make the state Australia’s
second largest in area, any meaningful analysis of Queensland politics must be
made on regional bases. Moreover, given it is also farther from Brisbane to Cairns
than it is from Brisbane to Melbourne, it is unsurprising scholars have argued
a ‘two Queenslands’ thesis that divides the state into ‘coast versus inland’1 or,
more commonly, between ‘Brisbane and the bush’.2 It has been argued elsewhere,
however, that Queensland’s economic, political and cultural variations are far more
nuanced, and that a ‘six Queenslands’ model is required for more meaningful
analysis.3 Queensland’s population surpassed five million in May 2018, to make the
state Australia’s third most populous. Queensland’s capital city houses 2.4 million
people and it is the nation’s third most populous city.4 Brisbane, Australia’s largest
local government authority since 1924, is just one of 77 councils and shires – down
from 156 in 2007 – comprising local government under state control. The fact
that more Queenslanders live outside their capital city than within it – the only
Williams, Paul D. (2019). Queensland. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune,
Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.978174332667
1 Holmes 1994.
2 Bowers 1986; Williams 2012a.
3 Williams 2019.
4 Population Australia 2018.
245
Australian state or territory where this occurs – indicates the power of Queensland’s
regions. More often, however, Queensland is anecdotally referred to as a state
divided between the two-thirds of residents who live in the state’s ‘southeast’ and
the one-third who reside in the ‘rest’ of the state.5
Political culture and populism
While each of Australia’s states and territories enjoys its own political culture, it
has been argued that Queensland’s varies from the norm more than any other
Australian state, largely due to its regionally centred industries, heavily decentralised
population and huge variations in topography, climate and natural resources.6
It has been further argued that ‘populism’ – a political movement that mobilises
a ‘common people’ against a vilified ‘elite’ – sits at the core of Queensland political
culture. Populist leaders – notable Queensland examples include William Forgan
Smith, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, Pauline Hanson and Clive Palmer – harness support
by appealing directly to (often less educated) voters who, usually located in the
regions, regard themselves as ‘outsiders’ who feel ‘dispossessed by technology or
other social or economic change’.7
Queensland’s special brand of populist political culture consists of five mutually
reinforcing elements: strong (often authoritarian) leadership that allows premiers
to dominate party, Cabinet, parliament and public opinion; political pragmatism
(from bypassing due process to policy flexibility); regionalism (appealing to the
‘country-mindedness’8 of rural Queensland); state development (a mission to
develop Queensland’s wilderness); and a state ‘chauvinism’ that asserts Queens-
land’s economic, cultural and moral difference from other jurisdictions.9
Moreover, as increasingly better educated Queenslanders become aware of
these populist appeals – and as leaders become increasingly self-aware of the
electorate’s own cognisance – these mantras, in turn, have evolved into a ‘meta-
populism’, whereby leaders engage in populism to the point that all stakeholders
– leaders, media and voters – accept this leadership style as part and parcel of
‘doing’ politics in Queensland. In this sense, meta-populism has extended the life of
traditional populism far beyond that normally expected in an increasingly educated
electorate.10
5 Williams 2019.
6 Smith 1985; Williams 2009.
7 Canovan 1981; Wear 2008; Williams 2009.
8 Aitkin 1985.
9 Williams 2009, 18–29.
10 Williams 2001a.
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Queensland’s historical themes
Queensland’s populism is a function of at least seven core themes that have come
to define the state’s history. These are: a heavy emphasis on regionalism borne
from the dominant primary industries of pastoralism, agriculture and mining; a
propensity to pit one group against another for base political gain; a propensity to
re-elect, often for decades on end, strong governments with huge parliamentary
majorities to create ‘electoral hegemonies’;11 the mission to pragmatically develop
the tabula rasa12 (or ‘blank slate’) of the state’s regions; a propensity for govern-
ments to manipulate the checks and balances on executive power;13 a tendency for
Queensland politics to polarise into extremism, from Labor’s early state socialism
on the left to One Nation’s reactionary conservatism on the right; and, last, Queens-
landers’ longstanding support for the public ownership of state assets.14
Periodising Queensland history
Indigenous Queensland
It is vital to distinguish Aboriginal Australians – who have occupied that part of the
continent now known as Queensland for at least 50,000 years – from Torres Strait
Islander peoples. Collectively, Indigenous Australians comprise 4 per cent of the
state’s population (90 per cent of whom identify as Aboriginal, 6 per cent as Torres
Strait Islander, and 4 per cent as both), with wide variations in language and culture
evident. As with other Australian colonies, pioneering farmers’ poor relations with
Indigenous peoples, sometimes culminating in violence and murder, remain a stain
on early European settlement.15
The ‘pre-party’ period, 1860 to 1890
Queensland’s ‘pre-party’ period (1860 to 1890), saw MPs elected as independents
without party affiliation, but almost always on the converged political interests of
rural and urban capital under loosely defined labels of ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’.
Consequently, MPs frequently ‘crossed the floor’ as governments rose and fell
with alacrity. Between 1860 and 1890, for example, Queensland saw 14 discrete
premierships.
11 Williams 2011; Williams 2004.
12 Waterson 1990, 139.
13 Wear 2002.
14 Williams 2010a, 299.
15 Evans 2007, 70; Johnston 1988, 79–86.
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Table 1 Queensland premiers, first period, 1859–1890
Premier Identity Tenure
Robert Herbert Conservative 1859–66
Arthur McAlister Independent 1866
Robert Herbert Conservative 1866
Arthur McAlister Independent 1866–67
Robert Mackenzie Conservative 1867–68
Charles Lilley Liberal 1868–70
Arthur Palmer Conservative 1870–74
Arthur McAlister Liberal 1874–76
George Thorn Liberal 1876–77
John Douglas Liberal 1877–79
Thomas McIlwraith Conservative 1879–83
Samuel Griffith Liberal 1883–88
Thomas McIlwraith Conservative 1888
Boyd Morehead Conservative 1888–90
Source: University of Western Australia n.d.
‘Proto-party’ period, 1890 to 1910
A second ‘proto-party’ period (1890 to 1910) saw the major parties find early
form without modern definition. This period was dominated by the ‘Continuous
Ministry’ that saw the conservative McIlwraith and the liberal Griffith unite to
create a powerful proto-party – the ‘Griffilwraith’ arrangement.16 Interrupted by
the short-lived Dawson Labor government in 1899,17 the Continuous Ministry
endured until 1903. In 1908, the dissident Labor premier William Kidston ‘fused’
16 Joyce 1977, 119.
17 Fitzgerald 1999.
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Table 2 Queensland premiers, second period, 1890–1911
Premier Identity Tenure
Samuel Griffith Liberal 1890–93
Thomas McIlwraith Conservative 1893
Hugh Nelson Ministerial 1893–98
Thomas Byrnes Ministerial 1898
James Dickson Ministerial 1898–99
Anderson Dawson Labor 1899
Robert Philp Ministerial 1899–1903
Arthur Morgan Liberal 1903–6
William Kidston Labor/Kidstonite 1906–7
Robert Philp Conservative 1907–8
William Kidston Kidstonite/Liberal 1908–11
Source: University of Western Australia n.d.
with Robert Philp to form the first Liberal Party to produce the state’s first two-
party system.
‘Pre-Fitzgerald party’ period, 1910 to 1990
The landmark 1989 Fitzgerald Inquiry into police and government corruption in
Queensland (1987–89) proved so traumatic that its recommendations to completely
overhaul the state’s political, electoral and public administration institutions have
cleaved the state’s history between a ‘pre-accountability’ period before 1990 and a
‘post-accountability’ period since. Consequently, we can describe Queensland’s third
political phase as a ‘pre-Fitzgerald party’ period (1910 to 1990) that saw the major
parties emerge as mass-based professional organisations capable of stable, long-
term government and, critically, enormous power with few checks and balances.
This phenomenon of executives dominating parliaments was exacerbated after the
abolition of the Legislative Council in 1922.
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This period saw just two electoral ‘hegemonies’: Labor from 1915 to 1957 (with
a single interruption 1929–32) and the Coalition from 1957 to 1989. Labor, under
the governments of T.J. Ryan18 and Edward ‘Red Ted’ Theodore,19 found early
support by bridging urban and regional interests in, for example, the establishment
of the eight-hour day and compensation for injured workers. Indeed, Labor
practised a form of ‘state socialism’ in the early part of the period when state-
owned sugar refineries, butcher shops, hotels and even an insurance company were
founded.20
This created something of a bipolarity within early Labor governments: while
administering progressive, even radical, economic policies – Queensland was often
described as the ‘Red North’21 – premiers exercised socially conservative, and
often authoritarian, leadership. The premiership of Ned Hanlon (1946–52) is a
case in point: Hanlon established the much-valued free public hospital system
and, conversely, took a hard line against striking meat and railway workers.22
While strong leadership was a key factor in Queensland Labor’s ability to avoid
the 1916–17 ‘conscription split’ that engulfed other state branches, division could
not be avoided in 1957 when the Labor Party’s organisational wing clashed with
another authoritarian premier, Vince Gair, ostensibly over the issue of workers’
leave, but, in reality, over the conservative faction’s fears of communist influence.
The resulting split kept Queensland Labor in opposition for 32 years.
By contrast, the Coalition ‘hegemony’, dominated by just two Country (later
National) party premiers – ‘Honest’ Frank Nicklin (1957–68) and Joh Bjelke-
Petersen (1968–87) – was marked not only by stability but by rapid economic
development in the state’s south-east. It also saw the cultivation (via an electoral
malapportionment that saw Country Party–voting regional seats with far fewer
voters than Labor- and Liberal-voting urban seats) of systemic corruption within
senior ranks of police and Cabinet. By the time of Bjelke-Petersen’s premiership
in the 1970s, mining had replaced agriculture as the state’s major export sector
and Queensland had become synonymous with arch-conservative authoritarian
leadership.
‘Post-Fitzgerald party’ period, 1990 to present
The state’s fourth era, a ‘post-Fitzgerald party’ period (1990 to present), has seen
the major parties continue to dominate politics – with increased competition from
minor players – but within the constraints of such key institutions as an
18 Murphy 1990.
19 Fitzgerald 2002.
20 Fitzgerald 1984, 6–8.
21 See Menghetti 1981. The fact that Fred Paterson, MLA for Bowen 1944–50, remains the only
Communist Party member elected to an Australian parliament suggests descriptions of
Queensland as historically ‘conservative’ are misplaced. See Fitzgerald 1997.
22 Blackmur 1996.
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Table 3 Queensland premiers, third period, 1911–90
Premier Party Tenure
Digby Denham Liberal 1911–15
T.J. Ryan Labor 1915–19
Edward ‘Ted’ Theodore Labor 1919–25
William Gillies Labor 1925
William McCormack Labor 1925–29
Arthur Moore CPNP 1929–32
William Forgan Smith Labor 1932–42
Frank Cooper Labor 1942–46
Ned Hanlon Labor 1946–52
Vince Gair Labor 1952–57
Frank Nicklin Country 1957–68
Jack Pizzey Country 1968
Gordon Chalk Liberal 1968
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen Country; National-Country; National 1968–87
Mike Ahern National 1987–89
Russell Cooper National 1989
Source: University of Western Australia n.d.
independent Crime and Corruption Commission, a non-partisan Electoral
Commission, a Right to Information Commissioner, an Integrity Commissioner, an
Ombudsman, and reformed public service, Cabinet and parliamentary practices.
Importantly, this period also saw economic rationalism steer the state into
administrative efficiency.23 Indeed, reforms in agriculture and pastoralism caused
23 Walker 1995; Wanna 2003.
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such significant economic (and consequently political) dislocation in regional
Queensland that populist minor parties were empowered to seize significant vote
shares.24 Given this looming economic backlash, the reformed National–Liberal
coalition under Rob Borbidge and Joan Sheldon assumed minority government in
1996.25 Debilitated by the rise of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON) – itself
fuelled by regional anger over gun control and the High Court’s Mabo and Wik
decisions – Labor returned to (briefly minority, and later majority) government
in 1998 under Peter Beattie, whose inclusive populism,26 affable leadership and
ubiquitous media presence27 complemented his penchant for mea culpa and policy
backflip.28 Indeed, Labor under Beattie in 2001 attained its largest parliamentary
majority since 1935.29 Anna Bligh, succeeding Beattie as Queensland’s first woman
premier in 2007, was popular for her handling of the 2011 Queensland floods, but
asset privatisation and public policy failures saw Labor suffer its worst ever defeat in
2012.30 When Annastacia Palaszczuk assumed leadership of the Labor Party most
expected that the party would be in opposition for a generation, but the Newman
government’s own unpopular privatisation policies saw the LNP defeated after a
single term.31 Palaszczuk’s Labor Party won government in its own right in late
2017, largely on voters’ fears of political instability in any LNP–PHON coalition.32
Key institutions and actors
Queensland’s political parties grew organically from local industrial bases.
Pastoralism, Queensland’s first industry, nurtured a wealthy ‘squattocracy’33 that
dominated parliament and government, and later comprised the core of the first
Country Party. Agriculture, the colony’s second industry, in turn created a smaller
rural middle class unique to Queensland. Many agriculturalists – often reliant
on government infrastructure – gravitated to late 19th-century social liberalism
and would later comprise the early Liberal parties.34 A small but more traditional
middle class also developed among professionals and business owners in urban
centres and that, too, gravitated to the Liberals. With the discovery of gold in
Queensland in the 1860s, mining soon comprised Queensland’s third industry
24 Leach, Stokes and Ward 2000, 9.
25 The 1995 Queensland election saw Labor retain government by a single seat. Labor’s result in
Mundingburra was later overturned in the Court of Disputed Returns and, after the Liberals
won the early 1996 re-election, the Goss government resigned.
26 Preston 2003; Wanna and Williams 2005.
27 Wanna and Williams 2005; Williams 2007.
28 Williams 2005.
29 Williams 2001b.
30 Williams 2012b, 643.
31 Williams 2018a.
32 Williams 2018b.
33 Fitzgerald 1982, 125.
34 Fitzgerald 1982, 125.
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Table 4 Queensland premiers, fourth period, 1990–2020
Premier Party Tenure
Wayne Goss Labor 1989–96
Rob Borbidge National 1996–98
Peter Beattie Labor 1998–2007
Anna Bligh Labor 2007–12
Campbell Newman Liberal–National 2012–15
Annastacia Palaszczuk Labor 2015–
Source: University of Western Australia n.d.
and, as elsewhere, miners often looked for more radical political solutions.35 Farm
labourers in the bush and industrial workers in the city were, however, the core of
Queensland’s working class.36
Australian Labor Party
Queensland Labor has governed Queensland for 75 of the 110 years between 1910
and 2020 and, consequently, has been labelled Queensland’s ‘natural party of gov-
ernment’.37 Trade unions became legal in Queensland only in 1886 and therefore
took root later than in other colonies. Despite this, the first Trades and Labour
Council was soon formed to represent workers industrially and, later, to nominate
‘labour’ candidates for election. By 1889 the Australian Labour Federation (ALF) was
established, but the monumental shearers’ and maritime strikes of 1890–91 – called
to fight falling wages in the teeth of looming economic depression – depleted ALF
resources. After the strikes failed to achieve desired outcomes, workers established
a new Australian Labor Party in Barcaldine, western Queensland, to sponsor trade
union candidates who could change industrial laws from within the parliament.38
Labor remains a ‘labourist’ party based on trade union membership – the
Australian Workers’ Union (formed by sheep shearers) has comprised a key
powerbase within Queensland Labor for more than a century – and has enjoyed
enormous success for several reasons, including strong populist leadership,
35 Stoodley 1970, 164.
36 Murphy 1975, 129–215.
37 Costar 1988.
38 McMullin 1991, 1–14.
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balancing urban and regional interests, a comprehensive branch structure, close
union affiliation and support, delivery of social services, and a commitment to the
ownership of public assets. Since 1989, Labor’s success has also been found in its
ability to manage internal dissent through an organised factional system. Prior to
1980, Queensland Labor resembled a blue-collar trade unionist clique that, prone
to internecine warfare under Trades Hall control, proved electorally unappealing.
After federal Labor removed this cabal and introduced internal democratic
practices, a transparent ‘consociational’ (formal power-sharing) factional system
developed where the conservative ‘Old Guard’ (now Labor Unity) would share
power with the right-leaning Australian Workers’ Union (now Labor Forum) and
the Socialist Left.39 Labor Forum proved the strongest faction between 1989 and
2012; since 2015 the Socialist Left has controlled both caucus and Cabinet.
Consequently, women, middle-class white-collar workers and migrants joined the
party in significant numbers. Labor today demands at least 40 per cent of its
candidates should be women, and aspires to have 50 per cent women MPs by 2025.
National Party
The conservative National Party owed much of its heritage to 19th-century
pastoralists, with Thomas McIllwraith as arguably the party’s spiritual father. But
the party itself began life – as Labor did – as a sectional pressure group designed
to enhance members’ conditions. Faced with a growing Brisbane ‘liberal’ faction
in the Ministerialists, a few farmers in 1895 formed a Farmers’ Union ‘to watch
over, encourage, and endeavour to develop agricultural interests’.40 By 1902, the
organisation had unsuccessfully contested elections; most farmers remained loyal
to the Ministerialists. By 1909 the Farmers’ Parliamentary Union had formed, then
reformed in 1913 into the Country Liberal Party (CLP), and again into the more
successful Country Party in 1920.
Wearied by successive defeats by Labor through a splitting of support between
Country and Nationalist (Liberal) candidates, the two non-Labor parties merged
into a single Country and Progressive National party (CPNP) in 1925. After
winning government in 1929, the CPNP was despatched to opposition after a
single term in 1932, and dissolved in 1935. The revived Country Party, anxious to
modernise its image and capture urban votes, became the National–Country Party
in 1974, and the National Party in 1982. The transformation worked: the National
Party (now known colloquially as ‘The Nationals’) under Joh Bjelke-Petersen – who
married rural agrarianism to urban development while exercising authoritarian
leadership under a law-and-order mantra – won government in their own right at
the 1983 and 1986 elections.41
39 Wanna 2000.
40 Bernays 1919, 147.
41 Metcalf 1984.
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Part of the National Party’s success during those years lay in its organisational
wing’s power – less than Labor’s but exceeding the Liberals’ – to set party policy and
direct MPs. The Nationals lost the electorate’s confidence after 1987, however, as
Bjelke-Petersen embarked on an ill-conceived campaign to become prime minister,
and after the Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed widespread government corruption.
Forming government only briefly with the Liberals (1996–98), the Nationals
struggled for both credibility and identity and, in 2008, dissolved.
Liberal Party
The Queensland Liberal Party owed its heritage to a rural (agriculturalist) and
smaller urban (business and professional) middle class, with Samuel Griffith a
guiding force. Long before formal organisation, however, numerous MPs adopted
an ill-defined ‘liberal’ label despite sharing many ‘conservative’ values. Liberals and
conservatives pragmatically set aside their difference in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries to form the ‘Ministerialists’. But, by 1909, progressives had merged with
Labor defectors to assume the name ‘Liberal’ and, in 1917, ‘Nationalist’. By 1923
the party had become the Queensland United Party, and in 1925 renamed again
when merging with the Country Party to become the CPNP. After dissolution it
became the Queensland’s People’s Party in 1943, and the Liberal Party in 1949,
and remained in opposition as junior coalition partner with the Country Party
until 1957. Hampered by the zonal electoral system that benefitted the Country
(National) Party, the Liberals also suffered from the absence of a large urban middle
class. Only as Liberal-voting migrants from southern states resettled in Queensland
did party support reach critical mass, despite the Liberals being often accused of
meekly acquiescing to the Nationals’ authoritarianism.42 When progressive Liberals
demanded the Nationals install key accountability reforms, Bjelke-Petersen
acrimoniously ended the coalition in 1983.
Liberal–National Party, 2008–present
Confounded by repeated defeats at Labor’s hands during the Beattie era – and
concerned that dwindling rural populations would eventually extinguish the need
for a stand-alone National Party – the then Nationals leader Lawrence Springborg
united the Liberal and National parties under a single constitution in 2008. The
LNP – technically a branch of the federal Liberal Party – enjoyed limited success
in 2009 before winning the largest parliamentary majority in Australian history
in 2012. The party lost the 2015 election, and the loss of 16 percentage points
in primary vote between 2012 and 2017 – largely due to the party’s former
privatisation agenda and tensions between ‘Liberal’ and ‘National’ tribes – have
prompted calls for the party’s dissolution.
42 Fitzgerald, Megarrity and Symons 2009, 177.
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Queensland Greens
The Queensland Greens – drawn from the Brisbane Green Party founded in 1984 –
were formed in 1991 as a party dedicated to ‘non-violence, social justice, grassroots
democracy [and] ecological sustainability’.43 Initially slow to find traction in a
conservative state committed to development and the extractive (especially coal)
industries,44 the Queensland Greens now poll 10 per cent of the state primary vote
(and much higher in inner Brisbane), saw their first state MP elected in 2017,
and have enjoyed Senate representation since 2010. The Greens’ commitment to
internal democracy sees leaders elected – and major policy questions settled – by
postal ballot among all branch members.45
Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON)
The economic rationalism of the 1990s placed much of Queensland’s regional and
rural population under pressure. Additional fears over Indigenous rights and gun
control – and the National Party that many saw as abandoning traditional Country
Party values – created a vacuum on the right of Queensland politics that was filled
in 1997 by PHON. Hanson, whom the Liberal party disendorsed shortly before
before the 1996 federal election for alleged racism – and who would go on to
win her seat of Oxley as an independent – galvanized the fears of regional and
urban fringe ‘outsiders’ who felt Coalition and Labor governments each pandered
to ‘elites’ and ‘special’ interests. PHON was immediately successful in winning
almost 23 per cent of the primary vote and 11 seats at the 1998 Queensland election.
But party unity and a coherent ideology proved elusive for the fledgling party
and, within a year, all sitting MPs had resigned from PHON.46 With Hanson and
her senior advisers accused of undemocratic leadership, party support collapsed
and PHON all but disappeared. Amidst more recent debates over (Muslim)
immigration, PHON support returned.47
Others
Minor and micro parties play an increasingly critical role in Queensland politics
at a time when voters feel established parties no longer represent constituents’
needs. Katter’s Australian Party (KAP) – like PHON – is a populist, anti-free-
trade party that increased its vote at the 2017 Queensland election. Other recent,
now defunct, right-wing micro parties include the Confederate Action Party, the
Citizens’ Electoral Council and the City–Country Alliance. The centrist Australian
43 Queensland Greens 2019.
44 Williams 2006.
45 Queensland Greens 2019.
46 Six MPs resigned to sit under the newly formed City–Country Alliance; five resigned to sit as
independents.
47 Williams 2018b.
Australian Politics and Policy
256
Democrats, the conservative Family First and the single-issue Daylight Saving for
South East Queensland (DS4SEQ) are also recently retired parties, while the Palmer
United Party (renamed the United Australia Party in 2018) contested the 2019
federal election without winning a single Senate or House of Representatives seat.
Independent candidates have also enjoyed recent support, with Liz Cunningham
(Gladstone) and Peter Wellington (Nicklin) sharing the balance of power in recent
hung parliaments.
Parliament
The Queensland parliament, comprised of a single Legislative Assembly chamber,
is unique among Australian states.48 Critically, Queensland’s unicameral status
since the abolition of the Legislative Council in 1922 has arguably facilitated
authoritarian leaders and undemocratic practices, and compromised the checks
and balances of public accountability to produce in the 20th-century systemic
institutional corruption. The Council was abolished by Labor partly because of its
inherently undemocratic nature – councillors were not elected but appointed, for
life, by the governor on the advice of the premier; Labor was also pragmatically
committed to abolishing a Council that consisted almost entirely of wealthy,
conservative pastoralists who frustrated most of Labor’s reforms. Premier Theodore
eventually flooded the Council with his own sympathetic councillors, who, in early
1922, immediately passed Labor’s abolition Bill.49 A referendum is constitutionally
required to reinstate the Legislative Council but, despite minor parties occasionally
proposing the idea, strong opposition from the major parties and the public make
restoration improbable. Despite this, it can be argued that the absence of a
Queensland upper house has produced the most powerful Cabinet system in
Australia, and the weakest parliament; law making in Queensland is therefore more
a function of Cabinet than of parliament.
Notwithstanding the above, Queensland’s post-Fitzgerald parliament is hardly
recognisable from that before 1990. Before the late 1980s, Queensland’s few
parliamentary committees performed only mundane domestic tasks;50 only after
the Fitzgerald reforms did Queensland gain such powerful instruments as scrutiny
of legislation committees, budget estimates committees, a public works committee,
a public accounts committee and an ethics committee. But even those committees
do not function as intended: governments enjoy majorities on committees, thus
compromising any claim to objective scrutiny. Question time is also controlled,
as government MPs ask soft and contrived ‘Dorothy Dixer’ questions. In 2016 the
Legislative Assembly was increased from 89 MPs to 93.
48 The Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory are also unicameral.
49 Fitzgerald 2002, 144–5.
50 Wanna and Arklay 2010, 24.
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Premier and Cabinet
Ideally, the Legislative Assembly will check Cabinet’s authority but, in reality, the
absence of a Legislative Council gives Queensland’s Cabinet enormous powers,
limited somewhat after 1990 by various anti-corruption commissions, parlia-
mentary committees and freedom of information requirements. Even so, Cabinet
remains the ‘engine room of government’.51 Until 2014, Labor Cabinets were elected
by caucus ballot, with portfolios allocated by the premier. Since then, Labor
premiers have handpicked their ministers. But both Labor and LNP premiers must
ensure Cabinet reflects a balance between women and men, youth and experience,
ideology (in Labor’s case, factional representation proportional to caucus repres-
entation) and geographic location.52 The size of Cabinet is entirely the premier’s
prerogative – the opposition leader will appoint the same number of ‘shadow’
ministers as portfolio ‘spokespersons’ – and, in recent years, ‘assistant ministers’
have also been appointed to create a broader frontbench. While the collective
ministerial convention obliging the entire Cabinet to resign after a loss of lower
house confidence is today unknown but not extinct, individual ministerial
responsibility is upheld – often reluctantly – with ministers required to resign for
policy or personal failings.
Much of Cabinet’s work is done by Cabinet subcommittees, with the Cabinet
Budget Review Committee (comprising the premier, treasurer and two other senior
ministers) the most important. While the power of premiers is today theoretically
constrained, in reality an electorally popular premier can exercise enormous
influence over party, policy and public debate.
Public service
Queensland’s public service remains committed to the Northcote-Trevelyan
principles of 1854 that require permanent and politically neutral officers to offer
sound advice to create a ‘high performing, impartial and productive workforce that
puts the people of Queensland first’.53 Notwithstanding this, Queensland’s public
service, like other states’, has seen since the 1980s a degree of politicisation at its
most senior levels. In short, governments usually appoint politically sympathetic
department heads whose contracts can be terminated after changes of government.
This development has been defended as central to developing a more cost-effective
and business-like organisation responsive to rapidly changing policy environments.
But politicised senior executives are arguably compromised in their ability to
deliver genuinely ‘free and frank’ advice. The public service is governed by the
Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) and overseen by an independent Public Service
Commission. Interestingly, despite Queenslanders’ support for public ownership,
51 Scott et al. 2002.
52 Hughes 1980, 154–99.
53 Queensland Government n.d.
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there is community concern that growth in Queensland’s public service – in 2018
standing at over 225,000 people with a total wages bill exceeding $25 billion – is
excessive.54
Electoral system
Queensland’s first election in 1860 was democratic by contemporary world
standards but would fail to meet today’s expectations. Despite the adoption of the
secret ballot, only property-owning men aged 21 years and over could vote for
male-only candidates for the Legislative Assembly’s 26 seats.55 By 1872, all males
over 21 years could vote and, after 1889, MPs were paid.
Queensland has seen governments manipulate electoral systems for significant
political advantage that, in turn, has seen electoral hegemonies extend far beyond
that normally expected. A Queensland government first manipulated election rules
in 1892 when the Continuous Ministry changed the method of voting from ‘first
past the post’ (FPTP) – where voters check a box against their favoured candidate,
and leave all others blank – to a form of optional preferential voting (OPV) known
as ‘contingent voting’ in which voters could number additional candidates, with
those ‘preferences’ (if no candidate enjoyed a simple majority of 50 per cent plus
one vote) distributed to the two highest scoring candidates. The system is ostensibly
more democratic than FPTP as it mitigates the risk of electing candidates with less
than half the public’s support. The Continuous Ministry’s motivations, however,
were instead driven by a fear of a burgeoning Labor Party splitting conservative
support.56
Later reforms included the abolition of ‘plural voting’ – where wealthy men
could vote in every district in which they owned property – and the enfranchise-
ment of women aged over 21 (both introduced in 1905), and, from 1915, the
right for women to stand for election. In 1942, the Cooper Labor government
returned the state to FPTP, again to split support between non-Labor parties. In
1949 the Hanlon Labor government legislated the first zonal electoral system – a
malapportionment commonly but incorrectly referred to as a ‘gerrymander’ – that
created additional small rural districts, each with fewer voters than Brisbane seats,
ostensibly because they were distant from the state’s capital. Expediently, the zonal
system also maximised Labor’s rural support.57
In 1958 the coalition Nicklin government introduced its own malapportioned
zonal system that advantaged the Country Party over both Labor and the Liberals
– the Country Party frequently controlled government with as little as 20 per cent
of the primary vote – and, in 1962, introduced compulsory preferential voting
54 Williams 2017, 643.
55 Between 1860 and 1910 Queensland’s Legislative Assembly boasted some multi-member
electorates with two, and occasionally three, MPs returned per district.
56 Hughes 1980, 86.
57 Knight 2003, 255–6.
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(CPV) to ensure the Country and Liberal parties fully benefitted from preference
exchanges. Indigenous men and women were enfranchised in Queensland in 1965
– the last state to do so. In 1973, the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18. After
the Fitzgerald Inquiry found in 1989 that Queensland’s unfair electoral system
helped shape an undesirable political culture of authoritarian leadership and a lack
of accountability, a temporary Electoral and Administrative Review Committee
oversaw a permanent Electoral Commission of Queensland that today serves as an
electoral ‘umpire’. Queensland returned to an OPV system and the principle of ‘one
vote, one value’,58 then returned to CPV in 2016. Other significant electoral reforms
include strict electoral donation laws: as of 2018, all electoral donations of $1,000
or more must be publicly declared, and property developers are banned as donors.
Fixed, four-year terms now see elections scheduled for the last Saturday in October.
Conclusions: plus ça change – major issues in Queensland, then and now
The history and nature of Queensland politics evokes the adage plus ça change,
plus c’est la même chose – the more things change, the more they stay the same
– perhaps more than any other Australian polity. After almost two centuries of
European settlement, 160 years of self-government and three decades of post-
Fitzgerald reform, much has changed in Queensland. But so much more remains
the same. While accountability initiatives since 1990 have wholly transformed
many of the state’s Cabinet, parliamentary, public service and electoral practices,
unchanging industrial and social forces suggest the state’s political culture has
only partially transformed. A predilection towards populism, strong leadership,
regionalism, state development and parochial state chauvinism, for example, all
remain key hallmarks of Queensland politics, largely because pastoralism,
agriculture and mining still dominate a state economy underpinned by a heavily
decentralised population – with educational standards often below the national
average – living far from the state capital. In that sense, much of Queensland
politics remains the conservative politics of regional materialism and not the liberal
politics of urban idealism. Despite this, a rapidly transforming southeast – home to
two-thirds of the state’s population – has produced in the past 30 years a distinctive
political subculture that boasts an increasingly multicultural and cosmopolitan
set of values. Problematically, this development has divided the state even more
profoundly along geographic, economic and cultural cleavages, with those divisions
now signposting the key policy terrain of 21st-century Queensland.
Such issues include: the capacity of ‘smart’ technologies to replace Queensland’s
pastoralism, agriculture and mining; the size of the public sector, the future of state-
owned industries and the management of an enormous state debt; to what extent
coal will complement renewable energies in Queensland’s energy mix; and whether
58 Stevens 1993.
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Queensland – or at least the southeast – should join the rest of eastern Australia in
the adoption of summer daylight saving. Queensland politics and political culture
are evolving creatures but, for now, Queensland remains different.
Table 5 Queensland election results, primary vote and seat share, 1989–2017
Election Labor Liberal–National* Other
Vote Seats Vote Seats Vote Seats
1989 50.3 54 45.1 35 4.6 0
1992^ 48.7 54 44.1 35 7.2 0
1995¥ 42.9 45 49.0 44 8.1 0
1998 38.9 44 31.3 32 29.8# 13
2001 48.9 66 28.5 15 22.6 8
2004 47.0 63 35.5 20 16.5 6
2006 46.9 59 37.9 25 15.2 5
2009 42.3 51 41.6 34 16.1 4
2012 26.7 7 49.7 78 23.6± 4
2015 37.5 44 41.3 42 21.2 3
2017** 35.4 48 33.7 39 30.9 6
Source: Electoral Commission of Queensland n.d.
Notes: * The 1989 and 1992 elections saw the stand-alone Liberal and National parties
compete independently; between 1995 and 2006 the Liberal and National parties contested
elections under a formal coalition; the two parties merged into a single Liberal–National
Party in 2008. ^ 1992 was the first election conducted on fair boundaries without a zonal
system. ¥ The 1995 election saw Labor win 45 seats to the Coalition’s 44, with the Court of
Disputed Returns later overturning the Mundingburra result; the subsequent 1996 re-
election saw the Liberals win; the Goss government resigned in February, 1996. # One
Nation’s 22.7 per cent and 11 seats comprised most of the ‘Other’ vote in 1998; ± Katter’s
Australian Party (11.5 per cent and two seats) comprised most of the ‘Other’ vote in 2012.
** The 2017 election was for 93 seats.
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South Australia (SA) is something of a curious paradox within Australia’s
federation. With a population of 1.67 million, it often remains peripheral to wider
political debates in Australia. In 2018, due to lack of population growth in
proportion to the rest of the country, it had its overall number of federal MPs in
the House of Representatives reduced from 11 to 10, thus further diminishing its
voice on the national stage. Federal elections tend not to be decided by outcomes in
SA. Economically, SA has been perceived to be a ‘rust-bucket’ state – economically
backward with a critical skills shortage, and an ageing population. According to
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, it comprises just over 6 per cent of the nation’s
economy. In 1991, the collapse of the State Bank was a significant blow to the
state’s economy. It has often taken SA longer to recover from national economic
downturns and usually ranks just above Tasmania in terms of many economic
metrics. More recently, with the closure of the Holden car plant in 2017 – and the
de facto end of car manufacturing in Australia – there remain ongoing concerns
about the future and vitality of the state. There is a lingering perception that SA is,
to quote a former premier of Victoria, a ‘backwater’.
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Yet, paradoxically, these perceptions and economic realities tend to mask a
more complex and rich political history. SA has a stable political system, strongly
influenced by the Westminster parliamentary system. Aside from the State Bank
collapse, it has lacked the scandals and corruption that have blighted other states
and territories like New South Wales (NSW) and Western Australia. Its political
system and workings can appear, on first glance, quite mundane. However, SA has
a unique and radical history. It was established as a planned ‘free settlement’ on
terms quite different to the other Australian colonies. It was, and continues to be
for some, a ‘social laboratory’ with a rich history of political and social innovation.1
It has pioneered legislation and political innovations, particularly throughout the
1970s.2 While SA, like the rest of the nation, has been dominated by the Labor/
non-Labor axis, it is the birthplace of a range of political movements and parties,
including the Australian Democrats, the Family First party and, most recently, the
Centre Alliance (which was the creation of key SA political figure and former
state and federal MP Nick Xenophon). While an Australian prime minister has
never represented a SA constituency, the state continues to influence and shape
Australian political debates, especially most recently in the areas of water and
energy policy. In 2018, Adelaide became the home of the new Australian Space
Agency – perhaps reflecting a state that can often ‘punch above its weight’ in the
federation.
Governing South Australia
The Constitution Act 1934 (SA) is the foundation of SA’s political system, setting out
the main framework and its core constitutional features. This is a system strongly
modelled on the Westminster system of government, and clearly influenced by the
colonial imprint of the UK. In 1856, SA became a self-governing colony, and the
original 1856 constitution was, for its time, one of the most radical in the world.
Underpinning the Westminster system is the doctrine of responsible government.
This is the model of how political accountability should work in SA. As we highlight
below, there are ongoing issues with political accountability. The doctrine of
responsible government entails the executive branch (the premier and the
government) being held accountable to the legislative branch, and in turn, through
free and fair regular elections, to the voters of SA.
SA, like many of the other states and territories, has a bicameral system with
power enshrined in two houses of parliament: the lower house (the House of
Assembly) and an upper house (the Legislative Council). In the Westminster
system, government is formed by the group winning a majority of seats in the lower
house. The leader of the winning party becomes Premier of SA. Since 1970, the
1 Rann 2012.
2 Parliament of South Australia n.d.
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House of Assembly has 47 members, and 24 votes are required to gain a majority
in the lower house. It is worth noting that the lower house in SA has far fewer
MPs than the same chambers in either NSW (93 MPs) or Victoria (88 MPs), which
has arguably had an impact on election results (see below). The Legislative Council
has 22 members (MLCs), each serving eight-year terms, with half the upper house
facing election on alternate cycles.
In the SA Constitution Act 1934, where there is a breakdown between the
two houses, section 41 of the Act provides for a ‘deadlock’ provision. In effect, if
a government Bill is consistently blocked then it can trigger the government to
seek permission to dissolve the parliament and cause new elections. From time to
time, there have been calls to abolish the upper house in SA, and in 2015 then
Labor Premier Mike Rann backed away from holding a referendum on the issue.
There appears, however, to be limited appetite for a unicameral system, such as in
Queensland.
While the SA political system is broadly grouped within the Westminster
tradition across Australia, there are some distinct features, not least the issue of
electoral boundaries and boundary redistribution. SA has had a long history of
‘malapportionment’ or what was termed the ‘Playmander’ – with highly dispro-
portionate electorate sizes.3 Election apportionment is the idea that each electoral
district, division or constituency should have broadly the same number of voters.
This is a key principle that underpins liberal democracy – the idea of ‘one vote,
one value’. Electoral malapportionment occurs when electorate sizes vary for
geographic, demographic, or political reasons. The effect of the Playmander in SA
was to give substantial and disproportionate voice to rural constituencies, violating
the principle of ‘one vote, one value’. It should be noted that malapportionment is
not the same as ‘gerrymandering’, which in the latter case is a systematic attempt to
manipulate the electoral boundaries for partisan advantage. While the Playmander
ended in the 1970s, the issue of electoral boundaries remains contentious in SA
politics for several reasons. First, SA has a very distinct geography with a highly
concentrated population with most people living in or near Adelaide or the other
major urban centres (approximately 75 per cent of a total state population of
1.67 million). This means that most elections are decided by marginal seats in
metropolitan or outer suburban areas.
Second, and relatedly, there tends to be a rough distinction between where the
voters and supporters of the major parties reside. An issue for the Liberal Party,
especially during the Rann/Weatherill years, was that its voters were concentrated
in rural areas, which had the effect of concentrating the liberal vote in ‘safe’ seats.
The upshot is that, on a number of occasions, they ‘won’ the popular vote but did
not secure the most seats. The Liberals ‘won’ the two-party preferred vote at the
2002, 2010 and 2014 elections but did not win office.
3 Orr and Levy 2009. The term ‘Playmander’ is derived from Thomas Playford (SA premier
1938–65, and leader of the Liberal and Country League) and gerrymander.
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Third, and unique to SA, one reason electoral boundaries proved to be so
problematic was the so-called fairness provision in the Constitution Act 1934,
overseen by SA’s Electoral Division Boundaries Commission. This clause was
introduced by Labor in 1991, and was supported by the Liberals. The aim was
to ensure that after each election the electoral boundaries must be redrawn to
ensure that the winning party or grouping that secured 50 per cent of the two-
party preferred vote should be able to be ‘elected in sufficient numbers to enable
a government to be formed’.4 Clearly, given the election results during the 2000s
this pursuit of ‘fairness’ proved elusive. The key impact is that marginal seats play a
particularly critical role in determining SA election results, and ultimately the type
of government that is formed. In one of the final acts of the 2014–18 parliament, the
Greens introduced a Bill to remove the ‘fairness provision’ from the Constitution
Act 1934, and with the support of Labor and others the Bill was passed in December
2017.5
The political history of South Australia
Political stability is one of the defining features of SA political history in the 20th and
21st centuries. By as early as 1905, a Labor versus non-Labor two-party contest came
to dominate the state’s politics, mirroring the dynamics emerging at the national
level. Since the 1930s, SA voters have also been prepared to return incumbent
governments at successive elections, creating a series of distinct eras of political
leadership – several of which we explore below. What these periods of alternating
long-term Liberal and Labor government hide, however, are considerable shifts in
voting patterns (including for the House of Assembly) and the significant influence
of electoral systems. Further, focusing on the Labor versus Liberal contest alone
obscures the enduring impact of independent members of parliament, the presence
of which has contributed to several minority governments. More recently, as well,
minor parties have expanded their influence in the Legislative Council – the
powerful upper house of parliament.6
The Playford era (1938–65)
As Figure 1 displays, SA began the postwar period during the Playford era. Sir
Thomas Playford was the longest-serving premier in SA history, leading the Liberal
Country League (LCL) government from 1938 to 1965 and steering his party
through eight election wins. The Playford era is most notable for its ‘forced
industrialisation’ of the SA economy. The Playford governments frequently
intervened in markets, established publicly owned utilities and housing, and led a
4 Lynch 2016, 7.
5 Church 2018.
6 Jaensch 2011; Jaensch 1977; Jaensch 1976.
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Figure 1 South Australian governments and premiers by party.
transformation of the state’s economy from a rural-agricultural to a predominantly
industrial base. Nonetheless, public spending on health and education was often
lower than in other states, while the paternalism and conservatism of Playford’s
LCL meant that SA also significantly lagged behind in social and cultural policy
reform.
Industrial expansion and economic growth underpinned both the LCL’s and
Playford’s personal electoral popularity. But they also contributed to Playford’s
eventual demise, as economic transformation fostered a changed political geo-
graphy, with population moving from rural areas and concentrating in the metro-
politan region. Indeed, if not for the peculiarities of SA’s electoral system (the way
we count votes and translate them into parliamentary seats) at the time, the Playford
era likely would have been much shorter.7 Figure 2 shows the share of the first
preference votes of the LCL/Liberal and Labor in House of Assembly elections from
1944 to 2018. For much of the Playford era, the Labor Party secured more popular
support. Indeed, in 1944, 1953 and 1962 this led to the Labor Party winning the
estimated two-party preferred vote but nonetheless losing the election. This was
a product of severe electoral malapportionment, nicknamed the ‘Playmander’ –
something we have already explored earlier in the chapter. It was not until the 1970s
that SA had a genuinely ‘democratic’ electoral system founded upon a ‘one vote, one
value’ principle and a level playing field for parties.
The Dunstan decade (1970–79)
Though not the first Labor government of the postwar era, the Dunstan decade of
1970–79 nevertheless represents the clearest break with the long dominance of the
LCL through the mid-20th century. Don Dunstan’s governments represented a highly
activist brand of social democracy, and a new type of Labor government – ‘electorally
7 Jaensch 1977, see chapter 3.
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Figure 2 Party shares of the first preference vote in the House of Assembly.
Note: the spike in the vote of ‘others’ in 1975 is due to a split in the Liberal Party.
successful, effectively reformist, and unashamedly appealing to middle-class voters’.8
Dunstan brought about a technocratic shift for Labor, elevating the role of technical
expertise and evidence in policy making, but later also increased public participation
in some aspects of decision making. The social reforms (e.g. Aboriginal land rights,
decriminalisation of homosexuality, first female judge appointed) and expansions to
individual liberty (e.g. easing censorship, reforming liquor licensing, establishing a
nude beach) were, in many cases, nationally significant, and in some cases world
firsts.9 The Dunstan government, however, occasionally struggled with the challenges
of economic management, albeit in the context of a narrow economic base in the state
and worsening global economic conditions.
The Bannon decade (1982–92)
As Figures 1 and 2 show, the Labor Party quickly bounced back from the loss of
government in 1979, returning to power just three years later. But Premier John
Bannon was a Labor leader substantially different to Dunstan. Where Dunstan was
charismatic, ostentatious and a zealous reformer, Bannon was cautious, mainstream,
and sought incremental change. Where social and cultural transformations were
the aim of Dunstan’s Cabinets, Bannon’s governments focused more on careful
economic management.10 Labor under Bannon recorded considerable successes,
8 Parkin and Jaensch 1986, 100.
9 Macintyre 2005; Manwaring 2016.
10 Parkin and Patience 1992.
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seeing the opening of the Olympic Dam mining project, expansion of the defence
industry, development of the public transportation system, greater environmental
protection, and reforms in the school and criminal justice systems. But the collapse
of the government-owned State Bank, one of the largest economic crises in SA’s
history, brought about the end of Bannon’s premiership and, soon after, a decade in
opposition for the Labor Party. Interpretations differ on Bannon’s record in office.11
Critics see a decade of missed opportunities (especially in contrast to Dunstan’s
record), while others laud modest reform in much more economically constrained
times.
The Brown/Olsen/Kerin governments (1993–2002)
The Brown/Olsen/Kerin era is the sole period of prolonged Liberal Party
government since Playford (the Tonkin Liberal government of 1979–82 lasting
just a single parliamentary term). In 1993 Dean Brown led the Liberal Party to a
landslide victory in an election that saw the peak of the Liberal Party’s electoral
support in the postwar period (see Figure 1). The Brown government, however,
was beset by factional infighting, slowing the pace of policy reform. This infighting
was a continuation of party leadership rivalries between Dean Brown and John
Olsen, who represented, respectively, the moderate and conservative groupings
within the SA Liberals.12 By 1996, opinion poll figures of Liberal and Labor support
had narrowed, prompting two Liberal backbenchers to shift their support for party
leadership from Brown to Olsen, allowing Olsen to successfully challenge for party
leadership.
Under Olsen’s leadership, the Liberals narrowly won the 1997 election, forming
minority government with the support of independents. The Olsen government
successfully broadened SA’s economic base, initiated major sporting events (e.g.
the Tour Down Under), and further developed the tourism industry. The Olsen
government was also marked by several policy controversies, notably the privat-
isation of electricity assets (Electricity Trust of South Australia, ETSA) and the mass
outsourcing of government services. The privatisation of ETSA caused increases
in the price of electricity, reducing further Olsen’s electoral popularity. Ultimately,
however, it was the ‘Motorola affair’ (Olsen’s attempt to lure the technology
company to the state with subsidies and preferential treatment) and Olsen’s sub-
sequent misleading of parliament that led to his downfall, being replaced as party
leader and (until the 2002 election) premier by Rob Kerin.
11 See concluding chapters in Parkin and Patience 1992 for different views on Bannon’s record in
office.
12 As such, Brown versus Olsen leadership struggles can be seen as stemming from unresolved
factional divides since at least the 1960s.
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The Rann/Weatherill era (2002–18)
Mike Rann emerged as leader of the Labor Party following its landslide election loss
in 1993, where Labor’s primary vote was reduced to just 30.4 per cent (see Figure
2). However, Rann benefitted from a Liberal Party in disarray, and after just two
terms in opposition, led Labor to victory in 2002, forming a minority government.
Through much of the Rann era, SA experienced sustained economic expansion
and relatively low unemployment, helping Labor rebuild its economic credibility
after the crises of the later Bannon years. Substantial inequality and economic
disadvantage remained, however, and Rann often clashed with local trade unions.
Nonetheless, the Rann era saw considerable achievements, including increased
funding for health and education, the growth of the mining and defence industries,
considerable infrastructure and tourism site development, and innovations in
participatory democracy and governance.13 Some view the Rann era as a variant of
the emerging ‘third way’ politics in the renewal of social democracy.14
As popular opinion began to shift against Rann, leading union and Labor Party
figures moved to replace him. Public fatigue with a third-term government, coupled
with the effects of the Global Financial Crisis placed greater constraints on Rann’s
government. Rann, knowing he lacked the numbers to withstand any leadership
challenge, stood down in October 2011, with Jay Weatherill elected unopposed by
the party as his successor. Weatherill faced considerable economic challenges in
his first term, including the closing of prominent manufacturing sites and aborted
plans for mining projects. Early budgets made large cuts to spending and privatised
public assets and services. Yet, following a surprise win in the 2014 election, Labor’s
agenda under Weatherill substantively changed. Weatherill led significant social
reform (e.g. removing discriminatory laws against the LGBTIQ+ community), and
demonstrated a capacity for policy innovation in economic management. Perhaps
most notable is Weatherill’s proposed reform of the electricity sector, arguing for
the construction of a government-owned gas-fired power station alongside the
expansion of renewable energy and grid-connected battery storage.
The influence of independents and minor parties
Examining governments only provides us with part of the story of SA politics.
Independent MPs have long been a fixture of the SA parliament, usually elected to
the House of Assembly, and often representing rural, regional and outer suburban
electorates. In many cases, independent MPs were often elected as members of
one of the major parties (or were members of major parties denied preselection).
The most significant impact of these independents has been in the process of
government formation. Elections in SA regularly produce ‘hung parliaments’ where
13 Spoehr 2009; Spoehr 2005.
14 Macintyre 2005.
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Figure 3 Party first preference votes for the Legislative Council.
Note: the rise in the vote of ‘others’ in 1975 is due to a split in the Liberal Party.
neither major party commands the majority of lower house seats needed to form
a government. In these instances, independents and parties on the crossbench
hold considerable sway over which party can form government. Since 1944,
independents have played this role seven times, following elections in 1962, 1968,
1975, 1989, 1997, 2002, and 2014.
Minor parties have more often derived influence from their position in the
Legislative Council. Until the mid-1970s, the LCL/Liberal Party dominated the
Legislative Council due to restrictive voting rights that favoured the wealthy
establishment and property owners. Following Dunstan’s electoral reforms intro-
ducing universal suffrage and a proportional electoral system, Labor and minor
parties alike have secured greater representation in the upper house. For minor
parties, as well, electoral reform contributed to a growth in their support. Figure 3
graphs the change in electoral trends.
Since 1975, the proportional electoral system has meant that minor parties
have secured sufficient seats to play a decisive role in the Legislative Council. Minor
parties have consistently occupied a balance of power role, meaning they can side
with either the government or the opposition of the day (should they be at odds),
and determine the fate of legislation. Thus, while these minor parties tend not to
affect the formation of governments, they influence the function of governments.
Since 1997, as well, this balance of power role has been shared among multiple
minor parties, as depicted in Figure 4. This means that governments face a complex
bargaining environment, needing to negotiate with and manage the interests of
diverse, rival parties.
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Figure 4 Balance of seats in the Legislative Council.
Key South Australian institutions and social actors
We group SA’s key institutions and actors into three main traditional types: govern-
mental/public, private and ‘third sector’ (or non-governmental). The distinctiveness
of SA’s institutional ecology is strongly shaped by its political history. The different
political eras, as sketched out above, have been fundamental in shaping SA’s devel-
opment. In its early years, the political system was infused with a radicalism and
democratic innovation.15 Given the historic economic challenges facing SA, a key
focus of government (and the creation of related public institutions) has been active
involvement in the economy. Though it has been a contested approach, the growth of
SA’s economy has in major periods reflected the institutionalisation of government’s
key role in development.16 Beyond the immediate political institutions of Cabinet
government, and the parliament, there has been an increase in reach and influence
of statutory agencies and other public institutions.
A key moment in SA’s modern social transformation is observable in the
institutional developments of the Labor Party during the 1970s under the
leadership of Premier Don Dunstan. Through the creation of a number of statutory
authorities, SA’s arts and tourism industries were institutionalised in an attempt
to diversify the economy and make it more resilient to the emerging dynamics
of globalisation. The Dunstan government’s statutory institutionalisation of new
pathways for employment in these areas also served to develop a social, cultural and
economic expression of the state’s experimental and progressive nature. In latter
periods, for example under Premier Mike Rann, his government was underpinned
by a number of key government boards and committees. A striking example was
the Economic Development Board (created in 2002), which for a time had
15 Payton 2016.
16 See Stutchbury 1986 and Wanna 1986.
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significant political influence, alongside the also powerful Social Inclusion Board.17
More broadly, we can see a growth of the ‘regulatory state’, with public goods
overseen by quasi-independent agencies and boards.
The private sector remains a critical actor in the development of the state,
and it is institutionalised through key actors. Pre-eminent among them is the SA
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Trading today as Business SA, this institution
represents the interests of businesses in the state, chiefly in terms of managing
industrial relations with employees and lobbying for institutional changes
favourable to business, such as the removal or changing of regulation. At times
it has played a significant political role, developing policy positions, commenting
on state budgets, but also running campaigns – most notably leading the charge
against a new proposed State Bank levy in 2017.
A third set of institutions are those often categorised as ‘third sector’ or non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). SA, like many other parts of Australia, has
a vibrant set of institutions that emerge from and seek to represent part of civil
society. An important social institution is that made up of the array of organisations
that fall within the SA labour movement. In 1876, SA was the first place in the
British Empire to legalise trade unions, and they remain key actors in the SA
political system. Today, SA Unions is the peak body of the union movement in
the state. The key powerful trade unions remain affiliates of the state Labor Party.
Outside of the union movement, one of the most prominent social actors is the
SA Council of Social Services which is an umbrella organisation for a suite of
community sector NGOs and bodies. In common with other parts of Australia,
increasingly social services are often contracted out to large-scale third party
providers.
How do we best understand the political power and influence of these instit-
utions across the public, private and voluntary/community sectors in SA? This
remains a contested set of debates that has preoccupied political scientists for some
time. Dye suggests that different ‘models’ of politics might help us understand power
in different ways.18 Arguably, the most common account applied in Australia would
be through the prism of pluralism. This model suggests that power is dispersed
among different groups, and that government policy is often the result of trade-offs
between, say, employer and employee groups. Other models, for example class-
based approaches, suggest that, in a capitalist market economy, business groups
have a built-in (structural) advantage and yield more influence, certainly more than
trade unions. Other models note how, at times, different interests (e.g. business and
labour) are institutionalised – in what is sometimes called a corporatist model. In
the Rann era when representatives from the Economic Development Board and the
17 Manning 2005. Under the Marshall government, the Economic Development Board was folded
into a new, smaller Economic Development Agency.
18 Dye 2013.
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Social Inclusion Commissioner were part of the Executive Committee of Cabinet,
this seemed like a clear effort to build a form of corporatism.
Key controversies in South Australia
Democracy and accountability
David Beetham argues that democracy is underpinned by two key principles:
political equality and popular control.19 Political equality entails that all groups of
people have a voice within a given democratic system. Popular control means that,
following Lincoln’s famous declaration, government should be ‘of the people, by the
people, for the people’. Beetham and colleagues have often undertaken democratic
‘audits’ to see how well a country or polity is faring in this regard. To date, there has
never been such an audit of state-level democracy in Australia (although there has
been a national one).20 The health of SA democracy remains in question in at least
three key areas: deliberation, accountability and governance.
In recent years, there has been a focus on ‘deliberative’ democracy.21 The main
claim made here is that voters should have more influence in between elections,
and the quality of government decisions can be enhanced by better deliberation
or discussion. Labor Premier Jay Weatherill was a noted fan of this movement
and instigated a range of ‘new’ deliberative techniques, including citizens’ juries.
The effect of this has been mixed, with particular criticism directed at the citizens’
jury on the nuclear fuel cycle. Yet, it showed a rare willingness to enhance SA’s
democratic institutions.
A second area of concern has been the issue of accountability – especially
the mechanisms for holding the government to account. In the Cabinet system of
government in the Westminster tradition the doctrine of ministerial responsibility
is critical.22 This has two dimensions: collective and individual. In the case of the
latter, the convention is that ministers are responsible for the workings of their
departments, and, when things go wrong, they should resign (or more commonly
be dropped or reshuffled). A number of scandals in SA, notably the Oakden abuse
scandal, have drawn repeated attention to the growing ineffectiveness of individual
ministerial responsibility.23
A third area of concern, and not limited to SA, is the fragmenting nature of
governance. Traditionally, the government and public sector (especially the main
19 Beetham 1994.
20 Sawer, Abjorensen and Larkin 2009.
21 Dryzek 2002.
22 Thompson and Tillotsen 1999.
23 The Oakden nursing home was a state-run mental health centre for older people, which was
eventually shut down in 2017 after allegations of abuse and neglect of residents. The Oakden
scandal was one of the drivers for the federal government to begin a royal commission into aged
care quality and safety in 2018.
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departments, e.g. education, health) were the main political and policy actors.
The shift from government to governance, however, entails a growth of statutory
boards, commissions and councils (and the like) to deliver and oversee the
outsourcing of public goods. Yet, there remains a concern about the effectiveness of
these boards, their accountability and their relation to democratic institutions. For
example, a number of scandals in health and the TAFE sector raise concerns about
‘arms-length’ institutions and their role.
Energy and nuclear power
Recent economic developments in SA have focused on debate around securing
the state’s economic and energy futures as the pressing need to respond to climate
change heightens. Following an extreme weather event in October 2016 that left the
entire state in blackout for hours, the Weatherill Labor government developed an
energy industry policy to ensure energy supply to homes and businesses would be
safeguarded in the event of future breakdowns in the existing energy grid. Through
public–private partnerships with international energy companies Tesla and Neoen,
the government has developed renewable energy infrastructure, further increasing
SA’s national leadership on renewables and energy innovation. The initiatives under
Premier Mike Rann institutionalised a nation-leading renewable energy policy and
objective to increase renewable energy as a major source of supply. As at 2018,
approximately 50 per cent of the state’s energy comes from renewable sources.
Recently governments have sought to enact watershed changes to SA’s econ-
omic trajectory through attempts to undertake large reforms. Prior to the Labor
government’s loss to the Liberal Party in 2018, then-Premier Weatherill had sought
to explore options to establish a secure dumping site for nuclear waste in SA.
The sequence of events relating to this highly contentious issue exemplified the
responsible government principles and processes at the core of the state’s democratic
institutions. There was a two-year royal commission inquiry into SA’s participation
in the nuclear fuel cycle and subsequent public consultation through a citizens’ jury.
The final commission report handed down a decision in 2016 not to support nuclear
waste dumping.
Privatisation and state ownership
Privatisation refers to policies ranging from outsourcing of government services to
the absolute sale of public assets. Privatisation in Australia, and SA in particular,
has a poor record, with questionable economic benefit and considerable social
cost.24 As governments began the process of privatisation in the 1980s, many
voters responded with a relatively open mind. After all, there were inefficiencies
and poor quality of service provided through some government-owned operations.
24 Cahill and Toner 2018.
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Several decades on, public opinion tends towards scepticism of privatisation, with
asset sales and outsourcing electorally risky. In particular, many voters appear
unconvinced that privatisation leads to lower costs for consumers, and are cynical
about governments’ underlying rationale. Indeed, there are often different motiv-
ations underpinning calls for privatisation. Aulich and O’Flynn distinguish, for
instance, between pragmatic privatisation where public assets are divested in a
drive for greater efficiency and a means of technical problem solving, and systemic
privatisation which derives from an ideological commitment to reducing the role
and size of government.25 Privatisations under both Liberal and Labor govern-
ments have been propelled by both of these motivations at different times.
Despite the potential electoral costs, successive governments have pushed
forward with asset sales and outsourcing. Most recently, the Weatherill Labor
government privatised the Land Titles Office, the Motor Accident Commission,
SA Lotteries, and forestry services. Further, the Marshall government in 2018
flagged the possibility of privatising some health and criminal justice services,
while the Labor opposition claims the Liberals also have SA Water in their sights.
The most controversial instance of privatisation in the SA setting, however, is the
sale of the Electricity Trust of South Australia (ETSA) in 1999. Arguably, this is
the source of the contentious energy politics outlined above. Interestingly, it was
the conservative Playford government that first established ETSA by nationalising
privately owned electricity assets in 1946. Fifty-three years later, it was Olsen’s
Liberal government that broke up and sold the state-owned electricity suppliers,
despite previous assurances to voters that such a sale would not occur. The ETSA
privatisation would not have gone forward, however, without the critical support
of two Labor members of the Legislative Council ‘crossing the floor’ to support the
sale.
Conclusions
SA remains at a political and economic crossroads. After 16 years of Labor, Steven
Marshall led the Liberals to government at the 2018 election. Marshall’s govern-
ment faces a range of political and policy dilemmas, including in the crucial areas
of health, the TAFE sector, and the wider economic environment. There remain
concerns that this populously small but geographically large state could be heading
back to how it has often been traditionally viewed – as an economic ‘backwater’. The
Marshall government is seeking to counter Labor’s more interventionist agenda,
by focusing on creating a smaller state, scaling back public spending, and focusing
on private-sector entrepreneurship. The Liberals have long been out of practice at
governing in SA, and only one of the current Cabinet – Treasurer Rob Lucas –
has served in government before. Strikingly, Marshall’s government has sought to
25 Aulich and O’Flynn 2007.
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innovate in its own way. Critically the Liberals are seeking to return to Cabinet
government and diffusing power across the Cabinet, rather than relying on a strong
leader and a small number of trusted lieutenants.
There are a wide range of concerns about the health of SA’s democracy, its
governance, and its key assets. The Marshall government will need to build a new
agenda, with widespread popular appeal, if it is to survive in what has until recently
been a state dominated by Labor.
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Although Tasmania is a natural Labor state, there are increasing institutional and
political challenges to traditional Labor dominance. Tasmania’s politics are pro-
foundly affected by a sense of economic fragility and the consequent influence of
large industries. The state has been both a national and global focus for environ-
mental politics and originated the world’s first green political party. Tasmania’s voting
system is unique, as are the electoral arrangements for both of its state houses of
parliament. As part of the Australian federation, it is represented by 12 senators – the
same number as other states.
Since European settlement, Tasmania has had an export economy relying heavily
on a few key industries for income and employment – agriculture, fishing, mining,
forestry and mineral processing, and, more recently, tourism and education. Due to
its small scale, narrow industrial base and limited per capita income, Tasmania relies
on federal revenue transfers to fund essential public services and infrastructure.
Historically, Tasmania’s underperforming economy was a central issue. The
resulting push for development of the state’s resources to create jobs has led to
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many environmental clashes over hydro dams, logging of native forests and, more
recently, concerns about the location and scale of tourism developments.
Political history
Tasmania’s political history has been shaped by its geography and is defined by
six broad eras: Aboriginal settlement; European exploration and convict settlement
at the time of the early Industrial Revolution; the end of convict transportation
followed by self-government during the mid-19th century; Federation and state-
hood followed by hydro-industrialisation for much of the 20th century; the rise of
the Green movement and the decline of manufacturing from the 1970s; and the rise
of tourism and the services sector from the 1990s.
Tasmania, known as lutruwita1 by its Indigenous inhabitants, the palawa
people, was first settled between 30,000 and 40,000 years ago, when there was
a land connection with the Australian mainland due to lower sea levels during
the last ice age. Subsequently isolated by rising sea levels, there were nine tribes
spread throughout the area. However, immediately before European settlement, the
palawa population was estimated at less than 15,000.
Located to the south-east of the Australian continent, Tasmania became a way-
point for European explorers of the Pacific, who followed the prevailing westerly
winds from the Cape of Good Hope in Africa. Early explorers included Abel
Tasman, who landed in 1642 and named the area Van Diemen’s Land. Marion
DuFresne (1772), Tobias Furneaux (1773), James Cook (1777) and William Bligh
(1788 and 1792) all visited around this time, as did several other French and British
explorers.
The first European settlement on the Derwent River, near present-day Hobart,
in 1803 was based partly on fear of French ambition, especially as George Bass and
Matthew Flinders had shown in 1798 that Van Diemen’s Land was separate from
the mainland and therefore might be distinct from the British claim to New South
Wales (NSW).2 Tasmania’s usefulness as a jail for convicts and political prisoners
was also important as it was realised that, as an archipelago of remote islands,
escape was almost impossible.3
The Bass Strait islands were used by sealers from the late 18th century, and
intermarriage between Aboriginal women and European sealers was common.
However, a clash between the palawa and the first European settlers near modern-
day Hobart led to a massacre and continuing intercultural violence, when a large
1 The written form of the Tasmanian Aboriginal language, palawa kani, has only lower case letters
following a decision by the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre to discontinue capitals (Harman
2018).
2 Clements 2014.
3 Although, in 1834, ten audacious convicts managed to build a boat, commandeer it and sail to
Chile (Courtenay 2018).
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hunting party of palawa were fired upon by frightened troops. Later, the ‘Black War’
(1824–31), the ‘most intense frontier conflict in Australia’s history’, led to the near
decline of the palawa and their culture. About 1,000 Aboriginal people and 200
settlers were killed during the conflict.4 By 1830, there were 24,000 settlers, but only
about 250 Aboriginal people remained alive.5
The independent settlement of northern Van Diemen’s Land was established on
the Tamar River in 1804 at Launceston, which has since tended to look northward
more than the southern capital. In fact, its establishment led to the founding of
Melbourne in 1835 by the entrepreneur John Batman, whose party sailed across
Bass Strait in the Hobart-built schooner Enterprize.
The fragility of the isolated southern colony was made stark in 1809, when
Governor Bligh from Sydney and Lieutenant-Governor Collins from Hobart Town
met after Bligh had been deposed by the Rum Rebellion and subsequently released.
Bligh sailed for Hobart Town, where Collins refused to help him re-take the post
of governor of NSW. Their relationship further soured when Bligh had one of
Collins’ sons, a crewman on his ship, flogged for insubordination.6 During Bligh’s
subsequent vengeful blockade of the Derwent aboard his 12-gun7 HMS Porpoise,
all ships entering the river were ‘taxed’ some of their cargo, which contributed
to the fledgling colony’s economic woes. After several months, Bligh eventually
returned to Sydney upon hearing that a new governor, Lachlan Macquarie, had
been appointed from England.
The Van Diemen’s Land economy grew based on fertile plains between Hobart
and Launceston suitable for sheep and cropping, at a time when Sydney settlers
had not established farms beyond the Blue Mountains.8 Shipbuilding, timber and
especially whaling were flourishing industries throughout the 1800s, and much
timber and whale oil were exported.
An 1823 Act of the British parliament separated Van Diemen’s Land from
NSW, and the Legislative Council was established in 1825 to advise the lieutenant-
governor. It consisted of six members chosen by him, expanding to 15 members
in 1828. By 1851, it had 24 members, 16 of whom were elected. Consistent with
similar jurisdictions, only men over 30 who owned a certain amount of property
were eligible to vote.
The colony’s value as a remote jail faded as the local economy developed.
Up until transportation ceased in 1853, nearly half of all convicts throughout the
Australian colonies had been sent to Van Diemen’s Land, which was increasingly
resented by the resident populace.9 The end of transportation followed the form-
ation of an Anti-Transportation League, supported by all elected members of the
4 Kippen 2014.
5 Clements 2014.
6 Clark 2012.
7 Winfield 2008.
8 Europeans did not find a route across the Blue Mountains, west of Sydney, until 1813.
9 Boyce 2008.
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Legislative Council. Many former convicts found their way to Victoria, lured by
the gold rush of the 1850s, as labour was in strong demand. This brought about
depopulation and economic stagnation in the southernmost settlements.
The global depression of the 1890s affected Tasmania’s export-based economy
significantly, and there was considerable support for combining in a federation
with other colonies and the promise of greater interstate trade that would follow.
In the first referendum of 1898, Tasmanians voted overwhelmingly in favour of
Federation, with a more than 81 per cent voting ‘yes’. At the second (1899) refer-
endum, the ‘yes’ vote was even higher, with nearly 95 per cent in favour. Both ‘yes’
votes were the highest of any jurisdiction, considerably higher than NSW, where
fear of a loss of influence saw ‘yes’ votes of 52 and 57 per cent respectively.10 Clearly,
Tasmanians thought that they would benefit from closer economic relations with
the wealthier mainland states.
During the 20th century, Tasmania was much affected by global convulsions
and electoral volatility increased, although the Labor Party was dominant for most
of the period.11 From a population of just over 200,000 people, Tasmania sent
more than 15,000 to the First World War. Nearly 2,900 died and about double that
number returned wounded, many having been gassed. There were fewer casualties
in the Second World War, but still about 4,000 in total.12 The state’s key economic
transformation, hydro-industrialisation, enabled electricity generation based on
central highland dams. Said to be inspired by later Premier Walter Lee’s visit to the
pre-war German Ruhr Valley, where the economy was booming, the Tasmanian
Hydro-Electric Department (later Commission or HEC) was created from private
companies in 1914 and continued building dams until the 1980s. Industries
attracted to the state as a result included paper, chocolate, zinc and aluminium
production, as well as wool and carpet mills throughout the state.
However, the HEC’s decision to flood the iconic Lake Pedder in the south-
west so horrified a growing number of conservation-minded people that it led
to the creation of the world’s first green political party in 1972 – the United
Tasmania Group, later the Tasmanian Greens and subsequently the Australian
Greens. Lake Pedder was flooded, but another attempt to dam the Franklin River in
the early 1980s led to global protests, a blockade and the intervention of the federal
government, backed by the High Court, to prevent the dam being constructed.
The Franklin River dispute marked the end of the hydro-based industrialisation
strategy and confirmed the importance of tourism-related industries to the state as
large-scale manufacturing employment continued to decline. A legacy of the dam-
building period is that Tasmania has Australia’s highest level of renewable energy
production, at 93 per cent, and is poised to export more renewable electricity to
10 Australian Electoral Commission 2011.
11 The Labor Party governed Tasmania for 45 of the 48 years between 1934 and 1982, for example,
longer than in any other state.
12 Watson 2015.
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mainland Australia.13 During the 1990s, tourism marketing and air and sea access
were improved, leading to a strong increase in visitor numbers, making tourism
and hospitality a driver of economic growth. Tourism, along with Tasmania’s
growing ‘clean and green’ natural produce, has also led to strong growth in the
food and beverage industries, both for local consumption and export. Chinese
President Xi Jinping’s 2014 visit boosted Tasmania’s appeal in Asian export markets
for agricultural products and as a tourism destination for his compatriots. By 2017,
tourism accounted for 10.4 per cent of Tasmania’s economic output and 15.8 per
cent of its total employment – compared with national averages of 6.3 per cent and
7.7 per cent respectively.14
Politically, the rise of the Greens on the left of the Labor Party changed the
complexion of representative politics in Tasmania as well as nationally.
Key institutions and actors
Tasmania’s political practice has several distinctive features, which have evolved
over time, contributing to a unique political culture. The relationship between
electoral systems and the success of political parties has been long studied, and
Tasmania is an interesting case study in this regard.15 Tasmania (like the Australian
Capital Territory) is unusual in using a proportional electoral system to elect its
lower house, having five electorates each of five seats for a House of Assembly
(lower house) of 25 members. The Legislative Council (upper house) consists of
15 single-member electorates. The multi-member lower house and single-member
upper house is the inverse of all other state electoral systems.
The ‘Hare-Clark’ electoral system, used in Tasmania since 1909, allows indep-
endents and minor parties to more easily secure representation in the House of
Assembly. In the 34 elections since it was introduced, independents or minor
parties have won seats in all but nine. In two of the nine elections where no
independent was elected, Labor and the Liberal Party each won 15 seats. Since
1989, when five Greens were elected to the House of Assembly, Tasmania has had
three ‘hung’ parliaments, which resulted in minority governments. It is fair to say
that all Tasmanian elections are close, and there has been a long-running argument
about the prospects and benefits – or otherwise – of majority government.
By-elections are rare and casual vacancies are filled by recounting the votes of
the retiring member in that division from the preceding election. While all other
states and territories have fixed four-year terms for their house of government,
Tasmania alone has a maximum four-year term.
13 Climate Council of Australia 2014, 31–2.
14 Eslake 2018.
15 See, for example, Bennett and Lundie 2007 on the effects of Hare-Clark in Tasmania.
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The number of members in the House of Assembly has changed over time. The
House had at least 30 members from its origins in 1856 until 1998, when it was
reduced from 35 to 25, as shown in Figure 1. This arose as a productivity offset
to justify a controversial 40 per cent pay rise for MPs as a reaction to union and
public pressure at a time of austere state budgets and restrictions on public sector
pay rises. But it especially suited the two major parties, which saw it as a chance to
make it harder for the Greens by lifting the quota required to win a seat from 12.5
per cent (one eighth) to 16.7 per cent (one sixth). A quota under Hare-Clark is the
total number of votes divided by the total number of seats per electorate plus one,
plus one vote.16
The nearly 200-year-old upper house – the Legislative Council – was recon-
stituted as part of the bicameral parliament in 1856. Along with the House of
Assembly, its size was reduced in 1998 – from 19 down to 15 seats, based on
single-member electorates. It is reputedly one of the most powerful upper houses
under the Westminster model of government due to its power to reject money
Bills (budgets) and thus send the lower house to an election. The government has
no power to dissolve the upper house. Further, elections for its single-member
electorates are staggered. Members are elected for six-year terms with elections
alternating between three divisions in one year and two divisions the next year.
This quirky electoral system means that, unlike other state upper houses and the
federal Senate, the Legislative Council never has to face either a full or half-house
general election. Further, it is the only parliamentary chamber in Australia in
which, historically, most of its members have been independents and therefore not
subject to party control. While most of these independents are politically quite
conservative, their autonomous scrutiny of government proposals arguably has
value. In recent years, both the Liberal and Labor parties have experienced electoral
success in the upper house, but independents still outnumber both parties.
Beyond the two-party system
Tasmania’s Hare-Clark electoral system has allowed emerging social movements
to secure parliamentary representation. As a result, significant trends in national
party politics, including the rise of the Greens, and growing support for the Liberal
Party from socially conservative working-class voters – the ‘Howard Battlers’ – were
evident in Tasmanian long before other states.
16 Where there is only one seat, the quota is therefore half the number of votes, plus one vote –
which is the same as used throughout Australia in all single-member electorates.
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In Tasmania, the Labor and Liberal two-party system17 generally prevailed
at the state level between 1949 and 1982, with continuous Labor governments,
occasionally with the support of independents, only disrupted by a one-term
minority Liberal government between 1969 and 1972.
By the early 1980s, a proposal to dam the Franklin River became the focus of
political debate both in Tasmania and nationally, at a time of high unemployment
in the state. The Liberal opposition in Tasmania supported the scheme while the
Labor government was torn between maintaining its commitment to industrial-
isation and the demands of an increasingly vocal and influential green movement
who were determined to save the Franklin. Labor Premier Doug Lowe proposed a
compromise of damming an alternative river in the south-west wilderness, which
would still generate more power for industry but save the Franklin River. Lowe’s
plan failed; he lost the party leadership over the issue and moved to the cross-
benches as a Labor independent. The government continued under his successor,
Harry Holgate, who called an election six months later. The Liberals, under Robin
Gray, subsequently secured a landslide win in the May 1982 election on the back
of unprecedented working-class support. A sign of things to come, the leader of
the ‘Save the Franklin’ campaign, Bob Brown, who later became the leader of the
Australian Greens, was elected to the House of Assembly in 1983. By 1989, Green
independents were a political force in Tasmania, winning five seats in parliament
and entering a power sharing ‘accord’ with the Labor Party, enabling Labor to
return to government in 1989.
The following 30 years have seen both majority Labor and Liberal governments,
with one period of minority Liberal government and a further term of Labor–Green
power sharing between 2010 and 2014. Not only was the Liberal Party’s 1980s
strategy to win working-class votes through a pro-development and jobs platform
later echoed nationally, rivalries between Labor and the Greens for progressive votes
in the inner cities were also first evident in Tasmania in the same decade.
Cabinet and the ministry
From 1972 until 1998, the Tasmanian government had a maximum of 10 ministers.
Following the reduction in the size of parliament in 1998, this has varied up
to nine ministers. The change in numbers, introduction of better parliamentary
committee systems and the success of major parties in the Legislative Council
has seen more ministers appointed to Cabinet from the upper house. Since the
reduction in the size of parliament, however, there are concerns that there are too
few government members from which to draw a Cabinet, too great a workload on
ministers and the potential for administrative conflicts where ministers have too
many portfolios. There is also the danger of having too few ordinary MPs to provide
17 The National Party has never achieved state-level representation in Tasmania.
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effective parliamentary scrutiny of government. As noted by Wettenhall, ‘questions
about patterns of relationships between executive governments and legislatures’18
are common in many small jurisdictions, especially island-states, where there are
disadvantages in having few ministers becoming ‘jacks of all trades’, or in having
the jurisdiction essentially run by the bureaucratic administration.
The changing political landscape
We have noted that Tasmania’s narrow industrial base and economic vulnerability
has resulted in an economy that is reliant on a small number of industries. As a
result of these concerns, Tasmanian voters have historically supported parties they
believe will deliver economic security. For much of the 20th century, Tasmania
has had Labor governments, but that changed in 1982, with the election, for the
first time, of a majority Liberal government,19 led by premier Robin Gray, who
subsequently held office for two terms. Since then, the Liberals have held
government from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2014 to the present.20 In between,
Labor held office for an unbroken period of 16 years (1998 to 2014), with four
successive premiers, including Tasmania’s first woman premier, Lara Giddings.
While Tasmania has also experienced three minority governments with the
Greens holding a balance of power,21 there has been a long history of independents
or minor parties holding the balance of power.22 A report by an advisory committee
chaired by A.G. Ogilvie noted in 1984 that ‘history has shown independents and
minor parties have a tendency to gain representation in a majority of elections’.23
This is facilitated by the Hare-Clark system, which enables candidates to win seats
with considerably less than 50 per cent of the vote in multi-member electorates.
However, the entry of the Greens to the left of the Labor Party on the back of the
conservation debates changed the complexion of representative politics within the
state. Since the early 1980s, the Greens have won up to five seats in some elections.
Much of their gains were at the expense of the Labor Party, which recorded a record
low vote of 28 per cent and won only seven seats in 2014. In the parliament elected
in 2018, the Liberals have 13 seats, Labor 10 and the Greens two in the House of
Assembly, while the Liberals have two seats and Labor four seats in the Legislative
18 Wettenhall 2018, 124.
19 The Liberal government of Angus Bethune (1969–72) relied on the support of Centre Party
member, Kevin Lyons (Haward and Larmour 1993, 1).
20 Premier Will Hodgman was re-elected for a second four-year term in March 2018.
21 These three hung parliaments with the Greens holding a balance of power were the Field Labor
government of the Labor–Green accord between 1989 and 1992, the Rundle Liberal minority
government between 1996 and 1998 and the Bartlett–Giddings Labor government, with two
Greens in Cabinet, between 2010 and 2014.
22 Newman 1992, 198–201.
23 Newman 1992, 98.
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Council. Nevertheless, a lack of major conservation-related issues24 at the 2018
state election probably resulted in a significant decline in the Greens vote, and they
won only two of the 25 lower house seats available.
The economy
Traditionally, Tasmania’s major industries have been mining, agriculture, fishing
and forestry. During the period of hydro-industrialisation, major metal and forest
product processing plants were also established in the state. Aquaculture has grown
from a relatively small industry in the late 1980s so that Tasmania is now a large
producer of seafood, particularly salmon. However, the narrow industrial base
means that average Tasmanian household income is almost 19 per cent below the
national average and, as a consequence, Tasmania is more reliant than other states
on federal Goods and Services Tax and grant revenue for the provision of public
services and infrastructure. A reliance on exports, a small number of relatively large
processing industries, the vagaries of interstate and overseas transport and reliance
on federal transfers have combined to make Tasmania particularly susceptible to
downturns in the Australian and international economies. From the late-1990s,
improvements to sea and air passenger transport sparked a growth in tourism,
which has now become one of the state’s major industries. Education has also
grown in importance, attracting more overseas fee-paying students, albeit from a
relatively low base. One outcome of the decades of debate over forestry, mining and
the environment is that some 42 per cent of Tasmania is protected in the World
Heritage Area, national parks or other reserves. Tasmania’s natural environment
and clean air, and its reputation for excellent food and drink products are key
factors in attracting visitors and students to the state. As of 2018, these factors were
contributing to strong economic growth and, for the first time in over a decade, the
Tasmanian economy was outperforming the economies of the mainland states.
Key issues
The much smaller scale of Tasmania’s political system, compared with the other
Australian states, is significant. Another distinctive feature of the island state is its
relatively dispersed population. There are three distinctive and competitive regions
– Greater Hobart and the south; Launceston and the north-east; and the north-
west and west coasts, including Devonport and Burnie. These regions have different
industrial bases, economies, needs and expectations. Despite the small size of the
state, each region has its own daily newspaper that champions causes for its district.
24 Whitson 2018. Although salmon farming was an issue, its restriction lacked significant support,
and the earlier question of a pulp mill on the river Tamar had been long buried.
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Overlaying this regional structure are the five House of Assembly electorates
discussed above, each about the same size, in terms of voter numbers, and with
boundaries drawn around communities of interest. The same electorates also give
Tasmania five seats in the House of Representatives – and 12 senators in the
Australian parliament, as negotiated under the Federation process, primarily by
Tasmanian Andrew Inglis Clark,25 an admirer of the US constitution.
Despite its small population, equal representation in the Senate means Tas-
mania’s demands cannot be ignored federally. Competition between the regions
and the voices of regional representatives at both the state and federal levels has
often led to duplication of services and infrastructure where they cannot be justified
by size of population alone. The state’s different regional economies have often led
to reliance on a small number of key industries or businesses to sustain employ-
ment, which can give a relatively small number of businesses a stronger voice in
the halls of government when lobbying for infrastructure, access to resources or
financial assistance.
The state’s smallness creates issues for governing and governance. All political
parties, at times, find it difficult to find capable candidates to fill vacancies. Name
recognition has seen the establishment of political ‘dynasties’, where members get
elected based on their family name. For example, current Liberal Premier Will Hodg-
man is the son of former federal and state MP Michael Hodgman, whose father,
William Hodgman, was a former president of the Legislative Council. The current
member for Denison, Scott Bacon, is the son of former Labor Premier Jim Bacon.
The same issue causes problems in filling positions at all levels of government, from
the judiciary to appointments and promotions in the public service, to filling board
positions on government–business enterprises. Relatively small networks in business
and politics mean it is hard to find people who have no past affiliations or business
associations that can lead to suspicions of cronyism and nepotism.
More than 95 per cent of Tasmanian businesses are classified as ‘small’.26 By
comparison, some government-owned businesses are big employers and have more
financial resources, which give them a dominant voice in key policy arenas. The
political power of a small number of private-sector business leaders, investors
and large (in Tasmanian terms) employers has also been a cause for concern.
For example, during the 2018 state election, a high profile advertising campaign
funded by gaming industry lobby groups against a Labor and Greens policy to
remove gaming machines from pubs and clubs was both effective and reminiscent
of the forest industry campaigns of the 1980s and 1990s. It is arguable that the
government was returned due to that campaign, and thus the Liberals are in debt to
the gambling industry.27
25 The same Clark as in the ‘Hare-Clark’ voting system.
26 Department of State Growth 2019.
27 See also Knaus and Evershed 2019 on the gambling lobby’s donations to the Liberals ahead of
the 2018 state election, totalling $500,000.
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Fault lines and the future
Historically, the underperformance of Tasmania’s economy is a recurring theme
and the subject of numerous inquiries and attempted interventions. The 1997
Nixon report on the Tasmanian economy for the Commonwealth government, for
example, noted that ‘economic activity and jobs growth in Tasmania is the worst of
all the states’.28 As we have noted, the Tasmanian economy is currently experiencing
a period of strong growth in what has been described as a ‘golden age’. In a speech
to the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), Premier Will
Hodgman declared Tasmania was ‘now a stronger, prouder, more confident place
and the economy one of the strongest performing in the country’.29
This economic renaissance began in the late 1990s, under Labor Premier Jim
Bacon, with a program he named Tasmania Together – an attempt to unite people
behind a plan to focus on Tasmania’s advantages – its natural attractions, its
reputation for excellent produce, the arts – and to instil a sense of confidence in
the community. Despite falling victim to irreconcilable differences over forestry,
Tasmania Together succeeded in promoting growth in tourism, a turnaround from
a net decline in population to growth from both interstate and overseas migrants,
and recognition of the importance of education and the arts as important sectors of
economic growth. The establishment of the Museum of Old and New Art, known as
MONA, by professional gambler and eccentric entrepreneur David Walsh in 2011
tapped into an international market of cultural tourism and has fostered innovation
and creativity across the state.
However, the growth in population, migration, tourism and education services
has generated its own set of problems. Road infrastructure, particularly in Hobart,
has not kept up with the growth in numbers; tourism infrastructure is struggling
to cope with increased visitation, and increased demand for accommodation has
caused housing affordability problems and a rising number of the homeless. In the
Hobart rental market, the amount of properties suitable for low-income people
declined rapidly in 2018 due to the tourism boom and the removal of properties
from the long-term market to the more profitable short-term Airbnb. Rapidly rising
housing prices have also adversely affected the rental market.30
The ongoing struggle between economic development and the environment has
defined Tasmanian politics. Struggles such as the fights to save the wilderness from
hydro development in the 1980s and the forestry conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s
seem to be abating. However, the rapid growth in tourism in recent years has led to
environmental tension around the location and scale of tourism infrastructure, such
as resorts, hotels and a cable car, and encroachment on wilderness areas.
28 Nixon 1997, v.
29 Hodgman 2017.
30 Anglicare 2018, 6.
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Conclusions
The central challenge facing Tasmania is whether the island state can exploit its
distinctive strengths to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth despite
the challenges of remoteness and scale. In many ways, this is a political challenge
as much as an economic one. Ultimately, Tasmania’s prosperity will depend on two
factors. First, the political challenge involves resolving traditional tensions between
progressive environmentalists and more conservative commercial interests. On this
front, the outlook is more optimistic than it has been for decades, given that
political conflict over forestry has abated significantly in recent years, although
concerns about aquaculture and tourism remain. A second challenge is whether
Tasmanians can have the education and skills to capitalise on the transition from
an industrial to a service and knowledge-based economy. The concern here is that
levels of educational attainment in Tasmania are well below the national average
and that growing numbers of businesses complain about shortages of skilled labour.
Tasmania is Australia’s smallest and poorest state. Its isolation, scale and
economic challenges have contributed to what is, by Australian standards, a unique
political culture. In recent years, Tasmania’s economic performance and outlook
have improved significantly, but it remains to be seen whether the ideological and
parochial divisions that have afflicted its politics in the past will prevent the island
state from realising its full economic and social potential.
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The state of Victoria can be thought of as Australia’s ‘second’ state not because of
historical chronology (Victoria, previously known as the Port Phillip District, was
an administrative province of New South Wales [NSW] until formal separation on
1 June 1851 and was established after both NSW and Tasmania) but rather because
of demographics and economics. Victoria is the second most populous state after
NSW, and the state’s capital city, Melbourne, is Australia’s second most populous
city after Sydney. Victoria provides the second largest tranche of members to the
House of Representatives, and the Victorian governor stands second in line to be
governor-general should the incumbent vacate the position.
Victoria is also important to the national economy, although the nature of its
contribution has changed over time. Initially settled (illegally) as an extension of the
Van Diemen’s Land fine wool industry by people such as John Batman and Edward
and Stephen Henty, Victoria received a massive infusion of free settlers with the
official discovery of gold in 1851 – the same year the Port Phillip District was
Economou, Nick (2019). Victoria. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian
Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
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separated from NSW and renamed Victoria.1 By the 1870s, Melbourne emerged as
a major manufacturing centre, and in the 1880s the city experienced a significant
real estate boom that was to end in a spectacular crash in the 1890s.2 At Federation
Victoria was a major producer of grains and wool as well as a manufacturer of
farming implements, and one of Australia’s landmark industrial disputes occurred
at the Sunshine Harvester Works in Melbourne’s western suburbs in 1907 – a
dispute that was resolved by Justice Henry Bournes Higgins outlining the concept
of a ‘minimum wage’ in his Harvester judgement.3
Victorian manufacturing was vital to the supply of Australian troops in both
world wars. After the Second World War, Melbourne’s armaments manufacturing
industry shifted to automobiles, with a race between Ford and General Motors to be
the first to develop an Australian car.4 The consolidation of manufacturing under
the auspices of British and American corporations led to Melbourne’s reputation as
the preferred home of international capital. As the base for the Australian Council
of Trades Union, there was a strong link between the city and the ‘industrial
relations club’.
For all this industrial activity, the state’s political history was, until com-
paratively recent times, dominated by conservatives and liberals.5 Until the 1980s,
Labor governments were rare. The state’s politics were invariably a battle between
rural conservatives and metropolitan liberals with the nascent Labor Party
something of an incidental player (see Table 1).6
Victoria was the home of such prominent colonial liberals as Henry Bournes
Higgins and Alfred Deakin, both of whom were participants in the Federation
movement. It was the home of arguably Australia’s greatest liberal-conservative
Robert Menzies, and Liberal leader Henry Bolte still holds the record as the state’s
longest-serving premier. With the advent of the modern party system, Victoria was
often referred to as the ‘jewel in the Liberal crown’. This historical theme stands in
stark contrast with more contemporary politics, in which Victoria (and especially
Melbourne) is viewed as the epicentre of progressive politics that is governed by the
Australian Labor Party (ALP) more often than not, and is arguably the strongest
state for the Australian Greens.
1 Legislation from the NSW Legislative Council authorising the separation was passed in 1850 upon
passage of the Australian Colonies Self Government Act 1850 (UK) in Britain. Promulgation of the
Act and actual separation occurred on 1 June 1851.
2 Cannon 1995.
3 Rickard 1984.
4 Conlon and Perkins 2001.
5 Murray 2007; Rawson 1977.
6 Holmes 1976.
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History
The colonisation of the Port Phillip District began with sheep farmers from Van
Diemen’s Land such as John Batman and Edward and Stephen Henty making the
trip by sea to ‘squat’ on the western plains of what was then part of NSW. The
entrepreneurial drive behind this initial land grab, to the cost of both Indigenous
people and the authority of the governor of NSW, Richard Bourke, was revisited in
1851 when gold was officially discovered at Warrandyte and a rush of free settlers
from around the world descended upon Melbourne.
By the 1870s gold mining went from alluvial activity to deep lead mining
undertaken by capitalised mining companies. Those who had rushed to the
goldfields but were displaced drifted back to Melbourne’s western suburbs in search
of work.7 By the time of the real estate boom of the 1880s, the vast majority
of Victorian residents lived in Melbourne and its suburbs. This demographic
characteristic persists: the 2011 Census found that 75 per cent of Victorians live in
local government areas classified as metropolitan.8
The gold rush reinforced the notion of Victoria as a place for small-scale
business operators and entrepreneurs as well as establishing the idea of Melbourne
as a cosmopolitan city. The rebellion of miners at Eureka (Ballarat) in 1854 also
demonstrated the importance of liberal ideas such as manhood suffrage and no
taxation without parliamentary representation, grievances free settler miners had
with the colony’s administration. Two years later Victoria obtained a constitution
that introduced a Westminster system of parliamentary government.
The new constitution was promulgated in Victoria in 1856. It provided for a
Legislative Assembly that would be elected by men over the age of 21 regardless of
property ownership. The assumption was that government would be exercised by
a ‘prime minister’ and a ministry with the confidence of the majority of the lower
house. The Legislative Council would comprise men of property, elected by men of
property, who could exercise a powerful veto over the lower house. Parliamentary
salaries were not introduced until 1870. Female suffrage was not legislated for
until 1908, and the law that prohibited women from standing for election was not
abolished until 1924. The property qualifications that applied to the Legislative
Council were abolished in 1951.
Political instability was the dominant characteristic of Victorian parliamentary
politics from colonial times until a major split in the Labor Party in 1955, which
set the basis for a period of Liberal Party dominance through to the 1980s.9 Prior
to 1955, leadership challenges, bitter fights between rural conservatives and urban
liberals, and the threat of early elections by a conservative-dominated Legislative
Council were the norm in Victorian politics.
7 Lack 1991.
8 ABS 2012.
9 Murray 2007.
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The upper house was a source of some controversy during these times. The
1855 constitution gave the Legislative Council powers commensurate with those of
the British House of Lords including the power to defeat Appropriation Bills and
thus force governments formed in the lower house to early elections. The Legislative
Council exercised the power to block supply on 10 occasions, the last time being in
1952 when it brought down a Country Party government.10
The 1952 blocking of supply occurred as a result of a political crisis within
conservative politics over the state’s electoral laws.11 Debates about the structure of
lower house representation to accommodate rural fears about being overwhelmed
by the population of metropolitan Melbourne were arguably the greatest policy
controversy in Victorian politics from self-government until the 1950s. At issue
was rural malapportionment, where rural voters had greater capacity to elect
representatives than metropolitan voters. Rural political interests fought tooth and
nail to protect voter inequality, and this split conservative politics. Spectacularly in
1929, the Labor Party was to form a coalition government with the Country Party
by promising to protect rural malapportionment, despite the fact that it was Labor
voters, clustered in a handful of seats in Melbourne’s industrial western suburbs,
who had the weakest voting power in the state.
Labor’s desire to have executive power overrode its opposition to rural malap-
portionment. The Labor–Country coalition lasted for only a matter of months, and
left in its wake a long-lasting bitterness between the Country Party and the main
anti-Labor Party of the time (initially the Nationalists, then the United Australia
Party, and then the Liberal Party). The most explicit expression of this antipathy
was to be found in the refusal of the two anti-Labor parties to form a coalition – a
position that was maintained until 1990.12
This also contributed to governmental instability. With the vote split across
three parties, absolute majorities in the Legislative Assembly were rare and most
of the governments formed between the end of the First World War and the
1950s were minority administrations that could collapse very quickly. Even those
governments that did survive struggled to get legislation through a very con-
servative Legislative Council. So volatile were the times that Labor eventually got
the opportunity to govern in its own right, having won a lower house majority in
1947 and again in 1952 as the anti-Labor parties split over proposals to reform the
electoral system.13
These Labor governments did not last long. In 1949, the Legislative Council
blocked supply in protest at Labor’s policy of nationalising the private banks (the
federal Labor government had passed legislation to do this in 1947, only for it to
be overturned by the High Court). On the second occasion, the Labor Party itself
10 Holmes 1976.
11 Costar 2006, 248.
12 Costar 1999, 90–1.
13 Costar 2006, 235–8.
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Table 1 Party governments of Victoria 1909 to 2019
Party Premiers Duration of party government
Liberal (Deakinite) John Murray 8/1/1909 to 9/12/1913
William Watt
Labor George Elmslie 9/12/1913 to 22/12/1913
Liberal (Deakinite) William Watt 22/12/1913 to 21/3/1917
Alexander Peacock
Nationalist John Bowser 21/3/1917 to 18/7/1924
Harry Lawson
Alexander Peacock
Labor George Prendergast 18/7/1924 to 18/11/1924
Country/Nationalist John Allan 18/11/1924 to 20/5/1927
Labor Edmond Hogan 20/5/1927 to 22/11/1928
Nationalist William McPherson 22/11/1928 to 12/12/1928
Labor Edmond Hogan 12/12/1928 to 19/5/1932
United Australia Party Stanley Argyle 19/5/1932 to 2/4/1935
Country Albert Dunstan 2/4/1935 to 14/9/1943
Labor John Cain Sr 14/9/1943 to 18/9/1943
Country Albert Dunstan 18/9/1943 to 2/10/1945
Liberal Ian MacFarlan 2/10/1945 to 21/11/1945
Labor John Cain Sr 21/11/1945 to 20/11/1947
Liberal Thomas Hollway 20/11/1947 to 27/6/1950
Country John McDonald 27/6/1950 to 28/10/1952
Australian Politics and Policy
300
Party Premiers Duration of party government
Electoral Reform Thomas Hollway 28/10/1952 to 31/10/1952
Country John McDonald 31/10/1952 to 17/12/1952
Labor John Cain Sr 17/12/1952 to 7/6/1955
Liberal Henry Bolte 7/6/1955 to 8/4/1982
Rupert Hamer
Lindsay Thompson
Labor John Cain Jr 8/4/1982 to 6/10/1992
Joan Kirner
Liberal and National Jeffrey Kennett 6/10/1992 to 20/10/1999
Labor Steve Bracks 20/10/1999 to 2/12/2010
John Brumby
Liberal and National Edward (Ted) Baillieu 2/12/2010 to 4/12/2014
Denis Napthine
Labor Daniel Andrews 4/12/2014
Source: https://www.vec.vic.gov.au/Results/results-historical-vicpremiers.html
split amidst allegations of communist infiltration of the trade union movement and
claims that groups of Labor members recruited to win back communist unions
had instead started to turn on Labor members. The willingness of Daniel Mannix,
the Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, to encourage this anticommunist sentiment
within an overwhelmingly Catholic Labor membership added a sectarian element
to this internal upheaval.14
The impact of the split was devastating for the Victorian ALP. The collapse of the
state Labor government was followed by an electoral rout that began an unbroken
period from 1955 to 1982 in which the recently formed Liberal Party would be the
14 Murray 1970.
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party of government. For most of this time, the Liberal leader was the conservative
Henry Bolte (premier from 1955 to 1972) whose loathing of the left in Victorian
politics was matched by his disdain for the Country Party.
Modern Victorian politics
The Labor split in 1955 provided the opportunity for Bolte and the Liberal Party
to dominate state politics until the 1980s. It was this period that led to Victoria to
be described as ‘the jewel in the Liberal crown’. Bolte led a socially conservative
government. His retirement marked a shift towards a more progressive approach
as a new generation of urban moderates emerged within the ranks of the Liberal
Party. The most prominent of these was Rupert (‘Dick’) Hamer who, as premier,
led a government that set about undoing a raft of conservative policies put in place
by his predecessor.15 By 1981, however, Hamer had retired amidst a sense that the
Liberal Party had atrophied. In 1982, Labor, under the leadership of John Cain Jr,
was elected to government for the first time since 1952. A new era of Victorian
politics had begun.16
Labor’s success in 1982 showed that the consequences of the 1954–55 split had
finally run their course. In 1983, amidst a hail of rotten tomatoes, delegates from
the four unions that split from Labor in 1954 were re-admitted to the party, thereby
altering the party’s factional balance. It is interesting to note that Labor’s subsequent
strong record of electoral success in Victoria dates from the apparent resolution of
the split. Meanwhile, there was an end to another old enmity, this time on the part
of non-Labor politics. In 1990, and just before the government-changing election
in 1992, the Liberal and National parties signed a coalition agreement for the first
time.
In contrast to the volatility of the interwar years, and the Liberal dominance
from the 1950s, contemporary Victorian politics has seen government shared
between Labor and the Liberal–National Coalition. Between 1982 and 2018, Labor
exercised power between 1982 and 1992, 1999 and 2010, and from 2014. During
these terms in government, there were five premiers: John Cain (1982–91), Joan
Kirner (1991–2, and Victoria’s first female premier), Steve Bracks (1999–2008),
John Brumby (2008–10) and Daniel Andrews (2014–). The Liberal premiers were
Jeff Kennett (1992–9), Ted Baillieu (2010–12) and Denis Napthine (2012–14). The
Labor dominance over this period is a noteworthy feature; clearly Victoria is no
longer a Liberal jewel.
15 Rodan 2006.
16 Considine and Costar 1992.
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Table 2 General election statewide primary vote Legislative Assembly, Victoria
1955–2018
Election
year
Liberal %
(seats)
Country/National %
(seats)
ALP %
(seats)
Others %
(seats)
1955 37.8(34) 9.5(10) 32.5 (20) 19.9(2)
1958 37.1(39) 9.3(9) 37.7(18) 15.6(0)
1961 36.4(39) 7.1(9) 38.5(17) 17.9(1)
1964 39.6(38) 8.7(10) 36.2(18) 15.3(0)
1967 37.5(44) 8.6(12) 37.9(16) 15.9(1)
1970 36.7(42) 6.4(8) 41.4(22) 15.5(1)
1973 42.3(46) 5.9(8) 41.6(18) 10.0(1)
1976 46.1(52) 7.1(7) 42.2(21) 4.5(1)
1979 41.4(41) 5.6(8) 45.2(32) 7.5(0)
1982 38.3(24) 4.9(8) 50.1(49) 6.6(0)
1985 41.9(31) 7.3(10) 50.1(47) 0.8(0)
1988 40.5(33) 7.8(9) 46.5(46) 4.9(0)
1992 44.1(52) 7.8(9) 38.4(27) 9.5(0)
1996 43.9(49) 6.7(9) 43.1(29) 6.3(1)
1999 42.2(36) 4.8(7) 45.6(42) 7.2(3)
2002 33.9(17) 4.3(7) 47.9(62) 13.7(2)
2006 34.4(23) 5.1(9) 43.0(55) 17.3(1)
2010 38.0(35) 6.8(10) 36.2(43) 18.9 (0)
2014 36.8(30) 5.5(8) 38.1(47) 10.1 (3)
2018 30.4(21) 4.7(6) 42.8(55) 21.0(6)
Source: http://elections.uwa.edu.au/index.lasso
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Table 3 Legislative Council results 1961–2018
Election Liberal % (seats) Country % (seats) ALP % (seats) Others % (seats)
1961 37.9 (9) 6.2(4) 38.9(4) 17.0(0)
1964 40.1(9) 8.9(4) 35.4(4) 15.5(0)
1967 38.5(10) 9.5(4) 36.9(4) 15.1(0)
1970 37.6(10) 6.1(4) 42.0(4) 14.3(0)
1973 43.1(11) 6.4(3) 40.8(4) 9.7(0)
1976 48.3(15) 7.9(2) 42.6(5) 1.2(0)
1979 43.7(12) 5.8(2) 45.3(8) 4.9(0)
1982 39.2(9) 5.5(2) 49.5(11) 5.6(0)
1985 41.1(8) 6.6(3) 47.3(11) 4.8(0)
1988 43.5(10) 7.5(3) 48.1(9) 0.8(0)
1992 43.5(14) 8.7(3) 38.5(5) 9.9(0)
1996 43.8(14) 6.6(3) 40.5(5) 8.9(0)
1999 39.7(11) 7.3(3) 42.2(8) 10.5(0)
2002 34.5(3) 4.3(2) 47.5(17) 13.4(0)
2006(a) 34.5 (15) 4.4(2) 41.4(19) 18.6(4)
2010 43.1(18)(b) 35.3(16) 21.2(3)
2014 36.1(14)(b) 33.4(14) 29.3(10)
2018 29.4(11)(b) 39.2(18) 30.8(11)
Source: http://elections.uwa.edu.au/index.lasso.
(a) Proportional representation system commences
(b) Liberal and National joint ticket
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Constitutional reform
The resurgence of Victorian Labor was to have significant consequences for the
state’s constitution, with associated consequences for the electoral system and the
Legislative Council. In 2002, Labor won its largest ever lower house majority. In
addition to winning control of the Assembly, Labor also won a majority in the
Legislative Council. Labor had won the Council once before, in 1985, but the
overturning of a result in one seat by the Supreme Court and the Liberal victory in
the subsequent by-election denied Labor that majority after only a few months.17
This time there was no question about its majority and, in addition to being certain
about getting its legislation through the parliament without amendment, the Bracks
government now also had the power to reform the state constitution. At that time,
the state constitution could be altered by an Act of the parliament.
Armed with the recommendations of a constitutional convention that it had
commissioned as part of its agreement with rural independents who held the
balance of power after the 1999 election,18 the Bracks government introduced the
Constitution (Parliamentary Reform) Bill 2003 (Vic) to the parliament in 2003. The
reformed Victorian constitution is now the only Australian constitution to make
explicit reference to the position of premier and to note the subordination of the
governor to the premier unless the premier has lost the confidence of the Legislative
Assembly. The amended constitution reinforces the idea of the Assembly as the
house of government by providing that Appropriation Bills need only to pass the
lower house to become law, thereby explicitly removing the Legislative Council’s
previous power to block ‘supply’. The Council’s power to amend or reject all other
Bills remains, although the new constitution provides for a ‘Disputes Resolution’
mechanism where the two houses can’t agree on a Bill. It also allows the premier
to declare a Bill to be ‘Special’ in that its rejection by the upper house could be
the trigger for the premier to be able to advise the governor for the need to call an
early election. In another diminution of the power of the upper house, the amended
constitution provides for fixed four-year terms for both houses and that elections
for both houses be held simultaneously.19
The amended constitution states that the Legislative Assembly will consist of
single representatives from 88 electoral districts (the constitutional time-bomb of
a 44-all outcome at the conclusion of an election ticks away), and 40 Legislative
Council members to be elected from eight upper house electoral ‘Regions’ each
made up of 11 lower house districts. The amended constitution comprises a
number of ‘reinforced provisions’ which means that they can now only be altered
by way of a constitutional referendum.
17 Costar and Economou 1992, 251.
18 Victoria, Constitution Commission 2002.
19 Taylor 2006.
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Electoral systems and party systems
Victorian electoral laws were amended in 2002. They now require voter equality
across all districts and provide for re-districting to occur after every second
election, thus finally laying to rest that venerable controversy of rural malap-
portionment. The Legislative Assembly continues to utilise single-member districts
and the alternative vote (known colloquially as ‘preferential voting’). As the upper
house requirements clearly involve multi-member electorates given the changes
to the constitution, the single transferrable vote (STV) method of proportional
representation favoured in Australian upper house electoral systems now applies in
Victoria.
This has had consequences for the Victorian party system (see Tables 2 and 3).
Between 1955 and 2006 – the first state election to be held under the auspices of
the new constitution – Victorian election outcomes in both parliamentary houses
were monopolised by the Labor Party, the Liberal Party and the National (formerly
Country) Party with the occasional independent securing a seat or two in the
lower house.20 The new electoral arrangements for the Legislative Council were
predicated on the understanding that the upper house could only be effective as a
house of review provided it was not dominated by either Labor or the Coalition.
This objective has been achieved; since 2006 neither Labor nor the Coalition have
had an upper house majority, with the balance of power being exercised by an
increasingly diverse number of minor parties.
Of the parties that have held seats in the upper house since 2006, the Australian
Greens have been the most consistent performer. The rise of the Greens has been
another significant development in Victorian politics and has been reflected not
just in the party’s ability to win seats in the upper house but also its success in
winning seats in the Legislative Assembly. In 2010, the Greens won the lower house
seat of Melbourne and since then have secured other inner urban seats. The greatest
challenge from the Greens occurs in what used to be very safe Labor seats, but it
has also been the case that the Greens have won inner urban seats from the Liberal
Party as well.
The correlation between lower house districting and demographics indicate
that the Greens’ lower house success reflects changes to the population of inner
Melbourne. For much of the city’s history the inner north and west were dominated
by blue-collar electors voting for the Labor Party. In the post–Second World War
period this constituency was augmented by waves of migrants, many of whom were
housed in high-rise public housing blocks constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. By
the 1980s, the inner city was highly sought after by well-educated professionals
attracted to the employment opportunities arising from the transition of inner
Melbourne from industrial suburbs to hubs of post-industrial economic activity.
The rise of post-secondary education as a major component of the Victorian
20 Economou, Costar and Strangio 2003, 162–7.
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economy was also a factor, as many key education institutions leading this
development are based in or near the central business district.
Significant gentrification of the inner urban suburbs has created the conditions
for a Greens-voting constituency. Beyond the inner city the Greens vote falls away
and the party’s role in these lower house districts is confined to influencing the
outcome between the major parties by way of preference distribution. Notwith-
standing this, the Greens now rank alongside the major parties as participants in
the Legislative Assembly, thus providing grounds for describing Victorian politics
as a four-party system. This also has the potential to make for a very close contest
for the Assembly. In theory, single-member electoral systems should reward the
successful party or parties with a clear lower house majority. Since 1999, however,
Victoria has experienced minority government twice (1999 to 2002 and towards
the latter stages of the Coalition government between 2010 and 2014) and some
election outcomes have been very close.
The policy debate
Given the significant constitutional and administrative capacity state governments
have to make public policy, the list of potential policy controversies on the state
policy agenda is vast. However, in the case of Victoria, the policy record can be
usefully assessed under two broad headings: the provision of infrastructure (which
is of critical importance to the state’s approach to economic policy), and ‘social
policy’. In both cases, something of a major transition occurred in the Victorian
approach to both economic and social policy during the 1980s and 1990s. In the
case of infrastructure provision, Victoria enthusiastically embraced the neoliberal
argument about the desirability of a reduced role for government, particularly
in relation to the provision of services that could instead be provided by the
private sector. Social policy, meanwhile, underwent no less a significant change, the
consequence of which was to erase the state’s previous reputation for conservatism
and prohibition – an approach to policy that was known to an older generation of
Victorians as ‘wowserism’.21
Infrastructure, economy and the state sector
Historically, the public sector has been a major presence in Victoria’s economy.
Until the 1990s, the Victorian economy comprised the private sector operating with
or through major state corporations providing energy, fresh water, transport, port
facilities and financial services.
21 Dunstan 1974.
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The extent of this mixed economy was so renowned it was even recognised
in the USA. In 1934, the Melbourne-based head of car manufacturer General
Motors Holden, Sir Laurence Hartnett, visited Detroit to persuade the American
parent company General Motors Corporation (GMC) to support development of
an ‘Australian’ car. His first task was to explain to GMC president, Alfred Sloan, that
the state of Victoria was not a socialist state simply because ‘the government ran the
railways’.22
Given that the Labor Party had hardly ever been in government between 1856
and 1982, the development of the state’s extensive public infrastructure was not the
legacy of socialist ideology but, rather, liberal and conservative pragmatism.23 Put
simply, Victoria’s political leaders were not averse to the idea of creating a state
corporation to build or run something considered vital to the advancement of the
colony/state.
Consequently, the rise of Victoria as an industrial state was linked with the
preponderance of a small number of very large state corporations providing trans-
port (the Victorian Railways, especially under the leadership of Sir Harold Clapp),
energy (the State Electricity Commission of Victoria, SECV, under the direction of
Sir John Monash and then, in the 1960s, following the discovery of oil and gas in
Bass Strait, the Gas and Fuel Corporation), fresh water and the disposal of sewage
(The Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works), and financial services (The
State Savings Bank of Victoria). By the 1980s, the aforementioned corporations and
others such as the Port of Melbourne Authority, the Grains Elevator Board, and the
Country Roads Board were at the heart of the Victorian industrial and agricultural
economy. Given their responsibility to build infrastructure, they were also major
employers of labour.
Reducing the public sector: privatisation
By the 1980s, public and political attitudes towards the public sector began to shift.
Those corporations that had been at the centre of the development of Victoria as
a major manufacturing state were now being critically scrutinised. The fact that
they were monopolies did not sit well with emerging economic theory about the
need for competition. Their very bureaucratic method of operation was sometimes
interpreted as being impervious to the needs of customers, and their corporate
approach to planning had the unfortunate political consequence of them being
seen to be beyond political control.24 A new generation of politicians tended to
have a less benign view of these corporations than their predecessors, and, in
this environment, arguments about the need to break up large state corporations
22 Hartnett 1981.
23 Holmes, Halligan and Hay 1986, 26–7.
24 Gerritsen 1985; Rosenthal and Russ 1988.
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and allow a diversity of private players into the market resonated in the political
debate.25
The election of the Liberal–National coalition government headed by Jeff
Kennett in 1992 marked a period of intense privatisation in which few corporations
were spared, although it was also true that the previous Labor government had been
forced to sell the State Savings Bank and had started the disintegration of the SECV.
Some of this had been done in response to pressure coming from the federal
Labor government whose treasurer, Paul Keating, was an advocate of privatisation
as part of his commitment to economic reform. The Kennett government’s
extensive privatisation was described by some as being the product of ideology,
but the new government declared that it had been elected to deal with Victoria’s
burgeoning public sector debt and it was simply following through on its
commitment.26
The initial purpose of the privatisation was to address the budget deficit.
Receipts from the sale of public corporations went to retiring debt. Privatisation
also sought to reduce the size of the state’s public sector workforce. Commencing
with the SECV and extending to other corporations, the government’s enthusiasm
for this approach extended to other areas of policy including corrective services and
local government. The reform of local government was quite extensive and involved
a suspension of local government elections for a number of years. Other changes
resonated with the small government agenda, and included capping rate rises,
amalgamating councils and requiring councils to contract their service provision
functions out to private providers.27 This reform hit rural councils particularly
hard, and it was noticeable that a collapse in support for both the Liberal and
National parties in regional and rural districts contributed to the unexpected defeat
of the Kennett government in 1999.28
The state as co-ordinator
In the period between its re-election in 1996 and its defeat in 1999, the Kennett
government’s approach to the policy debate began to shift. Whereas debt retirement
was a primary objective in the previous electoral cycle, the government used its
second term to undertake some major public works. Arguably the most significant
of these was a major road construction project to connect various freeways by
tunnelling under previously sensitive locations such as the Royal Botanical Gardens
adjacent to the central business district. This project was constructed by a privately
owned corporation which was also able to charge tolls. The role of government
25 Woodward 1999.
26 Parkinson 2000.
27 Kiss 1999.
28 Woodward and Costar 2000.
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was basically that of co-ordinator and regulator of what was otherwise a private
construction program.
The ‘City-link’ project was the harbinger of a new approach to infrastructure
provision that was to be adopted by governments that succeeded the Kennett
administration. This included Labor governments, none of which reversed the
privatisations undertaken by Kennett with the exception of some rural and regional
passenger rail services. The Bracks and Brumby Labor governments developed
the concept of the ‘public–private partnership’ as the basis for constructing the
major ‘East-link’ tolled freeway between Ringwood and Frankston and a major
water desalination plant at Wonthaggi in south Gippsland. The Andrews Labor
government used receipts from the sale of the Port of Melbourne Corporation to
fund a major underground rail project and an underground connector for the West
Gate Freeway (another privately constructed road with tolls).
This by no means exhaustive list of infrastructure projects commissioned by
both Labor and Coalition governments provides an insight into contemporary
thinking about the role of government and the public sector in the state’s political
economy. The previous method of creating large statutory corporations to build
and run infrastructure has been replaced by a preference for private interests
undertaking construction and operation of roads, rail and ports. The state sector’s
role is to decide what projects will be undertaken and then establish regulatory
regimes by which the functions performed by private providers can be overseen. In
some instances statutory bodies will also ensure the compliance of private providers
in relation to meeting social obligations: energy companies, for example, are
overseen by energy industry regulators and consumer watchdogs. The role of the
state sector has moved towards co-ordination and regulation as well as assisting
ministerial departments to formulate policy advice to government. In this respect,
the state sector is still a vital component of Victoria’s political economy, notwith-
standing the extent of the privatisation that has occurred since the 1990s.
Social policy
The transition in policy approach overseen by successive Victorian governments
since the 1980s has been even more starkly evident in the realm of social policy. The
retirement of Liberal premier Henry Bolte in 1972 marked the turning point. Under
Bolte, Victoria had capital punishment; homosexuality and pregnancy terminations
were illegal (this led to a network of ‘backyard’ abortion providers which, in turn,
led to the corruption of sections of the police); prostitution was illegal; shops closed
at 5.30 pm and did not open on Sundays, restaurants were not permitted to sell
alcohol and hotels had to close by 10 pm. There was scant weekend trading, there
were few conservation constraints on developers, urban planning laws prohibited
residential development in the central business district, and the only gaming
permitted was that run by the Totalisator Agency Board and applied only to horse
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racing. Victorians who wished to partake of gaming machines (known colloquially
as ‘poker machines’ or ‘the pokies’) had to travel to NSW. These prohibitions
reinforced the notion of Victoria as a staid, conservative and prohibitionist state.
The term ‘wowser’ emerged to describe this conservative Victorian mindset.
The task of undoing the Bolte legacy began under his successor, Dick Hamer.
His government moved to solve the police corruption crisis by decriminalising
abortion. This government also put in place extensive urban and rural conservation
laws. It abolished capital punishment and decriminalised homosexuality. The Cain
Labor government legalised and regulated prostitution and began deregulating
liquor licensing laws in a bid to encourage a cafe approach to wining and dining
that was emerging from Melbourne’s large ethnic communities, thereby setting
Victoria on course to enjoy a tourism boom. The Kennett coalition government
issued an apology to the Stolen Generation in 1997. It also deregulated retail
trading hours and radically expanded the gaming industry to include poker
machines, and backed the development of a major casino complex on the southern
bank of the Yarra River, where factories and warehouses once stood. The Bracks
Labor government instituted a bill of rights, and the Brumby Labor government
oversaw the decriminalisation of abortion. The Andrews Labor government
committed Victoria to ambitious greenhouse gas emission reductions. In 2017,
it also oversaw the introduction of ‘dying with dignity’ laws, thereby permitting
euthanasia in certain circumstances.
Some of these reforms precipitated bitter political exchanges, as the state’s
conservative forces within the community, politics and some of the churches
maintained their opposition to abortion and euthanasia. Other reforms have been
the subject of ongoing debate about their social consequences. Gaming liberal-
isation has been the subject of intense criticism on the grounds that it has caused
unacceptable social consequences. Strong concerns have been expressed about the
link between excessive alcohol consumption and violence, as well as its impact
on road safety. It is the prerogative of government to respond to these concerns
and formulate policy accordingly, but the significance of the extent to which social
policy has changed since the 1980s cannot be denied. Victoria generally, and
Melbourne in particular, are very different places to what they were at the height
of the ‘wowser’ period under the auspices of the Liberal Party conservatives of the
Bolte era.
Conclusions
The government and politics of Victoria reflect both stability and significant
change. Stability is to be found in the basic institutions of government where, in the
aftermath of the Eureka rebellion, colonial and British political actors were quick
to institute a Westminster system of parliamentary government that continues to
this day. Modifications to the constitution occurred periodically, with arguably the
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most significant of these being the changes in 2003, although all they really did
was codify the core Westminster conventions that the lower house is the house of
government, the upper house is a house of review, and the governor acts on the
advice of the premier.
The significance of change is to be found in the state’s politics and, through
it, the policy debate. The three-way division of the party system after the First
World War led to political volatility and obsession with electoral laws. Planning
and development of the state was left to the major state corporations that delivered
transport, resources and energy and this was to be a feature of the Victorian state
sector until it was comprehensively dismantled by the Kennett government in the
1990s. In the meantime, the Labor split in the 1950s led to one-party government
in Victoria, as a particularly conservative Liberal Party secured a series of election
victories and found little opposition to its agenda from the Legislative Council.
Although the decline of the conservative hegemony started with generational
leadership change in the Liberal Party, the key moment was the election of a
Labor government in 1982. This was significant for two reasons: first, this election
marked the end of Liberal dominance of the state’s politics and the beginning
of a new era where government could be led by either Labor or the Liberals
and Nationals working in coalition. Second, the election of Victoria’s main social-
democratic party began the process of converting Victoria from the prohibitionist
conservatism of the Bolte era into a more cosmopolitan and socially progressive
community. The modern Liberal Party has aligned with this, and brought a
commitment to economic liberalisation.
Both Labor and the Coalition have assisted in this transformation of Victoria
into a post-industrial economy with a strong reputation for being socially progres-
sive and remarkably cohesive for a community with such a diversity of ethnic and
racial backgrounds. As with all policy debates, there have been disagreements on
various aspects, and challenges arise as to how to cope with the growth of the
Melbourne metropolis in particular. Despite the decline of manufacturing, the state
continues to be a major driver of the national economy, and the policy-making
process – based on an elected parliament and an extensive if transformed public
sector – has been at the centre of this. Victoria’s record is a confirmation of the
significance of politics, the making of policy, and the importance of state governance
in Australia’s federal system.
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Western Australia
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This chapter furnishes an overview of the political history of Western Australia
(WA), explores the state’s relationship to the federation and outlines its key con-
stitutional, political and electoral features. It is argued that while WA shares much
in common with its federal counterparts, there are several areas of difference that
continue to shape its relationship to the federation.
European settlement
Indigenous peoples inhabited the territory of what is now WA for many millennia
before the official establishment of the Swan River Colony, in June 1829, by British
legislation introduced the month prior. The British view of this land at that time
has been described as: an area ‘that had been known to the Europeans longer than
any other part of the continent and was the least wanted’.1 British settlement was
Miragliotta, Narelle, Sarah Murray and Justin Harbord (2019). Western Australia. In Peter J. Chen,
Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta
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ultimately a pre-emptive response to concerns about French colonial ambitions in
the western half of the continent.
The particular circumstances that led to the colony’s founding by the British
would shape its developmental arc for the first five decades of settlement. The
British showed little appetite to invest in the nascent colony, which hampered WA’s
economic growth for several decades and undermined the business case for self-
government.2 Moreover, well into the first half of the 1880s, there was little urgency
for responsible government among WA’s elites, who feared that mass enfranchise-
ment would weaken their privileged grip over colonial society.3
When WA did attain self-government, it did so a number of decades behind
the other original colonies. Self-government of the colony became effective from 21
October 1890, with the UK parliament’s enactment of the Western Australian Consti-
tution Act 1890 (UK), to which was scheduled the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) (CA).
The achievement of self-government was not without tribulation. On some
views, the colony could have asserted responsible government unilaterally; how-
ever, it opted to petition the Imperial parliament in order to ensure its control
over crown lands. Unlike its colonial counterparts, any declaration of responsible
government, while arguably constitutionally possible, did not come with an auto-
matic claim to unused crown lands. The Imperial powers reckoned that the small
size of the colony’s population, concentrated in the south-west corner, rendered it
inadequate to the task of managing the vast territory that it sought to govern. The
Imperial authorities also held a well-founded view that the colony could not be
trusted to respect the dignity and liberty of Indigenous peoples.4
For these reasons, the eventual grant of self-government by the Imperial
parliament was encumbered by several conditions: a nominated upper house,
constitutional protections for native inhabitants of the colony in the form of the
now redundant section 70,5 and retention of crown lands above the 26-degrees-
south line of latitude in the hands of the British government. While the com-
promises were reluctantly agreed to by the colony, the outcome was nevertheless
hailed as a triumph of ‘the cherished birthright of Englishmen’.6
2 Moon and Sharman 2003, 184.
3 Curthoys and Martens 2013, 130.
4 Martens 2016.
5 The British were under no illusions about the brutal conduct of many of the colonists towards
Indigenous people and sought to secure some protections for them when WA became
self-governing. This came in the form of section 70, which specified: ‘There shall be payable to
Her Majesty, in every year, out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund the sum of five thousand
pounds mentioned in Schedule C to this Act to be appropriated to the welfare of the Aboriginal
Natives, and expended in providing them with food and clothing when they would otherwise be
destitute, in promoting the education of Aboriginal children (including half-castes), and in
assisting generally to promote the preservation and wellbeing of the Aborigines.’ However, the
Imperial parliament’s commitment to the survival of section 70 was weak and by 1897 the
provision was radically amended. See Curthoys and Lydon 2016.
6 Martens 2016, 41.
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Federation
The elation of achieving self-government was, however, quickly overshadowed by
the inexorable march towards Federation. WA faced the spectre of having to
relinquish its newfound independence before it had a chance to exercise it fully.
Compounding WA’s apprehension was the fact that almost half of its revenue
was drawn from intercolonial tariffs. The new federal Constitution would make
trade, commerce and intercourse among the states ‘free’, thereby undercutting an
important revenue source for WA.7
WA did eventually vote to enter the federation, with the initiative obtaining
nearly a 70 per cent ‘yes’ vote on 31 July 1900. However, the question was only
presented to the people as a result of intervention by colonial authorities. In order
to counter the recalcitrance exhibited by WA’s political elite, colonial authorities
adopted a carrot and stick approach. The carrot took the form of a deal to address
the colony’s financial anxieties, while the stick was the threat to annexe the colony’s
lucrative goldfields.8
WA’s sluggish acceptance of its political fate meant that the vote on the question
of Federation occurred 22 days after the enactment of the Commonwealth of
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK), but in time for the commencement of
Federation on 1 January the following year. WA’s initial reticence is captured in the
preamble of the federal Constitution, which omits WA as one of the parties that
‘have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth’.
The state’s ambivalence towards the federation has remained a distinctive feature
of its history and its identity. Some regard WA’s tentativeness as pathological, with
one former state government minister arguing that one need only ‘[s]cratch a
Western Australian and you find a secessionist underneath’.9 At various points in
time, WA’s feelings of grievance have found expression in the call for secession.
The most serious of such efforts occurred in 1933, when WA, reeling from the
Great Depression, voted to secede from the federation. The plebiscite obtained over
50 per cent of the electorate’s support.10 While the government of the time, led by
Premier Collier, dutifully – if reluctantly – petitioned the Imperial parliament for
relief, its refusal to hear the matter led to the supplication being dropped.11 It was
the position of the Imperial parliament that it would be unconstitutional for the
state to secede without federal parliamentary support.12
7 Musgrave 2003.
8 Musgrave 2003.
9 Quoted in Taylor 2015, 2.
10 Besant 1990.
11 Bolton 1993.
12 Besant 1990.
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There have been intermittent calls for WA to consider its future outside of the
federation.13 While the political class have generally been careful not to utter the
‘s(ecession)’ word, they have come close at times. In 2015,14 the premier warned
that WA’s ‘future’ might not ‘lay with the rest of Australia in a financial or economic
sense’, with the state facing its ‘Boston tea party moment’.15
WA and the federation today
While WA’s testy relationship with the federation has led to it being labelled by
scholars as the ‘reluctant state’,16 others have questioned whether secessionist senti-
ments have ever truly reflected a genuine intention to renounce the federation.17
It is, perhaps, overly simplistic to interpret secession rhetoric as a quirk of WA’s
political culture or a provocation to extract concessions from the Commonwealth.
Such claims are better understood as an ‘expression of the powerlessness felt by the
residents’ who perceive themselves to be on the periphery of political power.18
Several factors conspire to fuel WA’s grievance. The first emerges from fiscal
demands arising from the state’s geography and demography. WA occupies 33 per
cent of the continent, covering a total area of 2.5 million square kilometres, with a
population of 2.47 million people. It is the second least densely populated region in
Australia, behind the Northern Territory.19 And while the majority of the population
is urbanised, 23 per cent of its residents are located in regional areas, in ‘some of the
least hospitable places on Earth’.20 This includes estimates of 12,000 people living in
274 remote Indigenous communities.21
WA’s nine regions are vital to the economic health of the state and the fed-
eration.22 In 2017–2018,23 for example, WA accounted for 42 per cent of Australia’s
merchandise exports, the bulk of which was generated from natural resources and
agricultural production derived from its regions.
13 Over the years, secessionist calls have emerged from several quarters. In the 1970s, mining
magnate Lang Hancock bankrolled the Westralian Secession Movement. More recently, in 2016,
the Western Australia Party was established for ‘the sole purpose of representing the people of
WA to get a better deal from Canberra’ (https://westernaustraliaparty.org.au/about-us).
14 This was not the first of such calls in recent times. In 2011, Norman Moore, then state minister
for the regions, proposed that ‘WA should give some thought to going it alone’ (Gallo 2011).
15 Burrell 2015.
16 Reid 1979; Zimmerman 2011.
17 Bolton 1993; Sharman 1993.
18 Hiller 1987; Sharman 1993.
19 ABS 2016.
20 CEDA 2016, 11.
21 Regional Services Reform Unit 2016.
22 CEDA 2016, 13.
23 Department of Jobs, Tourism, Science and Innovation 2019.
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However, the state’s size, population dispersion and the physical diversity of
its regions generate significant governance demands.24 In ‘lacking economies of
scale’, the regions present ‘multiple challenges, especially in terms of inadequate
infrastructure provision and service delivery’,25 that are not confronted by WA’s
counterparts to the same extent.26 The WA government must spend significantly
more per capita on delivering an average level of services to ensure that all Western
Australians enjoy a comparable standard of living to their counterparts across the
federation.27
The second factor that complicates WA’s relationship to the federation is the
‘tyranny of distance’. WA’s capital is closer to Jakarta than it is to Canberra, and
it does not share a time zone with any of its federal cousins. Easement of the
physical obstacles of distance from the eastern seaboard was slow to occur.28 While
contemporary innovations in communication and transportation have removed the
effects of geographic isolation to a great extent, the perception that remoteness
equates to political invisibility endures.
Pre-Federation WA politicians were aware of the challenges that distance would
present for the state’s visibility in the Commonwealth.29 Moreover, the usefulness
of the federal parliament for channelling the state’s grievances quickly proved
ineffectual. WA’s representation in the federal lower house was, as it is today,
diminutive (10 per cent of the total share) owing to its small population, while the
party politicisation of the Senate quickly extinguished its role as a genuine states’
chamber.
A third factor that challenges harmonious relations with the federation is
economic differences. From its inception, the structure of the WA economy was
24 Concerns about neglect of the regions led to the Royalties for Regions scheme in 2008. The
scheme was the result of a political bargain struck between the Nationals and the Barnett
Liberal government following the 2008 state election. Under the agreement, the Barnett
government agreed to transfer 25 per cent of all royalty payments to the state for reinvestment
into regional WA. The McGowan Labor government, elected in 2017, has retained the program
but capped annual spending at $1 billion. The McGowan government’s announcement followed
the conclusion of a special inquiry into the program which criticised it for operating outside of
the state’s budget and destabilising WA’s finances (McNeill 2018).
25 CEDA 2016, 24.
26 It was also attributed to longstanding tendencies towards ‘government driven development’, the
high point of which was the infamous ‘WA Inc.’ affair when the secretive and procedurally
suspect commercial activities of the Burke Labor government (1983–86) led to the loss of
hundreds of millions of dollars of WA taxpayers’ money. In its aftermath, the Richard Court
government embarked on reform of state utilities and government practices, ostensibly to
disrupt the longstanding public policy paradigm (Stone 1993).
27 CGC 2015, 3–4.
28 Moon and Sharman 2003, 203–4.
29 As one member of the WA parliament then opined: ‘Our only connection with the other
colonies is by the intervening stormy sea, and the distance from Albany to Adelaide is the same,
some 1150 miles … We shall be situated at such a distance from the seat of Government that I
do not think we can expect that consideration for our wants and requests which we would be
entitled to’ (Parker quoted in Bolton 1993).
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distinct from the more populous ‘manufacturing’ eastern states. WA’s economy has
depended heavily on exports, principally agricultural commodities and resources.
This has meant that economic decisions that benefit the eastern economies have not
always aligned with WA interests.
One of the earliest indications of how economic differences could prompt
a misalignment of policy preferences between WA and the federal government
occurred with the introduction of a federal tariff in 1902. While the tariff was a
boon for the eastern states, it represented a grave economic liability for the import-
dependent west.30
In more recent times, the federal government’s efforts to tax profits on non-
renewable resources reignited disaffection. The first iteration, the ill-fated Resource
Super Profit Tax (RSPT) proposed by the Rudd national government in 2010, was
perceived as imposing a disproportionate burden on the WA economy. As then-
Premier Colin Barnett argued:
With 65 per cent of this revenue coming from Western Australia, it was … an
attack on the mining industry and on our resource income base. People talk about
these resources belonging to all Australians. Well, constitutionally, they don’t. They
belong to the people of each state.31
The second coming of the mineral tax, the Minerals Resources Rent Tax, while
a watered-down version of the RSPT, was similarly unwelcomed by the WA govern-
ment. When the tax was finally implemented in 2012, the WA government increased
mining royalties, which miners could offset against the federal tax. This action
reduced the federal take of the tax by $160 million annually,32 thus prompting a
threat from the Commonwealth to withhold infrastructure funding from WA.33
The sense of disenfranchisement has been magnified by the belief that the
Commonwealth has exploited the state’s resource-rich economy without fair recom-
pense. The consequences of WA’s booming resource economy have collided with
fiscal equalisation arrangements that are slow to adjust to changes in the economic
fortunes of the states.
WA’s concerns assumed particular urgency when the Commonwealth Grants
Commission (CGC) recommended, in 2015, that WA’s share of Goods and Services
Tax (GST) revenue be reduced from 37 per cent of the per capita average to 30
per cent. The CGC justified its recommendation on the grounds that ‘Western
Australia can raise so much more per capita in mining royalties at average rates,
other things being equal … its capacity to raise revenue from most other tax
bases is also above average, implying it requires less GST’.34 However, the CGC’s
30 Musgrave 2003, 99.
31 Quoted in Kelly 2010
32 Ker 2011.
33 The federal mining tax was repealed in 2014.
34 CGC 2015.
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recommendation occurred at a time when WA’s economic fortunes were stalling
due to falling iron ore prices. The sense of grievance was intensified when the
Commonwealth sought to exploit the situation to compel WA to implement far
reaching reforms in exchange for financial relief.35
However, the source of much of WA’s disgruntlement can ultimately be traced to
the expansionist tendencies of the Commonwealth. Very quickly, it has been argued,
the federation collapsed into an arrangement that is more ‘centralised than was ever
envisaged or intended, indeed one of the most centralised of all true federations’.36
The failures of the original design, judgements of the High Court and the Com-
monwealth’s willingness to use its financial clout to encroach into state policy areas
has led to what one former premier has described as the ‘smothering of the states’.37
Constitutional overview
Prior to 1890, the colony was under British control, with a locally residing governor,
the first being Captain James Stirling. While it had a Legislative Council of 18 men,
of which six were appointed and the remainder elected, its enactments had to be
reserved for Her Majesty’s pleasure, and the extent of executive power forestalled
responsible government in the colony.
The enactment of the CA brought about a fully elected Legislative Assembly
and, initially, an appointed Legislative Council, which also became an elected body
in 1893, prior to the six-year limit allowed for by section 6 of the Act.38
Within a decade, amendments to the franchise and the Council and Assembly
were proposed by the colony’s first premier, Sir John Forrest. While initially taking
the form of amendments to the CA, it was eventually determined that a separate
and distinct constitutional enactment should be introduced.39 To this day, WA
35 Fenna 2015a. In 2018, the Morrison federal government announced a 70 per cent floor in the
GST dollar to begin in 2022–23, increasing to 75 per cent in 2025 (Laschon 2018). While the
WA treasurer, Ben Wyatt, welcomed the reform, he rejected that it was a ‘windfall’, reasoning
that ‘A windfall would suggest that WA had somehow won the lotto, got some money that it
doesn’t deserve or money unexpectedly that for some reason wasn’t, or shouldn’t have, come to
Western Australia’ (Perpitch and Laschon 2018).
36 Fenna 2015b.
37 Burrell 2018. It is important to note that WA’s constitutions, as with all of the original states,
retained their constitutional status post-Federation with sections 106–108 preserving state
constitutions, parliamentary powers and enactments, subject to the dictates of the Commonwealth
Constitution. However, several High Court judgements, in expanding the scope of the national
government’s policy competency, have largely eroded the sphere of the states’ activities.
38 Murray and Thomson 2013, 22.
39 While there are differing explanations for this departure from consolidating the amendments, it
is likely that it avoided the possible activation of the provision in the CA 1889 which potentially
required an absolute majority in both the Assembly and Council, rather than a simple majority,
for some amendments to the text of the CA 1889. For more, see Miragliotta 2003, 157; Murray
and Thomson 2013, 27–8.
Australian Politics and Policy
320
retains two unconsolidated constitutional enactments: the CA and the Constitution
Acts Amendment Act 1899 (WA).
A little over a century later, the state’s colonial apron strings were loosened
with the passage of the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth and UK). These dual enactments
meant that the British parliament no longer had legislative powers over the states,
repugnant legislative restrictions were removed and the avenue of appeal from the
state Supreme Courts to the Privy Council was abolished.
In 2015, the preamble to the CA was amended to ‘acknowledge the Aboriginal
people as the First People of Western Australia and traditional custodians of the
land’, followed by the statement that the WA parliament ‘seeks to effect a recon-
ciliation with the Aboriginal people of Western Australia’.
Key government institutions
The Australia Acts 1986, although releasing Imperial legislative control, retained the
role of the monarchy in the state governmental structure. The state governor was
‘Her Majesty’s representative’ (section 7[1]) although slight alterations were made
to the governor’s office and it was set out that advice to the monarch was to be
‘tendered by the Premier’ (section 7[5]).
The governor’s role includes ceremonial as well as constitutional functions,
such as assenting to legislation, proroguing parliament, issuing electoral writs,
chairing the Executive Council (which makes official governmental decisions) and
making governmental appointments.40 In almost all instances, the WA governor
acts on advice, unless rare circumstances arise to justify the exercise of the
governor’s reserve powers.
The present Assembly contains 59 members with a maximum four-year term,
and the Council has 36 members, drawn from six electorates, with a fixed four-year
term. The premier leads the party with a majority in the Assembly and presides over
ministerial decisions made by the Cabinet. There can be up to 17 state ministerial
positions, and one must be filled by a member of the Council.
The WA parliament has plenary legislative power to make ‘laws for the peace,
order and good government’ of the state,41 including the ability to enact extra-
territorial laws. While there are some express constitutional limits on its power
through the terms of the Commonwealth Constitution, the High Court of
Australia, since Federation, has also determined that some implied legislative limits
exist.42 Further, the CA includes restrictive procedures that seek to make it more
40 ‘Letters patent’ 1986.
41 CA, section 2(1).
42 These include intergovernmental immunity (Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal (NSW); ex parte
Defence House Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410) and the implied freedom of political
communication (Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; McCloy v
New South Wales (2015) 257 CLR 178).
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difficult for the parliament to enact or amend particular laws by standard legislative
procedures (Bills must be passed by absolute majorities or referendum, or both).
While such provisions will not always be binding on a later parliament and require
a suitably authoritative source to be so, they seek to apply to Bills that, for example,
abolish the Council or Assembly, alter the office of governor or seek to amend the
restrictive procedures themselves.
The state courts, comprised of the Supreme Court, the Magistrates Court, the
District Court, the Children’s Court and the Family Court, although not formally
independent from the legislative and executive arms, enjoy a de facto separation by
convention. This is also protected to an extent by the integrated court structure that
chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution contemplates for ‘courts of a State’
and by the constitutional role vested in the Supreme Court of WA by the CA in
section 73(6).43
Other governmental agencies, sometimes referred to as the fourth arm or
integrity arm, include the Corruption and Crime Commission, the Auditor-
General, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative Investigations (the
WA Ombudsman), the Commissioner for Public Sector Standards and the Office
of the Information Commissioner. These offices jointly comprise the ‘Integrity
Coordinating Group’ of WA.44
Electoral law
WA operates under the oldest electoral legislation in Australia, with the current
statute, the Electoral Act 1907 (WA), passed during the reign of Edward VII. While
many of the original provisions of the primary Act remain in force, it has been
significantly updated in response to changing societal and political norms (see
Appendix).
The franchise
The initial entitlement to vote in elections was based on a property franchise for
those electors over 21 years of age, with the result that mostly white males met the
qualification. While the property qualification was extinguished for the Assembly
by 1907, an indirect property privilege prevailed until 1923 in that voters with
property holdings in multiple electorates were entitled to vote in each of those
districts. The property franchise remained for the Council until 1962.45
Women were granted the vote in the Assembly in 1899, making WA second
only to South Australia (SA) to confer women’s suffrage. It was also the first state
to elect a woman to parliament: Edith Cowan in 1921. The extension of suffrage
43 Johnston 2010, 101.
44 Creyke 2012, 37.
45 Phillips 2013, 3–5.
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to Aboriginal people on fully equal terms was not achieved until 1962. Initially,
enrolment and voting were optional for Aboriginal electors, even though voting
was compulsory for non-Indigenous electors from 1936.
Fixed-term elections
Prior to the 2000s, the government had the power to call an election at any time of
their choosing, provided they did not exceed the maximum length of the term of
parliament. However, by 2011 a cross-party consensus that this privilege afforded
the government an unfair electoral advantage had emerged, leading to calls to
introduce fixed-term elections.46 Since this time, general elections have been held
every four years on the second Saturday in March.
Electoral boundaries and ‘one vote, one value’
Prior to 1947, decisions regarding the state’s electoral boundaries were subject
to ratification by parliament. However, the Electoral Distribution Act 1947 (WA)
changed this and formalised the criteria to be considered when determining
boundaries. This Act remained in force until the ‘one vote, one value’ reforms
were introduced in 2005, removing vote weighting in the Assembly by no longer
specifying the number of metropolitan and country districts.
The challenge of balancing geography and demography when drawing electoral
boundaries has been particularly contentious in WA, so much so that it was the
last state to remove the zonal system, whereby country electorates averaged half
the number of voters in metropolitan electorates. While this system was designed
to compensate remote and regional areas for the challenges afforded by distance,
it meant that country electorates could have 3–4 times fewer electors than
metropolitan counterparts.
The principle of ‘one vote, one value’ was eventually secured by the Gallop
Labor government with the passage of the Constitution and Electoral Amendment
Bill 2005 (WA). Prior to this time, Labor’s efforts to introduce ‘one vote, one value’
legislation had been unsuccessful because the conservative parties, the beneficiaries
of the zonal system, had enjoyed uninterrupted control of the Council and were
able to block such reforms.
In spite of this, WA electoral law continues to make allowances for larger
electorates in recognition of the challenges of representing such a broad area. A
large district allowance provides for districts larger than 100,000 square kilometres
to have a nominal increase in elector numbers based on 1.5 per cent of the area
46 Constitutionally, however, such a change to the law required absolute majorities of both houses
and a referendum. To get around these provisions, legislation was introduced that provided that,
for conjoint elections, there were set dates when the writs were to be issued. This achieved the
desired outcome without extinguishing the governor’s entitlement to prorogue or dissolve
parliament (Congdon 2013).
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of the district. Furthermore, such electorates are permitted to be more than 20
per cent lower than the average district allowance, compared to all other districts,
which must be within a 10 per cent tolerance.
Since 2005, the state’s electoral boundaries are determined by the three electoral
distribution commissioners: a current or former Supreme Court judge (chair), the
electoral commissioner and the government statistician.
Electoral systems
As is common to bicameral parliaments, WA’s two chambers are elected under
different electoral systems.
At the inception of responsible government, elections for the Assembly were
conducted under first-past-the-post (plurality), combined with single-member
electoral districts. In 1907, plurality was replaced with optional preferential voting
(OPV), making WA the first Australian jurisdiction to introduce this method. In
response to concerns from non-Labor parties about preference losses in three-
way electoral contests, full preferential voting was adopted in 1911.47 This system
remains in force today.
Elections for the Council occur under proportional representation using the
single transferrable vote (PR-STV), introduced in 1987.48 The present system
superseded the 1965 regime, comprised of two-person electorates with staggered
six-year terms, conducted under full preferential voting.49
Campaign finance and public funding
Campaign finance restrictions were initially introduced in WA in 1904, in the form
of election expenditure caps on candidates. But it was not until 1996 that a more
comprehensive scheme was adopted, with requirements for an annual disclosure of
donations and electoral expenditure by parties and associated entities. The current
disclosure threshold is $2,500.50
Public funding of elections was introduced in 2006. Under the provisions,
candidates can apply to be reimbursed for electoral expenditure they incurred if
they secured more than 4 per cent of first preference votes (at $1.92713 per vote as
at 1 July 2019).
47 Phillips 2013.
48 The original form of PR-STV used the ‘inclusive Gregory method’ to transfer unused ballot
papers, or a portion thereof, won by elected candidates. This was amended to the
‘weighted-inclusive Gregory method’ in order to address an anomaly where a transferred ballot
paper could potentially increase in value to more than one vote (Miragliotta 2002).
49 Phillips 2013.
50 In comparative terms, WA’s disclosure threshold as at 2019 is higher than most other
comparable jurisdictions except SA ($5,191) and the Commonwealth ($13,800).
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Parties and the party system
The core elements of WA’s modern party system had emerged by 1914. Prior to this
time, elections and parliament were largely the preserve of ‘notables’, who formed
loose groupings in parliament. The formation of the Australian Labor Party (Labor)
in 1902 radically altered this dynamic. Created to represent newly enfranchised
workers and unionists, Labor quickly developed into a disciplined electoral party,
enabling it to dominate the contest for government for much of the period until the
late 1950s.51
Labor’s organisational and political successes triggered the mobilisation of the
Liberal and National (formerly Country) parties. While a group claiming to
represent business interests used the ‘Liberal’ label in 1911, it was not until the
establishment of the federal Liberals in 1944 that the WA Liberals acquired the
organisational discipline to emerge as the major non-Labor rival. For much of the
period from the late 1950s until the 1980s,52 the Liberals dominated government,
although, since this time, they have alternated with Labor in office. In the nine
elections held since 1986, the Liberals have held government on four occasions, and
Labor five times.
While the Liberals were slow to institutionalise, the Nationals had established
robust organisational underpinnings by 1914. The party was able to leverage its
close relationship with rural interests, along with its organisational structures, to
become a competitive conservative party. However, similar to divisions of the
National Party elsewhere, the WA Nationals have been under intense pressure from
demographic changes, structural change to the economy, electoral reforms and
competitive pressures from the Liberals.53 At various times, this has led to internal
fracture and the existence of two separate rural parties in the state.54
Acrimony within the Nationals has also affected the party’s ties with the
Liberals. There have been two key inflection points in the relationship between
the conservative parties, the first of which was between 1978 and 1986, when
the coalition disbanded. The second, and present, opened up in 2006, when the
Nationals abandoned the coalition to pursue a looser post-election ‘partnership’
with the Liberals, in which they sought ministries and funding commitments in
exchange for supporting the Liberals in office. While some scholars have declared
the Nationals’ latest strategy a triumph,55 it is unclear whether this tactic will
ultimately be sufficient to save the party from demographic forces over which it has
no control.
Prior to the 1990s, the Council overwhelming favoured the election of members
from the three major party groupings, and the conservative parties more particularly.
51 de Garis 1991.
52 Black 1991.
53 Moon and Sharman 2003.
54 Gallop and Layman 1985.
55 Phillimore and Mahon 2015.
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Between 1911 and 1993, election of persons entirely unconnected to one of the
three longstanding party groupings was a novel occurrence. However, in the seven
elections held since 1993, 33 independents and non-major parties have gained
election. PR-STV is credited with facilitating the election of ‘other’ electoral actors
to the Council and breaking the almost exclusive monopoly held by the three oldest
parties in the chamber. The most successful of the newer entrants has been the WA
Greens, which elected its first member to the Council in 1993 and has managed to
elect between two and five members of the Council at every election since.
Conclusions
WA’s formative historical experiences, its economy and its geography have made it
a sometimes-disgruntled member of the federation. But WA has more in common,
politically and culturally, with other units within the federation than it does
differences. Its grievances have been fiscal, as against identity-based, with the result
that outpourings of disaffection have ebbed and flowed with prevailing economic
circumstances.56 These grievances aside, WA is an integral constitutive unit of the
federation.
Appendix: timeline of key changes to elections in WA since 1890
1890 Creation of Legislative Assembly (LA) with four-year terms. Members of
Legislative Council (LC) nominated by the governor until 1893. Plural voting
with property qualification.
1893 Voting extended to male British subjects over 21 years of age. Property
qualification continued. Optional enrolment.
1899 Adult suffrage. Women awarded the vote in LA.
1900 Payment of members and triennial terms.
1904 Plural voting abolished.
1907 Current Electoral Act passed. Preferential voting introduced.
1911 Full preferential voting introduced.
1919 Compulsory voting for the Assembly.
1920 Women became eligible to be MLAs.
1921 Edith Cowan elected as first woman in LA.
56 Lecours and Béland 2018.
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1922 Independent electoral distribution commissioners to determine electoral
boundaries. Decisions ratified by parliament.
1936 Compulsory voting introduced for LA.
1939 First parliamentary election with compulsory voting.
1947 New distribution legislation – three commissioners, country ‘vote-weighting’
and no ratification of decisions by parliament.
1954 Ruby Hutchison elected as first woman in LC.
1962 Voluntary enrolment and voting for Indigenous people. LC franchise
extended to include spouses, but property qualification remained. Women
gained the vote in the LC.
1963–64 Adult franchise introduced for the LC with removal of the property
qualification. Voting entitlements for both houses became identical.
Enrolment and voting for the LC made compulsory.
1970 Voting age reduced to 18 years.
1975 Restrictions on clergymen standing for election were abolished.
1978 Reduction in number of members of either house now only by referendum.
1980 First Indigenous MP – Ernie Bridge – elected, later became first Indigenous
minister.
1983 Joint enrolment procedure introduced for Commonwealth/state enrolment.
Enrolment and voting became compulsory for Indigenous people. Australian
citizenship became a requirement to enrol.
1987 WA Electoral Commission established. Four-year term for MPs. Multi-
member regions introduced in LC to replace provinces. LC voting changed
to PR-STV.
2000 Funding and disclosure law introduced. Party registration law introduced.
2005 One vote, one value. Distributions in Electoral Act.
2006 Nomination qualifications – citizenship. Overseas voting expanded.
Authorisation of online advertising.
2009 Itinerant voting introduced.
2011 Fixed election dates.
2016 Federal direct enrolment and update introduced. Internet voting for a limited
cohort of electors. Early voting – removal of reasons.
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As a place-based layer of government, local governments around the world are
diverse. They operate within and respond to unique regulatory contexts and
circumstances, and mould the socio-economic development of the places they
govern. Within Australia, the legislative foundations of local governments and their
characteristics, governance, funding and reform agendas differ across jurisdictions.
While this diversity makes it difficult to develop a shared understanding, a range of
common challenges shape local governance.
This chapter reviews some of the contemporary challenges facing Australian
local governments. It begins with a discussion of the legislative foundations and
selected characteristics of local governments across Australia, their governance and
funding, and recent reform agendas. Next, public service delivery is considered,
and the emergence of place shaping as a concept guiding local governments in
the delivery of public services is examined. The chapter then discusses a range
of challenges for local governments in meeting rising community expectations of
public services and an expanded service-delivery task. Frameworks and methods
for measuring local government service-delivery performance are then presented.
Ryan, Roberta, and Alex Lawrie (2019). Local government. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
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Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion applying the concept of public
value to the evolving service-delivery task of Australian local governments.
Local government and Australia’s system of government
Australia is a federation with three levels of government: Commonwealth (national),
state and territory (regional) and local governments. Australia’s system of local
government is mostly established through the separate constitutions of each state
and territory. There are, in effect, seven different systems across the country. Indeed,
local governments are often referred to as ‘creatures of state governments’.1
Unlike other countries, local governments are not recognised in Australia’s
national Constitution. A 1988 referendum to change this was defeated, and cam-
paigns for another referendum have not been successful.2 However, local gov-
ernments are still represented at Australia’s chief intergovernmental forum, the
Council of Australian Governments.3
Their legislative foundations mean local governments occupy a somewhat
tenuous position in the federation. Many of their powers and responsibilities are
subordinate to state and national governments, and there is often significant
overlap between their responsibilities and those of state governments. These
foundations also place a range of constraints on local government service delivery.
For instance, the validity of higher levels of government funding local government
service-delivery activities has been challenged in the High Court.
Number, size and type of local governments
Australia’s earliest local governments were established in Perth in 1838, Adelaide in
1840 and Sydney in 1842. These were incorporated to provide town improvement
services, such as street lighting, for early colonial capitals. Other local governments
started as collectives of ratepayers formed to provide services to their properties.4
Over the next 70 years, the number of local governments grew to over 1,000. Today,
there is just over half that number, although this often changes as local governments
are impacted by ongoing structural reform.5
Like Australia’s states and territories, the 537 local governments across the
country vary substantially in population size, land area and economic dominance.
The largest by population is Brisbane, with over 1.2 million residents, while the
smallest, in rural Western Australia (WA), has just a few thousand residents. The
largest by land area is East Pilbara in WA, which covers 380,000 square-kilometres,
1 Larcombe 1978; Stilwell and Troy 2000.
2 Stilwell and Troy 2000.
3 Phillimore and Fenna 2017.
4 Larcombe 1978.
5 Dollery and Grant 2010.
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while the smallest is Peppermint Grove, which covers just 1.5 square-kilometres at
the centre of Perth.6 Australia’s local governments employ almost 200,000 people;
around 100 of these councils are the largest or second largest employer in their local
area.7
Local governments across Australia are typically referred to as ‘councils’, ‘cities’
or ‘municipalities’ in urban areas, and ‘shires’ or ‘towns’ in rural and remote areas.
‘County councils’ are incorporations of two or more local governments established
to deliver services, such as water, across rural areas.8 The entire Australian land
mass is not covered by local government areas. Some remote ‘unincorporated’
areas are administered by state and territory governments. The Australian Capital
Territory – the seat of Australia’s national government – does not have a formal
system of local government, and local services are delivered by the territory
government.
Most capital city councils have their own legislation that provides expanded
powers for these local governments.9 For example, the City of Brisbane Act 2010
(Qld) allows the lord mayor to prepare a budget for approval by the elected council
and allows councillors to be assigned a portfolio such as transport or community
services. In contrast, in non-capital city councils, the general manager or chief
executive officer prepares the budget for approval by council. The City of Sydney
Act 1988 (NSW) establishes voting rights for central business district businesses,
whereas businesses in non-capital councils do not have voting rights.10
Functions and governance
The functions of Australia’s local governments have expanded in the postwar era to
include a more diverse and complex range of economic, social and environmental
services, such as child care and youth services, libraries and aquatic centres,
economic development, environmental management and community health.11
Local councils are governed by elected councillors, who form the official governing
body, and an operational executive, led by a general manager or CEO, responsible
for day-to-day functions such as corporate governance and finance, community
services, assets and engineering, and planning and environment. Councils have
a high degree of flexibility in the organisational structures they choose to adopt.
Whilst these executive portfolio areas are fairly common, they can differ between
councils.
The responsibilities of councillors and mayors differ across the states and
territories, depending on the legislation establishing the local government system
6 Australian Local Government Association 2018.
7 Ryan, Lawrie and Hastings 2014.
8 Larcombe 1978.
9 Larcombe 1978; Spearritt 2000.
10 Ng et al. 2017.
11 Australian Local Government Association 2018.
Local government
333
in each jurisdiction. Generally, councillors act as formal decision makers and
approve strategic plans, policies and budgets prepared by the executive. They are
also responsible for appointing and overseeing the performance of the general
manager/CEO in accordance with an employment contract.12 The mayor is
typically a ceremonial figure, although there are differences here too. For example,
mayors in Queensland are mostly directly elected and have wide powers to prepare
major policies and budgets. In contrast, many metropolitan mayors in New South
Wales (NSW) are indirectly elected and share responsibility for major policies and
budgets with councillors and general managers.13
Funding
Australia has a high level of vertical fiscal imbalance compared to other countries.14
This means the level of government that collects revenue to fund services is often
not the level responsible for delivering them.15 In Australia, the national govern-
ment collects the most revenue from taxation (over 70 per cent) but is responsible
for less than half (about 40 per cent) of all public sector expenditure on service
delivery.16 To remedy this situation, Australia uses a complex system of inter-
governmental transfers to reallocate national revenues to and between state,
territory and local governments.17 A formula of horizontal fiscal equalisation is
then used to ensure that, at least theoretically, all governments have the financial
means to provide similar levels of service to their communities.18
Local government is the most evenly matched level of government in Australia
in terms of the tax revenue it collects and the amount it spends on services.
However, local governments are increasingly handed ‘unfunded mandates’ as
higher levels of government transfer responsibility for service delivery to them
without transferring revenue or providing new revenue powers to fund these
services.19 Nationally, local governments collect about 3 per cent of all tax revenues
and are responsible for about 6 per cent of total public sector expenditure on
service delivery.20 Of the $17 billion in revenue they collect annually, property
rates account for about 40 per cent.21 Australia’s local governments hold around
$400 billion in assets and infrastructure.22 Housing and community amenities
(24 per cent), transport and communication (22.5 per cent) and general public
12 Office of Local Government n.d.
13 New South Wales Electoral Commission 2019.
14 OECD 2014.
15 Charbit 2006.
16 ABS 2018.
17 Phillimore and Fenna 2017.
18 Stilwell and Troy 2000.
19 Charbit 2006.
20 Australian Local Government Association 2018.
21 ABS 2018.
22 Australian Local Government Association 2018.
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services (17.2 per cent) are the main expenditure items, although the amount local
councils spend on each function varies depending on the different responsibilities
of councils in each state and territory.
Because property rates are their main revenue source and state governments
use different methods to calculate the land values on which property rates are
based, local government revenues vary substantially across Australia. For example,
South Australian local governments collect 60 per cent of their revenue from rates,
compared with around 15 per cent for the Northern Territory.23 Other major
revenue sources include fees and charges (such as parking fines and fees for lodging
development applications), rental income from properties and grants from other
levels of government.
Capital city councils that include central business districts also often have
higher land values, which means they collect more from rates than other councils
and can deliver more advanced services.24 For example, Brisbane City Council
operates one of Australia’s largest bus fleets, whereas state governments operate
buses in other jurisdictions.25 While own-source revenue (such as rates) comprises
up to 85 per cent of a local government’s revenue,26 this is less in rural areas where
rateable land values are often lower.
Local governments also receive annual and one-off grants from higher levels
of government. These grants typically make up a larger share of revenue for rural
local governments.27 A range of criteria are used to determine the grant amounts,
and the formula is often the subject of conflict. Annual grants are classed as general
purpose and can be used for whatever activities a council desires, while one-off
grants are typically for specific purposes and can only be spent on activities defined
by national or state and territory governments.
In recent decades, the amount of revenue Australia’s local governments can
raise from property rates has been capped by some state governments. This
increasingly common practice has been a subject of conflict between local and state
governments, and some local governments have been granted special exemptions.28
Reform
Reforms to Australia’s local government systems in recent decades have focused
largely on structural and governance issues, such as altering administrative boun-
daries, amending codes of conduct and land use planning decision making.29 For
example, in the 1990s, the Victorian government dismissed all local governments
23 Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal 2009.
24 Spearritt 2000.
25 Brisbane City Council 2019.
26 Productivity Commission 2017.
27 Worthington and Dollery 2000.
28 Worthington and Dollery 2000.
29 Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010; Nicholls 2017.
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in order to redraw boundaries and drastically reduce the number of local councils.
Voter discontent with the swiftness of these reforms became a major state election
issue, and the government was promptly voted out of office.30 Similarly, in 2008,
the Queensland government halved the number of local governments; several of
the amalgamated councils have since demerged. In 2015, the NSW government
sought to reduce the number of local governments, but the reform process was
incomplete, halted due to voter discontent, a change of state political leadership and
court challenges by local governments facing mergers.
The driving force behind these moves to structural reform has been largely
ideological, the notion being that smaller local governments are inefficient. There
is no Australian evidence to support this claim.31 The most recent reforms in NSW
and the pressure for reform in Tasmania have primarily been driven by the property
sector, which has argued that different planning rules in different local government
areas create additional red tape and inefficiency in the development processes.32
Larger local governments can promote strengthened strategic leadership capacity,33
but this is difficult to measure or realise at times.
With the exception of introducing rate capping in some jurisdictions, state
governments have generally shied away from reforms that deliver a fairer share of
revenue to local governments. A national review of the federation that considered
the distribution of revenue and expenses between levels of government also failed
to include any proposals that would rebalance tax revenues to match the increased
service-delivery responsibilities of local governments.34 The continual focus of state
governments on structural reform while ignoring the financial basis of local
government is a source of ongoing conflict in the Australian federation.35
Service delivery
One of the major advantages of local government is that ‘it allows public services
to be adjusted to suit local needs and preferences’.36 Ideally, local governments are
established so that ratepayers who pay for local services can decide on what services
they receive.
30 Burdess and O’Toole 2004.
31 Drew, Kortt and Dollery 2012.
32 Property Council of Australia n.d.
33 Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012.
34 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014.
35 Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010.
36 Watt 2006, 8.
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Local government and service delivery
Australia’s local governments have evolved beyond a narrow emphasis on ‘services
to property’ to promote the social, economic, environmental and cultural wellbeing
of the communities they govern. This has been a response to citizens’ rising
expectations of public services and the devolution of service-delivery tasks from
higher levels of government to local governments.37 At the same time, local
government services have become subject to increased regulatory requirements
from other levels of government, particularly in core areas such as asset manage-
ment, land use planning and community planning. The costs of providing and
maintaining services have also increased faster than revenue.
The net effect has been that local governments now provide a wider range
and higher standard of services, such as sporting, cultural and community care
facilities, under increasing regulatory and financial constraints. These issues have
all contributed to the vastly increased complexity of local service delivery.38
Recently, attempts have been made to make sense of this expanded and more
complex service-delivery task for contemporary local governments (see Table 1)
The ability to tailor services to meet local needs is one of the justifications
underpinning Australia’s more decentralised system of local government.39 This
justification references the principle of subsidiarity, which is concerned with
ensuring service delivery is assigned to the lowest level of government capable
of performing the task, unless allocating to a higher level would achieve greater
efficiency and effectiveness.40 Because Australia’s local governments are closest to
their communities, they have unique insight into local needs. They determine
service levels according to these needs as well as state, territory and national
regulatory and funding conditions. Therefore, in one way, local governments act
as subsidiary agents responsible for delivering services for state and territory
governments. Yet, in another way, they are also legal entities with elected political
bodies responsible for their communities. This creates a somewhat conflicted
relationship between local government and citizens: as well as being ‘voters’ and
‘ratepayers’, citizens are also ‘customers’.
The justification for local government has been questioned on the basis that,
in a globalising world, it is not possible to constitute a spatial community. Indeed,
commentators have pointed to vast differences between the colonial life that existed
when local government systems were established, and have argued that ‘advances
in modern communications made community governments based on the village
or suburb an outmoded entity’.41 Further, because many public services are now
delivered and funded directly or indirectly by other tiers of government as well
37 O’Connor 2017.
38 See Walker and Gray 2012.
39 Colebatch and Degeling 1986.
40 Follesdal 1998.
41 Chandler 2010, 10.
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Table 1 Typology of expanding local government services
Function Services and infrastructure
Economic and community
development
Operation of tourist centres and facilities
Provision of grants to local groups to provide
services
Events and promotions
Sustainable land use Development approvals
Building approval and certification
Management of public land
Protecting the environment Preventing pollution or restoring degraded
environments
Providing environmental programs
Strategic planning
Community services Library services
Community events
Aged care
Early childhood education and care
Public health and safety Waste collection and management
Water and sewerage services
Preparedness and response to natural disasters
Source: adapted from Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012, 6.
as private and non-government sectors, local government is often not the only
service-delivery agent in a particular area.
Other factors to consider when examining the evolving nature of local
government service delivery include:
• ‘Core’ local government functions: although these differ across jurisdictions, there
is an expectation local governments should provide core services to a minimum
standard before other tasks are considered. Examples of core services include
building approval and certification, waste collection and management, and
cultural and recreation services, such as libraries.
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• Services delivered in competition with other providers: for a range of reasons, local
governments choose to deliver services in competition with other providers.
Examples include child care, golf courses, caravan parks and commercial car
parks. These can also provide new revenue sources or generate additional
revenue.
• ‘Market gap’ services: particularly in rural areas, local governments often face
pressure to provide services that are economically unviable for the private
sector due to small population numbers, and there are no alternative providers.
Examples include medical clinics, aged care services and programs, airports,
saleyards, abattoirs and cemeteries.42
Local government and place shaping
Place shaping is a concept that illustrates the evolving role of local governments in
the context of citizens’ increased expectations of public services and an expanded
service-delivery task. Place shaping helps identify the special characteristics of
local places, such as neighbourhoods, so that action can be taken on economic,
social and environmental fronts to enhance the quality of these places and the life
of their people.43 It involves the creative use of power to promote the wellbeing
of a community, and may include building and shaping local identity, regulating
harmful and disruptive behaviours, and helping to resolve disagreements.44
The introduction of place-based community planning across Australia, such as
the Integrated Planning and Reporting framework in NSW, can be viewed as an
effort to help local governments reconcile competing service-delivery demands.45
Through place-based processes, local governments take a ‘whole of council – whole
of community’ view and perform a stronger role by engaging communities more
deliberatively in decisions about services, models of delivery and the inevitable
trade-offs required between community expectations and regulatory and funding
constraints. These processes not only shape what gets delivered but also educate
communities about the increasingly complex service-delivery task facing local
governments. Place-based processes appear to be changing community perceptions
of local government. For example, respondents to one survey identified place-based
planning for the future as one of the most important functions of local governments
in Australia.46 This represents a clear departure from historical perceptions of local
governments as providers of services to property.
42 Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012, 7.
43 McKinlay et al. 2011, 4; Rablen 2012, 303–5.
44 Lyons 2007, 3.
45 Office of Local Government n.d.
46 Ryan et al. 2015.
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Major challenges
In addition to the problems of a growing service-delivery task and stagnant revenue
bases, major challenges facing contemporary Australian local governments include
rising maintenance costs for ageing assets; shifting community needs and expec-
tations about the role of local government in responding to economic, social and
environmental problems; reluctance to change existing service-delivery models;
and increasingly fragmented, multi-sector, multi-level service-delivery governance
frameworks.47
Local government assets
Most local government assets are long lived and not traded in markets. Even though
these assets are crucial to the economic and social vitality and everyday functioning
of communities, there is a ‘massive backlog of new projects and maintenance
and upgrade projects’.48 A 2006 national study estimated the Australia-wide cost
of restoring local government infrastructure was between $12 billion and $15.3
billion.49 Comrie suggests that since asset lifespans are difficult to predict, there
may be ‘some uncertainty as to the reliability of local government expenses’.50
Indeed, there is evidence that the total operating expenses of Australia’s local
governments exceed their revenue and that the sector is in a net negative financial
position.51 This has led to observation by some that local government faces
worsening financial sustainability and the emergence of a massive infrastructure
backlog.52
Other factors that have raised interest in the financial capacity of local
governments to manage assets over recent decades include:
• an increased range of responsibilities and expenditure without growing
revenues as property rates are volatile and fluctuate with land valuations
• additional service needs in urban and coastal areas that are experiencing rapid
population growth, and financial challenges for rural local governments that
are experiencing population and revenue decline
• concern that local government assets are ageing and renewal expenditure is
not occurring at the rate necessary to maintain existing service levels, let alone
meet citizens’ rising expectations.53
47 See Walker and Gray 2012, 5.
48 Campbell 2011, 2.
49 Campbell 2011, 2.
50 Comrie 2013, 9–12.
51 Comrie 2013, 9–12.
52 Dollery, Goode and Grant 2010, 81.
53 Comrie 2013, 8.
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Changing expectations: adapting to a changing climate
Addressing the impacts of a changing climate requires action by all three levels of
government as well as partnerships with organisations and institutions outside of
government. In light of the recognised exposure of public assets and the community
to climate change risk, local governments face a rapidly expanding service-delivery
task, including:
• developing climate adaptation policy and planning for local government areas
and, where possible, for regions
• sustainable design and land use planning, including new standards for con-
struction and effective regulation
• contributing to the development of more resilient communities that can work
together to reduce their vulnerability to climate change and recover more
quickly from adverse events
• developing new models for water reuse and recycling and municipal solid waste
management
• protecting natural resources and increasing the resilience of local ecosystems
• incorporating public participation at all levels of climate change adaptation.54
However, a key challenge for Australian local governments is that they lack
the legal power and financial resources to fulfil this mandate effectively. With a
strong reliance on rates and user fees and charges, they do not have access to
the new revenue streams needed to carry out many of these tasks.55 Another
core local government service, land use planning, is also affected; it is difficult
to predict how climate change impacts will manifest on a local scale, and there
is ‘a lack of scientific information at a scale relevant to inform local planning’.56
Therefore, effectively adapting to and mitigating climate change may appear beyond
the existing capacities of local government, particularly in rural and remote
Australia.57
However, a number of useful models are emerging to assist local governments
to address service-delivery challenges arising from climate change. Recently,
international networks, such as the C40 and Resilient Cities networks, have formed
to build local capacity and drive action by facilitating knowledge exchange.
Moloney and Fünfgeld also describe the Climate Change Alliances that have
emerged in Victoria as good examples of local governments demonstrating their
capacity to respond to climate change in the absence of clear direction and support
from state and national governments.58 Serrao-Neumann et al. also discuss three
Australian local government-led public participation initiatives and note that it is
54 Based on: Preston and Scott 2012; Moloney and Fünfgeld 2015; Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015.
55 Preston and Scott 2012, 14.
56 Baker et al. 2012, 135.
57 Baker et al. 2012, 128.
58 Moloney and Fünfgeld, 2015.
Local government
341
important that local governments work to ensure responsibility for climate change
adaptation is shared between the public and private sectors, and communities.59
Reluctance to change service-delivery models
Local governments design services to meet local needs. However, sometimes there
can be a reluctance to change service-delivery models. The dominance of different
functions performed by local governments across Australia’s states and territories
also influences their capacity to alter service delivery models. For instance, social
services are often amenable to delivery by non-government providers, while major
infrastructure is increasingly provided through public–private partnership (PPP)
models. The way services have been delivered in the past is a strong predictor of
how they will be delivered in the future. There is often considerable reluctance to
change how things are done due to ‘the uncertainty and management structure
costs incurred with a switch of models’.60
Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock suggest that ‘in complex and uncertain situations
organizational inertia and incrementalism may limit local public officials’ ability to
depart radically from past arrangements’.61 This could lead risk-averse managers to
prefer the maintenance of existing service-delivery models over potentially superior,
but uncertain, alternatives.
Other factors that may contribute to resistance to change in service delivery
include:
• concern about the costs associated with change, e.g. the fear that costs of
finding new vendors could outweigh costs involved in managing existing
contracts
• governance structures and skills, e.g. the structures and skills needed to manage
in-house service production can be quite different from those needed to contract
outside vendors
• specific jurisdictional characteristics, such as management capacity (e.g. for
evaluation), management structures (especially the relationship between polit-
icians and administrators) and the competitiveness of the market.62
Therefore, when analysing local government service-delivery models, it is wise to
consider the history of services in a locality and the path dependency of service-
delivery models, alongside the attitudes of public officials.
59 Serrao-Neumann et al. 2015.
60 Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008, 48.
61 Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008.
62 Lamothe, Lamothe and Feiock 2008, 28–34.
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Fragmented governance: working in partnership
Partnerships between government and the non-government sector are not new;
they stretch back to the local governments of the colonial era.63 However, the
notion of working in partnership has received growing criticism over the last
couple of decades following widespread outsourcing of service delivery to private
and non-government organisations. While persuasive arguments can be identified
both ‘for and against the private provision of public infrastructure in contemporary
local government’,64 concerns have been raised about whether the emphasis on
partnership privileges partners over the wider community.65
Local governments have pursued three common responses to privatisation:
• Hollowing out: declines in revenues and reductions in intergovernmental
transfers have forced local governments to ‘hollow out’ their services by
reducing service levels, outsourcing core service obligations through PPPs and
increasing user fees.
• Riding the wave: some local governments use privatisation as a two-edged sword,
harnessing the market towards public ends. As services are contracted out, local
governments create markets for public services by allowing competitive bidding
to drive down service costs while maintaining quality for ratepayers.
• Pushing back: often encouraged by citizen action, some local governments
have pushed back against pressures to cut or privatise services. This has led
to initiatives such as establishing multi-sector coalitions of citizens, non-profit
organisations and government to drive service delivery, particularly in the areas
of housing and economic development.66
Flinders has analysed local government PPPs in the UK, and suggests they
‘raise a host of political issues and tensions that have largely been overlooked’. These
include:
• Balancing efficiency and flexibility: PPP projects adopt a ‘buy now, pay later’
approach, creating issues for the policy flexibility of future local governments,
which are constrained by the need to service payments for contracts entered
into by previous governments.
• Failure to address core risks: PPPs do not solve the problems of capital-intensive
service delivery as they focus more on costs and do little to address underlying
revenue issues. Therefore, the risk of revenues not matching expenses stays with
government.
• Complex, delegated governance: when service delivery is contracted out, it can
confuse the public as to who is responsible. There can also be confusion within
63 Larcombe 1978.
64 Cannadi and Dollery 2005, 116.
65 Rees, Mullins and Bovaird 2012.
66 Warner and Clifton 2013, 52–7.
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government when authority for decision making and managing expenditure is
devolved to non-elected PPPs.67
Improving outcomes for local communities
A core tenet of place shaping is a strong focus on improving economic, environ-
mental and social wellbeing. New ways of managing the performance of local
governments in delivering these outcomes have also been introduced as part of
place-based planning processes.68 The core logic of performance management is
that organisations and managers are given targets derived from objectives, such as
promoting community wellbeing, and ‘instruments of authority or incentive’ are
used to encourage staff to achieve or exceed these targets.69
However, while performance management systems need to connect to penalties
and incentives to ensure targets affect behaviour, they must also be designed in
a way that does not crowd out public interest motivations by promoting ‘gaming
and cheating behaviours’.70 This requires constant care and attention, including
establishing clear links between measures, penalties and incentives as well as regular
adjustments to ensure targets reflect community wellbeing.71
Aligning local government performance and community expectations
Citizen expectations of performance influence their satisfaction with and choice
of services as well as their political voice, including who they will vote for.
Expectations can be defined as ‘judgements of what individuals or groups think
will or should happen under particular circumstances’.72 These include expectations
that decision-making processes will attempt to maximise expected utility, and
citizen views of reasonable or desirable levels of service performance. Community
expectations and judgements of local government service delivery are influenced
by factors such as:
• whether there are other agencies available to provide a service, or whether
council is the only option
• the demographics of the community
• the geography of the area
• the community’s willingness to pay higher rates to get more services from the
local council
• the presence of a strong local business lobby
67 Flinders 2005, 224–31.
68 Office of Local Government n.d.
69 Pollitt 2013, 347.
70 Pollitt 2013, 358.
71 Ryan and Drew 2019.
72 James 2011, 1420–1.
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• proximity to major towns (in the case of smaller settlements) where services
can more easily be accessed.73
According to James, the provision of performance information by local
governments affects citizen expectations of and satisfaction with local government
performance: ‘Information is valuable because it helps them exercise choice as
users of services through knowledge of what they expect to receive’.74 Community
satisfaction surveys are one way Australian local governments determine citizens’
expectations and assess performance. Typically, these surveys ask ratepayers to
indicate how important each service is to them, their satisfaction with what has
been delivered and what they feel needs improving.75
Community satisfaction surveys have become powerful tools to examine and
communicate citizens’ expectations in terms of service delivery and the
community’s judgement about performance. They help local governments to
identify gaps between expectations and performance and highlight areas where
performance improvement is needed. Increasingly, the findings of these surveys
form the basis of local government annual reports and are being fed into major
whole-of-organisation service delivery review processes.76
Conclusions: a public value approach to local government
Australia’s local governments are increasingly important to the proper function of
economies, communities and environments across the country. This is is reflected
in the growing diversity of their legal foundations, characteristics, governing
arrangements and funding. While recent reform agendas have focused more on
structural and monetary outcomes, the introduction of community strategic
planning, with place shaping and performance management as guiding principles,
is an exciting development that reflects the evolved role of local governments in
contemporary Australia society.
As local governments assume a greater role in society, beyond services to
property, they must strive to meet rising community expectations in increasingly
constrained and layered service-delivery contexts. This requires new frameworks
to guide their activities. Discussion of ‘public value’ has been widespread in public
policy since Mark Moore developed the conceptual framework for it in 1995.77
There is strong support for public value as a guiding principle for contemporary
local governments because it is seen as enhancing service-delivery outcomes.78
73 Independent Local Government Review Panel 2012, 6.
74 James 2011, 1431.
75 Morton Consulting 2014.
76 Ryan and Hunting 2015.
77 Alford and O’Flynn 2009; Williams and Shearer 2011.
78 See Benington 2009.
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For instance, Stoker suggests a public value style is well suited to fragmented
governance systems in the sense that ‘it bases its practice in the systems of dialogue
and exchange that characterize networked governance’.79 The public value frame-
work requires public sector managers to:
• aim to create something that is substantively valuable – that is, to constitute
public value
• be legitimate and politically sustainable, in the sense that they attract enough
ongoing support and resources from the authorising environment
• be operationally and administratively feasible, drawing on available organis-
ational and external capabilities.80
In contrast to the private sector, which can focus solely on monetary outcomes
and creating value for private shareholders, public value emphasises a much
broader range of activities valued by the public. The concept requires public
managers to search for and identify economic, social and environmental goals
valued by citizens, such as climate change adaptation. This necessitates constant
engagement with communities and stakeholders, as well as greater recognition
of the legitimacy of a wider range of stakeholders in realising these goals. For
instance, procurement processes that adopt a public value orientation require an
open-minded approach to identifying the best supplier for a service, regardless of
whether they are public, private and/or non-government providers. This means
that local governments must remain constantly attuned to public preferences and
integrate these into their service-delivery activities.81
Public value requires commitment to new goals and ways of working that are
more demanding than those that existed when local governments were established
in the colonial era. As the role of Australian local governments has expanded to
include services to people, they have begun moving down the public value pathway,
using place-based planning and working with communities and stakeholders to
identify broader goals and ways of achieving them. However, a more ambitious
reform agenda is required to build the regulatory, financial, human and technical
capabilities that contemporary local governments need to deliver on this commit-
ment. This is the major challenge facing modern Australian local government.
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Gender and sexuality in Australian
politics
Merrindahl Andrew
Key terms/names
backlash, bodies, institutions, leadership, numerical representation, parties, public/
private divide, quotas, substantive representation, suffrage
Gender pervades social and political life. It is impossible to function in the world
without using gendered categories and concepts and impossible to avoid gender roles,
whether one ends up conforming to or resisting them – or, as is more likely, doing
a complex mixture of both. Gender is one of the perpetually unresolved matters of
politics; woven into power structures but continually challenged, gender shapes many
of the most fraught and controversial political issues, such as reproductive rights,
welfare, violence and poverty. For feminists and their allies, gender politics offers the
hope of transformation and a centuries-long record of progress towards equality.
Over the last half-century, sexuality and gender diversity have increasingly
become topics of contention, with moves to end discrimination and promote
inclusiveness met by intensifying attempts at conservative repression. Lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ+) people’s rights and women’s
rights are framed as threatening and, at times, as foreign agendas, strengthening
neo-traditional sexual and gender diversity politics within nationalist political
movements.1 In Australia, LGBTIQ+ issues have become more prominent due to
Andrew, Merrindahl (2019). Gender and sexuality in Australian politics. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas
Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and
Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
1 Altman and Symons 2016.
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conflict over marriage equality and contestation about the place of sexual and
gender diversity education in schools.2
This chapter discusses the different ways gender and sexuality are manifested
in Australian politics, and the key concepts mobilised by scholars and advocates
working on issues of gender and sexuality. It begins with the ways feminist and
queer scholars have questioned definitions of ‘the political’ that rely on a gendered
view of the public/private divide. The second part of the chapter focuses on political
participation, outlining social movements that have put issues of gender and
sexuality on the agenda, exploring the attainment of voting rights and considering
gendered patterns of voting. The third section explains how powerful norms and
ideas about leadership are gendered and sexualised, and the fourth addresses
institutions, both in terms of the gendered nature of political institutions and
feminist institution-building. The fifth part focuses on representation in both its
numerical and substantive forms, outlining the representation of women and
LGBTIQ+ people in Australian parliaments and exploring the role of political
parties and quotas. The final section of the chapter discusses media, backlash and
social change in the area of gender and politics.3
Expanding politics: questioning ‘normal’
Politics has conventionally been viewed as being about government and the public.
But politics can also be defined in terms of power. Applying this broader view
of politics, we can see that the apparently natural division of public and private
subordinates women and children. In liberal political theory, the division between
state and civil society (public and private) is established through a fraternal social
contract that claims to free individuals from traditional hierarchies.4 As Carole
Pateman and other feminist scholars have shown, however, this social contract
is based on a concealed ‘sexual contract’ in which the individual is implicitly
understood as a man who is the head of his household, with women and children
subsumed within the family – the private sphere, where men can do what they
wish.5 As Pateman argues, ‘the doctrine of “separate but equal”, and the ostensible
individualism and egalitarianism of liberal theory, obscure the patriarchal reality of
a social structure of inequality and the domination of women by men’.6
2 Williams and Sawer 2018.
3 At places throughout this chapter I use the terms ‘men’ and ‘women’ in a simplistic, binary way. I
acknowledge that this is not an accurate way to encompass differences in gender and that it excludes
people who are gender diverse. My use of these terms in this way reflects the fact that much of the
research I am summarising in the field of politics, as in scholarship generally, employs this model of
gender, and I acknowledge the value of scholarship that tries to move beyond this binary.
4 Pateman 1989, 118–40.
5 Celis et al. 2013, 6; Pateman 1989.
6 Pateman 1989, 120.
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The identification of the family with the private sphere has made caring labour
invisible and undermined women’s participation by associating the private with
feminised and stigmatised qualities such as emotion, irrationality and the body.
As politics is typically identified as being related to the state, some things are
seen as being more closely related to politics than others. In particular, bodies,
reproduction, sex and emotion are often seen as existing outside the state and as
feminine, compared with institutions and rules, which are considered to be at the
centre of the state and to be masculine.
This pattern has severely constrained attempts to address rights violations,
including violence against women and children. In feminist approaches to politics,
there is an attempt to question this division and challenge claims of equality,
while also exploring the private as a site for new forms of politics based on care
and dialogue. A major contribution of feminist and queer scholarship has been
challenging these presumptions about what ‘the political’ is.7
These challenges have expanded the discipline of political science to consider
topics such as what citizenship would look like if it was truly inclusive of women,
dependence and care responsibilities, performance and appearance, and voice and
interruption. However, much political science scholarship continues to disregard
gender and sexuality (as well as race, class, disability and other factors)8 in a way
that perpetuates the centring of white men’s experiences as ‘normal’ and ‘others’ as
aberrant or exotic.9
While gender remains important in political scholarship and practice, there
has been a strong critique of the binary and essentialist way gender terms and
categories are used. Scholars have sought to deconstruct gender, going beyond even
the sex/gender distinction (sex as biological fact, gender as social construction) to
focus on how power relations produce gendered subjects.10 This project, sometimes
called ‘queering’, has challenged not only patriarchal presumptions but also some of
the categories on which feminists have tended to rely, such as women/men.
At the same time, the hegemonic nature of feminism, and what it includes or
excludes, has been criticised. This has involved challenging the concept of ‘women’
as a unified category and recognising that gender is always intertwined with Abor-
iginality, race, sexuality, dis/ability, class, cultural background, migration status and
other identity factors.
As well as questioning what is included in ‘politics’, it is worth considering
the boundary drawn around Australian politics. Much of what is discussed in this
chapter applies also in many other countries. Developments in gender, sexuality and
politics are occurring at transnational levels, especially through online communi-
cations and communities, international networks and cultures, and migration.
7 Smith and Lee 2015, 55.
8 Kantola and Lombardo 2017, 1–17.
9 Celis et al. 2013, 2.
10 Smith and Lee 2015.
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The focus on ‘Australian’ also reflects current political power and the legacies
of colonisation. Colonisation has significant gender and sexuality dimensions,
including the disruption of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander gender roles and
norms, colonial laws regulating sexuality, sexual violence and servitude, and the
gendered impacts of child removal – together with concerted resistance. The legal
and cultural power structures on which the Australian state was founded continue
to exist, meaning that Australian politics is not culturally or linguistically neutral
but distinctively British – a situation that is variously endured, contested and
accommodated by people from other backgrounds.
A body of scholarship and activism is now concerned with Indigenous and
decolonising perspectives on feminism, which call on participants to reflect on
their own situatedness within systems of power. These perspectives identify and
challenge the unearned privileges of whiteness, rather than reproducing a
presumed neutral or universal conception of womanhood, which, in reality, has
been derived from white women’s experiences and viewpoints.11 They also
highlight problems in the feminist critique of the public/private divide, in that
this divide is shown to obscure the existence of racialised women who are denied
access to the liberal private sphere – a denial played out in contemporary politics
through the removal of children from Black and Indigenous mothers. Building on
this understanding, Indigenous and decolonising perspectives on feminism engage
in bringing to light the violence upon which the liberal social-sexual contract is
based and creating new modes of politics and governance with care at the centre.
In terms of research practices, the development of feminist research ethics
also requires attention to the social position of the knowledge producer and the
potential for relationships and care between the people involved, and exploring
alternative modes of knowledge beyond the abstract and individualised.12 Feminist
research also includes epistemological shifts towards valuing the knowledge of
racialised women, including art, storytelling, music and dance, approaching this
knowledge through dialogue to create new ways of speaking about and engaging in
the political.
Political participation
Gender is an issue because feminists and their allies have made it so. The reason
they have done so is that gender inequality and gender norms have enormous
impacts on individuals and communities, including on people’s power and rights,
practical circumstances (employment, income, education), safety and access to
decision making.13 The same is true of sexual and gender diversity. Without lesbian
11 Moreton-Robinson 2000; Motta and Seppälä 2016.
12 Ackerly and True 2008.
13 Australian Human Rights Commission 2018; Celis et al. 2013.
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and gay liberation movements and the expanding mobilisation of LGBTIQ+ people
these issues would not be visible or addressed within politics or political science.
Feminist and LGBTIQ+ movements in Australia have been responsible for
expanding civil and political rights, raising new issues for consideration within
formal politics, achieving reforms and building new organisational forms.
In Australia, the mainstream (white) story of the women’s movement has its
roots in the struggles surrounding the vote, responsibility for children and military
conscription that took place towards the end of the 19th century and in the early
20th century.14 It is important to acknowledge that the movement was created
within a colonial context and carried ideas of progress that were embedded in
colonialism – an intertwined history that is now the subject of interventions from
Indigenous and decolonial feminisms.15
In the UK, USA, Australia and western Europe, these earlier mobilisations are
often called the ‘first wave’. The ‘second wave’ of feminist mobilisations occurred in
the same countries from the 1960s until roughly the 1980s.16 The ‘waves’ metaphor
is useful in that it identifies highly visible surges of mobilisation, but it can be
misleading in that it obscures the less visible work done ‘in between the waves’
– which includes policy advocacy, work within institutions, institution building,
community building, informal networks and artistic affinities.17
The ‘first wave’ women’s movements were largely white, heterosexual and
middle/upper class, oriented towards experiences of womanhood that excluded
the issues faced by other women.18 As women’s liberation and gay and lesbian
rights movements mobilised on larger scales from the 1960s onwards, the groups
seen as central to the movements continued to be those that were comprised of
white middle/upper class people. However, alongside these movements have been
a range of other mobilisations, including Aboriginal women’s collective efforts for
rights and wellbeing, separate from the feminist movement,19 women’s mobilisation
within trade unions,20 white working-class Marxist-socialist feminist movements,
human rights activism by and for women with disabilities,21 and migrant and
refugee women’s mobilisations and community building.22
While the account given here centres on the gender dimension of the women’s
movement and other movements, this is not to say that gender (or at least gender
as understood by those in the ‘mainstream’ of the women’s movement) is, in reality,
the most salient feature or ‘axis’ of oppression/privilege for the people involved.
14 Andrew 2008.
15 If this was written by Aboriginal women, the story of women’s politics and feminist movements
would undoubtedly be different.
16 van Acker 1999, 7.
17 Katzenstein 1990; Staggenborg and Taylor 2005.
18 van Acker 1999, 7.
19 Behrendt 1993.
20 Francis 2014.
21 Henningham 2014, 157–61.
22 Pallotta-Chiarolli 1998.
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Indigenous and decolonising feminisms are among those approaches bringing
other dimensions of oppression and privilege to the fore.
The gay and lesbian rights movement, which evolved into the LGBTIQ+ rights
movement,23 has successfully achieved legal decriminalisation of homosexuality in
all Australian states and territories (from South Australia [SA] in 1975 to Tasmania
in 1997).24 LGBTIQ+ communities have mobilised cultural power through events
such as Mardi Gras and popular culture expressions of sexuality and gender
diversity, many of which are international in nature. As in other countries, lesbian
and gay groups created community responses to HIV/AIDS that challenged the
state’s neglect of lesbian and gay lives.25 Marriage equality (achieved in 2017) has
been the most notable recent campaign in relation to sexual and gender diversity.
Another important focus of contestation has been Safe Schools – a national
program aiming to eliminate homophobic bullying in schools and create safe
schooling environments.
Voting rights
As we have seen above, there are various forms of participation outside of formal
politics that are particularly relevant for people who are marginalised in or
excluded from formal politics. In systems of electoral democracy such as Australia,
however, voting is seen as the foundational form of participation.
The Australasian colonies were among the first jurisdictions worldwide to
introduce universal white male suffrage: the right of all white men aged 21 and over
regardless of class or property to vote.26 Women (and, in some states, Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander men) were excluded regardless of property. Queensland
and Western Australia explicitly denied Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people of all genders the vote.
In 1895, SA introduced voting rights for adult women (including Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander women). The other Australian states and territories
followed, extending voting rights to some women within the next decade and a
half.27 The right to stand for office followed somewhat later in most jurisdictions;
women could not stand for election to the Victorian parliament until 1923.28
The process of Federation and the formation of the new Constitution of
Australia provided opportunities for white women to press for political rights.29
As a result of women’s mobilisation and support from allies, especially from SA,
the Constitutional Convention of 1897 secured agreement (by only three votes)
23 Johnson, Maddison and Partridge 2011.
24 Winsor 2017.
25 Johnson, Maddison and Partridge 2011.
26 Curtin 2014, 312.
27 Curtin 2014, 312.
28 AEC 2015a.
29 Curtin 2014, 312–3.
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that white women would be eligible to vote and stand for the new Australian
parliament. The Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth) established the rights of
white women aged 21 and over to vote and stand for parliament at the national
level but explicitly excluded ‘any aboriginal native of Australia, Asia, Africa or the
Islands of the Pacific, except New Zealand’, unless they were already enrolled in a
state before 1901.
The achievement of voting rights is often described as legislators ‘giving women
the vote’. However, excluded people were not passive recipients in the process. Major
mobilisations of women through organisations such as the Women’s Christian
Temperance Union and the Australian Women’s Suffrage Society were instrumental
in persuading male legislators and voters, through interventions such as the
260-metre-long Women’s Suffrage Petition presented to the Victorian parliament in
1891, containing 30,000 signatures.30 Those who opposed extending the franchise
used arguments such as the prospect that men may have to perform housework and
child care because women would be so occupied with civic concerns.
As noted above, Federation did not improve the situation for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people, and patterns of disempowerment continued. From the
1950s, however, the US civil rights movement inspired Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people to intensify their efforts to obtain voting rights, among other rights.
It was not until 1962 that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people gained the
right to vote in federal elections.
Using the vote
Many early women political activists rejected the idea of pursuing political power
through the established parties in favour of articulating a maternal civic philosophy
that held itself above the grubbiness of ordinary politics.31 At the same time, women
political activists vigorously encouraged women voters to assess parties on their
merits (particularly their positions on key issues such as child welfare and women’s
economic independence). Echoes of this practice of non-partisan mobilisation
can be seen in organisations such as the Australian Federation of Women Voters
(1921–82) and the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL) (1974 onwards).32
Historically, women as a statistical group33 have voted more conservatively than
men in Australia, supporting the Liberal–National (Coalition) parties more than
men and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) less than men.34 Given that left-wing
parties are more likely to pursue policies supporting women’s economic equality, it
30 Curtin 2014, 312–3.
31 Curtin 2014, 31–4; Koven and Michel 1993.
32 Andrew 2014; Byard 2014.
33 This non-disaggregated measure obscures voting differences by class, race and other factors.
Many women would have been voting less conservatively than white middle- and upper-class
women and men.
34 Curtin 1997.
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might be expected that they would be the ‘natural home’ of women voters. However,
women’s equality is just one issue considered by voters, and others may take
priority.35 Women may also have been influenced by the ALP’s view of labour as a
right of the male breadwinner and of class solidarity as mateship.36
In recent years, the gender gap in voting behaviour has narrowed.37 From the
1960s onwards, there has been a gradual increase in the percentage of men voting
for the Liberal or National parties and a gradual increase in the percentage of
women voting for the ALP.38 In 2010, with Julia Gillard – Australia’s first woman
prime minister – contesting the election, the gap was reversed; women were
supporting Labor more than the Coalition and more women than men were
supporting Labor. This shift was consistent with international trends, in which left-
of-centre parties were able to narrow and in some cases begin to reverse traditional
gender gaps that had seen them supported more by men than by women.39 In the
2013 election, the gender balance shifted back so that roughly equal proportions of
women and men supported Labor and the Coalition, although women were more
likely to vote for the Greens than men. In 2016, women were once again more likely
than men to vote for Labor (by 7 per cent) and more likely than men to vote for the
Greens (by 4 per cent).40
The voting patterns of LGBTIQ+ people are much less studied. The Australian
Electoral Study, perhaps the key scholarly source of information about voting
behaviour and attitudes in Australia, does not ask about respondents’ sexuality and
only allows respondents to select ‘Male’ or ‘Female’ identification for gender (with
no option for ‘Other’, ‘Trans’ or ‘Non-Binary’).41
Leadership
Scholarship on women in politics has shown that leadership is associated with mas-
culine qualities of toughness, single-mindedness and aggression. These qualities are
seen as undesirable in women, as well as – via the conventional double standard
– positive attributes impossible for women to fully embody.42 Women politicians
are often punished harshly for transgressing norms of femininity or leadership
(constructed as mutually exclusive). Sinclair has drawn attention to the ‘power and
privilege reproduced in leadership and leadership research’, which ‘reinforces the
35 Curtin 2014.
36 Curtin 2014, 148.
37 Bean and McAllister 2015, 41–4.
38 Manning 2013.
39 McAllister cited in Manning 2013.
40 At the time of writing analysis was not yet available for the 2019 election.
41 McAllister et al. 2017.
42 Sinclair 2014.
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power of a narrow white male elite and continue[s] the oppression of the majority
of women, Indigenous peoples and those from non-white backgrounds’.43
Over the last few decades, feminist studies have explored possibilities for
relational, non-hierarchical models of leadership and organisational management.44
At the same time, feminist studies of leadership are bringing to light women leaders
in a variety of domains, including those usually overlooked as sites of leadership,
such as environmental movements,45 disability advocacy,46 and children’s media.47
While ‘post-heroic’ ideas about leadership have become more popular in corporate
life, in practice, ‘rewards and promotions [continue] to flow to those demonstrating
traditionally “masculine” leadership traits’.48
Recently, scholars have also begun to ask how sexuality and bodies (intertwined
with gender) interact with concepts of leadership.49 This scholarship has identified
the association of leadership with a particular form of masculine heterosexuality
and the censoring of women’s sexuality by dominant models of leadership.50
Institutions
Institutions are not just organisations with names and legal structures; they also
operate as ‘formal and informal collections of interrelated norms, rules and routines,
understandings and frames of meaning that define “appropriate” action and roles and
acceptable behaviour of their members’.51 These norms, rules and routines have strong
gender and sexuality dimensions and are often based on masculine expectations and
practices, with major impacts on outcomes, including government policies.52
In studies of women in New South Wales and Victorian politics, political
institutions (especially parliaments) have been found to be actively hostile to
women. Furthermore, they are venues in which feminist norms such as consult-
ation and consideration of emotions and the bonds of dependence are often
derided.53 Challenges to these gendered norms have come in many forms, such as
breastfeeding in the chamber, which has led to changes to rules against ‘strangers’
being allowed onto the chamber floor.54 Challenges over the working hours and
scheduling of parliaments are another arena in which there have been attempts to
43 Sinclair 2014, 28.
44 Sawer and Andrew 2014.
45 Elix and Lambert 2014.
46 Henningham 2014.
47 Tomsic 2014.
48 Sawer and Andrew 2014, 296.
49 Bell and Sinclair 2016.
50 Sinclair 1995.
51 Mackay, Munro and Waylen 2009, 255.
52 Brennan and Chappell 2006, 3.
53 Brennan and Chappell 2006; Grey 2009.
54 Grey 2009.
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give greater weight to (gendered) relational imperatives, against the (gendered) bias
towards unencumbered individualism in the traits expected of parliamentarians.55
Feminist institution building
Under the Whitlam Labor government in the 1970s, Australia developed a (then)
unique model of women’s policy machinery in which dedicated units in depart-
ments, supported by a central hub, worked to integrate gender analysis throughout
the different policy areas. Women’s budget statements analysed budget commit-
ments with a gender lens, and ‘femocrats’ (feminist bureaucrats) within government
tried to maintain links with feminists outside government, particularly the Women’s
Electoral Lobby.56
From the 1990s onwards, this model declined, in part due to rising neo-
liberalism and the gradual disappearance from public view of an autonomous,
active and oppositional women’s movement.57 The recent surge of feminist activity
globally (including the Women’s March, #metoo and other mobilisation against
violence and harassment), as well as ongoing Indigenous women’s resistance and
leadership, has intensified demands for greater gender equality mechanisms. The
announcement in 2018 that the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ Time Use Survey
(a key mechanism to measure gender disparities in unpaid care labour) will be
reintroduced after a 12-year hiatus may be a sign that feminist demands for
stronger women’s policy machinery are being heard.
The other major stream of feminist institution building – non-government
women’s services, such as shelters and women’s health centres – has continued,
now running as part of a large, under-resourced sector of government-funded
but independently run community services.58 This institutional ‘nestedness’59
sometimes supports and legitimises women’s services, but it also makes it difficult
for them to sustain and gain recognition for their distinctive role.
Representation
Across the world, much attention has been given to the participation of women
(and, more recently, LGBTIQ+ people) in formal politics, measuring inequalities
as well as identifying the underlying factors that structure participation, with the
aim of improving the inclusiveness of existing political systems. The concept of
representation is key to this ‘inclusion project’.60
55 Grey 2009, 205–10.
56 Sawer 1990.
57 Maddison and Partridge 2007; Sawer 2007, 40.
58 Murray 2005; Wainer and Peck 1995.
59 Mackay 2014.
60 Squires cited in Celis et al. 2013, 9.
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For scholars of gender and sexuality, representation is not just numerical (or
‘descriptive’) but also substantive. This means that there needs to be a distinction
between simply having a woman or LGBTIQ+ person in a position of power
(numerical representation) and that representative addressing issues and adopting
political positions that advance the goals of feminist and LGBTIQ+ activism
(substantive representation). Many women politicians, for example, share socially
conservative positions that are opposed to feminist and LGBTIQ+ activism; yet
their participation as visibly feminine people in politics is still significant in itself.
Feminist and queer scholarship has sought to define what difference representation
makes – and could make – without assuming that underlying dynamics are
automatically shifted by numerical representation.
There is evidence that numerical representation enables substantive represen-
tation, such as the collective action of women in parliament across party lines on
reproductive rights during the deliberations on a drug used for medical abortions.61
Women and LGBTIQ+ people being present in decision making affects what issues
are prioritised and brings knowledge about marginalised problems and experiences
into decision making. But this does not happen in the absence of countervailing
forces, especially existing norms and male-majority representation, but also (at
times) harassment, political violence and more subtle forms of marginalisation
and exclusion. The diversity of women and LGBTIQ+ people is also not yet well
addressed in scholarship on representation or in advocacy for greater represen-
tation. There is a growing understanding that the category ‘women’ is, in itself,
important, but needs to be used in a more disaggregated and nuanced form also
addressing race, class, migration status and disability.
Gender representation often tends to be seen as seeking parity in binary terms,
encompassing the two genders that are taken to compose humanity: male and
female. Manon Tremblay notes, though, that ‘the French concept of parité … is
deeply heterosexist’, and human beings cannot be reduced in this way: ‘Things are
much more complex’.62
Representation in parliaments and Cabinets
Practices of assessing parliamentary gender representation in simple terms are
now well established. In October 2019, 30.46 per cent of Australian House of
Representatives members were women, placing Australia 47th in the world.63
Representation differed between the two houses of parliament, with 50 per cent
women in the Senate.64 While analysis of LGBTIQ+ representation has not yet been
published for the 2019 election, in 2016 LGBTI representation stood at 3 per cent in
61 Sawer 2012.
62 Tremblay 2019, 108.
63 Inter-Parliamentary Union 2019.
64 Parliament of Australia 2019.
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House of Representatives and 5 per cent in the Senate (compared, for example, with
the UK, which had 6.9 per cent LGBTI representation in the House of Commons
after the 2017 election).65 Worldwide, in February 2016 the LGBTQ Representation
and Rights Research Initiative identified 180 ‘out’ lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans
(LGBT) parliamentarians in 42 countries.66
Studies of electoral systems across the world have shown that proportional
representation systems (as in the Senate) have a positive effect on the election
of female candidates, compared with majoritarian systems with single-member
electorates (as in the House of Representatives).67 This can be seen in the Australian
parliament. Yet as Wilma Rule notes, ‘Negative electoral system features have been
overcome by women’s political mobilization’.68
Until recently, research on the gendered impact of electoral systems has ignored
the role of sexuality. Manon Tremblay raises several possible avenues for inquiry,
including the fact that, unlike women, who are distributed fairly evenly across
different geographic areas, LGBTIQ+ people may live in quite dense concentrations.
In this kind of constituency, ‘to be an openly LGBT person can be an asset in the
selection of candidates’.69 The finding that urbanisation had no impact on the 2017
Australian marriage equality vote – contrary to assumptions that rural areas are less
LGBT-supportive than urban areas70 – affirms Tremblay’s point that further research
is required on LGBT-supportive attitudes and parliamentary representation.
In Australia, while Liberal women’s representation in parliament increased
significantly in 1996, supported by mentoring from the party’s Liberal Women’s
Forum, there have since been reductions in women’s representation on the
Coalition side; women comprised only 17 per cent of Coalition MPs in 2016 (which
was the lowest level since 1993)71 and 27 per cent of senators. By September 2019,
this rose to 19.5 per cent of Coalition MPs and 42.9 per cent of Coalition senators.72
By comparison, women made up 41.2 per cent of Labor MPs and 61.5 per cent of
Labor senators in 2019, while the Greens had just one male MP in the House of
Representatives and five out of nine (55.6 per cent) Greens senators were women.73
In contrast, the number of openly LGBTIQ+ Coalition parliamentarians inc-
reased from one in 2012, when Senator Dean Smith was elected, to four (all gay
men) in 2016 – the three new members being elected to the House of Repres-
entatives. The ALP had three: two women senators, including Senator Penny Wong,
the leader of the opposition in the Senate and shadow minister for foreign affairs,
65 Williams and Sawer 2018, 647. Note: acronyms in this paragraph differ as they have been
transcribed from the source texts.
66 Tremblay 2019, 91.
67 Tremblay 2019, 92.
68 Rule 1987, 495.
69 Tremblay 2019, 106.
70 McAllister and Snagovsky 2018, 419.
71 Williams and Sawer 2018.
72 Hough 2019.
73 Hough 2019.
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and one man in the House.74 One of the Greens’ five senators (Senator Janet Rice)
identifies as LGBTIQ+ and is the Greens member with portfolio responsibilities for
LGBTIQ+ issues.
If parliaments are the formal venues for democratic representation, ‘the
ministry [Cabinet] is the apex of political power’.75 Women’s representation in
Cabinet has increased from no women in federal or state/territory Cabinets until
194776 to around 26 per cent at the federal level (under a Coalition government in
2018),77 after highs of 30 per cent under the Rudd Labor government between July
and September 2013 and 27 per cent under the Turnbull Coalition government in
2016–17.78 These are small numbers overall: only two women held federal Cabinet
positions before 1983, and until 1996 there was only ever one woman in Cabinet
at a time.79 Labor governments at the state level (Victoria and Queensland) have
recently achieved 50 per cent representation in Cabinet.
Jennifer Curtin observes that party discipline has very much limited oppor-
tunities for Liberal Party feminists to act as part of a broader non- or cross-party
feminist agenda. The ability of women ministers in the Australian conservative
parties to substantively represent women’s issues is, in many ways, hidden due to
the expectations of Cabinet confidentiality.80
Political parties and quotas
Political parties have been both a key barrier to the representation of women
and LGBTIQ+ people and a site in which people have organised for better
representation. As Manon Tremblay concludes, ‘of all the cultural, socioeconomic
and political factors affecting the election of women to legislative assemblies,
parties are surely the most influential variable’.81
While research on the preselection of LGBTIQ+ people is lacking, scholars
have confirmed global trends in which parties tend to place women candidates
lower down party lists, nominate proportionally fewer women for safe seats and
be less likely to preselect women than men as candidates for single-member
electorates.82 These trends are also evident in Australia. Since party preselection
is generally the necessary first step towards election to parliament, parties have a
major role in hindering or facilitating women’s representation.
In response to this, feminists and their allies have pushed for quotas to improve
representation of women in parliament. More recently, quotas for LGBTIQ+ people
74 Williams and Sawer 2018.
75 Moon and Fountain 1997.
76 AEC 2015b.
77 RMIT/ABC 2018.
78 RMIT/ABC 2017.
79 RMIT/ABC 2017.
80 Curtin 2014, 152.
81 Tremblay 2008, 234.
82 Tremblay 2008.
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have also been proposed. Quotas are rules about the minimum/maximum pro-
portions of a group who are allowed or required to fill positions – in this case, in
party-endorsed candidacies.
Gender quotas aim to disrupt the taken-for-granted-ness of politicians being
men as well as provide substantive redress for the barriers that disproportionately
obstruct women candidates. Quotas can be legislated or applied as rules within
parties. Quotas have contributed to the doubling of women’s representation in
parliaments around the world over the last 20 years.83
Different views about quotas reveal different beliefs about who is suitable for
and capable of holding office. Opponents of quotas typically argue for selecting ‘on
merit’.84 Given that current ‘merit-based’ systems have produced such disparities
in representation, this implies that women and other under-represented groups are
inherently less meritorious. Those who support quotas see structural and cultural
barriers as discouraging and excluding people who would be as capable as (perhaps
even more capable than) those who have found it comparatively easy to get their
‘merit’ recognised. In 2016, Vote Compass found that while a majority of Labor
voters were in favour of gender quotas, 60 per cent of Coalition voters were against
them, and men overall were nearly twice as likely as women to oppose quotas.85
In 1994, as a result of concerted activism by the ALP-aligned group EMILY’s List
and the National Labor Women’s Network, the ALP introduced a quota requiring
at least 35 per cent of winnable seats to have women candidates preselected. This
was increased to 40 per cent in 2012 and a target of 50 per cent by 2025 was then
set.86 The Liberal Party has a target (set in 2016) to preselect women in 50 per cent
of winnable seats by 2025, but calls for binding quotas have been rejected by party
leaders. Instead, the party has established the Enid Lyons Fighting Fund to help close
the gender gap in political finance.87 While the Greens do not have formal quotas,
the party has comparatively strong representation of women and LGBTIQ+ people
(leading both the ALP and the Coalition parties in the proportion of candidates and
elected representatives after the election in 2016).
Mechanisms to improve the representation of LGBTIQ+ people are less
developed, but the ALP now has Rainbow Labor, a network operating within the
party that was successful in changing the party’s policy on marriage equality. After
the 2016 federal election, the Queensland State Conference of the ALP adopted the
first LGBTI quota in Australia, requiring at least 5 per cent LGBTI candidates in
winnable Queensland seats for state, federal and local government elections.88
83 Sawer 2015.
84 Matthewson 2019.
85 Williams and Sawer 2018.
86 https://www.emilyslist.org.au/
87 Gauja, Buckley and Curtin 2018.
88 Williams and Sawer 2018, 646.
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Media, backlash and social change
Scholars including Linda Trimble, Carol Johnson, Julia Baird, Elizabeth van Acker
and Blair Williams have shown how media coverage of women politicians gives
platforms for gendered abuse, focuses on their appearance and trivialises their
substantive contributions.89 Women who perform femininity to an acceptable
standard find that this is taken as delegitimising their value as professional
politicians. Politicians who are mothers face questions about how they will be
able to manage their public role while tending to their children’s needs. On the
other hand, women who do not perform conventional femininity to an acceptable
standard find that this ‘failure’ brings into question their ability to fulfil their
role – for instance, Julia Gillard’s childlessness, which conservative commentators
portrayed as making it impossible for her to relate to ‘ordinary women’. Acceptable
and unacceptable performances of femininity (and masculinity) are also assessed
through the lenses of race, sexuality, class and dis/ability.
As Australia’s first woman prime minister, Julia Gillard was subjected to
extreme levels of misogynist abuse, particularly on social media and radio, but also
in ‘real life’. In 2011, the opposition leader stood in front of banners reading ‘Juliar
… Bob Brown’s Bitch’ and ‘Ditch the Witch’ while speaking at a carbon tax rally.
A Liberal–National Party fundraiser menu offered ‘Julia Gillard quail’ with ‘small
breasts, huge thighs and a big red box’. 90
Gillard finally (after having avoided referring to her gender throughout her
public life) spoke out against what she saw as the misogyny of then opposition
leader Tony Abbott in a speech to parliament, which was subsequently shared
and viewed on social media over three million times. The opposition and the
mainstream media suggested that she had ‘played the gender card’ as a political
tactic, while women’s news sites and social media sharing indicated a very different
and more supportive response. Trimble and Johnson have noted that the discourse
of the ‘gender card’ and ‘gender war’ were used to try to silence people making an
issue of inequality.91
On leaving politics, Julia Gillard argued that as a result of her prime
ministership it would be easier for the next woman and the next woman after that.
McLaren and Sawer note that, while this might be true, her treatment suggests
it may well be more difficult for the next feminist.92 The backlash against Gillard
emboldened anti-feminists, and potentially increased the polarisation of views
about feminism and gender equality. It is notable that, in centre-right and far-right
parties in Europe, men are more likely than women to identify as promoting gender
equality, suggesting that it is riskier for women to do so than men.93
89 Baird 2004; van Acker 1999; Williams 2017.
90 Jabour 2013.
91 Johnson 2015; Trimble 2016.
92 McLaren and Sawer 2015.
93 Celis and Erzeel cited in Williams and Sawer 2018, 642.
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While Gillard is a prominent example, women, LGBTIQ+ people and people
from other marginalised groups who publicly engage in politics face abuse, hate
speech and at times violence – whether they are involved as candidates or media
commentators or are active on social media or in their communities and
workplaces. The ferocious online attacks on Yassmin Abdel-Magied, a young
Sudanese-Australian engineer, broadcaster and writer who made a Facebook post
on Anzac Day reading ‘LEST. WE. FORGET. Manus, Nauru, Syria, Palestine’, are
another example of hate speech at the intersection of race and gender.94 At the same
time, effective communities and networks of marginalised people are flourishing,
giving support and discursive resources to members engaged in politics.95 Backlash
and community-building effects are now being recognised as key elements of social
change.
Conclusions
More than ever, Australian political institutions are grappling with issues of gender
and sexuality. At the same time, communities and movements are demanding
that those with power use it to create a broader understanding of what politics is
and who can be part of it. By integrating an awareness of gender and sexuality
throughout the work of the discipline, political science can contribute to this
process.
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The importance of the relationship between government and business is best
captured in a rhetorical question: What is more important: strong government,
prosperous business or civil society? The question is rhetorical because there is
no correct answer. Strong government is necessary to provide a system of law
and order; however, without prosperous businesses to pay taxes, it is difficult for
government to collect the funds to perform its role. And civil society is necessary
to hold governments and businesses to account; but if we take a Hobbesian1 view of
human society, civil society cannot exist without strong government undertaking
many essential roles, including political representation, public provision, and
maintaining law and order, defence, public safety, regulation, infrastructure and
trading relations. Of course, in a modern economy, all three institutions are
necessary to ensure a society has an appropriate level of stability, security and living
standards for its members.
Although in times past the study of government–business relations focused
on the nation-state, the phenomenon known as globalisation has had a significant
de Percy, Michael, and Heba Batainah (2019). Government–business relations. In Peter J. Chen,
Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta
and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
1 Hobbes 1985 [1651].
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impact on the way governments and businesses interact in the global economy.2
Nevertheless, nation-states remain the legitimate political power within their
jurisdictions, and global businesses operating within these jurisdictions are still
subject to the laws of the host nation-state. In practice, the government–business
relationship is influenced by national institutions and cultures and, in line with
changing societal values and interests, remains necessarily dynamic.3
This chapter discusses the various aspects of government–business relations in
the context of the capitalist economic system. It outlines the sectors of the economy,
introduces the levels of analysis for understanding government–business relations
and discusses the various ways that governments and businesses interact, before
considering industry policy and the regulation of business. The chapter concludes
with a discussion of some of the emerging issues for government–business
relations, including the impact of disruptive technologies.
Sectors of the economy
A central feature of the capitalist economic system is the idea of the market. The
term ‘market’ can mean many different things, such as a physical space where
goods and services are bought and sold (e.g. a shopping mall) or even a virtual
space where the sale and purchase of goods and services is conducted completely
online (e.g. eBay). The market is the incentive mechanism for the production and
distribution of property, goods and services and, through ‘competitive interactions
of businesses and consumers’, for the creation and dispersion of wealth.4 Markets
are often said to be ‘self-regulating’ through the laws of supply and demand, but
they often require government regulation to ensure fair competition, prevent
market abuse and provide a safety net (e.g. for the elderly and people with
disabilities who are not able to participate actively in market relations).
In terms of typologies, markets can be classified into four broad categories:
markets for goods and services, financial markets, markets for the sale and purchase
of land and property, and labour markets, where employers and employees
negotiate salaries and wages for work performed. Capitalist economic systems, and
markets in particular, have an expansionary tendency.5
Economic activity within the capitalist system can be divided into three
interrelated spheres of activity: the ‘for-profit’ private sector, government and the
public sector and the civil society or not-for-profit sector. Although these spheres
intersect in various ways in practice, the division of the sectors can be understood
in terms of the legal standing of entities within each sector and their sources of
2 Wanna 2003, 420–1.
3 Parkin and Hardcastle 2010, 352.
4 Ryan, Parker and Brown 2003, 24.
5 Stilwell 2002, 49–50.
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revenue. For example, government agencies form part of the public sector and
are established by various Acts of parliament; their major source of funding is
tax revenues. Businesses form part of the private sector, are established, under
the relevant laws, through articles of association and the investment of private
funds to conduct commercial activity, and are funded by profits created through
the production and sale of goods and services. The civil society or not-for-profit
sector is funded by donations and gifts, and provides philanthropic, charitable or
welfare services that are not provided by government or business and are designed
to deliver some social benefit to members of the community.
In practice, the division between the three sectors is dynamic. Civil society
organisations, locally, nationally and globally, often seek funding from government
and business and may even enter into partnerships with the other sectors in
performing their role. In Australia, for example, the former Commonwealth
Employment Service, which provided job recruitment and search services for
employers and employees, was replaced by a competitive network of private and
civil society employment-sector providers (initially Job Network, then Job Services
Australia, known as Job Active since 2015). In this case, as in others, the delineation
between the three sectors is far from clear – the sectors tend to overlap in terms
of funding sources and activities. Nevertheless, the underlying purposes of each
sector remain an important conceptual framework for understanding the capitalist
economic system as practised in nation-states. The various relationships between
the sectors differ depending on local values, interests, cultures and circumstances,
despite the homogenising effect often attributed to globalisation.6
Levels of analysis
There are three main levels of analysis that are useful in understanding government–
business relations globally or within a nation-state. The macro level considers histor-
ical institutional choices and preferences at the national level and provides a general
guide to the ‘proper’ role of the state in the market and in various sectors of the
economy. The meso level considers government–business relations at the industry or
sectoral level. This level of analysis is covered in detail in the sections on industry
policy and regulation below. The third level of analysis is the micro level, which
considers government–business relationships at the level of individual firms or
projects.
At the macro level, the different ways that capitalism is practised within nation-
states is often referred to as ‘varieties of capitalism’.7 These differences stem from
the intersection of economic and political institutions within nation-states, where
institutions are defined as the formal and informal values, rules, routines and
6 Scholte 2008, 1476.
7 Hall and Soskice 2001.
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procedures that influence behaviour through what is considered by a given society
to be ‘appropriate’.8 Hall and Soskice9 differentiate between two main types of
capitalism: liberal market economies and co-ordinated market economies. In
liberal market economies, such as Australia, Canada, the USA, the UK and New
Zealand, firms tend to operate at arm’s length from other firms and governments,
and interact through competition and formal contracting. In many ways, the
‘invisible hand’ of the market is left to guide the equilibrium of supply and demand
of goods and services.10 In co-ordinated market economies, such as Germany,
Japan and Sweden, on the other hand, firms tend to be more collaborative in their
relationships, and interactions with other firms and governments tend to be more
strategic in attaining equilibrium in supply and demand.
While the macro level is useful in understanding comparative differences
between countries in general, it is inherently weak in analysing what occurs at the
meso or industry level, where practices within both liberal and co-ordinated market
economies tend to be more diverse. For example, Australia’s market economy is
relatively young, in comparison to the market economy of the USA, with many
Australian industries either entirely owned by governments (such as the postal,
telecommunications and energy industries) or heavily subsidised by governments
(such as the agricultural, mining, textiles and automotive manufacturing indus-
tries) until market reforms were introduced in the 1970s and 1980s in line with
international trends. Further, Australia’s health and education sectors, although
increasingly subject to competitive pressures, remain predominantly government-
owned or controlled, underpinned by social expectations that governments will
continue to provide or fund these services. If we take the two extremes at either end
of the varieties of capitalism spectrum – the competitive market economy of the
USA on the right and Sweden’s co-ordinated market economy on the left – Australia
tends to fit somewhere in the middle, with competition occurring in some sectors
of the economy and greater co-ordination occurring in others.11
The micro or firm level of analysis is typically adopted to examine the behav-
iour of firms in the political economy, such as participation by firms in business
associations, strategic choices by firms in different policy environments, or to assess
the extent of political activism by firms.12
While the scholarly study of government–business relations in the Australian
context has been largely situated as a sub-field of policy studies, it is inherently
multidisciplinary.13 The different levels of analysis place greater emphasis on
different aspects of the government–business relationship, encompassing inter-
national political economy at the macro level, policy studies at the meso level and
8 March and Olsen 1989; Peters 2005, 30.
9 Hall and Soskice 2001, 8.
10 Smith 2003 [1776].
11 Chaudhri, Samson and Kerin 2000, 21.
12 Arnold and Hussinger 2004; Bell and Warhurst 1993; Sen and te Velde 2008.
13 Bell and Wanna 1992, 5; Wanna 2003, 420.
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business studies at the micro level. Understanding the levels of analysis can be
useful in researching different aspects of government–business relations, broad-
ening the potential field of academic literature that can be drawn upon for research
and in formulating theories at the grand (highly abstract), middle-range (typically
the result of a research project) and narrow-range (used to guide practice) levels.14
Government–business interactions
A number of scholarly disciplines have contributed to our understanding of how
governments and businesses interact. For example, Jacoby15 listed a variety of
ways that government–business interactions occur in practice. Governments may
attempt to stabilise the economic environment for businesses; subsidise some
industries; promote business abroad; finance small and minority firms; purchase
military hardware and other products from businesses; enter into joint or mixed
ventures with businesses; tax businesses and make businesses tax collectors (such
as the current arrangements for the Goods and Services Tax); regulate particular
functions of businesses; engage in joint management of public utilities (such as
ActewAGL); and sell postal services, power, government publications, police and
fire protection, and many other commodities and services. Businesses, on the other
hand, may consult with government informally or individually, or formally and
collectively, through lobby groups such as the Business Council of Australia or
through specialist lobbying firms; support political candidates financially or in
other ways; or publicly criticise governments in an effort to influence the policy
agenda (such as the Minerals Council of Australia’s campaigns against the Rudd
government’s mining super-profits tax and the Gillard government’s carbon pricing
scheme). Businesses may also launch campaigns against government policies
through advertising and other forms of public appeal. Increasingly, businesses
and executives lobby governments and make public appeals on issues that do not
necessarily relate to the financial interests of their industries, such as when Qantas
chief executive Alan Joyce spoke out in support of the ‘yes’ vote in the recent
plebiscite on same-sex marriage in Australia.
There is a ‘rich tradition’ of the study of government–business relations at the
national level in Australia.16 Although state involvement in the market was the
dominant paradigm for much of Australia’s early history, the impact of government
intervention on the economy was not without its critics.17 Coinciding with the rise
of ‘neoliberalism’ and the New Right in the 1980s, Australia adopted an approach
to managing the economy known locally as economic rationalism.18 The traditional
14 Merton 1968.
15 Jacoby 1975, 5–6.
16 Bell and Head 1992; Bell and Wanna 1992; Wanna 2003, 420.
17 Eggleston 1932; Hancock 1930; Kelly 1992; Smith 2006 [1887].
18 Pusey 1991.
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industries were no longer protected by government (the Whitlam government had
started to dismantle protection during the 1970s) and would be exposed to
international competition. Up to this point in time, the nature of the government–
business relationship in Australia was heavily focused on industry assistance, and
competition regulation had only seriously been pursued since the establishment of
the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
Beginning in 1983, the market liberalisation agenda had gathered pace under
the Hawke Labor government and the economy began to change significantly.
Following on from the introduction of the Prices and Incomes Accords, a series
of agreements between the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council
of Trade Unions, the government facilitated a tripartite, consensus-based power
sharing arrangement between government, business and trade unions. This
tripartite arrangement, facilitated by institutions such as the Economic Planning
Advisory Council, became known as corporatism and attracted much study from
government–business relations scholars.19 A key principle of corporatism was con-
sensus building between the three parties, with the major groups in the economy
(theoretically) participating in decision making. As trade union membership
represented about half of the workforce at the time, it was generally representative
of the interests of labour.20 With the election of the Howard Liberal–National
(Coalition) government in 1996, however, corporatism was quickly dismantled,21
and the decline in compulsory union membership saw union membership
declining steadily from 1992 from traditional levels of almost 50 per cent of the
workforce, to 14 per cent of the workforce by 2018.22
At the industry level, business scholars such as William Byrt23 developed
approaches to understanding the interaction between business and government
by focusing on various elements of the relationship that affect business, such as
regulation, consumerism, trade unions and public enterprises. There are a number
of different approaches to studying government–business relations, but these
approaches are much more than an analysis of the struggle for dominance between
the two monsters – Leviathan (government) and Behemoth (business) – as the two
tend to merge ‘in complex and specialised arrangements, producing a pattern of
interaction which brings together both government and non-government bodies’.24
One of the major industry-level studies of the ‘protective state’ and its ‘gradual
transformation’ of the manufacturing industry in Australia25 was conducted by
political scientists Capling and Galligan in 1992.26 More recently, scholars
19 Bell and Wanna 1992, 4; Wanna 2003, 421.
20 Hall and Soskice 2001, 20.
21 Head 1997.
22 Gilfillan and McGann 2018.
23 Byrt 1990.
24 Colebatch, Prasser and Nethercote 1997, xviii.
25 Wanna 2003, 423.
26 Capling and Galligan 1992.
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considered government–business relations in light of globalisation and found,
among other things, that local practices of government–business interaction
persist.27 This means that local effects of national culture, law and ideologies and
the ‘appropriate’ role of the government in the economy cannot be overlooked
when considering the government–business relationship.
Although individual studies in government–business relations continue, schol-
arly interest in the subject has been in general decline, with many Australian
universities abandoning specific government–business relations subjects by 2017.
This decline has coincided with turmoil in Australia’s political leadership, with
prime ministers and governments changing frequently since 2007, preventing the
stable, long-term approaches to government–business relations characteristic of the
Hawke and Keating Labor and Howard Coalition governments. Yet, as will be seen
in the section on emerging issues below, the topic is of increasing importance. We
now turn to the major elements of the government–business relationship: industry
policy and regulation.
Industry policy
The term sector typically refers to the various firms that produce goods or services
of a similar type, such as the mining, agricultural, manufacturing, transport,
tourism and construction sectors. The term industry is usually a subclassification
of a given sector. For example, the transport sector includes taxis, but the taxi
industry is distinct from other transport industries due to its private, point-to-point
transport focus. The taxi industry is also regulated in certain ways by the states and
territories. While these distinctions are important for collecting statistics (and there
are numerous classification standards), for our purposes the term industry will be
used to refer to firms that produce similar products or services and will include the
policy and regulatory institutions of the state that govern a particular industry.
Generally, industries are divided into three types: primary, secondary and
tertiary. Primary industries are focused on the production of raw materials and
typically include mining, agriculture, forestry and fishing. Secondary industries
are those that use raw materials to produce goods, such as the manufacturing,
engineering and construction industries. Tertiary industries are those that produce
services rather than goods, such as wholesalers, retailers and transport. They can
be further classified as quaternary (knowledge, such as education, media and
telecommunications) and quinary (personal services, such as hospitality, health
care and recreation) industries. These types of industries are important, and the
relative industry mix in Australia has changed significantly over time, with the
manufacturing industries declining significantly since protectionism was largely
replaced by competitive markets in the final decades of the 20th century.
27 McAllister, Davis and Moodie 2004; Parkin and Hardcastle 2010.
Government–business relations
379
Under protectionism, policy instruments were used to restrict the impact of
international competition. For example, secondary industries in Australia, such
as the textile, clothing and footwear and automotive manufacturing industries,
were protected by tariffs (government charges that increase the cost of cheaper,
imported goods) and quotas (government-imposed limits on the number of goods
imported). This approach to protecting domestic industries from international
competition is known as barrier protectionism. Protectionism was a major form of
industry policy in Australia and elsewhere from the end of the Second World War
until recently. However, beginning in the 1970s, and in the 1980s under the Hawke
government, Australia’s economy, following international trends, was increasingly
the subject of trade liberalisation and competition reform.28 This meant that tariffs
and quotas were reduced or removed and domestic industries, particularly the
textile, clothing and footwear and automotive manufacturing industries, faced
increasing international competition. By the second decade of the 21st century,
cheaper labour costs overseas meant that Australian manufacturing declined and
continue to decline as a result of the end of protectionism.29
One consequence of barrier protectionism for government–business relations
was the concentration of lobbying forces from both manufacturing companies and
the related trade unions. As these industries relied on government protection to
prosper, both capital and labour had an interest in the ongoing success of the
sector. The sunk costs of lobbying and compliance, in addition to higher wages
supported by inflated prices, provided little incentive for protected industries to
seek efficiencies. As international trends in trade liberalisation led to numerous
free trade agreements with other nations, other heavily subsidised sectors, such as
agriculture, were also subjected to competition. Debates over the benefits of free
trade versus protection continue as a result of the 2008–10 Global Financial Crisis
and, more recently, in the USA under the Trump administration. Nevertheless, there
is bipartisan agreement that Australia has prospered under trade liberalisation, with
the Department of Foreign Affairs under a Labor government admitting that:
The myth that lower tariffs destroy jobs has been debunked. Trade liberalisation
has made the economy more flexible. The number of people employed in Australia
in export-related activity in services such as finance, property and business
services is increasing.30
Industry policy remains central to the government–business relationship,
although as Australia continues to enter into free trade agreements under the rules-
based trading regime monitored by the World Trade Organization, the types of
policy instruments adopted have changed. Today, there are two major types of
28 Emmery 1999.
29 ABS 2018.
30 DFAT 2010, 34.
Australian Politics and Policy
380
industry policy that are compatible with the free market: passive and anticipatory
industry policy. Passive industry policy does not mean that government does not
make policy for industries; rather, government focuses on establishing conditions
that support competition within all industries. This may include monetary policy,
establishing trade agreements that are beneficial to businesses, enacting compet-
ition regulation to prevent monopolies and other non-competitive practices,
reducing taxation and compliance costs, or incentivising research and develop-
ment. Anticipatory industry policy involves governments making policies that
target particular industries. In anticipatory industry policy, governments attempt
to stimulate or assist certain industries to achieve desired economic outcomes. This
can be politically risky as it requires governments to ‘pick winners’ – in effect, to
predict what will happen in the future, and attempt to stimulate and incentivise
firms in a particular industry to change their market behaviours.
For example, during the 2008–10 Global Financial Crisis, the Rudd govern-
ment introduced a series of industry policies designed to stimulate the economy (or
‘fiscal stimuli’). A green car initiative was introduced to subsidise the automotive
manufacturing industry to develop fuel-efficient vehicles, enabling the industry to
compete internationally by using Australia’s highly skilled workforce to develop
sophisticated technologies. In addition, funding was provided to schools for
building halls and fences (to stimulate the construction industry), subsidies were
provided to householders to install roof insulation and individuals receiving
education assistance or family welfare payments were given a one-off cash payment
of approximately $900 to stimulate the retail sector. While not considered
protectionism per se, this level of government intervention in the economy
challenged the orthodoxy of the previous decades’ market reforms.
These types of intervention reflect anticipatory industry policy, where govern-
ments attempt to achieve economic objectives through direct intervention. Where
anticipatory industry policy differs from protectionism, however, is that it tends to
be for a specific purpose and for a short period of time. Protectionism, as practised
in the postwar era, on the other hand, was a long-term, institutionalised policy
designed to reduce the impacts of international competition. The Rudd govern-
ment’s policies were designed to stimulate, not protect, the industry. Nevertheless,
then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd wrote:
The time has come, off the back of the current crisis, to proclaim that the great neo-
liberal experiment of the past 30 years has failed, that the emperor has no clothes.
Neo-liberalism, and the free-market fundamentalism it has produced, has been
revealed as little more than personal greed dressed up as an economic philosophy.
And, ironically, it now falls to social democracy to prevent liberal capitalism from
cannibalising itself.
Industry policy can be further classified into two different types (which may
be either anticipatory or passive). Horizontal industry policies apply to all industries
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(noting that definitions in the literature vary considerably). This may include
research and development, the environment, skills education, human capital,
infrastructure investment, innovation stimulus and so on.31 Vertical industry policy
is targeted at particular industries. Policy instruments such as tariffs and quotas are
generally considered protectionist, and therefore inconsistent with modern ideas
concerning global markets. Vertical industry policies, on the other hand, are not
inconsistent with the rules established by the World Trade Organization if the
intervention is focused on a particular outcome in the short term.
It is not unusual for governments to use a combination of horizontal and
vertical measures to bring about structural change in the economy. For example,
tariffs on Australian exports of sugar were not excluded from the Australia–United
States Free Trade Agreement, which meant that the Australian sugar industry
would not be competitive and would require transformation to adjust to the market
conditions. The Howard government introduced the Sugar Industry Reform
Program to help sugar cane farmers and harvester operators cope with the loss of
protection. This program included welfare payments, crisis counselling services,
industry-exit assistance, business planning and diversification assistance, retraining
and other funding to assist those affected by the changes.32
Similarly, the Gillard Labor government introduced a carbon pricing taxation
scheme, which was generally horizontal in that it was intended to affect industries
other than road transport and agriculture, and later become a carbon emissions
trading scheme. However, the Abbott Coalition government replaced the policy
with the Direct Action Plan to fund carbon emissions reduction projects through
an Emissions Reduction Fund, among other ‘green’ projects.
One of the challenges for vertical industry policy is the difficulty in ‘picking
winners’. Some of the outcomes from recent industry policies include:
• The Rudd government’s Green Car Innovation Fund did little to stimulate the
industry, and, once elected, the Abbott government wound up the scheme and
did not support the industry further. In 2017, the last Holden vehicle rolled off
the production line and car manufacturing in Australia ceased.
• The Rudd government’s Home Insulation Program led to the tragic deaths of
four workers, numerous house fires resulting from the use of poor materials,
the demotion of then Environment Minister Peter Garrett, and subsequently
the Royal Commission into the Home Insulation Program.
• The Gillard government’s carbon pricing scheme was labelled a ‘carbon tax’, and
a coalition of industry groups, known as the Australian Trade and Industry
Alliance, launched a major campaign against it. The competition regulator, the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, investigated complaints
from consumers about false justifications for price increases, particularly
31 Emmery 1999; Pelkmans 2008.
32 Thompson et al. 2010.
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electricity providers falsely claiming that the carbon pricing scheme was
responsible for price rises. The Abbott government’s Direct Action Plan consisted
of payments to businesses and effectively removed the cost of carbon emissions
from industry and placed the burden on taxpayers.
Government–business relations in the area of industry policy have been far
from ideal over the last decade. Not only have the constant changes in federal
governments (and political leadership) created an uncertain operating envi-
ronment for businesses, the lack of stability has also provided little incentive for
businesses to invest in long-term strategy, especially in relation to environmental
sustainability. We now turn to regulation, another important element of
government–business relations.
Regulating business
The rationale for regulation in a market economy stems from a number of concerns.
While regulation may appear to interfere with the workings of the ‘invisible hand’
of the market, in the last few decades, most developed economies have been
through phases of deregulation of industries, privatisation of government services
and, more recently, re-regulation to address anti-competitive behaviours, to include
the cost of externalities (such as environmental, social and other related impacts)
not captured in the production process or where the market has failed. Regulation
involves governments making laws to influence the behaviour of firms. This can
include rules to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, to protect consumers from
unfair trading practices, to establish safety and other standards, and to achieve
other social or economic policy goals. Traditionally, governments consult with
industry in establishing a regulatory regime to support certain policy goals. Once
the regulatory model has been established, it is standard protocol for regulators to
enforce the relevant laws, rather than contribute to policy debates, and their major
function is to protect the public interest.
There are two major approaches to regulating businesses: ex-ante (before the
event) and ex-post (after the event) regulation. Ex-ante regulation focuses on the
structure of markets. This may include the number of firms in a given market,
the conditions for entering a market, the degree of product differentiation and
so on. Ex-post regulation is mostly concerned with the behaviour of firms or the
way they conduct business. This may include how a firm relates to its competitors
and customers. These two approaches to regulating businesses may be used in
combination. For example, to enter the telecommunications industry, firms may
need a specific level of capitalisation and may be required to purchase a tele-
communications carrier licence before operating in the market. Once a firm has
met the requirements to operate in the market, it may then be held accountable
for its behaviour according to the rules that apply within that industry. Various
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government and industry agencies may regulate firms concerning different
issues, such as security cameras in taxis or pricing of consumer goods and services.
Types of regulation may be classified along a spectrum based on the extent
of government intervention in the industry, ranging from government ownership
and command and control to self-regulation and co-regulation, to incentives-based
regulation designed to influence behaviours.33 Command and control regulation
involves the imposition of rules and standards backed up by criminal sanctions.
Some of the advantages of this type of regulation include clear definitions of
unacceptable behaviour, establishing performance standards supported by law and
appearing politically decisive. Some disadvantages are that regulation can be
complex and legalistic, defining acceptable standards can be difficult and the close
relationship between the regulator and businesses can lead to what is known as
regulatory capture. Regulatory capture occurs when the regulator begins to protect
the interests of the industry itself, rather than protecting the public interest. In
practice, the command and control model, at the extreme, involves government
ownership of the entire industry.
At Federation, government ownership of the post, telegraph and telephone
industries specifically excluded businesses from operating in these industries.
Further, railways were owned by the state governments, and competition in freight
services was restricted until a 1954 Privy Council decision ended the protection
of the industry, paving the way for an increase in competition from other means
of freight transport. It was not until the 1990s that telecommunications, electricity,
gas and water services in Australia were subjected to competition. For much of the
20th century, it was believed that these industries were natural monopolies, where
the economies of scale available to one entity operating in an industry provided
the greatest efficiency, in that the cost of adding another subscriber or connection
to the existing network was infinitesimal. Having more than one operator in such
natural monopolies, it was assumed, would involve unnecessary investment and
costs and therefore make the delivery of services inefficient. A step down from
government ownership is a regulated monopoly. In this instance, the government
establishes the rules for operating the privately owned monopoly and regulates the
prices that the firm may charge (whether through price capping or limitations on
the rate of return on investment). However, for the most part, natural monopoly
theory has been made irrelevant by improvements in technology, particularly
billing systems, and most utilities today are delivered via a competitive market.
In the telecommunications industry, for example, the regulatory framework
uses a variety of different approaches to achieve the desired policy outcomes.
For instance, the Department of Communications and the Arts (a government
department) provides policy advice to the minister for communications for the
telecommunications industry. Through legislation, the parliament establishes
33 Hepburn 2006.
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regulations for the telecommunications industry. The Australian Communications
and Media Authority (ACMA) (a statutory authority) enforces the rules for entry
into the telecommunications market and issues the relevant licenses (ex-ante
regulation), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) (a
statutory authority) has a role to assess the impact of mergers and acquisitions
(ex-ante) and a particular role for addressing anti-competitive behaviour (ex-post
regulation), while the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman (TIO) (an
external ombudsman funded by the industry) deals with consumer complaints that
are not resolved by the firm (ex-post regulation). In this case, the ACMA regulates
using a command and control approach, the ACCC uses command and control in
making decisions about its roles, and the industry, through the TIO, self-regulates
(and funds the regulator) and agrees to abide by the decisions of the ombudsman.
Incentives-based regulation might include additional taxes to reduce the
consumption of certain goods, such as those currently applied to tobacco products,
or market-based instruments, such as a carbon emissions trading scheme. In a
typical carbon emissions trading scheme, the government caps the allowable level
of pollution and sells permits to businesses to pollute to that level. Businesses can
then trade these permits with other businesses. In theory, as the price of permits
increases, businesses will innovate to reduce their carbon emissions, thus gaining a
competitive advantage over businesses that still need to pay for the pollution they
generate. Other market-based mechanisms include the auction of radio frequency
spectrum to mobile telephone, radio and television providers, or the provision of
subsidies to encourage particular habits or activities under the Direct Action Plan,
discussed above.34
Self-regulation occurs in many areas of private-sector activity, such as media
and advertising, and many crucial professions, including the law, medicine,
accounting and taxation services. Self-regulation places the onus of maintaining
standards on the industry body, such as Ad Standards and the regulation of
television advertising, and often includes tribunals and complaint mechanisms
where alleged abuses can be aired and investigated. Participants in self-regulated
areas of activity in essence agree to their behaviour and actions being monitored by
their industry peers and to accept any punishment or redress awarded by whatever
tribunal is empowered to consider disputes or complaints.
Each approach to regulation has its merits, and different mixes of approaches
and types are used in different industries. An emerging idea in the regulation of
businesses is regulatory co-design,35 where governments and industry collaborate.
Although there is some risk of regulatory capture, the approach can be useful
in industries where technology is moving rapidly, or where the industry accepts
that regulation is necessary but a suitable regulatory framework has not been
established. One example of this approach is currently being trialled in the road
34 Hepburn 2006, 5.
35 Productivity Commission 2017, 43.
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transport industry. As heavy vehicles cause the most damage to the road network,
a system of user charging has been in place for some time, but it is still some way
from capturing the external costs of road damage. Working with the industry, the
Department of Infrastructure, Regional Development and Cities has implemented
the National Heavy Vehicle Charging Pilot. In the near future, various pricing
options, which might include a reduction in fuel excise and vehicle registration fees,
will be ‘mock billed’ and tested by road transport businesses, with a view to testing
the new system on an opt-in basis paying with ‘real money’. Technology is enabling
such opportunities to improve regulation, but it can introduce new problems for
government–business relations, which we discuss in the next section.
Emerging issues – disruptive influences
The taxi industry in Australia was one of the last regulated monopolies to be
subjected to market liberalisation and disruptive technologies. As late as 2013,
a report on the Victorian taxi industry made no mention of the emerging ride-
sharing industry led globally by Uber, a multinational corporation. Ride-sharing
businesses are part of the growing sharing economy, where individuals use their
private assets, such as their cars or their houses (with businesses such as Airbnb),
to sell services using proprietary smartphone ‘apps’ that provide the marketing and
billing systems. While the Australian Capital Territory anticipated ride-sharing and
reformed the taxi industry, the states did not. Allegedly, Uber began operating
throughout Australia despite laws prohibiting unregulated businesses from oper-
ating in the point-to-point transport industry. This presented a complex problem
for the state governments. Consumers wanted to use ride-sharing because it was
cheaper and there was a perceived lack of customer service from the existing reg-
ulated taxi operators. Governments were forced to reform the industry, resulting
in protests from taxi operators, many of whom saw the value of their investment
in taxi licences reduced significantly with little time to adjust to the changing
conditions. State governments were forced to compensate taxi licence owners and
to implement packages to ameliorate the effects of industry disruption. Taxi oper-
ators have commenced a class action against Uber seeking further compensation
for lost business.
Unlike the approach adopted with sugar industry, the taxi industry disruption
was almost a complete surprise to regulators and taxi operators alike. This level of
disruption could have been avoided had the reforms been introduced years before,
but neither government nor the industry was prepared. The most striking part of
the introduction of ride-sharing was not so much the advances in technology, but
the way that the technology has been used globally to disrupt traditional industries.
While other jurisdictions have attempted to ban ride-sharing operators, consumer
demands are forcing governments to enable new services, thus challenging the
command and control approach where it matters most – at the ballot box.
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Conclusions
Businesses in Australia are becoming increasingly involved with the public and
civil society sectors in complex ways, and the government–business relationship
is increasing in importance. However, political instability, along with disruptive
technologies, mean the future of this relationship is uncertain. Further, emerging
social and political issues, such as the failure of affirmative action laws to address
gender inequalities in pay and the number of women in leadership positions in
the workplace, indicate that governments cannot solve these problems in isolation.
In the midst of decreasing trust in government in Australia, increased citizen
participation in policy making is seen as one way to improve the legitimacy of
government by bringing businesses and citizens into a system of co-governance.
Yet after a decade of political instability, and recent events suggesting that the
instability will continue, a significant departure from traditional approaches to
government–business relations is politically risky. While the study of government–
business relations may have peaked in the 1990s, it seems time for a revival of this
important field in political studies.
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Indigenous politics
Diana Perche and Jason O’Neil
Key terms/names
constitutional recognition, Country, First Nations, First Peoples, Indigenous,
invasion, the Intervention, self-determination, settler colonialism, sovereignty,
treaty/‘Makarrata’ (Yolŋu word)
Indigenous politics is possibly one of the most complex and misunderstood areas
of politics in Australia. Indigenous issues are often presented as particularly
contentious, and the divergence of interests between governments, business, the
community and First Peoples themselves is frequently emphasised. We know that
Indigenous issues do not have much salience in public opinion polls.1 Nevertheless,
political leaders at both state and federal levels have often sought to use Indigenous
issues to score points in public debates, demonstrating their ideological credentials.
Many debates in Indigenous affairs are framed around deep-seated conflicts over
values such as choice, equality, rights, responsibility, diversity, self-determination
and sovereignty.
The major parties have moved away from the bipartisanship that surrounded
the 1967 constitutional referendum and the passage of the Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth). Instead, over the past three decades, we have
seen divisive and confusing debates around the Mabo case and the recognition of
Perche, Diana, and Jason O’Neil (2019). Indigenous politics. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John
R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 Goot and Rowse 2007.
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native title;2 the creation and abolition of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC); the move towards ‘mainstreaming’ of Indigenous govern-
ment services after decades of self-determination; the acknowledgement of the
Stolen Generations culminating in the apology given by Prime Minister Kevin
Rudd in 2008; the Northern Territory Emergency Response (the Intervention),
affecting residents of remote communities, introduced by the federal government
under Liberal–National Coalition (Coalition) Prime Minister John Howard in
2007; and the current debate around constitutional recognition, treaty and a ‘Voice’
to parliament.
It is difficult for a relatively small minority to gain a genuine voice for their issues
in the mainstream media and government. It is also challenging to develop effective
policies without an understanding of First Nations culture and communities. This
chapter breaks down some of these difficulties by:
• exploring the identities of First Peoples and how they understand their place
within Australia
• considering the structural barriers to political participation by First Peoples
• briefly explaining the history of activism by First Peoples since colonisation.
We conclude by reflecting on whether there is one ‘Aboriginal movement’ or many,
and considering the significance of the Uluru statement from the heart and the
return to nation-based identities.
Who are the First Peoples in Australia?
It is useful to clarify the terminology that is used in this chapter. First Peoples in
Australia have been called many things by non-Indigenous people since the 18th
century. Some of these are now recognised as outdated, being based in theories of
racial difference. Even the terms ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘Torres Strait Islander’ describe
legally defined identities that have been imposed. Prior to the arrival of Europeans,
there were no ‘Aboriginal’ people in Australia – there were Dharug, Wiradjuri,
Larrakia, Noongar, Ngarrindjeri and so on, and these identities remain important
today. The authors of this chapter have elected to use the collective terms ‘First
Peoples’ and ‘First Nations’, in recognition of this history and the diversity of
First Peoples. The two terms are used interchangeably, depending on whether the
emphasis is on Indigenous Australians as collective peoples or as collective polities.
Legal definitions of identity are often debated, and sometimes disparaged, and it
is important to understand the ways in which identity can be externally imposed or
denied. In public policy, the ‘Commonwealth definition’ adopted by the government
in the late 1970s remains current for the purposes of determining eligibility for
2 Mabo v Queensland (No 2) [1992] HCA 23 (Mabo).
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Indigenous-specific programs and employment in identified positions. It determines
Indigenous status based on three criteria:
• that the person is of Aboriginal (or Torres Strait Islander) descent
• that they identify as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander
• that they are accepted as such by the community in which they live.3
These criteria have been difficult for some people to satisfy, particularly mem-
bers of the Stolen Generations who have lost links to their birth families and their
communities. For many First Peoples living in cities or country towns throughout
most of the 20th century, it was preferable to deny Aboriginal heritage or avoid
connecting with other Aboriginal people, out of fear of racism and social exclusion.4
The principle of self-identification is recognised in the United Nations Dec-
laration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which states: ‘Indigenous peoples have
the right to determine their own identity or membership in accordance with their
customs and traditions’.5 The damage done to First Nations through colonisation,
with the associated loss of land, culture, language and connection to kin, has made
this very difficult for many First Peoples, even today. This is sometimes reflected
in present-day conflicts over native title, recognition of traditional ownership and
governance of organisations and communities.
The importance of self-identification is clear when we consider the Common-
wealth’s official statistics on the size of the First Nations population in Australia.
The 2016 Census counted 649,171 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders – 2.8 per
cent of Australia’s population.6 While First Peoples make up over 25 per cent of
the population of the Northern Territory (NT) (over 58,248), the largest numerical
population lives in the states of New South Wales (NSW) (216,176) and Queensland
(186,482). Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are more likely than non-
Indigenous people to live in remote or very remote parts of Australia; nevertheless,
over one-third of the Indigenous population lives in capital cities.
There are hundreds of different First Nations in Australia, with different cultures,
traditions, lore and languages. First Peoples believe they were born out of ‘Country’.
Country represents a specific area of land and water, but is not reducible to just the
geography of the land and its flora and fauna. Each Nation belongs to and is a part
of Country, which they are responsible for, born from and live with in a mutually
beneficial relationship. All elements of a First People’s Country connected not only
with each other but also with other Peoples’ Country. In English, Country is an
expression of First Peoples’ understanding of the cosmos or ‘philosophy of existence’.7
3 Gardiner-Garden 2003.
4 Read 2016.
5 United Nations 2007, article 33.
6 ABS 2017. Note that the Australian Bureau of Statistics recognises that the Census undercounts
the Indigenous population, and projected estimates released in 2018 indicate that the population
in 2016 was 798,400 or 3.3% of the Australian population. See ABS 2018 for more detail.
7 Weir 2012, 3.
Australian Politics and Policy
392
While their cultures and languages differ widely, all First Peoples have a spirit-
ual connection to Country, to the land of their ancestors and its inhabitants. This
is because First Peoples believe that land, people and the laws that govern them
all were created at the same time by their ancestral creation beings. There is an
inherent understanding that all things are connected: First Peoples are connected to
Country through their ancestors, who were born from Country. These connections
are expressed here by Yolŋu elders:
Bawaka is our homeland, our Country. Country means the land, but it means so
much more too … When ngapaki [non-Indigenous people] come to Bawaka, we
ask Bawaka Country to welcome you. Bawaka is alive, it talks to us and cares for us
… We welcome you so that the land and the sea, the tides, the currents, the plants,
the animals, the winds, the rocks, the songs and the dreams recognise you.
And we are Bawaka Country too, Yolŋu people, our ancestors and our unborn
children, with our Yolŋu languages (dhäruk), our Yolŋu knowledge and our Yolŋu
Law (Rom). People are Country too … Country will welcome you as long as you
respect it, as long as you behave well and care for the land and the nature, care for
each other as family, as kin.
Country is everything in balance, everything connected as kin. Country
nourishes us, and we nourish Country. We can’t be separated from it … We live on
Country, we won’t be treated as if we have no strength, no knowledge, no Law, no
language. Country makes us strong. Country cares, Country nourishes, Country is
who we are. We are Yolŋu.8
This connection, and the wealth of Indigenous knowledges and science that come
with it, have largely been overlooked by governments throughout settler-colonial
history. Since the earliest days of colonisation, land has been seen as a commodity
to be exploited. This is the antithesis of First Peoples’ connection to Country – a
living entity that is to be cared for and cultivated only in accordance with its needs
and limitations.
An important aspect of the relationship between First Peoples and Country is
the cultural protocol of not speaking for someone else’s Country. First Peoples are
quick to reject anyone who purports to speak on their behalf. In its simplest form,
this is a recognition of each People’s custodianship over their own Country. In a
political context, every Nation has its own issues, priorities and internal politics;
local decision making involves a long process of consensus building to ensure that
the right decision is made and that it is done in a culturally appropriate way. At
an individual level, it is important that everybody’s voice is heard. Indigenous
governance is built on consensus-making: sitting down and talking through an issue
until there is a solution that everyone can accept. When this diversity of views is left
unrecognised, it can lead to issues of misrepresentation and inappropriate decision
8 Burarrwanga et al. 2014.
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making. This is often the case when governments fail to tailor their policies to local
needs or when one individual is called on to speak on behalf of all First Peoples.
Political activism and engagement
The arrival of European settlers in Sydney Cove in 1788 was not a peaceful process.
When understood from the standpoint of the clans of the Eora Nation, the first
to encounter the settlers as they established the British penal colony, it was the
beginning of an invasion. Despite being weakened by disease and malnutrition,
as their food sources were destroyed or made inaccessible, the First Peoples were
not passive, and violence spread as the settlers sought to extend their control over
the Country of neighbouring Nations. Violent battles, revenge attacks and reprisals
were common in the early years of the colony, and losses in what we now know as
the ‘Frontier Wars’ were severe.
By the 1830s, colonial governments had begun to move Aboriginal people away
from settlements, onto reserves and missions, under supervision, and eventually
established the regime of ‘protection’, under which Aboriginal people were segre-
gated, prevented from moving freely and subjected to ‘civilising and Christianising’
by missionaries and superintendents. Children with lighter skin or mixed parentage
were removed. First Peoples had their freedom of movement and freedom of
association constrained under the supervision of the Protection Boards. All of these
actions combined are now understood to be acts of genocide, seeking to ‘eliminate
the native’.9 First Peoples continued to resist the power of the settlers through this
period with overt political tactics, such as petitions, rebellions and formal
complaints to authorities about their treatment and conditions, often demanding the
right to own land, and through less visible actions, including maintaining culture
and language in secret.
By the end of the First World War, many reserves were closing in the south,
as land was reallocated to soldier settlement schemes and governments found
the costs of maintaining reserves and providing rations and housing increasingly
prohibitive. Many First Peoples were forced to live on the fringes of urban settle-
ments, relying on precarious low-paid employment. In the north, where frontier
conflicts continued into the 1920s, large reserves were still being used to restrict
the movements of First Peoples, and to suppress culture and language in coercive
and punitive environments, especially in Queensland. The impact of this violence,
racism and exclusion continues to affect many First Peoples today, in the form of
intergenerational trauma.
First Nations political activity was very much constrained by government, but
this does not mean that it was non-existent. On missions and reserves, resistance
took many forms, such as women’s ongoing efforts to preserve culture and kinship
9 Wolfe 2006.
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ties against the wishes of the authorities.10 Early political organisations, such as
the Australian Aboriginal Progressive Association, founded by Fred Maynard and
Tom Lacey, and later the Australian Aborigines’ League under the leadership of
William Cooper, Doug Nicholls and Margaret Tucker, called for land and citizenship
rights in the 1920s and 1930s. A significant protest was organised in Sydney on 26
January 1938, known as the ‘Day of Mourning’, disrupting celebrations of the 150th
anniversary of British settlement in Australia and prompting Prime Minister Joseph
Lyons to meet with a delegation of men and women to discuss their concerns. These
organisations received support from non-Indigenous activists, including Christian
groups, trade unionists and members of the Communist Party of Australia.
By the 1960s, activism around Indigenous issues had become much more visible,
and First Nations voices were increasingly being reported by the media. The
government’s policies of segregation and ‘protection’ were abandoned in favour of
‘assimilation’. Governments began to extend essential services and entitlements to
Aboriginal people, including access to education and health care and eligibility for
welfare payments.11 In return, First Peoples were expected to abandon their culture
and ‘learn’ to live their lives as white Australians did. These assimilationist policies
allowed greater freedom of movement and access to education and employment
for First Peoples, but their lack of equal treatment as Australian citizens became
increasingly obvious to the wider public. The Australian government faced inter-
national criticism over the poverty and exclusion of First Peoples.12 Meanwhile, the
civil rights movement – a coalition of activists including feminists, Christians and
trade unionists – focused on the campaign to give Aboriginal people ‘citizenship’ by
amending the Constitution.13 In reality, the 1967 referendum was more limited in its
impact: it removed the provision in the Constitution that excluded Aboriginal people
from being counted in the Census and gave the Commonwealth the power to legislate
on issues affecting Aboriginal people, a measure that activists hoped would override
the obvious neglect of First Peoples’ welfare by state and territory governments.14
The apparent achievement of formal political equality for First Peoples as a
result of the civil rights movement in the 1960s satisfied many white activists, but
it was soon clear that little would change the substantive inequality experienced
by First Peoples, particularly economic inequality and poverty.15 Land rights were
the subject of much of the political activism during this period, both in terms
of the rights of First Nations to make decisions about what happens on their
traditional lands and in terms of the potential for land ownership rights to be the
basis of economic development – a path out of poverty. The spiritual significance
of Country and its importance as the basis of law and social and cultural wellbeing
10 Goodall 1995.
11 Haebich 2008.
12 Clark 2008.
13 Chesterman 2005.
14 Attwood and Markus 2007.
15 Taffe 2005.
Indigenous politics
395
was also emphasised by First Peoples. A number of key flashpoints attracted atten-
tion in metropolitan areas, such as the Yolŋu protests over bauxite mining at
Yirrkala and the Gurindji walk-off at Wave Hill, where aggrieved station hands
demanded the restoration of their land.16
Land rights were also a significant part of the demands made by protesters at
the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, established in January 1972 on the lawns in front
of Parliament House in Canberra. For the Commonwealth, the struggle for land
rights was ultimately an issue that could not be ignored, and the Labor Party, under
the leadership of Gough Whitlam, worked on developing a policy to legislate for
land rights in the NT. This legislation was ultimately passed by Malcolm Fraser’s
Liberal government in 1976. Many vested interests, such as mining companies and
pastoralists, fiercely opposed the land rights legislation. They were supported by the
NT government in resisting claims. First Nations activists were obliged to contest
claims and defend hard-won rights for many years. As Arrente activist and former
Director of the Central Land Council Bruce (‘Tracker’) Tilmouth observed, ‘land
rights took a lot of getting, by a lot of people’.17
First Nations have continued to force issues onto the government’s agenda
through protest, advocacy and sustained campaigns. In many areas, activists have
worked for long periods of time to achieve recognition for significant issues,
struggling to gain acceptance of the problems in the face of government and media
indifference or active resistance from vested interests. For example, Meriam man
Eddie Koiki Mabo and others pursued their claim for recognition of ownership
over land in the Torres Strait in a series of court cases against the Queensland
government, which lasted for over a decade, and eventually resulted in the sig-
nificant Mabo case decided by the High Court in 1992 and the subsequent passing
of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) by the Keating Labor government.
In several cases, the Commonwealth government has been obliged to respond
to First Nations advocacy by establishing wide-reaching inquiries. These have
substantially changed the debate around Indigenous affairs over time. Notable
inquiries include the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (1991)
and the inquiry into the Stolen Generations (1997). Both allowed First Peoples to
be heard and reported. Both challenged accepted narratives of Australia, pointing
to the racism embedded in institutions, policy decisions and society. More recently,
the Royal Commission into the Detention and Protection of Children in the Nor-
thern Territory (2017) has shown that institutionalised racism has not diminished
in many parts of the Australian political system.18
16 Attwood 2003.
17 Tilmouth 1998.
18 Royal Commission into the Detention and Protection of Children in the Northern Territory
2017.
Australian Politics and Policy
396
Indigenous organisations and leadership
The 1960s and 1970s saw First Peoples push for self-determination, in recognition
of their unique status as Indigenous peoples and in pursuit of their own solutions
to disadvantage and dispossession. With cautious support from the Whitlam Labor
government, First Nations people put self-determination into practice by establish-
ing Indigenous organisations such as land councils, community-controlled health
services, charities and social enterprises. First Peoples needed legal entities to hold
the title for land rights and to negotiate with mining interests. Organisations like
the Aboriginal Legal Service and Aboriginal Medical Service were started by First
Peoples to meet their communities’ legal and medical needs. These organisations
seek to maintain independence from the government of the day, but many rely
on government funding to operate. Indigenous organisations are now widespread,
delivering services to local communities, employing substantial numbers of First
Peoples and acting as representative bodies.
Successful Indigenous organisations and businesses have empowered First
Peoples to attain new levels of wealth and success within Australia’s political and
economic system. Individuals who achieve this success are often identified as
Aboriginal or Indigenous ‘leaders’ by governments and the mainstream media.
This can lead to controversy because First Peoples identify very strongly with their
Elders. Elders are the leaders of Indigenous families and communities. People do
not become Elders simply by virtue of age. Although they may garner respect due
to seniority, they will not be recognised by the wider community without a level
of cultural knowledge and leadership.19 It is this cultural knowledge that is the
source of authority within First Nations. Elders are respected as knowledge holders
– the custodians of knowledge passed down to them by their own Elders about the
proper way to do things according to obligations to Country and lore.
Leadership is a contentious issue in Indigenous politics.20 It cannot be assumed
that a democratically elected leader holds legitimate authority in an Indigenous
context. This is one reason why ATSIC was subject to criticism by First Peoples: the
commissioners were elected in a democratic process but were not seen as legitimate
representatives of the regions and peoples they served.21 When governance is
structured to meet the needs of the settler-colonial state, it is easily critiqued as
denying First Nations sovereignty, and the cultural authority held by Elders and
Traditional Owners over their Country. Media and government departments need
to be mindful of singling out Indigenous individuals because of their success or
qualifications within the Australian system, as they may lack cultural authority
within the community. This is important because governments have a reputation
of woefully inadequate consultation with First Nations. Finding the right people
to talk to – those who have the authority and knowledge relevant to the issue –
19 Yunupingu 2016.
20 Maddison 2009.
21 Smith 2001, 168–9.
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can be a difficult task. This is the heart of the problem of treating First Nations as
a broad Aboriginal or Indigenous population, rather than as a diverse collection
of communities with identities independent of each other and of the broader
Australian population.
Case example: Seed Indigenous Youth Climate Network and climate justice
The relationship between First Peoples and Country means that environmental
issues are understood as essential to protecting Country, culture and First Nations
livelihoods. Despite this, the voices of First Nations people are often absent in
debates on environmental issues. Seed Indigenous Youth Climate Network (Seed)
is an organisation founded in 2014 by First Nations young people that works to
empower First Nations communities and individuals to campaign against fossil
fuel extraction on their Country and for climate justice. Seed is concerned with
climate ‘justice’ because climate change disproportionally affects those who have
contributed the least to carbon emissions, including young First Nations people.22
Seed has been involved in two major campaigns. They have supported First
Nations communities in the NT to learn about the impacts of hydraulic fracturing
(fracking) and to campaign against fracking being allowed on their Country. Seed
has also collaborated with other organisations in the Stop Adani movement,
opposing the Carmichael coal mine being built on Wangan and Jagalingou
Country.
The model of activism used by Seed involves community-based education of
First Nations peoples on the potential impacts of fossil fuels on Country; training
First Nations young people to be grassroots campaigners and elevate the voice of First
Peoples; collaborating with other environmental organisations to raise awareness of
their own campaigns; and aspiring to make climate change an Indigenous issue.
The work of Seed and young First Peoples campaigning for climate justice is
giving a voice to communities that are both the most invested in the wellbeing of
Country and the first to feel the impacts of climate change.
Barriers to engagement and participation
Like other minorities, First Peoples face considerable structural barriers to full
participation in the Australian political system. It is important to recognise that,
in the case of the First Nations, these structures have been firmly entrenched since
the earliest days of European colonisation. Settler law and institutions took no
account of the existence of First Peoples, deliberately ignored their ownership of the
land and denied their sovereignty. In this section, we will briefly consider some of
the factors that continue to prevent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples
22 Seed Indigenous Youth Climate Network n.d.
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from enjoying political equality. These include obstacles to political representation,
institutional impediments to accountability and the role of the media.
The Australian Constitution explicitly excluded Aboriginal people from the
newly formed political community, and First Peoples were not included in the
constitutional conventions leading to Federation. Aboriginal people were not given
the right to vote in federal elections until 1962; even after that date, voting was
not compulsory for Aboriginal people. The franchise for Aboriginal citizens had
been inconsistently applied and even occasionally withdrawn by state governments
throughout the first half of the 20th century. Under pressure from the Common-
wealth, all state jurisdictions legislated the right to vote and to stand for election for
First Peoples during the 1960s, with Queensland the last to conform in 1965.23 In
some jurisdictions, little effort was made to encourage enrolment until compulsory
voting was finally extended to Indigenous people in 1984.24
Even after gaining the vote, it proved extremely difficult for First Peoples to
gain representation in parliaments. The relatively small First Nations population is
scattered across many electorates. The majoritarian electoral system guarantees that
a substantial number of electorates are ‘safe seats’, where a large majority of voters
favour one or the other major party and minority voices are easily overlooked.
Furthermore, the dominance of the major parties means that candidates most often
rely on party support to get elected, and Indigenous people have, until recently,
only very rarely been preselected by major parties to run for election, especially
for winnable seats. The first Indigenous member of the federal parliament was
Neville Bonner, Liberal senator for Queensland, who served from 1971 to 1983.
Aden Ridgeway was the second, elected in 1998 as senator for NSW, representing
the Australian Democrats, and serving one term. The first Indigenous member of
the House of Representatives was not elected until 2010, when Liberal candidate
Ken Wyatt, a Noongar man, became the member for the Western Australian (WA)
seat of Hasluck. The number of Indigenous members of parliament at the state and
territory levels remains very small, with the exception of the NT.25
The lack of parliamentary representation for First Nations has received critical
attention in recent years, and political parties have much work to do in ensuring
that First Peoples are preselected as candidates. The 2016 federal election was
notable because a record number of 17 Indigenous candidates stood for election
across the nation, of which 11 were preselected by either Labor or the Coalition.26
The 2019 federal election saw 22 First Nations candidates campaigning, though
only eight of these were running for major parties, and few in winnable seats.27
23 AEC 2017; Attwood 2003.
24 Goot 2006.
25 Gobbett 2017.
26 Morgan and Mandybur 2016; Perche 2018.
27 Perche 2019.
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Following the 2016 election, albeit briefly, the number of Indigenous members
of parliament rose to a peak of five, including Ken Wyatt (Liberal, Hasluck) and
Linda Burney (Labor, Barton) in the House of Representatives, and Patrick Dodson
(Labor, WA), Malarndirri McCarthy (Labor, NT) and Jacqui Lambie (Jacqui
Lambie Network, Tasmania) in the Senate.
Once elected, the challenges of working effectively in a white institution can
be enormous. The adversarial debating system, the majoritarian electoral system,
which allows little room for consensus building, and the dominance of the two
major parties, which frames issues as binary decisions, all work against the First
Peoples’ traditional forms of decision making. Maddison observes the ‘represent-
ational dilemmas’ experienced by First Nations members of parliament, as elected
representatives are constrained by party discipline and are not free to speak against
the party line, even on issues that may negatively affect First Peoples.28 Nor can they
easily represent the diverse interests of all First Peoples, including those outside
their own electorates. The need to manage expectations in the electorate is often
challenging.
Despite these constraints, the presence of First Nations members of parliament
is significant. They reflect the presence of First Nations people in the wider com-
munity and give the otherwise white institution greater legitimacy. First Nations
members of parliament take opportunities to present different perspectives in
debates and committee inquiries. This has proven particularly important in the
Senate estimates committee process, where Labor Senators McCarthy and Dodson
have used their practical understanding of the impact of government policy in
remote parts of Australia to interrogate ministers and bureaucrats working in
Indigenous affairs and to hold the government more effectively to account for the
impact of its policies in Indigenous communities. Finally, there is undoubtedly
strength in numbers, and solidarity can stretch across the parliamentary chamber,
as the member for Barton, Linda Burney, noted in 2018:
The wonderful thing is that we [the Labor Party] have a First Nations caucus, and
we have a very good relationship amongst the Indigenous MPs, no matter what
part of Parliament we’re on. We have a good relationship collectively, and we meet
informally. That’s the mechanics, and the framework we’re working in.29
Parliamentary representation is not enough on its own to ensure that govern-
ments are held to account for decisions affecting First Peoples. Indeed, detrimental
policies are frequently made by governments driven by ideological agendas or
bureaucratic misunderstanding of the issues. The Commonwealth government’s
winding back of native title law and the abolition of ATSIC under Prime Minister
John Howard are notable examples, as are the Labor government’s decisions under
28 Maddison 2010.
29 Burney 2018.
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Prime Ministers Julia Gillard and Kevin Rudd to dismantle the successful Com-
munity Development Employment Program and refuse to consider compensation
for members of the Stolen Generations following the apology in 2008. In each
case, government policy reflected dominant settler ideological views about the
inappropriateness of ‘separate’ or ‘different’ treatment of First Peoples compared to
the non-Indigenous population, and dismissed calls for redress or recognition of
the special status of First Nations as sovereign peoples with specific rights. A more
recent example is the Community Development Program introduced by the Abbott
Coalition government, a punitive form of ‘Work for the Dole’ targeting people living
in remote parts of Australia, with poorly designed ‘work-related activities’ alongside
severe penalties for failing to attend the activities five days a week, all year round.
In the most striking example, the Howard government’s decision to impose an
intervention on remote communities in the NT was rushed through parliament
in 2007, with no opportunity to consider the perspectives of First Nations and
those affected, in a crisis-driven response to the problem of child sexual abuse in
some remote Indigenous communities. The extreme and widely criticised response
included compulsory welfare quarantining, enforced health checks and school
attendance for children, alcohol bans, increased police presence, changes to housing
tenure, abolition of the permit system controlling access to Aboriginal-owned land
and compulsory acquisition of leases over townships on Aboriginal land. The initial
rollout of the Intervention included army and police officers and the installation of
a ‘Government Business Manager’ in each community.
The targeted nature of these measures required the government to suspend the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), underlining the illegitimate nature of the
Intervention. For some observers, the Howard government appeared opportunistic,
using the cover of a ‘crisis’ in remote communities to justify the rapid imple-
mentation of unpopular and far-reaching changes that it had wanted to introduce,
in particular the imposition of township leases and the removal of permits
controlling access to Aboriginal land.30 Others noted the lack of evidence base
for the policy measures31 and the absence of logical connections between the
imposed policies and the problem of child abuse that had been identified in the
original report that triggered the crisis – the Ampe akelyernemane meke mekarle
(‘Little children are sacred’) report.32 The Howard government lost the election
immediately after rolling out the Intervention in the prescribed communities, but
the incoming Rudd government chose to extend it by another five years and expand
its reach to more communities, despite criticism and clear opposition from many of
the First Peoples affected.33
30 Turner and Watson 2007.
31 Behrendt 2007.
32 Anderson and Wild 2007.
33 Altman and Russell 2012.
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Sullivan explains that this lack of accountability is because the intended audience
is not the First Peoples, but rather:
The wishes of white Australia, the context in which those wishes are formed
largely through mass media images and reporting, and the ability of government
to convince white Australia of adequate funding, appropriate programs and
commensurate performance are significantly more influential than the voices of
Aboriginal citizens. One of the greatest inhibitors of Aboriginal development is
that Aboriginal policy is formulated for the non-Aboriginal public.34
Yolŋu Elder and leader Galarrwuy Yunupingu has observed the same phenomenon
over decades of pursuing legislative and policy reform for his people, engaging with
both Labor and Liberal governments. He points to the deeper settler logic that
prevents genuine responses to First Nations demands for change:
All the prime ministers I have known have been friendly to me, but I mark them
all hard. None of them has done what I asked, or delivered what they promised …
For a prime minister is beholden to his party and to the parliament, which in turn
is held by the Australian people. And the Australian people seem to disapprove of
my simple truths, or the idea of proper reconciliation. The Australian people do
not wish to recognise me for who I am – with all that this brings – and it is the
Australian people whom the politicians fear. The Australian people know that their
success is built on the taking of the land, in making the country their own, which
they did at the expense of so many languages and ceremonies and songlines – and
people – now destroyed.35
The challenge of holding governments to account for policies targeting First
Peoples is even more complex given the overlapping responsibilities of the Common-
wealth and state and territory governments and the opaque nature of federal–state
financial arrangements, which see Commonwealth funds disbursed to states and
territories to spend on disadvantaged populations, without any clear lines of account-
ability.36 The perennial issue of overcrowded housing on Aboriginal-owned land
in the NT is a clear example of the blame-shifting that can occur as funds are
allocated by one level of government and spent by another, with poor outcomes.
Similarly, the Commonwealth’s ‘Closing the Gap’ policy, designed to close gaps in
health, employment, education and other outcomes between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people, has failed to meet many of the targets originally set in 2008, but
responsibility for the failure is difficult to trace due to the multiple departments and
agencies involved, across two levels of government.
34 Sullivan 2011, 76.
35 Yunupingu 2016, 29.
36 Dillon and Westbury 2007.
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The attention paid by mainstream media to Indigenous affairs is minimal, as
a rule, with occasional bursts of intense, almost voyeuristic scrutiny.37 This is, in
part, because assumptions are made in newsrooms that stories about Indigenous
affairs are not of interest to urban audiences on the east coast.38 Few media outlets
employ journalists who specialise in Indigenous affairs. Furthermore, journalists’
understanding of the lives and circumstances of those living in remote Indigenous
communities is usually extremely limited, given the lack of ongoing contact and
time spent in the communities, along with language and cultural barriers.39 Often
this will mean that the government’s framing of an issue can go unquestioned, and
few Indigenous voices are directly reported.
This distance between mainstream media and First Peoples has consequences
in terms of the wider public’s understanding of the issues. Sensationalist coverage
focusing on dysfunction, alcohol consumption, violence, welfare dependence and
poverty is often dominant and entrenches racist stereotypes without providing an
understanding of the context.40 This creates an environment in which extreme and
paternalist policies can be imposed with little backlash from voters. Researchers
Kerry McCallum and Holly Reid have observed the particular influence of The
Australian newspaper. As one of the few mainstream media outlets choosing to
focus on Indigenous issues, the newspaper uses a ‘campaigning’ approach, framing
stories about Indigenous communities in ways that emphasise individual respon-
sibility, moral failure and crisis, thereby endorsing government action such as
the Intervention. The newspaper also privileges the voices of a small number of
conservative Indigenous leaders.
First Peoples are increasingly using special interest media and social media to
expand the range of voices in public debate. Indigenous newspapers, such as the
National Indigenous Times and the Koori Mail, community radio stations and the
government-funded National Indigenous TV (NITV) are presenting First Nations
perspectives and voices and covering stories not receiving attention elsewhere.
The @IndigenousX rotating Twitter account and blog also makes a significant
contribution to social and political debates, creating awareness of Indigenous
knowledge and perspectives and providing an independent communication
channel for a diverse range of views. First Nations journalists are also increasingly
taking up positions in mainstream newsrooms and studios, articulating viewpoints
that rarely receive public attention.41
37 Langton 2008.
38 Waller 2013.
39 Waller 2013.
40 McCallum and Reid 2012.
41 Moran 2019.
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One movement or many?
Demands from First Peoples for change have taken many different shapes through-
out Australia’s political history. The 1970s saw the birth of a strong pan-Aboriginal
movement,42 inspired by the civil rights and Black Power movements in the USA.
First Peoples collaborated as a nationwide collective to campaign for land rights, self-
determination, treaty and sovereignty. This movement instilled a strong Aboriginal
identity in many First Peoples. Following the Howard government’s dismantling of
ATSIC and rejection of self-determination in favour of ‘practical reconciliation’, there
has been a strong emphasis on engaging with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
individuals through increasingly neoliberal policies. At the same time, in opposition
to the one-size-fits-all approach of government and in a resurgence of First Nations
identities and political culture, the emphasis has shifted from the pan-Aboriginal
movement of the 1970s back to a focus on localised Nation-based identities,
recognising the sovereignty of each Nation over their own Country.
First Nations sovereignty remains the great unanswered question of Australia’s
colonisation.43 First Peoples claim sovereignty as distinct political communities,
while also pursuing their rights as citizens of Australia. This can be a source
of conflict and confusion in Indigenous politics.44 First Nations have continuing
sovereignty over their Country, which exists alongside and arguably in contestation
with the sovereignty of the Crown. The High Court of Australia has refused to
consider First Nations as sovereign;45 to do so would be to challenge the sovereignty
from which the High Court receives its authority.
Sovereignty is often understood in international politics as the power to exercise
supreme and unrivalled authority within a given territory. As Falk and Martin
explain, most First Nations’ demands for recognition of sovereignty do not take
this form. Rather, they rely on a notion of ‘internal sovereignty’, which is shared,
recognised and negotiated within a geographic area.46 This is concerned with
creating the space for First Nations communities to protect their culture, law and
traditions and to exercise autonomy with respect to matters that are important to
them, such as economic development, land resource management, protection of
cultural heritage and education.47 Internal sovereignty does not seek to displace
non-Indigenous people but does demand recognition of the identity and authority
of First Nations to make decisions for their own people. First Nations hold sover-
eignty not as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander individuals, nor as a single
pan-Aboriginal movement, but as hundreds of distinct polities across the continent.
42 Burgmann 2003, 44–84.
43 Reynolds 2006.
44 Maddison 2009, 44–5.
45 Coe v Commonwealth [1979] HCA 68; Coe v Commonwealth (No 2) [1993] HCA 42; Mabo
[1992] HCA 23.
46 Falk and Martin 2007.
47 Behrendt 2003.
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For this sovereignty to be exercised, it needs to be recognised at the local and
regional level, acknowledging the authority of the respective Nations.
The return to Nation-based identities has also seen a reinvigoration of the
treaty movement. Some of Australia’s state governments have recognised this reality
and begun negotiating with First Nations on a government-to-government basis.
While there is a clear need to redefine the relationship between First Nations
and government, the path forward is unclear. There have been calls for self-
determination and treaty for at least 50 years. First Nations and individuals have
their own articulations of what sovereignty looks like, what constitutes real ‘self-
determination’ and the contents and parties to any treaty or treaties.48 The following
case examples examine two prominent models: state-based treaty-making and a
federal constitutionally enshrined ‘Voice’. Both models are valuable examples of
how the settler-colonial state can renegotiate its relationship with First Nations
within the framework of a liberal federalist representative democracy.
Case example: Victorian treaty process
The Victorian Labor government led by Premier Daniel Andrews committed to
treaty negotiations in February 2016 and has engaged in a process of consultations
with First Peoples in Victoria through Self-Determination Forums, Aboriginal
Victoria Forums, a Community Assembly and the establishment of the Victorian
Treaty Advancement Commission. Jill Gallagher AO, a Gunditjmara woman, was
appointed as Treaty Advancement Commissioner. Her work involves advancing
the treaty process and establishing an Aboriginal representative body. In February
2019, the representative body was named the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria.
The role of the assembly is to establish the negotiation framework for treaty,
including ‘what is on and off the negotiating table, and who can negotiate’.49
The First Peoples’ Assembly will be made up of 28 Traditional Owners. Eleven
seats are reserved for the 11 recognised Traditional Owner groups. The other 17
will be democratically elected by all Victorian First Peoples over the age of 16.50
The process is the first of its kind in Australia and has garnered a great deal
of attention inside and outside Victoria. Concerns have been expressed about the
representation of First Nations’ interests in the process, whether treaty negotiations
would survive a change of government and the risk of Commonwealth intervention.
Specifically, the process has been critiqued by First Peoples for not being a nation-
based treaty process, with the suggestion that peak bodies currently recognised by
the government are afforded greater attention than nations themselves. Also, as
the process exists through government policy and legislation alone, it can easily be
48 For an example of an early discussion of First Nations sovereignty and a draft treaty, see Gilbert
1988.
49 Victorian Treaty Advancement Commission 2018a.
50 Victorian Treaty Advancement Commission 2018b.
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altered or abolished by a successive state government or a Commonwealth govern-
ment exercising the races power under the Australian Constitution.51 However,
with the Andrews government securing a second term and the assembly formed in
mid-2019, the Victorian process is gaining momentum.
The Victorian treaty process began at the height of the constitutional recog-
nition movement, which has dominated Indigenous politics at the national level
for a decade. Constitutional recognition has been critiqued as a purely symbolic
reform, palatable to the general population but distracting from the real issues and
concerns of First Peoples.52 The revitalisation of the treaty movement and the Uluru
statement from the heart are both emblematic of the true desires of First Peoples:
recognition of their sovereignty as the First Nations of Australia and substantive law
reform that empowers First Peoples to self-determine their future.
Case example: constitutional recognition and the Uluru statement from the heart
The Uluru statement from the heart holds a unique position in Indigenous politics.
Its origins are in the constitutional recognition movement. Constitutional recog-
nition of Australia’s First Peoples initially came to mainstream attention in 2007,
when Prime Minister John Howard committed his government to symbolic
recognition. Prime Minister Julia Gillard created an expert panel that conducted
over 250 consultations around the nation and delivered its final report in 2012.53
The movement for constitutional change was pushed by Recognise, a government
and corporate-sponsored campaign run by Reconciliation Australia. The expert
panel was followed by a Referendum Council, which had bipartisan support but
came as a direct response to widespread calls for greater First Peoples involvement
in the process.
The Referendum Council held 12 First Nations consultations during 2016–17,
inspired by the original constitutional conventions of the late 19th century. These
consultations were unique, as they were Indigenous-designed and led. During the
Regional Dialogue process, 1,200 First Nations delegates were consulted, making
it ‘the most proportionately significant consultation process that has ever been
undertaken with First Peoples’.54
Each Regional Dialogue selected representatives to attend the First Nations
National Constitutional Convention at Uluru in May 2017. At the Uluru convention,
representatives rejected outright the idea of symbolic recognition, which was the
major concern of the Recognise campaign. First Peoples instead opted for sub-
stantive reforms to the Australian legal system in the form of a staged process:
51 Section 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution (the races power) was amended following the
1967 referendum to provide the Commonwealth with the ability to create legislation specific to
First Peoples.
52 O’Neil 2014.
53 Expert Panel on Constitutional Recognition of Indigenous Australians 2012.
54 Referendum Council 2017, 10.
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Figure 1 Denise Bowden, CEO of the Yothu Yindi Foundation, signing the Uluru statement
from the heart. Source: Australian Human Rights Commission 2017.
• A First Nations Voice to parliament, enshrined in the Australian Constitution
• A truth-telling commission, designed around local processes of examining the
untold and suppressed histories of settler–First Nations relations
• A Makarrata Commission, using the Yolŋu word for an agreement between
parties after a struggle.
These claims were outlined in the Uluru statement from the heart, a document add-
ressed to the Australian people. This has been summarised as: voice, treaty, truth.55
The Referendum Council’s final report summarised its findings and supported
the call for a First Nations Voice to parliament.56 Both the Uluru statement from the
heart and the final report received hostile responses from the Coalition government
under Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Parliamentarians attempted to reinvig-
orate the issue of symbolic recognition in the Australian Constitution, holding a
Senate inquiry into constitutional recognition that reported in 2018.
55 Appleby and Davis 2018.
56 Referendum Council 2017.
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First Nations leaders and activists have been working to gain bipartisan support
for a referendum on a First Nations Voice to parliament, after gaining a commit-
ment from the Labor Party in late 2018. The purpose of the First Nations Voice is
to provide a constitutionally enshrined voice for First Peoples within the Australian
political system, to combat the decades of policy failures and lack of substantive
consultation with First Peoples on Indigenous issues.
Conclusions
This chapter focused on the complex nature of Indigenous politics, and the diversity
of First Nations across the Australian continent. Historically, governments have
failed to take into account the political culture and leadership of First Peoples, pre-
ferring policies that are one-size-fits-all and often based on a poor understanding
of local priorities. This has led to decades of policy failures, allowing for the contin-
uation of socio-economic disadvantage and denying First Nations’ culture, law,
knowledge, experiences and aspirations.
First Peoples have a long history of political activism and resistance, pre-dating
the formal recognition of political equality and the right to vote in the 1960s.
Adapting to changing circumstances and the restrictions imposed by governments,
First Peoples have maintained a number of consistent demands over a long period:
land rights, self-determination, treaty and recognition of First Nations sovereignty
arising from their continuing obligations and connection to Country. The struggle
against institutional racism and social exclusion has also been an enduring theme.
Activism has led to significant achievements in terms of social and political change,
but First Peoples are forced to work within racialised institutional structures.
Indigenous politics has the potential to change for the better and to move
away from the history of failed policy making and denial of First Nations as self-
determining political actors. The Uluru statement from the heart presents an
important opportunity for substantive reform at the national, state and territory
level, and the move towards treaty negotiations in certain jurisdictions shows
another promising path forward. It is clear that First Peoples in Australia are deter-
mined to engage as equals in the political process and work with all Australian
citizens to develop a new, more inclusive political culture, reflecting the contem-
porary realities of First Peoples, settlers and migrants sharing the Australian story.
In the words of the Uluru statement from the heart, all Australians are invited to
‘walk with us in a movement of the Australian people for a better future’. It is now
up to governments to find appropriate ways to respond.
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The rise and fall of multiculturalism and public support for multiculturalism in
Australia has historically been influenced by social issues, such as public concerns
about globalisation, national identity, immigration, social cohesion and population
growth. In contrast to other settler countries, multiculturalism was originally
developed to dismantle the White Australia policy and provide the legislative and
policy foundations for supporting migrants from non-English-speaking back-
grounds (NESB). In Australia, multiculturalism has focused primarily on the needs
of migrants and their right to express their cultural identities. Attempts to include
Indigenous Australians in multicultural policy have been met with caution due to
the concern of conflating issues regarding Indigenous Australians (especially with
regards to land rights, constitutional recognition and reconciliation) with distinctly
migrant experiences.1
Multiculturalism is underpinned by a vast body of philosophical literature on
modern liberalism and cultural diversity that examines the concept of a ‘politics
Juliet Pietsch (2019). Multicultural Australia. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
1 Parliament of Australia 2011.
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of difference’.2 Kymlicka, for instance, explores the importance of collective rights
to self-determination. These rights can be held by individuals or groups, such as
minority nationals or Indigenous peoples.3 Kymlicka argues that cultural group
rights are needed, on the one hand, to protect a cultural community from forced
segregation and, on the other, to provide enough flexibility to protect other
communities from forced integration (i.e. Indigenous peoples).4
Countries have approached multiculturalism differently due to their unique
historical, legal and cultural circumstances. For instance, in Canada multicultur-
alism was introduced to resolve tensions between French- and English-speaking
Canadians. There was a much stronger emphasis on the institutionalisation of
multiculturalism in Canada than in Australia, which was strengthened in 1982 with
the inclusion of protections for Canada’s multicultural heritage in the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. This was followed by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1988
which aimed to address the under-representation of minority groups in parliament.
In contrast, Australia has never adopted a legal framework for multiculturalism.
Instead, it has focused on improving social and economic outcomes for migrants
from NESB. Before the introduction of multiculturalism in Australia, migrants
from NESB struggled with low levels of English literacy and were often the victims
of racism and discrimination due to the enduring impact of the White Australia
policy.
This chapter focuses on the development of multiculturalism in Australia, as
distinct from other countries around the world. The first section of the chapter
traces the development of multicultural Australia in three distinct phases: 1) inte-
gration of non-British postwar European migrants; 2) social justice and equality;
and 3) citizenship and civics. The second section of the chapter examines public
attitudes towards multiculturalism over time, drawing on findings from the Aus-
tralian Election Studies, and reflects on the meaning of multicultural Australia in
the 21st century.
The development of multicultural Australia
After the Great Depression and the Second World War, Australia moved towards
an ethnically plural program, concomitant with a significant decline in arrivals
in Australia of migrants with British origins. By the 1940s, it was clear that
immigration from Britain was not going to be sufficient to achieve economic
growth in Australia. Therefore, Australia’s immigration resources were diverted
from Britain to the refugee issues in western and southern Europe. To assist with
2 Faulks 1998; Favell 1998; Isin 2008; Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Levey and
Modood 2009.
3 Kymlicka 1995; Kymlicka 1989.
4 Kymlicka 1995.
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overpopulation and fears of political instability in Europe, Australia was persuaded
by the International Refugee Organisation to accept large numbers of people
displaced by the war. After the Second World War, the decision to initiate a
program of mass migration was announced in the Commonwealth parliament by
the first minister for immigration, Arthur Calwell.
Australia introduced the assisted European migration program, which began
in 1947. The Australian government was initially hesitant to admit Greek and
Italian refugees because they were seen as culturally different and politically suspect
due to the influence of communism in their home countries.5 However, due to
the demand for labour, the program eventually accepted 170,000 refugees from
countries including Malta (1948), Italy and the Netherlands (1951), Germany,
Austria and Greece (1952), Spain (1958), Turkey (1967) and former Yugoslavia
(1970).6 European immigration peaked in the 1960s, with a total of 875,000 assisted
passages.7 Overall, the European immigration program helped to increase the size
of the workforce and contributed to postwar economic expansion.8 Postwar
migrants formed the backbone of the manufacturing sector and the Snowy
Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme. In fact, it could be argued that the Snowy
Mountains Scheme, which attracted over 100,000 migrants from Europe under
assisted migration schemes, was the beginning of multicultural Australia.
In this period, the ideology behind the European immigration program was
‘assimilationism’. Non-British migrants were encouraged to naturalise and
assimilate.9 In 1945, Arthur Calwell, the minister for immigration in 1945–49,
proposed that ‘Australian nationality’ be equated with Australian citizenship to
facilitate immigration and deportation, the issue of passports and the represen-
tation of Australians abroad.10 Calwell proposed that to qualify as an Australian
national one should be:
• a person born in Australia who has not acquired another nationality
• a British subject not born in Australia who was not a prohibited immigrant at
his time of entry and has resided in Australia for five years
• a person naturalised in Australia who has residence of five years
• the wife of an Australian national who is herself a British subject resident in
Australia, or
• a child born outside Australia whose father, at the time of birth, was an
Australian national.11
5 Vasta 2005.
6 Jupp 1992.
7 Jupp 2002, 23.
8 Jakubowicz 1989.
9 Jakubowicz 1989; Jordens 1997.
10 Dutton 1999.
11 Dutton 1999, 14.
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Following the 1947 Commonwealth Conference on Nationality and Citizenship,
the Commonwealth nations agreed on a system of nationality and citizenship. In
1949, Australian citizenship came into being after the enactment of the Nationality
and Citizenship Act 1948 (Cth). Citizenship was seen as a crucial component of
nation building.12 However, Australian citizenship was still associated with being a
British subject.
The conception of citizenship based on a sense of national belonging led to
different levels of discrimination against non-British migrants. For example, non-
British subjects could only obtain citizenship after five years, whereas British
subjects only had to wait one year to obtain citizenship.13 In terms of eligibility for
citizenship, there was also discrimination between Asian migrants and European
migrants. For instance, by 1958, Asian migrants were required to live in Australia
for 15 years or more before becoming eligible for naturalisation under the
Migration Act 1958 (Cth). By contrast, European migrants only had to wait five
years for naturalisation.14
At the 1952 citizenship convention, the minister for immigration, Harold Holt,
referred to the importance of restrictions in Australia’s immigration policy. He
stated that restrictions were not based on racial superiority, but rather on differ-
ences between cultures that make successful assimilation difficult.15 Although Holt
was mainly referring to migrants from Asian backgrounds, this discrimination was
also directed towards southern European migrants, who were often provided little
or no support for their resettlement. For example, in 1952, the Department of
Immigration’s social workers reported severe distress among non-British migrants,
where shelters for the homeless were unable to cope and thousands were left
sleeping in parks.16
During the 1960s, Australia entered a recession with large-scale unemployment
among the thousands of migrants recently arrived in the country.17 Welfare
departments provided low-level services but were not properly equipped to cope
with the large numbers of people from NESB. For example, during this time,
professional interpreters were minimal within government services.18 The
problems associated with settlement for all migrants from NESB and the need
for them to assimilate and conform to a culturally different environment created
a build-up of pressure on the government to change its migrant settlement and
welfare policy. By the end of the 1960s, it was evident that no single government
department could meet all the settlement needs of migrants. The government
12 Jordens 1995.
13 Zappala and Castles 2000.
14 Brawley 1995.
15 Jordens 1997, 149.
16 Jordens 1997, 13.
17 Jakubowicz 1989.
18 Jakubowicz 1989; Jupp 1966.
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suggested that migrant settlement services should be dispersed into other govern-
ment departments and agencies.19
During the late 1960s, many European migrants experienced poor working
conditions and poor health associated with unhealthy working environments and
unemployment.20 James Jupp’s Arrivals and departures (1966) provided significant
insight into anti-assimilationist complaints and migrant welfare problems. Jupp
criticised the lack of government housing, the lack of pensions for elderly migrants,
the high number of migrants in low-skilled employment, the lack of recognition of
overseas qualifications, poor protection of migrant workers by Australian unions
and the lack of English-language courses and available interpreters.21
Other researchers also highlighted the disadvantaged situation of migrants in
Australia and contributed to the public debate on the problems of assimilation.22
For example, Jerzy Zubrzycki argued for a commitment to cultural diversity
through promoting the teaching of foreign languages.23 Jean Martin also high-
lighted the importance of ethnic pluralism at numerous conferences. Martin argued
that migrant groups existed in varying degrees of isolation because there were
no mechanisms to help them settle into Australian life. Martin, an advocate of
ethnic pluralism, blamed the assimilation policy and the ‘de-valuation’ and ‘non-
recognition’ of migrant institutions and cultures for the problems that migrants had
to endure.24 Between 1969 and 1971, integrationist migrant welfare programs were
initiated, which aided migrant English-language competence, social mobility, social
integration and the improvement of migrant welfare services.25
In 1973, the Labor government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam, promoted a reconceptualisation of Australian national identity in terms
of multiculturalism. The term ‘multiculturalism’ was borrowed from Canada but
applied differently in the Australian context. The Labor minister for immigration,
Al Grassby, identified that nearly a million migrants had not taken up Australian
citizenship because of their experiences of racism and discrimination. Grassby
suggested encouraging the retention of social and cultural differences among non-
British Australians. In response, the Australian Citizenship Bill 1973 (Cth) was
introduced in 1973, reflecting a new national identity that was anti-racist and
challenged assimilationist values.26 The focus of citizenship shifted from culture
and British inheritance to the principle of territoriality – that is, residence on the
territory of the Australian state.27
19 Jordens 1997.
20 Castles et al. 1988.
21 Jupp 1966.
22 Price 1971; Price 1966; Zubrzycki 1995; Zubrzycki 1968.
23 Zubrzycki 1995; Zubrzycki 1968.
24 Lopez 2000.
25 Lopez 2000, 129.
26 Davidson 1997.
27 Zappala and Castles 2000, 40.
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In 1974, the government also introduced a Bill to combat racial discrimination
and ratify the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, to which Australia had been a signatory since 1966 but had not
ratified. The Bill was passed by both houses of the Commonwealth parliament on
4 June 1975 and became the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The legislation
made it unlawful to discriminate against a person because of their nationality, race,
colour or ethnicity. The passing of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 formally
ended the White Australia policy. However, that policy had such a significant
impact on the public imagination and sense of national community and identity
that its effects lingered for decades afterwards.
The Whitlam government attempted to fill the void left by the old nationalism,
and redefined the concept of Australia’s ‘national community’.28 The new national
identity was to be more inclusive, embracing liberal humanist values, progressive
ideals and overall social reform.29 The success of the Whitlam government at the
1974 election represented popular endorsement of the changes made by Gough
Whitlam. For example, Murray Goot found that ‘the polls of 1974 and 1975 were
the first of their kind to produce clear majorities in favour of the current rate
of immigration’.30 However, problems with the Whitlam reforms began to emerge
when the Whitlam government was placed under pressure with the build-up of
refugees in camps in South-East Asia as a result of the war in Vietnam, which
displaced up to 800,000 people.
With increasing numbers of Asian migrants in the late 1970s, the government
was under international pressure to move ahead of the general population of
Australia in endorsing a new ethnically inclusive national identity. Migrant services
and programs: the report of the review of post-arrival programs and services to
migrants, known as the Galbally report, was introduced in 1978 as a key driver in
formulating government policies affecting migrants. At the heart of the report was
the need to provide encouragement and financial assistance for migrants so that
they could maintain their cultural identity.31 The Galbally report recommended:
• improvements in the Adult Migrant Education Program, which was initiated in
1947 to teach survival English to refugees
• free telephone interpreter services for migrants from NESB and emergency
services
• the establishment of Migrant Resource Centres
• the introduction of a Special Broadcasting Service (SBS).32
28 Curran 2002, 470.
29 Lopez 2000, 222.
30 Goot 1988, 8.
31 Galbally 1978.
32 Jupp 1992.
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The Fraser government strongly supported the recommendations of the report,
initiating expanded migrant settlement services and seeking to promote cultural
pluralism as a source of strength to Australia’s national identity rather than a
threat. The Galbally report suggested shifting migrant services from the general
area of social welfare to ‘ethnic specific’ services.33 For example, Galbally proposed
that many on-arrival services be provided through voluntary organisations, rather
than through public agencies.34 He also recommended withdrawing government
funding from the Good Neighbour Councils, which were originally set up in 1949
to cater to the needs of non-British European refugees.35 Overall, between 1976
and 1983, the Fraser government reduced spending by shifting funding from
government agencies to voluntary organisations within the community. Therefore,
cultural diversity was encouraged, but only if political and economic structures
were left intact.36
When the Labor government was elected in 1983, it set about reforming some
of the Liberal policies of multiculturalism. The Review of Migrant and Multicultural
Programs and Services (ROMAMPAS) was released in 1986. It proposed a strategy
of providing basic resources and support for cultural expression, stressing the
importance of equality. The report suggested four principles for developing
government policies:
• All members of the Australian community should have an equitable opportunity
to participate in the economic, social, cultural and political life of the nation.
• All members of the Australian community should have equitable access to an
equitable share of the resources that governments manage on behalf of the
community.
• All members of the Australian community should have the opportunity to
participate in and influence the design and operation of government policies,
programs and services.
• All members of the Australian community should have the right, within the
law, to enjoy their own culture, to practise their own religion and to use their
own language, and should respect the right of others to their own culture,
religion and language.
The focus of the report was ensuring equal opportunity and outcomes for
all Australians. The report also recommended the establishment of an Office of
Multicultural Affairs (OMA), which was set up in 1987 and assumed responsibility
for the Commonwealth Access and Equity Strategy.37 As part of this responsibility,
the OMA prepared the National Agenda for Multicultural Australia, which focused
33 Kalantzis 2000, 104.
34 Jupp 1992.
35 Jupp 1992.
36 Jupp 1988, 927.
37 Jupp 1992.
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on the issues of access to public services and equity in the allocation of public
resources. The OMA identified three new directions for multicultural policy:
• cultural maintenance and respect for cultural difference
• promotion of social justice
• recognition of the economic significance of an ethnically and culturally diverse
community.38
The principles of multiculturalism were broadly accepted by the Hawke and
Keating Labor governments throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.39 However, with
the rise in Asian immigration, there were rumblings that the government was
moving too far ahead of public opinion. For example, Geoffrey Blainey argued
that the immigration policy in the early 1980s was insensitive to the views of
the majority of Australians. In All for Australia, Blainey criticised Australia’s
immigration policy and the slogan ‘Australia is part of Asia’. He argued that
Australia was importing unemployment but not announcing what it was doing.40
Furthermore, he criticised the nature of multiculturalism as an identity for
Australia:
Multiculturalism is an appropriate policy for those residents who hold two sets of
national loyalties and two passports. For the millions of Australians who have one
loyalty this policy is a national insult.41
Blainey’s criticisms were later echoed in the mid-1990s. For example, in 1996,
leader of the One Nation Party (ONP), Pauline Hanson, expressed the following
concerns about Asian immigration and multiculturalism in her maiden speech in
federal parliament:
Immigration and multiculturalism are issues that this government is trying to
address, but for far too long ordinary Australians have been kept out of any debate
by the major parties. I and most Australians want our immigration policy radically
reviewed and that of multiculturalism abolished. I believe we are in danger of
being swamped by Asians.42
The recognition of ethnic difference in multiculturalism was interpreted by the
ONP as a form of disrespect to Anglo-Australian identity.43 In fact, it is possible
that ONP populism caused the most damage to multiculturalism. In 1996, the
newly elected Howard Liberal–National (Coalition) government made cuts in the
38 Allbrook, Cattalini and Associates 1989, 20.
39 Jones 2003, 116.
40 Blainey 1984.
41 Blainey 1988, 22.
42 Hanson 2016.
43 Leach 2000, 45.
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areas of immigration and multiculturalism. The term ‘multiculturalism’ as a
defining component of national identity was also losing support.
In the late 1990s, questions were raised about whether an ethnically diverse
nation can also be a unified nation. According to Ruth Fincher, over the years
there have been two opinion groups. First, there are those who support the idea
that ‘an ethnically diverse population, its growth fuelled by sustained and non-
discriminatory immigration, benefits the “nation” by improving its economic
resources, its social breadth, its international linkages, and its citizenship’.44 Second,
there are those who suggest that ethnic diversity weakens the character of national
identity. According to Fincher, ‘theirs is a view of essential Australianness that
sees a national character as having been formed amongst Anglo-Australians from
the time of English settlement’.45 Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, the
latter view has become more prominent in the Australian media because of fears of
Australia becoming a fragmented society.
The rise of transnationalism tends to encourage states to reassert their authority
in shaping national identity and national citizenship.46 The frequency of terrorist
attacks has also led to governments reaffirming national identity and establishing
new citizenship obligations. As a result, Eleonore Kofman argues that more than
ever ‘the state is asserting its role as protector of national identity and social
cohesion’.47 For instance, the world’s leading democracies began to apply more
pressure on migrants to integrate, assimilate and conform to civic values.48 One
of the casualties of the new focus on civic integration was multiculturalism. The
new assertiveness of liberal states to impose liberal values, such as democracy
and gender equality, coincided with a retreat from multiculturalism in theory and
policy.49
The shift to civic integration was partly due to the pressure to maintain a
secure environment and also to obtain public consent for large-scale influxes of
skilled migrants.50 In Australia, in 2006, there were suggestions in the media that
a national consensus supporting high immigration would be at risk unless the
Australian public tackled the key issues of common values, social cohesion and
multiculturalism.51 Furthermore, on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, former Prime Minister John Howard and opposition leader Kim Beazley
led national debates on immigration, values and terror. Howard said, ‘people in
Australia are in no doubt that extreme Islam is responsible for terrorism’ and Kim
Beazley called for ‘all new Australians to sign up to Australian values when they
44 Fincher 2001, 27.
45 Fincher 2001, 28.
46 Holton 1998; Kofman 2005.
47 Kofman 2005, 454–5.
48 Kofman 2005.
49 Joppke 2004.
50 Joppke 2004.
51 Albrechtsen 2005.
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applied for their visas’.52 The debates in the Australian media escalated quickly
following the London terrorist attacks in 2005 and the fear of home-grown
terrorism. Zubrzycki, one of the original proponents of multicultural policy in
Australia, stated in The Weekend Australian that he never imagined that his
preference for a culturally diverse policy could welcome hard-line isolationist
groups antagonistic to Western values.53
The combined issues of immigration, national values and terrorism have raised
questions as to how the modern nation state should fulfil its role as protector
of national identity and social cohesion.54 The Australian government response
has been to support high levels of migration but at the same time demonstrate
to the public that they are tightly monitoring the management of migration and
diversity.55 In terms of managing migration, Australia has selected migrants based
on their utility to the economy and on the skills shortage. In terms of managing
diversity, migrants with transnational links have been encouraged to integrate and
embrace Australian civic values.56 Political leaders have led debates on the issues of
Australian national values and citizenship as a way of rethinking questions of social
cohesion and national identity.
At the turn of the century, with nearly 25 per cent of Australians born outside
the country, with transnational connections, the Coalition government specifically
focused on the notion of citizenship as a basis for a collective national identity. The
government proposed more difficult and protracted citizenship tests. In October
2006, Liberal MP Petro Georgiou criticised the government’s discussion paper
‘Australian citizenship: much more than just a ceremony’ in a speech delivered to
the Murray Hill Society at the University of Adelaide. Georgiou argued that difficult
and protracted citizenship tests were not necessary to promote social cohesion and
integration. In particular, Georgiou criticised the proposed English tests, arguing
that the take-up of citizenship is lowest among English speakers. For example,
migrants from the UK, New Zealand and the USA have traditionally had lower
take-up rates of citizenship than migrants from non-English-speaking countries.
With no real break in terrorist incidents in Western countries, and subsequent
concerns about racial and ethnic tensions, the civic approach to multiculturalism
and social cohesion was largely supported by successive Labor and Liberal
governments in the first two decades of the 21st century. Fears about terrorism on
home soil in Australia were realised in Sydney in 2014, when Australians witnessed
the Lindt cafe siege, which took place in front of a television studio. A lone gunman
– Man Haron Monis – with a Muslim background entered the cafe and held hostage
52 Megalogenis 2006, 1.
53 Megalogenis 2006.
54 Kofman 2005.
55 Ang and Stratton 2001.
56 Prime Minister John Howard on talkback radio received public criticism for his suggestions that
a small section of the Islamic population was unwilling to integrate. See also Kerbaj 2006; letters
to the editor in The Weekend Australian, 2–3 September 2006.
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up to ten customers and eight employees. After a 16-hour stand-off hostages Tori
Johnson and Katrina Dawson were killed, along with the gunman, when police
raided the cafe. Since the Lindt cafe siege, there have been several other attacks
by individuals with Muslim backgrounds, including in Sydney in 2015, when an
Iraqi youth attacked with a knife and shot an accountant who worked for the
New South Wales Police in Parramatta, and in Melbourne in 2018, when a Somali
migrant stabbed three pedestrians and a police officer, who later died in hospital.
These attacks further damaged government support for multiculturalism. They also
harmed Muslim communities that in most cases had fled from wars, terrorism and
religious violence in their countries of origin, only to be confronted with the reality
of politically motivated violence once again.
Public support for multiculturalism
So far, this chapter has looked at the development of multicultural Australia from
the perspective of government in response to changing immigration patterns,
public fears about national identity, globalisation and national security. However,
throughout the changes in government policy, the broader Australian public has
maintained consistent views towards multiculturalism. One way to measure public
attitudes towards multiculturalism is to ask people whether they feel equal
opportunities for migrants have gone too far. As can be seen in the previous section,
the original goals of multicultural Australia were to provide equal opportunities
for migrants through a range of programs, such as providing English as a second
language support for migrants from NESB, as well as a range of migrant welfare,
cultural and translation services.
Figure 1 shows the results from the 1990–2016 Australian Election Studies.
The Australian Election Study surveys a representative sample of Australians each
election year, asking questions on a range of social and political issues. The
advantage of the Australian Election Studies is the way in which the surveys track
political attitudes and behaviours over time, asking the same questions in each
election year. The results in Figure 1 reveal that up to 44 per cent of respondents
were not overly supportive of multiculturalism in the early 1990s. Interestingly,
the percentage that were concerned about multiculturalism decreased in the years
leading up to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the follow-up concerns about migration,
particularly arrivals of asylum-seekers with Muslim backgrounds. Asylum-seeker
arrivals became a source of political controversy during the 2001 election
campaign. In 2001, the Howard government, in what became known as the ‘Tampa
Affair’, claimed that asylum seekers had thrown their children overboard to secure
long-term protection in Australia. An Australian Senate Select Committee later
found that the children of asylum seekers were not placed at risk and that the
government had tried to mislead voters.
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Figure 1 Attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration (%). Source: 1990–2016
Australian Election Studies, https://australianelectionstudy.org/.
The percentage of survey participants that were concerned about multi-
culturalism increased throughout the first decade of the 21st century from 27 per
cent in 2004 to 35 per cent in 2016. This may, in part, be related to increasing media
attention on terrorist attacks in other countries. However, the results in Figure 1
also show that attitudes towards levels of migration run parallel to attitudes towards
multiculturalism, with an increasing percentage of Australians concerned about the
number of migrants allowed into Australia. In 2016, more than 40 per cent of the
Australian population felt that the number of migrants allowed into Australia had
gone too far, increasing from a low of 27 per cent in 2004.
Australian attitudes towards multiculturalism and immigration are also con-
sistently related to several important background factors, such as age, education
and political identification. Table 1 shows that, in more recent election years,
younger Australians were less likely to be concerned about equal opportunities
for migrants, compared to older Australians. For example, in 2016, only 14 per
cent of respondents in the ‘18–24’ age bracket expressed, concern compared with
over 40 per cent of respondents in the ‘35–44’ and ‘55 and over’ age brackets. In
some elections, younger respondents were more likely to express concern about
multiculturalism, compared to older respondents, such as in 1990, 1996, 1998,
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Table 1 ‘Equal opportunities for migrants gone too far’, by background (%)
1990 1993 1996 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 2013 2016
Age
18–24 34 46 52 35 40 18 19 42 31 14
25–34 28 46 46 34 36 26 24 30 34 30
35–44 21 43 40 33 34 25 28 42 35 40
45–54 15 40 43 36 34 27 32 42 40 33
55–64 15 41 42 29 31 27 28 34 41 40
65+ 18 46 46 31 33 29 27 35 39 41
Education
No qualification 26 49 50 36 42 28 30 41 43 39
Non-tertiary
qualification
19 46 46 37 37 33 34 44 46 46
Tertiary qualification 9 24 28 19 16 15 13 23 21 20
Vote
Liberal 20 47 50 31 37 33 32 45 45 40
Labor 21 41 36 30 32 21 25 31 31 32
National 30 50 59 41 39 31 43 65 47 47
Greens 39 39 17 9 15 25 12 9
Source: 1990–2016 Australian Election Studies, https://australianelectionstudy.org/.
The question was, ‘Do you think the following change that has been happening in
Australia over the years has gone too far, not gone far enough, or is it about right?’ ‘Equal
opportunities for migrants’.
2001 and 2010. This shows that younger age groups are not always supportive of
multiculturalism, as is often assumed, with younger age groups considered to be
more progressive than older age groups.
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Other, more consistent factors that are related to views on multiculturalism
are education and political identification. Those with a tertiary qualification are
consistently more likely to support multiculturalism, although even among respon-
dents with a university education there has been a steady increase in the number
concerned about multiculturalism, from only 9 per cent of respondents in 1990
to 20 per cent in 2016. Nevertheless, those without a university qualification show
a much higher level of concern about multiculturalism, with more than 45 per
cent of respondents in 2010 and 2013 and 40 per cent in 2016 stating that equal
opportunities for migrants had gone too far. The most consistent factor that is
related to views about multiculturalism is how respondents vote during the
election. Those who vote for Labor and the Greens at each election have been
consistently more likely to support multiculturalism, compared to those who vote
for the Coalition. This would be expected because since the 1990s the Labor Party
has more actively promoted multiculturalism. Federal and state Labor electorates
are also more likely to have significant populations of migrants from both low
socio-economic and non-English-speaking backgrounds.
Conclusions
Political leaders, by and large, acknowledge that the old form of nationalism in
Australia, based on common history, language and tradition, has declining
relevance. These leaders have given expression to what a new ‘national community’
should be. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Bob Hawke supported the view of a
‘national community’ in Australia as defined in terms of multiculturalism. This
view was presented in the 1989 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia.
Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke all attempted to reconcile diversity with a common
British-Australian identity. However, the use of multiculturalism as a symbol of
Australian nationalism began to unravel when subsequent governments began to
feel uneasy with the concept.57 Since the rise of the ONP and conservative politics
in the late 1990s and terrorism in the 21st century, consecutive governments have
refrained from promoting multiculturalism as a unifying symbol of national
identity. Instead, the policy of multiculturalism is considered useful for managing
cultural diversity and social cohesion.
The findings of the Australian Election Studies discussed in this chapter show
that while there are many ebbs and flows in government policies and public debates
on multiculturalism and immigration, there is a fairly consistent level of public
support for multiculturalism, especially among those with a tertiary qualification
and Labor voters. It appears that efforts among government and media elites to
undermine the enduring success of multicultural Australia have had very little
success, revealing the inclusivity and egalitarianism of the Australian population.
57 Curran 2002.
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Pressure groups and social
movements
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Groups and movements that pressure governments and political parties seeking
government to change policy are vital features of democracy. Without the com-
bined actions of people participating in groups and social movements, those who
wish to hold office may not be aware of issues affecting constituents or how changes
to policy may affect them.
Knowing about pressure groups and social movements is critical in considering
democracy, government and policy making. This chapter discusses what pressure
groups and social movements are, when they form, who joins them, how they work,
and why they cease to exist. These considerations shine a light on some of the
important theories about group power. The chapter also reflects on whether these
groups are good for democracy and discusses the kinds of pressure groups and
social movements in Australia.
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What are pressure groups and social movements?
Political scientists use a number of terms to describe pressure groups, including
interest groups and lobby groups.1 The term ‘pressure groups’ refers to organ-
isations that pressure government to change policy, whether for their own interest
or in the interest of others. A pressure group more broadly is defined as an asso-
ciation that seeks to represent a sector of society and make a direct or indirect claim
on government to influence policy, without wanting to govern.2
Interest groups seek to represent their own interests in government policy
without wanting to govern. Advocacy groups advocate for others. Some pressure
groups are both interest groups and advocacy groups.3 They might represent some
of their own interests, but also the interests of others.
The term ‘social movement’ refers to shared opinions and beliefs in a pop-
ulation which indicate preferences for changing elements of the social structure or
operation.4 These coalesce into people’s campaigns to change society and culture.
Sociologist Sidney Tarrow observed that major societal changes such as war,
recession, political instability, or large demographic or technological change often
prompt ‘waves of protest’ which give rise to social movements.5 Typically, social
movements centre on a broad issue, so are also known as issue movements.
What’s the difference between pressure groups and social movements?
Pressure groups differ from ‘social movements’ because they are specifically
organised to influence policy. Social movements evolve more organically and are
less concerned with changing government policy than with changing society more
broadly. Social movements may develop as people accept changing attitudes on
an issue, or because a political voice is required to address social exclusion.
Movements can place pressure on politicians at a grassroots level as people in
society accept a change about an issue,6 but this is not their reason for being.
In essence, social movements are formed solely in the community, rather than
forming in relation to the state. Counter-movements is a term used to describe
opinions mobilised in opposition to a social movement (e.g. the men’s rights
movement in reaction to feminism).7
Collective action is intrinsic to pressure groups and social movements because
they employ group power to alter public policy.8 Many activities may not be directly
political, but groups and movements spend at least some of their time and resources
1 Richardson 1993, 1.
2 Halpin 2012, 179; Matthews 1980, 447; Richardson 1993, 1; Smith 1993, 2.
3 Sawer 2007, 24–5.
4 McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1217–8.
5 Tarrow 1994.
6 Marsh 1995, 53–4.
7 McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1218.
8 Cook 2004, 138.
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trying to influence public policy. This may include indirect methods through
networking or participating in government consultations, or more direct methods
such as electioneering or strategic professional links to government by being close
to government decision makers, either geographically or politically.9 Contemp-
orary social movements tend to have many of the following characteristics:
• high levels of participation by individuals who don’t necessarily see themselves
as part of a formal organisation
• self-identification with the cause or issue of concern
• seeing political or ideological opponents as ‘enemies’ to overcome
• links with formal interest groups and ‘social movement organisations’ within
this wider tapestry of informal participation.
In practice, however, there is considerable overlap between social movements and
pressure groups. Often, what begin as social movements later spawn pressure groups.
Likewise, some groups that may form as pressure groups to address a policy issue
may focus their effort on broad-scale mobilisation and changing public opinion as
a way of bringing about the policy change they seek. For example, the campaign
for same-sex marriage in Australia began as a pressure group (stemming out of the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex rights movement, which sought legal
and policy change). As the quest for same-sex marriage gained traction in the broader
community, support for marriage equality became a social movement.
When do pressure groups and social movements form?
A number of theories explain formation. While these theories are explained
separately, in practice, many factors affect formation of pressure groups and social
movements.
Disturbance theory
David Truman observed the formation of pressure groups as a response to the
growing complexity of society. Any disturbances arising in the community upset
the balance within society. This in turn prompted pressure groups to form to
oppose these threats to the status quo. Truman also noted that in almost all
organised groups, an ‘active minority’ governed on behalf of the many.10
Similarly, Smelser noticed that successful social movements morph from
‘disturbances into generalised beliefs’. Smelser argued that social movements evolve
in stages, but a society needs to be structured to enable collective behaviour, like
a democracy, for it to begin. Secondly, a deprivation, or perceived deprivation,
9 Davis et al. 1993, 139; Warhurst 1986a, 312.
10 Truman 1951, 139–55.
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must exist according to a significant number of people. Certain factors hasten
participants in the movement to mobilise, such as the availability of movement
media to communicate and build common concerns or grievances.11
Population ecology and resource mobilisation theory
The theory of organisation population ecology illuminates the challenge to balance
outcomes for all interests. In the 1970s, scholars attempted to understand group
formation in the context of the politics of the day, as well as those who were trying
to promote ideas or change policy.12 Groups form depending on the population
density of other groups at the time of their formation, which ‘both legitimises
and constrains’ group formation.13 A group with the same motivation may arise
because great numbers of people wish to join them in a particular location; another
group with the same motivation may founder because it does not offer a unique
perspective and there are already groups at that place. These groups frequently
compete for the same resources, membership and funding.
Because pressure groups are in competition with each other, the existing
density of groups in the population affects a new group’s prospect of formation.14
Further, low density of groups increases the legitimacy of the organisations that
exist. Yet as more organisations form, competition for resources means some
groups cease to exist.15
Resource mobilisation theory emphasises the crucial question of how social
movements mobilise resources.16 This focuses on the way group and movement
actors raise funds and other politically useful resources (such as memberships).
While many movements and pressure groups have traditional support bases of
resources and labour, they may also have constituents that can provide money,
facilities and labour, even if they are not committed to the values underpinning
specific movements. How these resources are aggregated is critical to under-
standing the activities of organisations, as they inform strategy and tactics, and
affect the movement’s relationships with wider society.17
Political opportunity
Political opportunity is a third theory advanced to explain group formation, noting
that group formation depends on the political environment. In this framework,
favourable political conditions prompt advocacy groups to form. This can include
11 Smelser 1963.
12 Nownes 2004.
13 Jenkins 2006, 313.
14 Nownes 2004.
15 Jenkins 2006, 313.
16 McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1212–3.
17 McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1216–7.
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changes in government, which provide the impetus for groups to form whose ideas
align with those elected. But it can include structural factors, like the openness of
institutions to lobbying, litigation, or other forms of political practice that groups
and movements have expertise in.18
Overall, non-profit organisations and advocacy groups also increase as a more
diverse, inclusive and democratic polity offers the potential for them to exert
influence (political pluralism).19 Group formation can also be a reaction to the rise
of perceived threats to the interests of the group.20
Who joins pressure groups and social movements and why?
A variety of motivations prompt individuals to participate. Political economy and
public choice theory provide insights here. In this view, ‘special interests’ are
interpreted as competing for economic favour in exchange for political power.21
As decision-makers are seen as utilitarian, they weigh options of who to support
based on their resources and group power. In turn, those joining pressure groups
are viewed through the lens of transactions: groups provide personal incentives to
potential group members, and group members provide legitimacy for the group.
While theories of public choice and economics do not explain all pressure
groups, these dimensions are significant to understanding pressure groups in
politics and policy in contemporary Australia – particularly those with vested
interests, such as organised labour and capital. Other groups advocating on behalf
of, or for, the interests of others seek justice to address structural inequalities in
society or act altruistically to address inclusion and representation for a diverse
population, which is often not well explained by these economic models.
Incentives and exchange theory
Clark and Wilson categorised benefits offered to group members:
• Material benefits: offer tangible advantage for the member, such as economic
benefits (publications, or discounts on services and products) or improved
working conditions. This is often associated with Robert Salisbury’s exchange
theory, namely, that organisers offer incentives and benefits to potential
members for joining.22
• Solidarity benefits: are intangible, offering a sense of identity and community
through education, involvement and participation. This also brings a collective
18 Jenkins 2006; Nownes 2004.
19 Jenkins 2006, 313.
20 Gamson and Meyer 1996.
21 Snooks 1998, 203–12.
22 Salisbury 1969.
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identity, marking one as belonging to a group or standing for a cause. This, in
turn, can bring status, enjoyment and social capital.
• Purposive benefits: relate to the group’s purpose, such as to change a policy,
promote an idea, or pursue a particular action.23 These purposive benefits are
also termed ‘expressive’ benefits, as people join to voice their values and ideals.24
Clark and Wilson argued that one or more of these benefits must be provided to
members to either entice them to join or to remain part of the organisation. A
pressure group’s continued existence depends upon members sharing in the group
benefits, and group organisers extracting advantage from those members.25
Collective action and free riders
This leads to debates about how public-spirited pressure groups and movements
are. Mancur Olson argued that collective action was primarily motivated by desire
for individual benefit, but a benefit not available to a person acting alone. This
‘rational choice’ approach focuses on the cost–benefit calculation of members in
joining groups and movements. In this model, groups form because some
individuals perceive opportunities to benefit, possibly at the expense of others.26
Thus, some pressure groups have been seen to profit at a higher expense, such as
seeking a subsidy for a small group paid for by general taxation.
This approach also explains paradoxes in group formation: if groups produce
public benefits that all can access, what is the incentive of participation for the
individual? If groups become too large, some may benefit without paying the costs
of the group. This problem of ‘free riding’ can be seen in the way some groups
attempt to restrict the benefits of their collective action to their membership, such
as when unions historically enforced ‘no ticket no start’ requirements that
workplaces must employ union members.
Justice and altruism
Other scholars observe that rational choice fails to explain participation, or
recognise the role of ethics, justice and morality in tempering the ‘selfish’
motivations of individuals and pressure groups.27 The field of behavioural
economics recognises that human decisions are not always based on perfect
rationality, and uses insights from psychology to explore various motivations for
behaviour in exchange transactions.28 People judge intuitively, automatically and
emotionally, in line with their experience, and emotions are important aspects of
23 Clark and Wilson 1961, 134–5.
24 Salisbury 1969, 16.
25 Salisbury 1969.
26 Marsh 1995, 50; Matthews 1980, 455; Olson 2002 [1965].
27 Cigler 1990; Flam and King 2005; Sen 1977.
28 Thaler and Sunstein 2008.
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participation.29 A behavioural perspective recognises that people seek justice for its
own sake, superseding their self-interest.30
Cultural models
New social movement theory maintains that most social movements today are
international and largely concerned about their physical and psychological
environment.31 The internet is an enormous contributor to the global nature of
social movements and dialogue in the public sphere. Social movements can be
considered as sites of shared identity, and can be instrumental in radical identity-
forming processes. Old loyalties are detached from conventional views or the status
quo, and transferred to the new movement, bringing a sense of identity.32
Identity is a factor for both individuals and organisations becoming involved
in or recognised in relation to a social movement. Investing in a political struggle
means being socially identified as a certain kind of person or political actor.33
An individual may identify with a cause by connecting intellectually, morally or
emotionally with a broader community, but collective identity can be more difficult
to understand at a group level.34
Whether utilitarian and transactional, altruistic or cultural, motivations behind
group and movement expansion have tended to evolve within the democratic
framework of the post‒Second World War ‘welfare state managed economy’. Even
self-interested groups in a liberal democracy have positive implications: Beer saw
pressure groups as extending the capacity of governments to access a wide range
of opinions and policy proposals, and allowing the development, refinement and
delivery of more complex, customised state services.35
How do pressure groups work?
Political scientists have identified five levels through which pressure groups or
citizens convey their ‘demands’ to government:
• Concerned individuals acting of their own accord represent interests, or
advocate for others.
• Spontaneous group activity occurs, that is unplanned and unorganised.
29 Flam and King 2005; Kahneman 2003, 1469.
30 Rawls 1971.
31 Habermas 1995.
32 Melucci 1994.
33 Holland, Price and Westermeyer 2018, 287.
34 Fominaya 2010, 394, 398.
35 Beer 1982.
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• Groups of people sharing a common trait or concerns form non-association
pressure groups.36 Examples include particular cultural groups or localised
citizens concerned about a particular development in their town or suburb.
• Organised groups represent interests in a more sophisticated way through
institutions, such as businesses, educational institutions and non-government
organisations.
• Associations and specific lobbying organisations representing particular
groups advocate to influence how political, social and economic goods are
distributed in explicit policy changes.37
How the latter advocate depends on the structure of the pressure group.
Structures and roles of pressure groups
The structures of pressure groups depend upon their organisation and expertise.
While no single structure is common to pressure groups, typical features can be
observed. Pressure groups require spokespeople to provide media comment. Depen-
ding on the pressure group’s size, other spokespeople may handle specific policy
areas, and organisational teams focus on specific areas of policy. Pressure groups are
often quite geographically diverse, so regional co-ordination may be needed (though
since the internet became widespread, this is less important). Behind the figureheads
and policy teams, administration workers keep the group running.
Pressure group organisations tend to be concentrated in the national and state
capital cities, professional, and to varying degrees, integrated into the policy pro-
cess.38 Differing constitutional powers means that state governments are lobbied on
some issues, whereas the Commonwealth is lobbied on others. Often, both levels
of government receive representations. However, representation is only one role of
pressure groups.
In their quest to change policy, pressure groups often perform three distinct roles:
• Representation has a number of meanings in political science, but in this
chapter it refers to participation in the polity. Pressure groups represent both
constituencies and issues, mostly at the same time. While representing issues
is relatively straightforward, representing constituencies is more fraught. Some
constituencies expect representatives to convey the demands of the majority –
commonly called the ‘delegate’ model of representation. Other constituencies
expect representatives to gather relevant research and information, weigh up
the issues and use their own judgement to seek the best outcomes for those
represented – the ‘advocate’ model of representation. Of these two models, the
latter provides representatives with greater freedom of action.
36 Matthews 1980, 447.
37 Hogan 1996, 158.
38 Warhurst 2006, 331.
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• Education by pressure groups also takes several directions: educating their
constituency, the decision makers (such as politicians and regulators), policy
advisors (in the form of bureaucrats or political staffers), and the wider
community, including the media. This may entail a variety of strategies,
including speaking events, educational literature, letters, submissions to
government, talking on radio and even doorknocking.
• Scrutiny provides an ‘audit’ role: conducting research where necessary, ensuring
politicians and bureaucrats are aware of information and arguments, making
sure information used by policy makers or in the media is correct, and
checking correct procedures are followed. If necessary, it means taking matters
to court for judicial review.39
Strategies used to influence policy makers
Pressure groups demonstrate these roles in the strategies they employ, including:
• Direct and indirect lobbying of politicians, policy advisors and political parties,
and the public. Indirect lobbying aims to change government policy through
lobbying people and bodies which themselves may have influence on govern-
ment decision-makers, such as lobbying political parties and the public.
• Agenda-setting through lobbying activities, media work, or direct communi-
cations with the public.
• Electioneering through mobilising support or opposition for candidates or
parties based on their policy positions, or influencing public opinion so that
the wider public is inspired to act.
Pressure groups and issue movements can be more experienced and successful than
other political players in pursuing their policy agenda: not even political parties can
fully control their agenda, as others propose issues that affect it. Ian Marsh notes
that ‘veto power’ can be exercised by stakeholders who are negatively affected by a
policy change, and this can be more easily mobilised than support for the potential
beneficiaries of change. He observes:
Together, interest groups and issue movements challenge the integrating, opinion
forming and agenda setting capacities of the major political parties. They do this
by advancing and defending a widened and more differentiated political agenda.40
Yet despite any success, a group’s reliance on electoral tactics over party politics
or bureaucratic involvement is a sign of weakness. This is because it depends on
a concerted campaign rather than integration into the policy system. Similarly,
although protest can be powerful, it is a less assertive form of leverage because it is
39 Matthews 1980, 464.
40 Marsh 1995, 47–8, 101–2.
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often undertaken by groups without ‘insider’ knowledge or contacts, whether from
lack of resources or exclusion from consultation.41
A group or movement’s choice of strategies depends largely on its resources,
but also on the political system and its conventions, and on the goal.42 A lack of
power does not preclude successful lobbying by less-resourced pressure groups,
particularly where a pressure group boasts experience and evidence to persuade
policy makers of an argument. As a result, such pressure groups may become more
formally involved in the policy system.43
Excluding electoral tactics, focusing a lobbying effort on an individual politician
can be effective.44 It prevents some difficulties encountered when lobbying parlia-
mentary groups, where party discipline dominates responses. Although contact with
a member of parliament is usually referred to the relevant minister or at times to
Cabinet, it can also become a ‘fast track’ to raising the issue in a policy area.45 Of
course, lobbying also involves garnering support from others, including the media.46
Participation and involvement within policy-making institutions
Placing an issue on the policy agenda, lobbying and developing policy is a time-
consuming process of ‘continuous contestation’. It often involves participation from
a number of pressure groups to reach policy decisions.47 Negotiation is important
in policy making, as is ongoing interaction within the policy cycle.48 Ideally, the
policy process engages local communities and an array of voluntary groups, but for
decades governments have preferred to deal with one ‘umbrella’ group, rather than
a number of smaller organisations.49
Although some political lobbying is secretive,50 most pressure group attempts to
intervene in the polity are part of broad public consultation on the public record.
Pressure groups are useful to governments, offering representation, lending authority,
and providing knowledge – often gathered through close involvement with the subject
at hand.51 This can assist policy bureaucrats to gather invaluable information and
arguments about a particular policy before a decision is made, and is useful for
policy specialists providing briefing or advice.52 Governments use this expertise and
the advice of pressure groups in policy development,53 so engagement yields mutual
41 Vromen, Gelber and Gauja 2009, 244–5.
42 Rozell and Wilcox 1999, 2–3.
43 Vromen, Gelber and Gauja 2009, 236–7.
44 Barnett 2010, 47.
45 Matthews 1980, 467.
46 Barnett 2010, 73.
47 Vromen, Gelber and Gauja 2009, 322, 344.
48 Colebatch 2002.
49 Giddens 1998, 75–6; Matthews 1980, 458.
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benefits. It can broaden the government’s support by demonstrating stakeholder part-
icipation. Pressure groups achieve attention and credibility from the wider comm-
unity, and leverage to pursue their own policy priorities if the opportunity arises.
Yet some pressure groups are relegated to the periphery of the policy-making
process, despite access to the bureaucracy. Access alone is insufficient; without
influence, meetings are likely to be held with more junior officials.54 Consequently,
pressure groups invest considerable effort and resources to demonstrate that the
broader community supports their position, and sustain their argument that their
view should be taken into account by policy makers. This explains their efforts to
develop public opinion which promotes their own policy concerns, and supports
their claim to speak for broader sections of the community.55
Groups without sectional power or economic leverage have been excluded
from participation in policy making by their lack of representation in policy-
making institutions.56 Restrictions on representations from particular lobbyists and
pressure groups can be a calculated strategy by governments to achieve particular
political outcomes.57
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
recommends that a lobbying framework should include strategies to promote a
‘level playing field’. Information should be made readily available, conflicts and
preferential treatment avoided, and policy makers should be accessible to the broad
community and not just a privileged few, so that all voices can be considered.58
Insiders, outsiders, and thresholders
Wyn Grant noted that pressure groups, like many other political entities, are
frequently categorised as political ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’ in their access to govern-
ment.59 Insiders are very close to government, and numbers of pressure groups are
integrated into government. Others remain excluded, presumably because they lack
the requisite power, contacts or expertise.
Consequently, certain stakeholders are relatively subservient subjects of
‘bureaucratic citizenship’, while other groups enjoy a ‘right’ to consultation and
participation in the policy process. The Australian Council of Social Services
(ACOSS) is one of the few welfare or advocacy groups represented in policy
advisory committees. In many ways it is an insider group, as it retains ongoing
consultative status. Its lobbying role is accepted, but unlike ‘producer’ groups,
ACOSS is not able to use economic sanctions to achieve a policy result.60
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Although groups are normally more able to bring about change as insiders,
some pressure groups prefer to be ‘outsiders’. An outsider signals a separation
from government, which affirms a philosophical commitment to an issue and
provides freedom and independence to express views or pursue agendas without
real or perceived censorship. While some other outsiders may respect this position,
outsiders tend to be valued less by politicians – particularly if the strategy could
be perceived as extreme or unlikely to affect electoral results. However, changes in
societal values or recognition of the pressure group’s role and primary cause can
change these perceptions.61
This delineation may be too simplistic, however. In the University of Aberdeen
model, both insider and outsider strategies can be used by the same group,
especially those who have only occasional involvement in the political sphere, or
with limited opportunities to exert leverage (so-called thresholder groups).62
Cultural and communication work
Literature about social movements sheds light on the way that issues are ‘framed’
by organisations to garner support for a social movement or for policy change.
Framing refers to how groups link interpretations of individual interests, values and
beliefs with their activities, goals and ideology. Entman provides a useful definition
of framing and its policy implications:
to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.63
When a particular event is framed as meaningful, individuals can be prompted to
bring others together in collective action. Moreover, the event may serve to guide
social movement organisations or pressure groups.64
Yet, for all social movements, challenging the status quo means reinterpreting
certain aspects of social reality to elicit emotions and better prompt individuals to
collective action for social change.65 Frames, typically in a narrative form, structure
the focus of an event or situation, and seek to direct emotions and energy
accordingly. Narratives use stories to associate events and experiences, making
meaning relatable and enhancing the message for a collective purpose. For social
movements (and pressure groups) this is towards collective, political directions.66
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Throughout the last three decades, as internet use became widely adopted,
many pressure groups and social movements became able to use websites and
social media to frame and communicate issues and mobilise people online. The
internet significantly reduced the costs of recruitment and participation as public
meetings, street encounters, and mailed newsletters became increasingly redundant
in comparison to the low costs of internet engagement. While the internet supp-
lemented traditional activism, it has also provided virtual spaces for exchanges and
engagement.
Why do pressure groups and social movements cease to exist?
Just as groups and movements continue to form and act in response to their
context, they also disappear if they are no longer relevant.
Mortality and salience
Recent studies of organisational mortality look at the life cycle of interest groups.
Some pressure groups are not formed to persist and cease to exist once they achieve
their goal.67 Other groups that have longer-term interests may be less concerned
about competing with other or new groups. Rather, they focus on identity, purpose,
and adaptive responses to endure.68
A group’s salience (prominence and suitability) is also reduced if it does not
contribute to policy change and its influence is not recognised. That said, meas-
uring influence is fraught as many intersecting factors affect the policy process –
a pressure group’s contribution is one factor among many. Funding and resources
both affect how a group operates, its chances of contributing to change, and its
ability to last.
Funding and resources
The resources pressure groups have at their disposal vary. If a group does not have
sufficient numbers to support collective action, they may require more financial
resources to support their operations. Many groups have membership income,
whereas others rely on patrons or donors.69 As groups form or begin to develop,
they may overcome the ‘free rider’ issue without significant expense if they have a
patron.70 A range of figures and institutions can be patrons for a group or an issue,
including benefactors, celebrities, and even the state itself.
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In fact, some advocacy groups have received government funding to represent
the interests of those unable to represent themselves politically. Funding was mainly
provided to organisations who would advocate for citizens without sufficient skills,
power, resources or funds to advocate for themselves or participate in public debate.
This offered a way to connect unrepresented people to government through peak
bodies, helping to address inequalities in society.
A number of organisations, including the Women’s Electoral Lobby (WEL),
had funding withdrawn in the late 1990s, prompting speculation about alternatives
for the representation of such groups.71 Some groups, particularly organisations
providing welfare support, appear to have replaced some of this funding through
government service delivery contracts. These contracts included provisions to
refrain from commenting on policy, so receiving the funding limited their capacity
to comment on policy matters and undermined their ability to participate in robust
political and policy debate.
Are they ‘good’ for democracy?
Within the framework of political economy and public choice theory, organised
interests can be seen as a risk to good governance. Interest groups operate
ultimately from the same selfish motive: to benefit themselves, even to the exclusion
of others. They behave to maximise their economic, societal and legal or regulatory
conditions as they pursue their objectives in the political sphere. Political and
policy decisions may be attributed to the expedience and motivations of politicians
and political parties, such as electoral advantage, rather than policy best practice.72
Ultimately, while governments determine which interests to indulge, interest
group behaviour cannot be separated ‘from the surrounding institutional and
cultural framework’.73 In other words, governments cannot always be relied upon
to ensure a balance of optimal outcomes for all interests.74 In this critique, interest
groups potentially undermine governance and the economy.
Democratic participation
More positively, Beer identified pressure group types which governments can har-
ness to achieve superior policy outcomes. In this way, pressure groups are functional:
they support, rather than destabilise, governance and democracy (although Beer
cautioned that special interests had the potential to ‘impair’ a political system’s
action for the long-term interests of its citizenry).75 Beer’s more optimistic approach
71 Sawer, Abjorensen and Larkin 2009, 233.
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suggests that participation, making a contribution and concern for quality of life are
the values which inspire pressure group formation, rather than the self-interested
interpretation of some rational choice scholars’ view of pressure groups.76
Beer’s interpretation recognises that pressure groups arise from various
political environments. With this more ‘contextual’ perspective, each pressure
group can be examined and assessed in the context of its own history and situation.
In this view, collectives are motivated by the freedom of members of society to
choose, as part of a democratic and inclusive ‘provider’ society. Interest, or pressure,
groups are organised representations of citizens who facilitate democratic
participation. The motive to form a pressure group is egalitarian rather than selfish,
as groups lobby to address disadvantage.
Of course, motivations for pressure group participation overlap at times, as
those motivated by egalitarian aspirations and robust democracy realise they can
benefit from involvement in pressure groups, and can foster support from others
motivated by their own benefit. Few groups could be definitively categorised as
singularly motivated in a polity where different organisations and constituencies
represent a variety of interests. Either way, the representational role of groups is
critical for connecting the governed to their government.77 Moreover, Putnam’s
characterisations of ‘bridging groups’ that interact with others, and ‘bonding groups’
that provide solidarity for a minority, can each be seen as both actors in government
and society and precursors to more involved democratic participation.78
What kinds of pressure groups and social movements are in Australia?
Within Australia, pressure group participation is much higher than membership of
political parties.79 Pressure groups are often divided into two main camps:
• Sectional organisations represent traditional, recognised interests such as those
of the labour force, business or primary industries.
• Promotional groups advance interests other than these main sectors, such as
women’s interests or environmental issues.80 However, their focus on particular
issues can result in representing narrower interests than those of other political
groups.81
Both prefer different styles of action and different relationships with governments
or political parties.82 Despite some complications, most pressure groups in
76 Beer 1982; Marsh 1995, 57–80.
77 Zappala and Sawer 2001, 273.
78 Putnam 2000.
79 Warhurst 2006, 327.
80 Matthews 1980, 448.
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Australia could fall easily into these two categories; the categories may also
overlap.83
Sectional groups
Sectional interest groups represent significant sections of the community and the
economy, and are usually integrated into party politics and government. Some are
frequently involved in policy development, often as advisors.84 Despite a goal of
representing issues of their sector to influence policy, some sectional groups remain
aligned to particular political parties, even to the disadvantage of their interests.85
Sectional interests represent a ‘fixed’ clientele,86 and professional groups tend
to be well-resourced sectional interests. Somewhat lesser resourced are producer
groups who generate goods or services. This includes unions, which represent
labour services. Groups representing the interests of state welfare service clients
are more inclined to represent groups of individuals who are the clientele of the
welfare provider groups. When banded together, conglomerations of interests may
be called ‘collectivist’ pressure groups.87
Such groups prefer to lobby government through direct contact and raising
awareness in the community, and typically defend their own particular interests.
Labour organisations, business interests, primary producers’ associations, profess-
ional and consumer associations are all characterised as sectional interests. Groups
representing localised issues, migrant and Aboriginal organisations and churches
are also typical sectional interests.88
The major sectional interest organisations operate under established conven-
tions of participating in the policy-making process. Large sectional organisations
such as the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the National Farmers’
Federation, and the Australian Council of Trade Unions are involved in the policy
process, and are often represented on government advisory committees. Sectional
groups often employ highly qualified individuals to act for them; businesses
frequently recruit former senior public servants for such roles.89 In fact, business
groups are significant sectional interests representing their views to government in
Australia. The business lobby tends to be privileged because its resources, signif-
icant sectional interests and its production capability afford it power in a market-
based economy, described as structural power.90
83 Maddox 1996, 411; Warhurst 2006, 330.
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Agreement in sectional organisations can be difficult on contentious issues.
Smaller, possibly more autonomous groups in a sector may be more courageous,
and arguably more accurate when representing their particular constituency. This
is because they can refuse to compromise on an issue for the appearance of unity.91
In fact, some sectional groups may often promote causes not directly related to the
interests of their members.92 Yet there are advantages when pressure groups in a
sector work together.
Peak bodies
Peak bodies are usually strong sectional pressure groups, with several democratic
functions: involvement in the policy process of those most affected, developing
the capacity of its member organisations to enter into the policy process, but also
representing resource-poor sections of the community. Peak bodies represent, co-
ordinate, inform, research, and develop policy on behalf of member organisations
for their sector. Importantly, peak bodies are not service providers, though there
are a number of ways in which they provide services to their members (e.g. in
co-ordinating submissions, participating in consultation processes, and perhaps
providing information).93
Peak bodies bring together a number of organisations in partnership to generate
one voice speaking for the collective. For example, community organisations lobby
individually, but ACOSS also acts as an ‘umbrella’ group for all of the welfare
organisations. Even so, ‘representation’ must be considered by member organ-
isations of the peak body in appointing someone to speak for them as they confer
authority upon their peak body to speak on their behalf. In turn, peak bodies convey
a strong message and provide clarity for policy makers on whom to approach to
speak generally on the issues affecting a particular sector. Moreover, governments
prefer to deal with pressure groups that are able to speak authoritatively.94
Promotional groups and advocacy groups
Unlike sectional interest groups, promotional pressure groups are more peripheral
to government policy making. For this reason, they may use more electoral
tactics.95 Despite promotional groups appearing to succeed at the ballot box
through either election of candidates, or significant portions of the voting public
supporting candidates, they exert limited policy influence. This is because they are
not integrated into government processes and relationships, and can be divisive
for parties. That said, particular promotional groups obtained greater access to the
91 Warhurst 1984, 23.
92 Matthews 1980, 448.
93 Sawer 2002, 40–1.
94 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2007, 97–8, 111.
95 Matthews 1980, 460.
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bureaucracy during past decades due to some government agencies engaging staff
with links to promotional groups, or with a personal commitment to their cause.96
Promotional groups are often more concerned with advancing a particular
issue or cause. Advocacy groups are a type of promotional group that seek to raise
the status or profile of a section of society seen to be disadvantaged or deprived
– socially, politically or materially. Promotional groups tend to focus on causes to
advance the interests of society as a whole, and speak along policy lines rather than
as a representative.97
Promotional groups can be further categorised into single-issue and multi-issue
groups. This distinction is important, because promotional groups appear to be
conflated as ‘single-issue groups’ by government and policy makers, when in fact
their concerns can cross a breadth of matters within their cause or promotion. For
example, the WEL, which was formed ‘to change social attitudes and practices which
discriminate against women’ and works to protect the rights of Australian women,
could easily be dismissed as a ‘single-issue group’. However, the WEL campaigns on a
number of issues of relevance to women, including ending violence against women,
health and democratic participation.98
On a cautionary note, at times promotional pressure groups may be proxies
for more vested interests of sectional organisations.99 For example, the Alliance
of Australian Retailers was a group ostensibly opposed to the plain packaging of
cigarettes because the policy would damage the business of small retailers. It was
later found to be an ‘astroturf ’ group (i.e. a fake ‘grassroots’ organisation) as it
was funded by tobacco companies Philip Morris, British American Tobacco and
Imperial Tobacco Australia.100
Other types
Single-issue pressure groups focus on raising the profile of a single cause or issue,
perhaps as part of a social movement. Social reform movements seek to change
norms rather than push for radical change, whereas radical movements seek to
change the way society is structured. Groups and movements can be temporary,
whether short-term or semi-permanent, emerging as needed. Fusion refers to when
two or more groups or movements join for a common purpose.101
In the political sphere, the approach of single-issue pressure groups can be
seen as a ‘thin edge of the wedge’, as they concentrate on one particular issue
or one aspect of a more complicated issue, and they may not be integrated into
either the party system or the machinery of government. They do not become
96 Warhurst 1984, 20–4.
97 Vromen, Gelber and Gauja 2009, 239.
98 Women’s Electoral Lobby n.d.
99 Matthews 1997, 271; Matthews 1980, 452–3.
100 Davies 2010.
101 Cole and Foster 2001.
Australian Politics and Policy
446
part of government processes or advisory committees. Rather, single-issue lobby
groups focus on raising awareness of their particular issue so it is adopted by
more powerful pressure groups or the community itself. Ultimately, single-issue
groups require politicians to identify themselves as either for or against their cause,
and advocate for people to support or oppose the political candidate in turn.
Such groups are often criticised by their opponents for a perceived or attributed
negative effect on democracy, because they promote imposing a minority view
on the majority – an accusation ‘levelled at non-party organisations on both the
right and the left of politics’.102 This view may be reinforced by political parties,
who often dismiss the views or work of such groups. Parties are often unsettled by
promotional groups, and unwilling to identify themselves with groups that could
potentially deprive them of support.103 That said, a number of single-issue groups,
particularly in advocacy roles, play an important role in drawing attention to an
injustice or setting an agenda for policy change.
Multi-issue groups promote several, usually interconnected or themed, issues.
They are generally better resourced and therefore better able to promote their causes
and concerns. At times, the delineation between single- and multi-issue groups is
ambiguous. For example, an environmental group could be dismissed by politicians
and policy makers as a single-issue group, yet such groups frequently campaign on
related concerns such as greenhouse gas emissions, preservation of wilderness areas,
and recycling. Similarly, the Australian Christian Lobby may engage on a number
of issues including refugees, school curriculum and euthanasia, but is primarily
concerned with ‘Christian principles and ethics [being] accepted and influencing
the way we are governed, do business and relate as a society. We want Australia to
become a more just and compassionate nation.’104 An example of a demonstrably
multi-issue pressure group campaigning on interconnected issues is GetUp!, which
describes itself as a not-for-profit, grassroots advocacy organisation.105 GetUp!
pursues change to a variety of government policies, yet many of the issues Getup!
advocates originate from the same progressive viewpoint.
Conclusions
While the political sphere undergoes change from digital disruption and disaffection
with democracy, pressure groups and social movements form an important conduit
to ensure citizens’ voices are heard and reflected in policy. Theories of pressure
group formation can help explain why some groups emerge and last. An individual’s
decision to join a pressure group or social movement can be influenced by a variety
102 Warhurst 1986b, 107.
103 Warhurst 1984, 2–3.
104 Australian Christian Lobby n.d.
105 Get Up! n.d.
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of factors, but collective action is effective in bringing about change. Groups’ roles
of representation, education and scrutiny are used differently by groups who employ
insider and outsider strategies. Whether they are political insiders or outsiders, they
can use either or both kinds of strategies to exercise influence.
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Religious communities and politics
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Modern Western political thought usually conceptualises religion as private and
personal and politics as public. This chapter demonstrates that throughout Australia’s
post-invasion history religious organisations and commitments have had many and
varied public effects, both shaping and being shaped by political, social and economic
factors. After examining theoretical questions about how religion should be under-
stood in relation to politics, this chapter considers how religion has contributed
to debates about nationhood, national identity and belonging. It then investigates
religious communities’ involvement in formal political processes, in relation to the
party system, as political actors and as contractors of services.
Defining religion
Political scientists have not always paid much attention to religion – and, when
they do, they often do so without definition.1 Yet religion is an elusive concept;
Maddox, Marion, and Rodney Smith (2019). Religious communities and politics. In Peter J. Chen,
Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta
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1 Maddox 2015.
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many languages have no word that is a ready equivalent of what English speakers
understand as ‘religion’.
As Brent Nongbri pointed out, religion’s intuitive meaning for modern
Westerners is ‘anything that sufficiently resembles modern Protestant Christianity’.2
Traditions that do not fit that pattern tend to be either overlooked or reinterpreted
to squeeze them into a Protestant Christian mould.
To help navigate this problem, Ira Allen and Saul Allen proposed that political
scientists should think of religions as ‘systems of shared activity organized around
transcendental signifiers’.3 Focusing on activity systems (which are observable)
avoids favouring faith or belief (which are not only inaccessible to the researcher
but also of greater importance in some traditions than others). Similarly,
‘transcendental signifiers’ are observable in public discourse, and not limited to
such things as deities (which not all traditions have). The Allens’ definition also
helpfully avoids seeing ‘religion’ as static, allowing for the fact that such activity
systems change over time, in interaction with other aspects of society, including the
political.
Religion and democratic politics
Religious studies scholar Timothy Fitzgerald argued that the terms ‘religion’ and
‘politics’ acquired their modern meanings through being conceptually separated
from one another in the 17th century. ‘In this new formula’, according to Fitzgerald,
‘religion has nothing in its true nature to do with “power”’ and ‘governance and
the political state’ were redefined as ‘non-religious’. A consequence of the pattern
Fitzgerald identified is that modern Western political thought has theorised that
religion and politics are safest when kept separated.
This preference for separation is often traced to the trauma of the European
wars of religion in the 16th and 17th centuries.4 The wars of religion were
conventionally understood as being ended by the Peace of Westphalia (1648), a
series of peace treaties that enshrined the principle that rulers could choose their
own state religion, out of Catholicism, Lutheranism or Calvinism, while giving
limited rights to citizens who did not adhere to the state religion.
The Peace of Westphalia is often held to have inaugurated a new era of tolerance,
religious freedom and the liberal state, ending endemic religious violence.5
Maintaining peace, then, required citizens in liberal democracies to keep their
religious views to themselves.6
2 Nongbri 2013, 18.
3 Allen and Allen 2016, 559.
4 Fitzgerald 2015.
5 Cavanaugh 2009, 130–41.
6 Audi 2000.
Religious communities and politics
453
William Cavanaugh influentially labelled this account the ‘myth of the wars
of religion’ and argued that it is ‘false’ because, among other reasons, religious
tolerance and respect for religious freedom emerged only gradually, mostly long
after the Westphalian settlement.7 Cavanaugh concludes that the myth instead
legitimates the secular state’s claim to the exclusive use of violence – including
violence wielded against religious groups, especially those perceived as challenging
state interests.8
To Naomi Goldenberg, religions are more helpfully understood as ‘vestigial
states’ – that is, ‘the cultural remnants of former sovereignties that persist within
current states’.9 The main difference lies in the ‘abstractions they cite to justify
their authority’.10 Where fully functioning states ‘might ground themselves on such
terms as freedom, equality, justice, or as the proper homelands of an idealized
race or ethnicity’, the ‘vestigial states called religions often appeal to some form
of divinity (generally male)’.11 Goldenberg’s observations clarify that the kinds
of organisations conventionally called religions, and those conventionally called
states, share concerns with the organisation and distribution of (among other
things) material goods and power (of various kinds). Little wonder separating
‘religion’ from ‘politics’ proves much harder than it sounds.
In Australia, as elsewhere, religious communities have exhibited varying
political alignments, and the rise of the ‘no religion’ category provokes further
questions. Moreover, the demand to keep religion out of political debate is arguably
anti-democratic, preventing some people (the religiously committed) from drawing
on their deepest convictions in thinking about public concerns. Rejecting the
conventional wisdom that religion renders public life unstable, several scholars
have argued for democracy over secularism.12 Lori Beaman gives the name ‘deep
equality’ to the forms of ‘agonistic respect’ that facilitate democratic community
across religious differences.13
Religion and politics at Federation
The first national Census, in 1911 (following separate efforts by the various
colonies), found that 96 per cent of respondents identified as Christian, with
‘Church of England’ (Anglican) the largest group, followed by Catholics, Pres-
byterians, Methodists and smaller proportions of other denominations (mostly
Protestant) and undefined. The largest non-Christian grouping was ‘Hebrew’
7 Cavanaugh 2009, 177.
8 Cavanaugh 2009.
9 Goldenberg 2013.
10 Goldenberg 2013.
11 Goldenberg 2013, 40–1.
12 Bader 2008; Connolly 1999.
13 Beaman 2017.
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(Jewish), at 0.3 per cent, followed by Confucian, ‘Mohammedan’ (Muslim), Buddhist
and Pagan. Agnostics, Freethinkers, Atheists and No Religion collectively made up
half a per cent.
While this Christian dominance might look to modern eyes like a recipe for
consensus, in fact colonial parliaments debated religion fiercely in the decades
leading up to Federation (1901). Between 1853 (South Australia [SA]) and 1880
(New South Wales [NSW]), all the colonies abandoned public subsidies for
religious schools, and most ended religious instruction in public schools. Whether
excluding religion almost entirely (as in SA) or building non-sectarian religion into
the curriculum (NSW), the goal was to make education as inclusive as possible.14
The Constitution and formal political institutions
Australia’s Constitution and formal political institutions are not completely secular,
nor do they embody religious values, language and symbols to the extent of those of
some other liberal democracies, including the UK. People who become Australian
citizens, for example, are free to make their pledge ‘under God’ or not; either way,
the shared objects of their loyalty are distinctly liberal democratic and secular.
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 (Cth) begins with
reference to ‘the people … humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God’, an
expression that the late 19th-century framers of the Constitution thought would
be inclusive enough to avoid offending adherents of most faiths. A century later,
in a much more secularised social context, delegates debating a possible Australian
republic at the 1998 Constitutional Convention were happy to retain a reference to
God in the preamble to the Constitution, seeing it as a reminder of a generic source
of authority over lawmakers or as a reflection of the nation’s best aspirations, or
both.15
The other direct reference to religion in the Constitution occurs in section 116,
which states:
The Commonwealth shall not make any law for the establishing of a religion, or for
imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of religion,
and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust
under the Commonwealth.
A casual reading of section 116 might suggest that it erects a strong, American-
style wall separating church and state. In fact, the Constitution’s drafters were
not particularly careful about the wording of section 116, leaving constitutional
protection of religious freedom in Australia relatively weak. While the High Court
14 Maddox 2014a.
15 Maddox 2001, 41–90.
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has defined ‘religion’ broadly, it has interpreted ‘law for’ in section 116 as
prohibiting the Commonwealth only from making laws specifically intended to
establish a religion, impose observance, or prohibit free exercise. The court has
upheld Commonwealth laws that impinge on the exercise of a religion but are not
designed to do so. In addition, section 116 does not prevent the states or territories
from making laws concerning religion. Attempts in 1944 and 1988 to address these
issues via constitutional amendments both failed.16
The ban on religious tests for offices and public trusts in section 116, along
with Australia’s increasing independence from the UK after 1901, meant that the
King or Queen of Australia’s oath as British monarch to defend the Anglican faith
– potentially offensive to Catholics and other non-Anglicans – was pushed into
the background.17 The governors-general who have represented the monarch in
Australia since 1901 have included Catholics, Anglicans, other Protestants, Jews
and one avowed atheist. Government ministers, judges and parliamentarians have
been even more diverse in their religious affiliations. On taking office, they swear
either an oath ending with ‘so help me God’ or an affirmation omitting those words.
As noted above, Australian parliaments include some religious symbolism and
practices; for instance, almost all Australian parliaments start their daily business
with prayer.18 Most traditions on display in those parliaments do not have religious
origins but have developed within the institutions themselves, drawing on their
Westminster predecessors.
Indigenous religion
For at least 60,000 years, the territory that is currently Australia was covered by a
dense network of interlocking activity systems for organising power, knowledge, law
and goods. These systems were conceived in terms of humans’ relationships with
one another, with the land and with non-human others, both physical and spiritual.
The languages in which these systems were expressed – more than 250, with some
800 dialectal varieties19 – did not distinguish ‘religion’ from other areas of life, such
as political or economic. In the words of native title scholars Michael Dodson and
Diana McCarthy, ‘The Indigenous process by which historical events become part
of an everlasting and immutable Creation are ritualistic and religious’.20 In addition
to areas that European ways of thinking normally consider ‘religious’, this process
is also the basis of some matters – such as land ownership – that European ways
of thinking consider economic and of others – such as relationships, rights and
responsibilities between groups of people – that European ways of thinking consider
16 Beck 2018.
17 Bonney 2013.
18 Maddox 2001, 109–17.
19 Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies 2019.
20 Dodson and McCarthy 2006.
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political. As Dodson and McCarthy observe, ‘the fit between traditional knowledge
systems and Australian law is neither close nor comfortable’.21
In the colonial era, missions tried (with a few exceptions) to reshape Indig-
enous peoples’ political and economic systems, along with their beliefs, to fit a
European image of a ‘Christian’ way of life.22 Belief had practical consequences; for
example, colonial courts in the 1840s denied the testimony of Indigenous witnesses
because they were ‘ignorant of the existence of a God or a future state’ or even ‘had
no religion at all’.23
Yet, little more than a century later, Indigenous law was considered too religious
for an Australian court to recognise. The 1971 Gove case was the first land claim
to be heard in a federal court. Justice Blackburn found that the Yolŋu claimants’
relationship to their land was ‘religious or spiritual’ and that this precluded the
court from granting their claim.24 In a further twist, anthropologist Nonie Sharp
has shown how the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) finally undid the doctrine of terra
nullius and recognised Indigenous ownership, but at the cost of downplaying the
religious and spiritual aspects of Indigenous land law.25
In 2017, the First Nations Constitutional Convention, meeting at Uluru, encap-
sulated the unity of the spiritual, material and political by declaring that Indigenous
sovereignty:
is a spiritual notion: the ancestral tie between the land, or ‘mother nature’, and the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples who were born therefrom, remain
attached thereto, and must one day return thither to be united with our ancestors.
This is the basis of our ownership of the soil, or, better, of sovereignty.
The Uluru statement then spells out the consequences of that sovereignty’s fracture,
including catastrophic incarceration rates. It proposes political solutions, including
a Makarrata Commission, and a First Nations Voice enshrined in the Constitution,
enabling ‘this ancient sovereignty’ to ‘shine through as a fuller expression of Aust-
ralia’s nationhood’.26
Patterns of religious belonging and commitment
The pattern of religiosity in a country affects the ways that religious communities
interact with politics. A country in which a single religion has the committed
21 Dodson and McCarthy 2006.
22 Rowse 2017.
23 Smandych 2006, 107.
24 Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd and the Commonwealth of Australia (1971) 17 FLR 141, 167, 270–1
(Gove).
25 Sharp 1996, 149–88.
26 First Nations National Constitutional Convention 2017.
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Table 1 Religious identification in the Census since Federation (selected years)
1901 1947 1971 1996 2016
Catholic 22.7 20.9 26.9 27.0 22.6
Anglican* 39.7 39.0 31.0 22.0 13.3
Other Christian 33.7 28.1 28.3 21.9 16.3
Total Christian 96.1 88.0 86.2 70.9 52.2
Islam ** ** 0.2 1.1 2.6
Buddhism ** ** ** 1.1 2.4
Hinduism ** ** ** 0.4 1.9
Judaism 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4
Sikhism ** ** ** ** 0.5
Other religions 1.0 0.1 0.8 0.4 0.4
Total religions other than Christianity 1.4 0.5 1.5 3.4 8.2
No religion 0.4 0.3 6.7 16.6 30.1
Not stated 2.0 11.1 6.1 9.0 8.5
Source: ABS 2017; ABS 2014.
*Includes Church of England ** Less than 0.1 per cent
support of the vast majority of the population will have a different political dynamic
to a country in which a number of religions each have strong community support
or a minority of citizens have a religious commitment and the majority is non-
religious. The specifics of the religions concerned and their historical presence in a
country will also be important.
Australia’s contemporary pattern is religious pluralism. According to the 2016
Census, the largest single religious group – 30 per cent of the population – were
those who identified as having no religious commitment (Table 1). Australians
who identified as Christian comprised around half the population (52 per cent).
Catholics were the largest individual Christian group (23 per cent), followed by
Anglicans (13 per cent). The ‘other Christian’ group (16 per cent) is diverse, with
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Uniting Church identifiers comprising the largest sub-group at 4 per cent. ‘Other’
religions are also diverse, with Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus the largest non-
Christian religious groups. Each of the categories in Table 1 hides diversity within
religious groups: not all Catholics, Anglicans, Buddhists, etc. share the same beliefs
and practices. Those with no religious identification will also have had different
experiences of religion through their lives.
It is also clear from Table 1 that Australians’ religious identities are more diverse
now than they were at Federation in 1901, when nearly all of the population
identified as Christian. Those Christians were divided, with the largest two groups
being Church of England (Anglican in contemporary terms) and Catholic. The
‘other Christians’ were overwhelmingly Protestants – Presbyterians, Methodists,
Congregationalists, Baptists and the like. This pattern of an Anglican and other
Protestant majority and a significant Catholic minority reflected the colonising
populations’ overwhelmingly British and Irish origins, which had not altered much
by the Second World War. As other parts of this chapter show, this foundational
period of Christian dominance and subsequent diversity has had important effects
on Australian political institutions, political organisations and public policies.
Greater religious diversity began to develop from the 1970s, driven by two main
processes. The first was the growth of immigration from outside Europe, which has
increased the proportion of Australians from Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh
traditions. At the 2016 Census, 4 per cent of people born in Australia identified with a
religion other than Christianity, compared with 21 per cent of people born overseas.27
The second process has been secularisation. Since the 1970s, fewer and fewer
Australians have declared any religious allegiance. In 2016, 10 per cent of Aus-
tralians aged in their 80s and 90s had no religion, compared with 25 per cent of
those in their 50s and over 40 per cent of those in their 20s.28 This secularising trend
is also evident in patterns of religious practice and belief. About half of Australian
adults attended at least one religious service a month in 1950, compared with one-
fifth by the 1990s and one-sixth over the past decade. Practices such as prayer,
as well as belief in God, have also declined. In 2018, 30 per cent of Australians
prayed or meditated at least once a week. Twenty-six per cent believed in God, with
another 30 per cent believing in a ‘spirit’ or ‘life force’.29
This drift away from religious identities, practices and beliefs echoes the trends
in most other Western liberal democracies, with the exception of the USA. The
exact causes of this widespread trend have been debated, with factors such as
increasing scientific education, increasing feelings of personal security, decreasing
levels of childhood religious socialisation and decreasing trust in religious organ-
isations all proposed as important.30
27 ABS 2017.
28 ABS 2017.
29 Pepper and Powell 2018; Smith 2001, 253–4.
30 Norris and Inglehart 2011.
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These patterns of religious pluralism and secularism mean that religion has
very different interactions with Australian politics than it does with politics in
the USA. In America, Christian identification, church attendance, beliefs and
devotional practices are more common and more socially valued than they are in
Australia.31 Devout American politicians who invoke Christian language thus share
religious experiences and beliefs with many American voters in a way that devout
Australian politicians do not. This does not mean that religion is unimportant in
Australian politics; however, it means that American patterns of religious influence
on politics cannot be assumed to operate in Australia.
Parties and voters
When the Australian party system solidified in the early 20th century, it did so
primarily along class lines. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) was born out of the
trade union movement, while the forerunners to the current Liberal and National
parties drew heavily on the support of urban and rural businesspeople and
professionals. This class divide had some religious undertones, particularly in the
non-Labor parties, which were dominated by Protestants. Labor attracted Protestant
as well as Catholic activists and leaders. Labor’s first five federal leaders were
Protestants, before the party elected a Catholic leader, James Scullin, in 1928. Despite
the ALP’s diversity, a mythology of Labor Catholicism versus Liberal–National
(Coalition) Protestantism became popular in Australia, particularly after the First
World War conscription debate saw prominent Protestants, including Prime Minister
Billy Hughes, leave Labor to take up leading roles in the non-Labor parties.32
Labor’s ranks continue to include Catholics and Protestants. By contrast, the
non-Labor parties remained dominated by Protestants until the final decades of
the 20th century, when upward social mobility among Catholics increased their
presence and visibility within the Liberal and National parties. Three of the four
federal Liberal leaders since 2007 have been Catholics. This trend effectively ended
any lingering sectarian traces in the major party contest.33
The most prominent Australian party that could legitimately be seen as a
‘church’ party was the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which split from the ALP in
the 1950s and had strong connections with the Catholic Church.34 The DLP held
seats in the Senate from 1956, using its voters’ preferences and the Senate balance
of power to extract concessions from Coalition governments until it lost electoral
support and disbanded in the 1970s.
31 Putnam and Campbell 2010.
32 Hogan 1987, 178–88
33 Hogan 1987, chapter 10.
34 Warhurst 2005.
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More recently, minor parties promoting conservative Christian values have
held a handful of seats in federal and state parliaments. The most notable have been
the Christian Democratic Party, the re-formed DLP, Family First and the Australian
Conservative Party; however, none of these parties has achieved nationwide
organisation or support. By the same token, minor parties such as the Secular Party
that have attempted to mobilise the growing number of non-religious Australians
against the ‘power and privileges’ enjoyed by churches have secured negligible
electoral support.35 Right-wing populist minor parties, such as Pauline Hanson’s
One Nation, have built support partly through expressing hostility to Muslim
immigrants and Islamic traditions.36
If the vast majority of Australians with religious commitments do not take the
opportunity to vote for ‘religious’ parties, this does not mean that religion does not
affect their voting. Political scientists have identified two longstanding relationships
between religion and voting in Australia. The first is that religious identification
affects party support. At the 2016 federal election, for example, 44 per cent of
Catholics voted for Labor or the Greens, compared with 37 per cent of Anglicans
and 33 per cent of Uniting Church adherents. Voters with no religion were most
likely to support Labor (56 per cent). The second pattern is that more observant
members of religious groups are less likely to support left-of-centre parties. In 2016,
33 per cent of voters who attend religious services at least once a month voted Labor
or Green, compared with 49 per cent of voters who never attended.37
These differences are weaker than they once were but they persist. No entirely
satisfactory explanation has been advanced. More religious Australians are more
conservative on issues such as euthanasia, sexuality and abortion; however, they
are not consistently more conservative on the economic and social issues that
typically divide the major parties. Moreover, the religiously observant are likely to
be exposed to competing messages from their leaders about how they should vote.
The distinctive socio-economic profile of many local churches and other religious
communities – older and more middle class than the wider community – may also
promote conservative or aspirational values. The evidence remains unclear.38 There
is also very limited evidence about how growing Australian religious communities
such as Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism affect patterns of voting.39
35 Secular Party of Australia 2019.
36 Pauline Hanson’s One Nation 2018.
37 Bean 2018, 240–1.
38 Perales, Bouma and Campbell 2019, 118–19; Smith 2009; Smith 2001, 264–76.
39 Al-Momani et al. 2010.
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Religious commitment among political elites
Australia’s federal politicians have at least as high rates religious adherence as
the general population.40 Also, leaders have become more outspoken about their
religion. For example, in the decade to 2019, three prime ministers (Rudd, Abbott
and Morrison) have regularly discussed their Christian faith (respectively,
Anglican, Catholic and Pentecostal), while a fourth (Turnbull) was a less vocal, but
consistent, church attender (Catholic). Only Julia Gillard claimed no religion. The
tendency for Australian politicians to discuss their religion publicly has increased
as popular levels of religious commitment have fallen.41
Australian parliaments, not noted for ethnic or gender diversity, have never-
theless long enjoyed a range of religious representation. Jewish and ‘freethinking’
members served in colonial parliaments and, after Federation, in the national
parliament, representing all political positions. For example, between 1858 and
1866, Judah Moss Solomon served in both houses of the SA parliament; in 1899,
his son, Vaiben Louis Solomon, became the colony’s first Jewish premier. Sir Isaac
Isaacs was a member of the first parliament, served as attorney-general in
1905–1906 and, as Australia’s ninth governor-general, became the British Empire’s
first Jewish vice-regal representative. In 1917, the NSW Legislative Assembly could
not sit on Yom Kippur because both the speaker and deputy speaker were Jewish.
The 45th parliament (2016–19) included six Jews (ALP, Liberal and Centre
Alliance) and four Muslims (ALP and Greens).
It is tempting to look for direct correlations between politicians’ religions and
specific policies, but the reality is considerably more complicated. To take a few
examples, the ALP’s longstanding opposition to public funding of Catholic schools
was permanently altered by Gough Whitlam, a self-described agnostic from a
Protestant family. Further education policy changes favouring Christian schools
and introducing religious chaplains in public schools were initiated by John
Howard, who, while in office, described himself as only a sporadic churchgoer.42
Same-sex marriage was eventually legislated under the Catholic (and marriage
equality advocate) Malcolm Turnbull, having been resisted by the atheist Julia
Gillard. Religion is not an independent force in political processes; it interacts with
party pressures, politicians’ career paths, electoral calculations and community
expectations, among other factors.43
40 Maddox 2001, 11–19.
41 Crabb 2009.
42 Maddox 2014a, 183; Maddox 2005, 258.
43 Maddox 2014b.
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Religious communities as political actors
While many religious communities will claim to be non-political, they engage in
politics in various ways and often develop theological or doctrinal understandings
of this political involvement and its limits. Local religious communities can have
some impact on the politics of their immediate communities and are in turn
affected by local government planning decisions and the like. Although determined
advocacy by local religious leaders sometimes reaches wider audiences, their efforts
are mostly limited to mobilising members of their congregations and surrounding
communities. In doing so, local religious communities often respond to positions
taken by their state or national leaders, to religious advocacy and lobby groups, or
to wider social movements that include religious groups. These local responses may
not be uniform, particularly when the state or national leadership of a religious
community is openly divided on a public issue or offers no clear guidance on
it. Before the 2017 postal survey of Australian voters on same-sex marriage, for
example, the governing bodies of most major religious groups held official
positions, mostly opposing same-sex marriage. National and state leaders of some
religious communities were openly divided on the issue, however, which gave local
religious leaders scope to openly oppose, or at least fail to endorse, the official line
of their organisations.44
As the same-sex marriage debate indicated, there is no peak religious organ-
isation that speaks in the public arena for all religious communities, or even for all
Christians. Most, but not all, major Christian denominations are members of the
National Council of Churches in Australia (NCCA), which, among other activities,
makes statements on public policy issues such as economic justice, Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander rights, refugee rights and welfare, foreign aid, peace and
security. Member churches are not, however, bound by NCCA statements. Muslims
Australia (the Australian Federation of Islamic Councils) and the Executive
Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) act as national peak bodies for most significant
Islamic and Jewish communities. The NCCA, Muslims Australia and ECAJ
maintain interfaith dialogue and express similar positions on some policy issues,
such as religious tolerance, refugees and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
rights; however, united action in other policy areas has been limited.45
Internally, religious communities reflect a similar diversity of views about
public issues. As John Warhurst points out in the case of the Catholic Church,
often mistakenly seen as a monolithic organisation, the ‘Catholic lobby’ is a diverse
patchwork that includes formal bodies such as the Australian Catholic Bishops
Conference, major service delivery agencies such as Catholic Social Services
Australia, Catholic Health Australia, the National Catholic Education Commission
44 Perales, Bouma and Campbell 2019, 114–5.
45 Executive Council of Australian Jewry 2019; Muslims Australia AFIC 2019; National Council of
Churches in Australia n.d.
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and Catholic universities, advocacy bodies such as the Australian Catholic Social
Justice Council, the Australian Catholic Migrant and Refugee Office and the
Australian Catholic Council for Employment Relations, charitable bodies such as St
Vincent de Paul, pressure groups in which Catholics have played major roles such
as Right to Life Australia, along with key individual clergy and laypeople. In some
policy areas, such as health care and education, the Catholic lobby acts as an insider,
negotiating directly with government officials on the basis that Catholic hospitals
and schools form a key part of policy implementation. In other policy areas, such as
refugees, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander rights, peace and security, Catholic
bodies rely on outsider repertoires of public mobilisation and protest, often through
participation in broader social movements.46
Several developments in the lobbying efforts of Australian religious comm-
unities have been evident in recent decades. The first has been the growth, since
the 1960s, of interest groups and social movements with positions that directly
challenge traditional religious values. Where once the Christian churches were
dominant voices, particularly on ‘moral’ issues such as euthanasia, sexuality and
abortion, now they are just one set of voices competing with a range of other vocal
and well-organised interests.
The sectarian conflict between Catholics and Protestants (including Anglicans)
that marked the lobbying efforts of Christian churches for much of the 20th century
has largely disappeared, replaced by an increasing tendency to unite against secular
voices in policy debates.47 In recent years, this co-operation has extended to Islamic
and other religious communities. In addition, sections of the churches have sought
a role within social movements alongside secular groups with whom they share
positions, a pattern that developed from the late 1970s in movements for peace,
Aboriginal land rights, refugees and the environment.48
The most recent development has been the increase in professional lobbying by
or on behalf of religious communities. This development has been most obvious in
the Canberra-based Australian Christian Lobby, which has employed staff to lobby
parliamentarians and influence voters since 2001, mostly in support of conservative
policy positions. Its techniques are partly borrowed from similar organisations in
the USA, but it has less influence than its American counterparts.49
Religious communities as service providers
Australia’s shift to neoliberal governance has increasingly built religious organis-
ations into policy implementation, as providers of services that were previously
46 Warhurst 2008.
47 Hogan 1987.
48 Smith 2014.
49 Maddox 2005; Payne 2019; Smith 2014; Smith 2009.
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supplied predominantly by public agencies. Especially since the mid-1990s, edu-
cation, welfare, aged care, health and disability services have been progressively
privatised, with religious organisations as major participants. Economist Paul
Oslington calculated in 2015 that, due to contracting arrangements with govern-
ments, ‘Church-related not-for-profit organizations deliver approximately half of
social services in Australia’, and that this proportion would increase due to the
introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme.50
The effects of this shift included hastening the de-unionisation and dereg-
ulation of workforces in social services. The transfer of substantial quantities of
previously government services to religious organisations, which are exempt from
aspects of anti-discrimination law, removed a significant proportion of the
education, health and welfare workforce from the reach of these protections and
raised questions about the use of public money for services that were not provided
on a purely non-discriminatory basis. Religious organisations have historically
been effective critics of government policy; but, from the mid-1990s, the contracts
under which they become agents of government policy often included ‘no-criticism’
clauses, limiting this capacity.51 By giving a publicly funded boost to organisations
with declining memberships, Oslington observed, the contracting system put ‘most
Australians’ contact with Christianity … through education or social services
rather than congregations’.52
Providing contracted services also gave religious organisations an edge in
debates about religious freedom. Through the 20th century, discussion of religious
freedom mainly centred on protecting members of religious minorities from
discrimination, and many conservative Christian churches were strong opponents
of moves to strengthen religious freedom, extend the reach of section 116 of the
Constitution or initiate laws against religious discrimination, fearing that such
moves would compromise their right to proclaim their own beliefs. In the 21st
century, discussion of religious freedom shifted to conservative churches’ concerns
about same-sex marriage, and especially fears that they would lose their entitlement
to discriminate on the basis of gender, gender identity and sexual orientation, or to
teach a heterosexual-only view of marriage.53
One area where the involvement of religious organisations in delivering public
services has been particularly evident is schooling. By 1880, all of the Australian
colonies had abolished public subsidies for religious schools, and from then until
1963, religious schools received no public money. ‘State aid’, as it was called, was
reintroduced incrementally, first by the Coalition government under Robert
Menzies. This was followed by a much larger expansion, in 1973, by the Labor
government led by Gough Whitlam. The original justification was equity, given the
50 Oslington 2015.
51 Maddox 2005, 228–59.
52 Oslington 2015.
53 Poulos 2019.
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dire state of many Catholic schools that were unable to afford even basic facilities.
The return to ‘state aid’ was part of a larger package of education reform overseen
by the Commonwealth Schools Commission, which was required to observe the
‘primary obligation … to provide and maintain government school systems … of
the highest standard and … open, without fees or religious tests, to all children’.54
Since then, however, the funding mix has consistently favoured private schools
over public schools, as well as shifting from the neediest schools to benefit the
better-resourced schools.55 In 2019, one in three private schools received more
public funding per student than public schools with similar student profiles.56 Since
more than 90 per cent of private schools have some form of Christian affiliation,
this represents a substantial public subsidy to religious organisations.
In 1977, the highest proportion of Australian students to date – 78.9 per cent
– was enrolled in public schools. In 2019, nearly one-third of Australian students
attended private schools. Australia’s education landscape since the 1960s reflects a
similar pattern to other areas of service provision: religious organisations attracted
increasing amounts of public money, even as religious adherence declined.
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated that, while Australia’s formal political institutions
are broadly secular, Australian politics has been substantially shaped by dominant
Christian traditions, often in surprising ways. Members of non-Christian religions
have taken prominent roles in Australian public life, but their traditions’ impacts on
the public culture have been smaller overall than that of Christianity. Indigenous
ways of knowing, including the spiritual dimensions of sovereignty and land
ownership, remain an aspect of the Australian religious landscape that the non-
Indigenous population is still attempting to comprehend.
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Voter behaviour
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Representation is the basis of modern democratic theory. In most mature electoral
democracies, it is achieved through regular elections, which provide voters with
the opportunity to select representatives whose policy goals align with their own.
This chapter explores how citizens vote and some of the key influences on their
behaviour.
Research into voter behaviour has been greatly influenced by a shift from
normative assumptions about how citizens should behave in democratic society
to studying how they act. This highlights a troubling and persistent problem for
democratic governance: if citizens in representative democracies are largely not
interested in politics and are under informed about basic matters of state, how can
they provide any control over public policy through elections or referendums?
Borrowing from social psychology, political science provides an answer to
this. While most voters are far from perfectly equipped to analyse political issues,
most use limited information to make reasonably sophisticated judgements about
political leaders, candidates, parties and salient matters, particularly those relevant
to their lived experiences. When voters pool their individual opinions at elections,
Ratcliff, Shaun (2019). Voter behaviour. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
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the resulting collective decision is actually likely to be better than an individual
decision.
This chapter will explore the political science research on voter behaviour to
better understand how representative democracy functions.
What is public opinion?
Public opinion is a concept frequently used by political leaders, journalists and
political scientists to describe and understand politics. It can be viewed as the
aggregation of the attitudes and preferences of individuals who comprise the public.
This term – ‘the public’ – is widely used, but in political science it has a particular
meaning. Sociologist Herbert Blumer suggested three criteria. In his framework,
the public consists of a group of people who:
• face a common issue
• are divided on how to address it
• are engaged in discussion or debate about the issue.1
In this view, publics emerge over particular issues, such as immigration or the rate
of taxation. To become a member of a public, an individual must join a discourse
on an issue, thinking and reasoning with others. According to Blumer, if a public is
not critically engaged with an issue, then that public ‘dissolves’, and uncritical and
unengaged public opinion becomes mere ‘public sentiment’.
However, this is not a universally accepted definition. More recently, philo-
sopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas argued that public opinion is context
dependent, anchored to the ‘public sphere’ – the political and social domain in
which people operate, which changes over time.2 It comprises public discussions
about politics outside the formal arena of government, such as conversations in a
cafe or bar, talkback radio or what is covered in the editorial pages of a newspaper.
Changes in the public sphere include who is permitted to participate and the
issues and positions that are considered to be socially acceptable. In the past,
women, those who didn’t own property and some ethnic and racial groups were
not permitted to engage in Australian political debate or vote in elections. Because
it consisted only of the opinions of certain groups of men, the public sphere in
mid-19th-century Australia, for instance, did not consider it socially acceptable to
discuss issues such as LGBTIQ+ rights.
1 Blumer 1946.
2 Habermas 1989.
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The history of the public opinion as an idea
Most early theorists and philosophers, including Plato and Machiavelli, were
generally dismissive of the political opinions of the common people. They believed
most citizens did not have the capacity for rational political judgement. However,
some were more positive. Aristotle advocated an early version of the wisdom of
the crowd. The modern, mostly more positive, attitude towards public opinion can
be traced to the Enlightenment, which saw a growth in literacy, the development
of early newspapers and the distribution of political pamphlets. Enlightenment
thinkers, including John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, argued for the existence
of normative, inalienable rights for individuals, protected by the state, and for
greater citizen participation in government.
Lockean political theory was a significant inspiration for the design of the
political system and culture of the USA and other modern representative demo-
cracies. Locke argued that humanity was subject to three laws: divine, civil and
opinion (or reputation). He regarded the latter as arguably the most important.
Poor public opinion could force people to conform to social norms. Despite this,
he generally did not consider public opinion to be a suitable influence for govern-
ments. Other Enlightenment thinkers had a more positive view. David Hume
argued that public support provided government with legitimacy – and was the
only thing that could do so. This view is closest to modern normative beliefs about
the functioning of democracy.
Modern views of voter behaviour
Despite the early origins of the concept, the study of voter behaviour and public
opinion emerged as modern fields of research later, in the 1930s. Key debates
included how voters learn, why they believe certain things and prefer particular
policy options, how their attitudes match with their behaviours and their influence
on government policy decisions.
Much of our understanding of human behaviour comes from the field of social
psychology, where studies of public opinion typically employ one or more of four
basic concepts: beliefs, values, attitudes and opinions.
• Belief systems tend to be thematically and psychologically consistent. They are
the assumptions by which we live our lives, comprising our understanding of
the world, our attitudes and our opinions.
• Values are ideals. They are our understanding of the way things should be.
Many researchers distinguish between ‘terminal’ and ‘instrumental’ values.
Terminal values are ultimate social and individual goals, like prosperity and
freedom. Instrumental values are the constraints on the means used to pursue
our goals, such as honesty and loyalty.
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• Attitudes are the relatively stable and consistent views we hold about people
and objects. These are often defined as evaluations combining emotions, beliefs,
knowledge and thoughts about something.
• Opinions are the expressions of attitudes, sometimes seen as narrower, more
specific and more consciously held (as opposed to unconscious attitudes we
may have formed without deliberation) than attitudes. The idea that opinions
are separate from attitudes is not universal, though.
Do voters hold meaningful political opinions?
Political science research was deeply influenced by the behavioural revolution that
occurred during the mid-20th century. Changes in approaches to investigation
permitted researchers to measure citizens’ preferences and behaviours, raising
questions about the capacity of citizens and challenging some of the normative
assumptions of representative democracy. Whether voters are competent political
agents and can be considered rational actors began to be studied.
Besides social psychology, theories of voter behaviour and public opinion have
been heavily influenced by the discipline of economics. Rational choice theory
has been one of the most consequential of these theories. It is a set of normative
standards and empirical models used to understand human decision making. These
operate on the assumption that aggregate social behaviour is the result of
independent decisions made by individual rational actors. These decisions are
informed by a set of defined preferences from among the available alternatives.
Preferences are assumed to be complete and transitive. Individuals with
complete preferences can always say which of two alternatives they prefer or that
neither is preferred. Transitive preferences are always internally consistent in their
order of desirability. If option A is preferred over option B and option B is preferred
over option C, then A must always be preferred over C. When preference order is
both transitive and complete, it is commonly called a ‘rational preference relation’,
and those who comply with it ‘rational agents’. In this framework, the rational
agent can take available information, probabilities of events and potential costs and
benefits into account when determining preferences and will act consistently in
selecting the alternatives that maximise their interests.3
Anthony Downs’ An economic theory of democracy is one of the most influential
political science works published after the Second World War.4 In a Downsian view
of electoral democracy, voters are rational utility maximisers. They support the
party with policies closest to their own preferences (which are generally expected
3 For a general discussion on rational choice, see Hindmoor 2006. For specific discussions on
rational choice theory as a framework for understanding politics, see McGann 2016 and
Dowding 2009.
4 Downs 1957.
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to benefit their self-interest). Parties and candidates are also utility maximisers,
seeking the private benefits of public office and, therefore, electorally motivated
and willing to adjust their policy offerings to match the preferences of the median
voter. In doing this, parties provide voters with the greatest utility for their vote and
increase their chances of electoral success.
Not all political scientists believe voters are rational actors though. The public’s
general lack of knowledge about all but the most important political issues is one
of the best documented findings in the social science literature,5 with citizens’
limitations as political actors causing some political scientists to question whether
they are capable of acting as we might expect and hope, even in the modern era.
American writer and political commentator Walter Lippmann6 mirrored many
earlier views of the public. He argued citizens were unable to behave rationally or
think deeply. Similarly, one of the founders of modern public opinion research,
Phillip E. Converse,7 found that, in the 1950s and 1960s, only slim majorities of
voters had even a basic understanding of how government worked. Fewer still held
informed opinions on even the most salient policy matters, and the preferences
they did hold lacked consistency across issues. Citizens’ answers to individual
survey questions on one issue were largely unrelated to their answers to other
questions on different (but related) topics. For instance, a respondent who wanted
lower taxes would not always also support less spending. More broadly, very few
voters were consistently on the left or right of the political spectrum.
To make matters worse for normative concepts of democracy, citizens were also
found by Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet,8 Butler and Stokes,9 and Converse to
provide inconsistent answers when asked the same question at different times. A
respondent, asked whether they supported higher spending or lower taxes one year,
often completely changed their position when asked two years later.
Much of the research from social psychology supports this cynicism about
citizen competence. Psychological and experimental research has repeatedly
demonstrated the irrationality of individuals10 and the influence of context on
preferences and decision making.11 Citizens’ policy positions are often unstable
and inconsistent.12 Behaviour is frequently influenced by emotion13 and framing.14
Voters use evidence incorrectly or prejudicially and are often overly confident about
5 Converse 1975; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996.
6 Lippmann 1927; Lippmann 1922.
7 Converse 1964.
8 Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1968 [1948].
9 Butler and Stokes 1973.
10 Redlawsk and Lau 2013.
11 Rabin 1998.
12 Converse 1964.
13 Brader 2012.
14 Kahneman 2003; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991.
Australian Politics and Policy
474
their conclusions,15 and their acceptance of new evidence is clouded by motivated
reasoning.16
Reconciling these findings with democratic theory
Concerns about the capacity of citizens to meaningfully participate in electoral
democracy are inconsistent with the general assumptions of classical democratic
theory, which requires citizens to be informed and attentive for democracy to
properly function. These concerns are typically reconciled with the normative
ideals of democratic theory through the wisdom of the crowd argument. Aggregate
opinion can be much more stable and, as a result, appear more ‘rational’ than
individual opinion.17 Even large proportions of random error ‘cancel out’ when
aggregated, resulting in reasonably efficient and stable collective choices.
There may also be some problems with the concerns about voter competence
raised above. In a number of countries, representative democracy appears to be
working relatively well. Lau and Redlawsk18 estimate that, at the five US presidential
elections between 1972 and 1988, approximately 75 per cent of citizens voted the
same as they would have if they had been operating with ‘full information’. Here,
full information is the decision they would make if they had the greatest possible
understanding of the choice they were making and the alternatives.
Lippmann and Converse may have been overly pessimistic about voters’
political sophistication. It is possible that unrealistic goals were set for the average
voter. There were also measurement problems with some of the earlier studies. The
period in which Converse studied may also have been one with unusually low levels
of ideological difference between the major political parties in the USA (where they
conducted their research), making it harder for voters to understand the difference
between the parties or to adopt strong positions on many areas of policy.19
Gerald Pomper20 studied the association between party identification and voter
preferences on six issues between 1956 and 1968. Consistent with Converse’s
findings, from 1956 to 1960 the relationship between party identification and
preferences was weak or non-existent. However, this relationship strengthened for
all six issues between 1960 and 1964. Regardless of starting position, from 1964
Democrats were more likely to be liberal and Republicans conservative in all of
these policy areas.
Earlier studies of voters’ political preferences also failed to take into account
the measurement error inherent in public opinion surveys. Responses to these
15 Gilovitch 1991.
16 Bartels 2002.
17 Page and Shapiro 1992.
18 Lau and Redlawsk 1997.
19 Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976, 99, 179–80.
20 Pomper 1972.
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surveys can be influenced by external stimulus, which may change the salience
of different attitudes at different times,21 and questions may be unclear or the
respondent may become confused or bored, answering incorrectly or carelessly.
These problems with survey design can result in greater apparent instability in
the political attitudes held by citizens than is actually the case. Most voters hold
relatively stable political preferences, but this has a random component that adds
noise to survey responses.22
The general consensus in the modern political science literature is that most
voters hold positions on a wide range of public policy issues that can be measured,
with error, which is largely created by imprecise question wording and respondent
inattention.23
In defence of voters
Voters certainly face limitations, but how far do these extend? Voting is cognitively
demanding. Most political issues are complex, abstract and remote from citizens’
lives, and voters lack the time and resources to properly make informed policy
distinctions between parties.
The average citizen is not always capable of making – or willing to invest the
resources to make – optimal choices. Rather, we as individuals are often forced to
trade off effort and optimisation. It cannot be expected that voters will have a high
degree of familiarity with policy details in most domains, nor should it be expected
that they will behave equally rationally across all issues.
Although citizens may not be familiar with policy details, they usually exhibit
behaviour that is logical, responding to circumstances with ‘bounded rationality’
to obtain some utility from their vote. ‘Bounded rationality’ makes different
assumptions than economic theories of rationality.24 Rather than being intimately
familiar with policy themselves, citizens learn from their own lived experience and
take cues from parties, elites and opinion leaders, who actively promote specific
policies to voters, providing cues to their supporters about political matters and the
importance of particular issues.25
21 Zaller 1992; Zaller and Feldman 1992.
22 Achen 1975; Feldman 1990.
23 More recently, Converse (2000) clarified his position on this issue, stating that survey item
responses are probabilistic over a ‘latitude of acceptance’, with this probability space varying
depending on the political sophistication and interest of the respondent.
24 Kahneman 2003.
25 Gilens and Murakawa 2002; Levendusky 2010; Lupia 2016; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Popkin
1991.
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How citizens learn
Political and social psychology provide substantial critiques on citizens’ capacities
to perform their democratic duties, helping us reconcile voters’ limitations with the
idea that democracies work reasonably well.
Voters do not necessarily need detailed knowledge about politics and policy
to fulfil their democratic duty. They can be thought of as ‘cognitive misers’, who
minimise the effort involved in making potentially complex or difficult decisions
using shortcuts, learning only as much as they need to and receiving and
interpreting signals from elected officials, opinion leaders and other sources.
One way voters make political choices (such as choosing who to vote for) with-
out a substantial investment in information gathering is through the use of heuristics,
or cognitive shortcuts.26 These are also used when making non-political decisions.
Individuals are using a heuristic, for instance, when they fix their beliefs more
heavily on the first piece of information they receive (the ‘anchor’) when making
a decision. This is known as the anchoring heuristic. An example is the first price
mentioned during a negotiation. If a salesperson offers a very high price to start
negotiations, this becomes a psychological anchor for the buyer, meaning the
counter-offer and final price are more likely to be higher than otherwise.
The representativeness heuristic is another cognitive shortcut. This involves
comparing a problem or decision to the most representative mental prototype.
When a voter is trying to decide if a politician is trustworthy, they might compare
that politician’s characteristics to other people they have known in the past. If
the politician shares traits with a kind grandfather or harsh teacher, they might
be assumed to be gentle and trustworthy or critical and mean. This results in
classifications that may or may not be correct, but saves on the effort of seeking
additional information for critical analysis.
Party identification can also be thought of as a form of heuristic that guides
voter behaviour.27 This helps to make politics less cognitively demanding for voters.
Once citizens decide which party generally represents them, this single piece of
information can act as a shortcut guiding how they view issues and events. A policy
championed by the party this voter identifies with is more likely to meet with favour
than the same policy advocated by a different party. For instance, if the Liberal
Party promotes a new policy, voters who identify as Liberal supporters may be more
inclined to believe this is a good idea than if the Labor Party had proposed the same
policy.
Party identification can also guide how we view events. Bartels showed that
voters’ statements about objective facts, such as whether unemployment increased
or decreased, were heavily influenced by party identification.28 Under Republican
26 Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982.
27 Campbell et al. 1960.
28 Bartels 2002.
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presidents, Democratic identifiers were more likely to believe the economy was
doing poorer than it was and Republicans were likely to believe it was doing better;
and the reverse is usually true when a Democrat is in office.
Another common shortcut is the availability heuristic. This involves assessing
the probability of an event based upon how easy it is to recall similar cases. When
making a decision, you might remember several relevant examples. Since these are
easier to remember, you may assume these outcomes are generally more common
than harder to recall examples. For example, it might be easy for individuals to
remember media coverage of violent crime, but harder to recall car crash fatalities,
which are more common but less frequently reported.
The availability heuristic is driven, in part, by the influence of mass media.
Newspapers, radio, television and news on the internet provide examples of crime,
terrorism, plane crashes and shark attacks out of proportion to their actual
incidence compared to other events. This often causes us to overestimate their
likelihood. The availability heuristic allows politicians – whose message is amplified
by the media – to influence us with cues and gives the media itself the power to help
set the agenda.
Agenda setting, elite cues and framing
The reason voters use heuristics or other shortcuts – as Lippmann29 and Zaller30
identified – is that in large and complex societies they generally have no other
choice. Their time and attention is finite, and political and policy issues are
complicated. There is too much happening, often at a significant distance from
their lived experience, for the average citizen to form a detailed and intimate
understanding of every event, policy and personality that makes up modern politics
in electoral democracies.
One of the major sources relied upon by voters for political information is
the media. Its influence on voter attitudes and decision making has long been
recognised. It is important to realise that the information the public receives – and
that shapes its opinion – is never a full account of all important facts. Rather, it is
a selective view of what is happening, which voters use to try and understand their
political environment.31
By choosing to report certain stories, the news media and other actors control
the flow of information to the public. They cannot necessarily tell people what to
believe, but they can impact perceptions about the importance of issues.32 This
process is called agenda setting .
29 Lippmann 1922, 59.
30 Zaller 1992, 6.
31 Graber 2001.
32 Cohen 2001.
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The media are not the only group that have influence on public opinion. Cues
can be taken from parties, elites and opinion leaders, who actively promote specific
policies to voters. Individuals use these signals to save time and effort. Rather than
attempting to master all the issues that might be important, voters can rely on
experts and political elites to help shape their opinions on matters about which they
are not well informed.
Political elites are not just politicians but also policy experts and religious
leaders, union officials and business executives, environmental campaigners and
other interest groups, and journalists. Individuals may also take cues from personal
acquaintances if they are seen as being more knowledgeable about a particular
issue.33
As with heuristics, the use of cues is an imperfect but necessary part of
democratic engagement by ordinary citizens. For the vast majority of individuals,
participation would be impossible without it. It can be a reasonably sophisticated
process. Voters can take into account the source and nature of cues on a particular
issue, including how close the position taken by the source of the cue is to the
recipient’s views on other issues.34
Beyond agenda setting and cues, the media and elites – including political
campaigns run by parties and candidates – may also use framing to influence
voters.35 This occurs when an issue is portrayed a particular way to guide its
interpretation. Individuals will react to a choice differently, depending on how it is
presented.
Most political issues are heavily framed to persuade voters. In Australia, the
decision to call people arriving by boat to seek asylum ‘refugees’, ‘boat people’ or
‘illegals’ is the result of framing. The choice of words and imagery is often deliberate
– designed to evoke a particular reaction from the audience. Political actors try and
place their cause and message in a positive frame or their opponent’s in a negative
frame.
Aggregating individual preferences: studying voter behaviour
We can study voter behaviour a number of ways: through electoral results (aggre-
gate studies) and using public opinion surveys (individual-level studies). Both have
strengths and weaknesses.
Measuring aggregate voter behaviour
The ultimate expression of public opinion is the votes cast by citizens at elections,
referendums and plebiscites, which we can examine to understand what voters
33 Watts and Dodds 2007.
34 Gilens and Murakawa 2002.
35 Tversky and Kahneman 1981.
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think about particular issues and how they behaved in different parts of the
country.
We can combine election results at the level of legislative districts – the discrete
geographic spaces represented in a legislature, such as the Australian parliament –
with other information. This can include census data, such as the average age of an
electorate. We can combine these data with election results to see how the average
age of the electorate was associated with support for different political parties or
policy preferences.
However, there are risks associated with exclusively relying on these aggregate
election results to study voter behaviour. This risks committing an ecological fallacy,
a type of error where inferences are made about individuals based on aggregate
group-level data. For instance, we may observe that the Liberal–National (Coalition)
parties do better in low-income electorates. We may infer that this means that lower
income voters support these parties. However, the aggregate relationship between
income and voting for the Coalition parties is meaningless if rural electorates tend
to have lower average incomes and voters in rural areas are also more conservative,
rather than low-income voters themselves necessarily being more likely to support
conservative parties. Within individual districts, voters with lower income may
actually be more likely to vote for the Labor party. We cannot be sure whether this
is the case without individual-level data, including the kind of information collected
through public opinion surveys.
Using surveys to understand voter behaviour
As students and scholars of public opinion, we want to examine the attitudes
and behaviours of voters more frequently than every three (or more) years, when
elections are held, and to make inferences about the behaviour of individual
citizens, not just aggregate-level election results. Generally, electoral returns are
not disaggregated by demographics, socio-economic status, issue preferences or
other attributes of citizens. We also want to understand attitudes towards issues
that elections are not necessarily held on. Quantitative data from random,
representative samples of the electorate – public opinion surveys – can provide a
snapshot.
Much of our exposure to public opinion surveys (commonly called ‘polls’) is
through the ‘horse race’ coverage of politics – who is winning, who is unpopular
and how much has changed in recent weeks or months. Survey research can be
much more extensive than this and can be used to understand what shapes public
opinion (Is it the media, politicians’ messages or culture?). Surveys are useful for
understanding citizens’ attitudes towards policies, events and political leaders, and
how they might vote at elections and respond to future political decisions. Surveys
can also be used to examine the influence of public opinion on political and policy
decisions made by leaders.
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The history of public opinion surveys
Prior to the development of survey research, sociologists and political scientists
generally studied behaviour and opinions by interviewing people in small groups.
Although providing detailed information, this often resulted in samples that were
too small and too concentrated in limited geographical areas (such as particular
neighbourhoods or workplaces), making it impossible to make generalisations
about the broader public. Journalists and magazines often conducted informal
straw polls and interviews on the street, but these were more for entertainment than
serious research.
Most of the tools on which modern sampling is built have their origins in the
1940s and 1950s. In the USA, Australia and most other representative democracies,
populations became more urban (and therefore concentrated), household tele-
phones became more common, mailing lists became more accurate and people
became generally easier to reach.
A significant incentive for the development of better public opinion measures
was the burgeoning US radio industry in the 1920s and 1930s. Broadcasts were
primarily funded by advertisers, who wanted to know the size of audiences when
agreeing to pay for air time. Statistical sampling provided this, with random
samples of hundreds or thousands of people offering relatively accurate estimates
of the general population.
Political surveys followed, providing a way to regularly measure citizens’
privately held opinions. This was done by the news media, obtaining measurements
of shifting opinion that they could report. Political parties, candidates and leaders
also undertook surveys and used the data obtained to guide political decisions.
Early survey research relied on in-person interviews. Home telephones were
not yet ubiquitous and were mostly owned by the wealthy. Mail surveys were
difficult, as there was often an absence of complete and reliable lists of valid postal
addresses. However, face-to-face surveys have many of the same drawbacks as
interviews. Regardless, these early efforts at sampling sometimes provided useful
data and established the foundations for later efforts.
There are several types of surveys, and methodological decisions can influence
the utility of different survey types for different purposes. First, researchers need to
decide how they are going to select their sample. The most common method is opt-
out, or random, sampling, which sits at the centre of modern survey research. It is
built around the idea that every individual in the population of interest (e.g. citizens
likely to vote in an election) has a known probability of being sampled. Random
sampling helps us to secure a representative sample by providing the means to
obtain what is intended to be an unbiased selection of the larger population.
From address-based, in-home interview sampling to surveys by mail, random digit
dialing after the growth of landlines and mobile phones, and online surveys,
researchers have placed significant effort into collecting representative samples.
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The near-universal acceptance and use of representative, random samples is
due to a high profile polling error more than 80 years ago. During the 1936 US
presidential election, the then very popular magazine Literary Digest ran a mail-
in survey that attracted more than two million responses. This is a truly massive
sample size (generally a good thing), even by modern standards. Despite this, the
magazine incorrectly predicted a landslide victory for Republican candidate Alf
Landon over incumbent Democratic President Franklin Roosevelt, who decisively
won the election. The reason for the error? The magazine’s very biased sample of
voters. Subscribers to the Literary Digest were predominantly car and telephone
owners – an affluent group of voters who were not representative of the wider
electorate – and Roosevelt’s supporters were under-represented.36
The attribute that made the Literary Digest sample so large – the huge list of
subscribers who mailed in survey responses – also made it more error prone. It
used a biased sample. The Literary Digest survey is what we call an opt-in survey.
This is the other main form of sampling.
The problem with this form of survey is that often the respondents who choose
to opt-in are different from the population you are trying to study in important
ways that correlate with the outcome you are researching, biasing the results.
Smaller surveys conducted by George Gallup, Archibald Crossley and Elmo Roper,
with samples comprised of randomly selected voters, more accurately predicted
the 1936 election results.37 Accordingly, opt-in convenience surveys were largely
discarded by researchers in favour of random sampling.
In addition to the nature of the sample, there are also different methodologies
with which to collect a survey sample. The most common forms of surveys are:
• In-person survey: these allow the interviewer to build a personal rapport with
respondents and gain more complete answers. This method can also allow
for longer and more detailed surveys, and interviewers can use visual aids.
However, in-person surveys are much more expensive than other methods
and are geographically constrained by the area an interviewer can cover. They
also have significant problems with social desirability bias – the tendency of
respondents to answer questions in a way they believe will be viewed favorably
by others, under-reporting potentially undesirable behaviour (e.g. eating junk
food, smoking) and over-reporting what might be construed as good behavior
(e.g. exercising daily, eating well, working hard). Due to the cost involved, this
methodology is not used regularly for surveys in the modern era.
• Mail survey: these surveys have the benefit of being affordable, suffer less from
social desirability bias, as there is no human interviewer directly involved, and
can be longer than phone polls. As a result, they have remained popular for
academic surveys. However, as there is no person involved – either on the other
36 Squire 1988.
37 Gosnell 1937.
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end of the phone or in the room with the respondent – response rates can be
very low.
• Phone survey: this is are the most frequently used survey method. Phone
surveys are cheaper than in-person interviews. Most general population
telephone samples use random digit dialing, with phone numbers sampled
from computerised lists of all possible telephone exchanges in the relevant
population. These surveys generally provide a high-quality representative
sample and are fast and reliable. A national representative sample of a thousand
respondents can usually be collected in a few days at limited cost. However, the
rapid spread of mobile phones and caller ID has complicated survey research.
In addition, phone surveys tend to be quite time-limited, as it is difficult to keep
the respondent on the phone for more than a few questions. To reduce costs,
some survey research companies have adopted ‘robocall’ technologies. These
use prerecorded questions, with respondents providing answers through the
keys on their telephone or through automated voice recognition. This reduces
costs and the problem of social desirability bias. There is no interviewer to
offend or be judged by – or for the researcher to pay. However, robopolls
have high non-response rates and can only be used for shorter interviews, as
respondents are more willing to hang up on a machine than a human.
• Online survey: these tend to have lower response rates than surveys involving
human interviewers. However, they have fewer problems with social
desirability bias and tend to be affordable. Originally, they were criticised for
not being representative, with their samples skewed towards a young, internet-
connected population. However, this has become less of a problem as internet
penetration has increased. Additionally, some survey research companies have
tried to build representative panels that samples can be drawn from, often
providing high-quality results.
Conclusions
Learning about voter behaviour is the first step to understanding if and how
democracy works. For students of electoral democracy, this is important as
representation sits at the heart of democratic theory. Research shows that citizens’
aggregate preferences influence policy outcomes to varying degrees.38
While there are questions about the ability of voters to function as competent
political actors, some of the early critiques were found to have been overly
pessimistic. It is arguable that many studies set unrealistic expectations of the
average voter. Rather, public opinion and the involvement of voters are necessary
safeguards of democracy.
38 Gilens 2012.
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Young people and politics
Philippa Collin and Jane McCormack
Key terms/names
active citizenship, citizenship, dutiful citizen, engagement, interest groups, internet,
mobilisation, participation, politics, political socialisation, representation, self-
actualising citizen, social movement, youth
‘[W]e do not support our schools being turned into parliaments’
‘What we want is more learning in schools and less activism in schools’
Prime minister of Australia, Scott Morrison1
Young people’s relationship to democracy is a dynamic one. Over time, how youth,
participation and citizenship are defined has changed, reflecting the persistent and
changing norms and conventions of Australian society and politics. As suggested
by Scott Morrison’s response to the student-led ‘School Strike 4 Climate’, there
are both firm and contested ideas about who young citizens are and their role in
Australian democracy. These reflect how ‘youth’, as a life stage, is conceptualised,
how citizenship is defined, how people develop and express political views and
behaviours and create, share and consume political media, what constitutes
Collin, Philippa, and Jane McCormack (2019). Young people and politics. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas
Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and
Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
1 Australian Associated Press 2018.
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participation and how people exercise their rights and responsibilities in Australian
democracy and shape its ongoing evolution.
This chapter looks at how young people’s relationships to politics have changed
and diversified over time. It first considers how young people’s citizenship and
their role in democracy can be conceptualised. The second section looks at young
people’s status in Australian politics – in formal processes, policy and advocacy.
The final section discusses how young people’s political interests and participation
in democracy are evolving in relation to the constraints and opportunities of
Australian democracy.
Conceptualising young citizens
Like most concepts in social science, ‘citizenship’ and ‘youth’ are not ‘natural’ –
actually, they are highly contested! Not only has their meaning changed over time,
there are also lively and continuing debates about how we should think about these
terms – and therefore who can participate in democracy and how.
Citizenship
Citizenship is a key term in theories of democracy because it defines who belongs to
a particular community – or to a state such as Australia. In this regard, citizenship
refers to a legal and administrative status – specifically membership of a political
community. Citizens have rights – for example, to vote and to help decide how
their community or country is governed. Liberal theories of democracy present
the exercise of rights as the most important form of political participation; citizens
need knowledge and experience to understand and use their rights well. Citizens
also have democratic duties and responsibilities. For example, communitarian
theories argue that citizenship is fostered through a sense of belonging, which
requires that people join communities and associations to learn about and
contribute to democracy in ways that benefit the broader group – or ‘common
good’. This way of thinking about citizenship connects to the idea of ‘active
citizenship’, which is often evoked in youth policy,2 and suggests that to qualify as
citizens young people must demonstrate that they contribute to civic associations.
Throughout history, many people have pointed out that these rights, and
opportunities to exercise the responsibilities of citizenship, are not experienced
equally by all. For instance, until the 20th century in most democracies, women
were citizens but lacked some political and civil rights, such as the right to vote or
to own property. So radical theories of democracy – such as feminism – argue that
citizenship is necessarily exclusionary, producing ‘second- or third-class citizens’
because some members of political communities are less valued and more
2 Harris 2012.
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marginalised and disadvantaged than others. They point out that citizenship is
enacted when people and groups challenge who ‘counts’ as a citizen by undertaking
‘acts’ such as speaking, marching or posting content online to express opinions or
to protest an event or issue – thus constituting themselves as members of a public.
These different theories of citizenship all affect how young people are perceived in
Australian politics.3
Youth
While ‘youth’ can refer to a stage of life somewhere between ‘childhood’ and
‘adulthood’, the term is ambiguous because it is hard to determine when childhood
stops or adulthood starts. Historically, psychology and developmental sociology
have viewed ‘youth’ as a universal, biological stage through which young people
should pass on normal pathways to (full) ‘adult’ citizenship.
However, there is no distinct age at which young people become ‘adult’ or ‘full
citizens’ in Australia. Young people can leave formal education at 15 (depending on
the jurisdiction) but are not paid ‘adult’ wages until they are 21; they can be held
criminally responsible for their acts from the age of 10 and be jailed in adult prisons
from 17, and yet, for the purposes of youth support payments, they are generally
not considered ‘independent’ until they are 22.4 While (in certain industries) there
is no minimum age at which a young person can gain employment and pay income
tax, they are not allowed to vote until they are 18.
Broadly speaking, youth policy defines ‘young people’ as aged 12–25 years,
but the ambiguity reflects the fact that the experience of youth is not ‘fixed’ –
it is shaped by context, policy and lived experience and in relationship to social
institutions, like the family and education and justice systems. Sociologists White
and Wyn describe youth as a ‘relational term’ – meaning it is mostly defined
in relation to what it is not.5 Just as young people are ‘not yet adult’, they are
largely constructed in mainstream political discourse as not yet (full) citizens. This
contributes to the idea that young people are only fully of value ‘in the future’ –
and that they need to be monitored and managed towards ‘good citizenship’ in
the interests of protecting society’s future.6 Over time, concerns about whether or
not young people will develop into ‘normatively good’ citizens have manifested
differently in scholarship and policy but have frequently been anchored to the
question of how people acquire political knowledge and behaviours – or political
socialisation.
In the 1950s, scholars of political socialisation were particularly concerned with
how children and young people develop political orientations and the way families,
3 See Collin 2015, Furlong 2012, and Marsh, O’Toole and Jones 2007 for further reading.
4 See Department of Human Services 2019.
5 Wyn and White 1997.
6 See White, Wyn and Robards 2017, chapter 11.
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schools and existing community and government structures help young people
to learn and ‘practise’ civic skills.7 In the 1960s and 1970s, as young people were
increasingly questioning traditional values, creating new cultures and leading or
participating in social movements, researchers and policy makers asked questions
about the participatory rights of children and young people. This is exemplified in
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990). The convention has a specific
article that lays out children and young people’s ‘right to participation and to be
heard in decisions that affect them’ (article 12). Since the 1990s, significant interest
in how to realise young people’s right to participate in community and government
decision making has arisen. Sometimes this is termed ‘youth development’ –
helping young people to grow into good adult citizens. Governments and non-
government organisations have also introduced programs and strategies to enable
youth participation as ‘active citizens’ – where young people participate in approved
ways in adult-managed processes.8
Rather than linear progress in the understanding and recognition of young
people as political actors, these phases are better thought of in terms of emerging,
contrasting and sometimes overlapping concerns, approaches and debates about
the nature of youth citizenship and participation. For example, in Australia, since
2000 there has also been an effort to design and deliver ‘civic education’ through
schools and other programs; in civil society there has been a burgeoning of
organisations, local networks and youth-led movements advocating and developing
a wide range of strategies and forms of youth political participation.
The status of young people in Australian democracy
Young people’s status in Australian democracy is ambiguous. As described above,
a range of laws and different age thresholds govern young people – although only
those young people aged 18 and over are ascribed full political rights and can
vote and run for office. A number of Australia’s political parties have federal and
state ‘youth wings’ that are open to members of various ages. For example, the
Young Liberals’ federal branch is currently open to those between 16 and 31,9 while
Australian Young Labor is currently open to those between 14 and 26.10 Statistics
regarding young people’s membership or involvement in party activities are seldom
published, however, making accurate assessment of how many young Australians
are actively involved in political parties difficult.
What young people can – or should – do has been increasingly ‘governed’
(regulated by policies and laws) since the middle of the 19th century, when
7 See Edwards 2012 for a good summary and discussion.
8 Bell, Vromen and Collin 2008.
9 Young Liberals 2019.
10 Australian Young Labor n.d.
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parliaments in Western countries started to legislate in areas such as education
(compulsory schooling), justice (laws and institutions for ‘juveniles’) and work
(minimum working age).11
Increasing governance reflects a ‘deficit’ approach that emphasises what young
people are presumed to lack; it also contributes to a focus on the value young people
hold as ‘future citizens’ rather than as citizens of the present.12 Another effect of
policy making for young people is that particular areas of policy (such as education,
mental health, work) are seen as ‘youth issues’, while others (such as tax, transport
and climate) are generally not. This is another way in which young people are
constructed as ‘trainee citizens’, as is exemplified by ongoing debates about the age
at which people should be allowed to vote.
Case study: lowering the voting age – the debate
The debate about the minimum voting age is almost as old as the franchise itself.
From the 1960s onwards, most established democracies lowered the voting age from
21 to 18, including Australia in 1973. Since then, debate has turned to extending the
franchise to those aged 16 and over. Indeed, the voting age has been lowered to 16
(in a variety of circumstances) in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Brazil, Norway, the
Philippines, Scotland, Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua.13 Currently, young
Australians can enrol to vote at 16 and vote when they turn 18. In 2018, Senator
Jordan Steele-John (Australian Greens) introduced a Bill proposing to lower the
minimum (non-compulsory) voting age to 16.14
The arguments for and against lowering the voting age are wide-ranging and
have evolved over the past five decades. Rights-based arguments include: that young
people should be allowed opportunities to vote for the governments and members
of parliament that make decisions on policy that affects them, and that reducing
the franchise to 16 would bring it into line with other legal and administrative
thresholds that permit young people to, for example, enlist in the defence forces (at
age 16.5), consent to sexual interactions (at 16) and get a driver’s licence (16 in most
states).15 Advocates also argue that lowering the voting age could positively address
the marginalisation from mainstream politics that many young people experience16
by signalling that their views and participation are valued at an institutional level.
Opponents maintain that young people are not mature, knowledgeable or
responsible enough. Recently, some have used neuroscience to argue that adolescent
11 White, Wyn and Robards 2017, 266–8.
12 Cohen 1997; Prout 1999.
13 Bessant et al. 2018.
14 Commonwealth Electoral Amendment (Lowering Voting Age and Increasing Voter Participation)
Bill 2018 (Cth).
15 See Bessant et al. 2018; Collin 2018.
16 Collin 2015; Harris 2012.
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brains cannot manage the rational and logical processes required for voting. Some
suggest that young people’s views are already adequately represented in the political
system and that there is little evidence to indicate that lowering the voting age will
increase participation.17
Australia’s leading experts in electoral participation maintain that there is simply
not enough evidence to determine the effect of lowering the voting age on the political
engagement of young people and on Australian democracy more broadly.18
Another feature of young people’s relationship to democracy in Australia is
that youth interests are inconsistently represented at different levels of government.
Treatment of these interests has historically depended on the political priorities of
the parties in government. Various attempts to engage with young people in policy
processes at a federal level have been developed at different times since the 1980s.
For example, in 2007, the newly elected Labor government appointed a minister for
youth and re-funded the national youth peak body (the Australian Youth Affairs
Coalition). The government invested in national research and consultations to
create a National Youth Strategy (2010).19 It also created ‘experimental’ mechanisms
for engaging with young people in agenda setting and policy making, such as the
Australian Youth Forum – an online platform to promote discussion by and with
young people on policy issues. A federal Office for Youth Affairs has also existed at
various times. Its purpose has largely been to research government action on youth
issues and to support the planning and co-ordination of policies and services that
affect young Australians.20
Since 2013, Australian federal governments have supported a National Child-
ren’s Commissioner, who advocates for the rights and interests of children, and
reviews and reports on legislation, policy and practice that affects them. After
its election in 2013, the Liberal–National (Coalition) government defunded most
federal-level youth policy initiatives, abolished parliamentary representation and
closed the Office for Youth.
Variation in how young people are represented in government extends to the
states and territories of Australia. Prior to 2013, only some states had dedicated
youth offices, government-funded initiatives and/or children’s advocates or com-
missioners to enable young people’s participation and ensure their needs were
considered across government. As of early 2019, however, all state and territory
governments have some form of goal, aim, vision, mission or commitment that
recognises the importance of hearing young people’s voices; most have developed
(or are developing) youth policies or strategies with young people’s input; most
17 McAllister 2014; Young Liberals 2018.
18 McAllister 2014.
19 Australian Government 2010.
20 Ewen 1995, 30.
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have some form of youth advisory group that feeds into government; and all have
children’s advocates or commissioners.
In response to the challenges of representation, an active ‘youth sector’ has
emerged in Australia, made up of a range of ‘interest groups’ – organisations
seeking to represent and advocate for the interests of young people and to influence
public policy. These include community and non-government organisations of
varying sizes, such as large charities, service providers, social movement organ-
isations and associations. There is also a network of national, state and territory
peak bodies for youth affairs. Young people are extensively involved in or lead
many of them. An important contribution the youth sector has made to youth
politics is in the area of participation, by advocating for young people’s right to
be heard, particularly when it comes to issues and policies that affect them. These
organisations consult with young people about relevant issues and advocate for
young people’s participation in policy and decision making; many provide training
and resources to assist communities, organisations and government bodies to
better engage young people in their agenda-setting processes and other activities.
Popular engagement mechanisms include youth advisory committees, youth
executives, in-person and online consultations and forums, and the co-design of
relevant initiatives.
Engaged and active citizens?
Much research on youth political participation has focused on levels of political
knowledge or ‘civic literacy’, electoral participation and membership of traditional
civil society organisations (such as churches and charities). These are ‘institutional’
measures of participation. Studies using these measures identify increasingly low
levels of knowledge, trust, membership and support for traditional political actors
(e.g. politicians), institutions (e.g. parties) and ‘repertoires’ of participation (e.g.
voting or joining a political party or union) among young people.21 For example,
2004 research by the Youth Electoral Study showed that only 50 per cent of
surveyed Australian high school students would enrol to vote if it was not
compulsory. Some scholars and commentators interpret this as indicating greater
apathy and/or poor civics knowledge among young people.
However, other researchers argue that these studies’ definitions of ‘politics’ and
‘participation’ (e.g. as elections and voting) do not reflect the broader ways young
people think about or practise politics. They show that young people engage in
a wide range of non-electoral, ‘cause-oriented’ participatory practices, including
signing petitions, buying a particular brand or product because of a political belief,
taking part in demonstrations and joining online or local issues-based groups.22
21 Collin 2015, 8–9.
22 Harris and Wyn 2009; Martin 2012; Norris 2003; Vromen 2003.
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Rather than participating in politics mainly due to a sense of obligation to
particular forms of democracy and democratic institutions (e.g. political parties or
government), the theory is that young people participate because of causes or issues,
such as violence, climate change or corruption.23
Case study: youth activism and networked participation
Many young Australians actively participate in social movements, activist
organisations and other initiatives in which they learn about and campaign on issues
that concern them. In recent decades youth-led issues-based movements have
blossomed, using the internet and social media to connect with and mobilise their
young members and grow national and global networks for action. For example, the
Australian Youth Climate Coalition (AYCC) emerged in the early to mid-2000s as a
youth-led organisation founded and governed by young people and based on strong
coalitions with other organisations and movements. In contrast with older styles
of civic organising, the more than 150,000 AYCC ‘members’ can choose their level
of involvement – and self-organise. For example, the AYCC encourages ‘members’
to organise their own actions – online and offline – and runs different campaigns
and activities from which members can ‘pick and choose’. They are also unique for
running workshops and training aimed at school-age students, as well as networking
and building coalitions with aligned causes and communities.
Another youth-led issue-based movement emerged in 2018, when school
students from Castlemaine, Victoria, organised with peers to demand that
parliamentarians take urgent action on climate change. Inspired by 15-year-old
Swedish school student Greta Thunberg, who had regularly gone on strike from
school to bring attention to the climate crisis, they coordinated with a group of
classmates to go on strike and journey every week to the offices of different members
of parliament in their region to stage a similar event. Organised by word of mouth,
eight initial school strikes in the Castlemaine region attracted between 20 and 50
students to each event. Following the success of the initial strikes, the AYCC helped
the Castlemaine students create a webpage for their movement and develop a
campaign strategy, trained them in organising events and, importantly, helped them
generate a social media presence to allow a decentralised model that would support
students anywhere in Australia to organise and co-ordinate their own school strikes
for climate action. An online community grew, and students across Australia began to
co-ordinate and organise in their own regions.24 On 30 November 2018, an estimated
15,000 students temporarily left school to attend rallies in 30 locations around
Australia to demand that politicians take immediate action on climate change. This
(school) student movement has spawned similar groups and developed informal
23 Norris 2003.
24 Susie Burke, emails, 20 and 26 March 2019.
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links to other groups and campaigns, such as #FridaysForFuture. On 15 March 2019,
150,000 students in 56 locations around Australia were some of an estimated 2.29
million strikers across 2,699 sites in 135 countries participating in a School Strike for
Climate.25
Lance Bennett uses ‘dutiful’ and ‘self-actualising’ to describe two ways of
thinking about contemporary citizenship.26 Dutiful citizens are guided by
ideologies, mass movements and traditional loyalties to particular parties and the
values, processes and institutions that constitute representative government. In
contrast, self-actualising citizens respond to personal political concerns and
connect informally to issues through family and friendship groups, lifestyle and
identity. They value participatory forms of governance where different members of
society inform and influence government decision making. Thinking about dutiful
and self-actualising citizens helps to move away from debates about whether young
people are ‘more’ or ‘less’ politically active now than they have been in the past.
While young Australians are less involved in traditional organisations, such as
churches, charities and political parties,27 they do participate in online and local
activities run by community groups, organisations and networks and create their
own campaigns and actions. A 2018 Mission Australia survey of 28,286 15- to
19-year-olds found that 36.8 per cent participated in volunteer work, 36.4 per cent
in arts/cultural/music activities, 27.4 per cent in student leadership, 22.6 per cent in
youth groups and 18.8 per cent in religious groups.28
The internet is key to changes in how people participate.29 The extent to which
the internet mobilises new political actors or improves engagement is widely
debated. It is generally accepted that social life is increasingly mediated by digital
technologies and networks. The internet plays an important role in youth political
practice as a means for: seeking news, information and opinions on social and
political issues; communication and cultural expression; and joining and/or
participating in online organisations and interest groups.30
Loader, Vromen and Xenos31 build on the concept of the self-actualising citizen
in developing the idea of the ‘networked young citizen’. The term describes how
young people now relate to democracy through an explicit emphasis on identity,
personalisation, participation and horizontal relations for civic and political
engagement, and the role that the internet, and specifically social media, plays.
Their research on the role of the internet produces some counterintuitive findings.
25 #FridaysforFuture 2019.
26 Bennett 2007.
27 Martin 2012; Vromen 2003.
28 Carlisle et al. 2018, 30.
29 Collin 2015; Vromen 2011.
30 Loader, Vromen and Xenos 2014; Stanyer 2005; Vromen 2007.
31 Loader, Vromen and Xenos 2014.
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For example, while some are concerned about an ‘echo chamber’ effect, recent
international comparative research finds that regular review of a social media news-
feed can expose young people to incidental information on political issues and
activities that they might not otherwise be knowledgeable about or interested in.32
While these new understandings of young people’s participation in democracy
help to challenge mainstream stereotypes, it is important to remember that young
people are not a homogenous group and that these new networks and forms
of participation are not accessible to all young people. Digital media do not
necessarily equalise participation opportunities; quality of use and access – and
the ways people participate online – can be affected by factors such as gender,
level of education and socio-economic and cultural backgrounds.33 While some
organisations and institutions enhance participation via the internet, generally
speaking, the barriers to participation that exist offline persist online.34 In Australia,
governments at all levels are only just beginning to adopt online strategies to engage
meaningfully with citizens (of any age).35
Moreover, the discourse of the self-actualising citizen may amplify the adoption
of a ‘self-reflexive experience of inequality’36 – whereby young people assume
personal responsibility for addressing structural or global problems such as housing
unaffordability or climate change, which they are unable to respond to alone.
Henrik Bang has warned that while ‘everyday’ political practices – such as ethical
consumerism or issues-based social media advocacy – can be empowering for
young people, they are also associated with less direct engagement between citizens
and policy makers.37 This is a process he calls ‘de-coupling’ – where the politics
of everyday practices are removed from the politics of formal institutions and
actors. Another concern is that alongside discourses of ‘active’, self-actualising and
networked citizenship run equally powerful discourses that construct young people
as apathetic or antisocial.
A focus on understanding why people choose not to engage in institutional
forms of political participation in new scholarship has helped to show that
disengagement can be a conscious response to experiences of exclusion, loss of trust
or desperation with the ‘system’.38 Anita Harris argues that central to contemporary
globalisation and neoliberalism are ideas of self-invention, consumption and
engagement in mainstream political and civic activities that are at the heart of
the discourse of ‘active citizenship’; young people are accordingly constructed as
‘failed citizens’ if they are unable to overcome hardship or exclusion or comply
32 Xenos, Vromen and Loader 2014 .
33 boyd 2014; Mossberger, Tolbert and McNeal 2008; Vromen 2007; Xenos, Vromen and Loader
2014.
34 Banaji and Buckingham 2013.
35 Collin 2015.
36 Threadgold 2011.
37 Bang 2005.
38 Edwards 2009; Farthing 2010.
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with normative expectations of a neoliberal society.39 Acts that directly challenge
the power of adults, institutions and the nation-state are rendered invisible or cast
as antisocial or anti-democratic (e.g. civil disruption, hacking websites or wearing
religious dress).40 This extends to unemployed or minority young people (such as
those from Indigenous or migrant backgrounds) whose daily and cultural practices
may confront the status quo – and who are the main targets of ‘youth engagement’
policies.
Young people as a group are frequently derided by political elites as not yet
worthy of political voice and agency. They also witness negative views on politics
expressed in the media and by the adults around them. The political parties rarely
address young people on their own terms, about their concerns and with deep
commitment to addressing the complex issues society faces. In light of large youth
mobilisations such as #SchoolStrike4Climate and the associated youth climate
movement, it is difficult to maintain that Australian young people are disengaged
from politics – even if they are excluded from formal processes of government.
Rather, declines in institutional acts may be due to the emergence of new
opportunities for participation through activist and issue-based networks.
While these loose networks mostly exclude the state and its representatives,
the youth climate action movement highlights how youth movements arise out of
informal coalitions and partnerships between businesses, voluntary organisations
and public institutions (such as schools). School students challenge the authority of
the state by calling on their peers, communities and other actors such as celebrities
and big businesses to do more. But young people also engage with governments
through a variety of youth participation mechanisms, voting, advocacy and
campaigning.41 As such, young people may not be acting against or turning away
from government and other formal institutions of democracy but looking beyond
them to shape the kind of society they want to live in. Importantly, this does not
mean that young people see democracy as irrelevant – many young people acutely
feel the role of government in their everyday lives.42 Young people may not be loyal
to institutions and processes of democracy, but they do have a sense of being both
marginalised and controlled by the state, which demonstrates that the state still
plays a significant role in shaping young people’s views of politics and participation.
Conclusions
Young people reflect the anxieties and hopes of Australian democracy. Youth is not
a fixed or natural category but one that is fluid and changing – produced by the
39 Harris 2012, 149.
40 Bessant, Farthing and Watts 2017, chapter 8.
41 Collin 2015.
42 Marsh, O’Toole and Jones 2007.
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way young people are constructed in policy, social structures and different contexts.
As such, young people occupy an ambiguous place in Australian democracy. Young
people in Australia enrol to vote and participate in elections in high numbers.
However, they are more likely to value and engage in non-electoral and non-
institutional forms of political participation – especially local, individualised
collective action (such as signing a petition or joining a march) and loose, cause-
oriented networks that campaign on particular issues. In this regard, the views
and behaviours of young people reflect generational shifts in the values and norms
underpinning contemporary democracy – signalling exciting new ways forward.
However, young people remain a lightning rod for studies, explanations and
strategies addressing perceived declines in support and engagement with
traditional political institutions and elites. As such, the dominant approach is to
focus attention on what can be done to ‘engage young people’ in existing democracy
or to tweak political institutions, processes and cultures in order to respond to
young people’s preferences. Rather less common is the suggestion that young
people’s ideas and preferences could result in improvements in democracy – a more
participatory, accountable, responsive and creative democracy capable of dealing
with the complex policy problems of our time.
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Policy making

Making public policy
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It is commonly believed that Australians are uninterested in politics. Whatever the
truth of this proposition, voters are generally interested in government policies that
they believe will affect them, although the manner in which policy is made remains
opaque for many.
We argue that public indifference to how policy is made is problematic. Policy
making affects the life of every person residing in Australia; it shapes the social,
economic and physical environments in which we act out our lives. The policy
process itself can also have repercussions for society and communities, particularly
when community opinion about policy options is divided. An example is the emo-
tionally charged public debate leading to the passage of legislation allowing for
marriage equality in Australia.1
Policy making is, in part, an exercise in rational problem solving. It is also an
intensely political process and requires the judicious consideration and balancing of
complex issues, including public opinion, competing interests, social relations and
Butcher, John R., and Trish Mercer (2019). Making public policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry,
John R. Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija
Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI:
10.30722/sup.9781743326671
1 Neilsen 2012.
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the distribution of power within a society. A recent example is the South Australian
Murray–Darling Basin Royal Commission, which found that policy governing the
management of water resources was largely driven by political considerations, ‘not
science’.2
For the most part, policies begin as statements of values and intent. Policies
often have an ideological foundation, and are frequently portrayed as occupying
part of a spectrum ranging from left to right. For example, governments or parties
of the right or centre-right might be characterised as favouring market forces over
government intervention, individual rights over collective rights and unilateralism
over multilateralism. Governments of the left are typically portrayed as favouring
government intervention in social and economic affairs, emphasising collective
rights and preferring multilateral approaches to problem solving.
Such characterisations are, of course, simplistic. Governments of the right some-
times resort to intrusive uses of state power despite the value placed on individual
sovereignty, and governments of the left sometimes resort to market mechanisms to
address distributional inefficiencies.
This chapter aims to help students to understand:
• what policy is
• how policy happens
• the principal theoretical constructions of the policy process
• key approaches to understanding the policy process
• the contestable nature of public policy
• the importance of evidence-based policy
• the craft of policy making
• the importance of policy analysis and policy instruments
• the task of policy implementation
• the implications of policy failure.
What is ‘policy’?
This chapter is primarily concerned with formal expressions of government – or
public – policy:
• as a set of values and convictions
• as operational rules designed to comply with legal requirements
• as embodied in law in the form of primary legislation or regulation.
In each case, the formal expression of policy gives form and consequence to policy
intent.
2 Murray–Darling Basin Royal Commission 2019, 63.
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Almost every aspect of our lives is affected by policy; policy affects our birth,
the manner in which we are raised and educated, our access to health care, the
quality of our physical environment, how we conduct ourselves, whom we might
marry, our access to employment, our rights at work, our access to housing, how we
raise our children and even the quality of our deaths and what we are able to pass
on to the generations succeeding us.
In broad terms, policy can be said to represent preferred responses to problems.
For any given problem there might be a number of available responses. For
example, the statement ‘anyone who attempts to travel illegally by boat to Australia
will be turned back to their country of departure’ is a declaration of policy. It sets
out a preferred response under defined circumstances. To the extent that such a
statement sets out a preferred response, it also precludes other potential responses.
Policy provides a framework for what can and ought to occur in prescribed
situations. However, policy is also malleable and is subject to interpretation and
adjustment as circumstances change. Changing expectations, attitudes, beliefs, values
and behaviours often lead, eventually, to changes in government policy. Laws allow-
ing same-sex marriage, assisted dying or the recreational use of cannabis represent
policy responses to cultural changes. Similarly, technological change and envi-
ronmental changes – think of digital technology, automation or climate change –
have fuelled a demand for adaptive policy responses (as well as entrenching resistance
to change in some sections of the polity). Likewise, changes in the economy and in
our systems for production have driven adaptive changes in policies pertaining to
industry, consumer law, employment, education and finance (among others).
How does policy happen?
Public policy can be a messy business. The 19th-century American poet, John
Godfrey Saxe, is reported to have written ‘Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire
respect in proportion as we know how they are made’.3
Public policy is an expression of political intent and a framework for action.
Political parties or groupings, in and out of government, will have a set of policies
– a policy platform – covering a broad and diverse range of matters. Ideally, policy
platforms are internally consistent and represent a coherent narrative for
governance. This is not always the case, and the highly contested nature of public
policy sometimes means that governing parties bring contradictory positions to the
business of government.
3 Citing famous quotes can be messy too; a similar remark is frequently misattributed to the
19th-century German statesman, Otto von Bismarck.
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For a problem to be considered deserving of a policy response – having what
the influential political scientist John Kingdon4 refers to as ‘policy salience’ – there
first needs to be:
• broad agreement that a problem exists
• a broadly shared understanding about the nature of the problem
• a broad acceptance of available solutions.
Moreover, propositions about the existence and nature of problems, not to mention
the nature of possible solutions, need to be tested in a variety of forums: for
example, within the broader community and the electorate; within communities of
interest, including geographical regions, industry sectors and civil society; within
professional ‘epistemic’ communities of subject area specialists; and within political
parties themselves.
The existence and importance of ‘problems’ is often highly contested, both in the
community at large and within political parties. Even where there is broad agree-
ment about problems, ‘solutions’ are often controversial. There are many reasons
why it is difficult to reach a majority view about the nature of policy problems
and preferred solutions. Different actors and stakeholders bring different things to
the table and their perspectives are shaped by their lived experience, education,
qualifications, attachment to particular interests, attachment to community, ideol-
ogy, religious beliefs and personal convictions.
Policy makers also need to be attuned to perceptions of ‘winners and losers’.
In other words, who benefits from the policy and who perceives themselves to be
adversely affected by the policy? They also need to be aware of the potential for
‘interests’ (e.g. civil society organisations, industry groupings, communities) to
mobilise for or against policy proposals. Taking all of these factors into account, it is
easy to see why it can be so difficult to reach agreement about problems and solutions.
Theoretical perspectives
In his book Analyzing public policy, Peter John5 outlines the principal approaches
for understanding the policy-making process:
• Institutional approaches, which take the view that that political organisations –
such as parliaments, legal systems and bureaucracies – shape public decisions
and policy outcomes.6
• Groups and network approaches, which claim that associations and informal
relationships, both within and outside political institutions, shape decisions and
outcomes. These approaches not only consider the effects on policy of unique
4 Kingdon 1995.
5 John 2012, 12.
6 Linder and Peters 1990; van Heffen and Klok 2000.
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relationships between groups and entities, they also embrace the idea that
networks of relationships affect policy outputs and outcomes.7
• Exogenous approaches, which assert that factors external to the political system
determine the decisions of public actors and affect policy outputs and outcomes.8
• Rational actor approaches, which claim that the preferences and bargaining of
actors explain decisions and outcomes. This approach is often called ‘rational
choice’.9
• Ideas-based approaches, which hinge on a view that ideas about solutions to
policy problems have a life of their own, and that ideas circulate and gain
influence independently in the policy process.10
Theoretical perspectives such as these are useful in helping us to understand the
policy-making process as a social, cultural, historical and political phenomenon.
Each allows us to consider some facet of policy making and to understand the
nature of the environment in which policy occurs.
While each of these approaches serves a particular intellectual purpose and
reflects particular ‘truths’ about how policy comes to be, none tells the whole story.
Nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive (e.g. many institutional accounts also
rely heavily on rational actor thinking).
The reality is that making public policy is a complex social behaviour and any
given policy exhibits the influences of multiple institutions, groups and networks,
exogenous factors, preferences and ideas generated within epistemic communities.
A marketplace of ideas
Public policy might best be described as a marketplace of ideas and prescriptions
for the broad and diverse array of matters that need to be actively governed in order
for human society to function. It involves making difficult choices and negotiating
multiple trade-offs between competing options. Moreover, this is a highly contest-
able marketplace, especially in liberal democratic societies like Australia’s.
Policy practitioners need to be mindful of the ideological leanings and philo-
sophical underpinnings of governing parties. It is also important for them to
understand the policy leanings of non-governing opposition and minor parties in
order to anticipate possible resistance to policy proposals and advise government
about policy compromises that might be broadly acceptable to legislatures.
Although Australia’s polity is often portrayed as a ‘two-party system’, our
parliaments are generally made up of representatives from multiple parties as well
as independents who have no formal party affiliation. And although electoral
7 Dowding 1995; Howlett, Mukherjee and Koppenjan 2017; Sabatier 2013.
8 Howlett 2009; Howlett and Cashore 2009.
9 Hall and Taylor 1996; Hill 2014.
10 Braun and Busch 1999; John 2003.
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contests in all Australian jurisdictions usually involve competition between two
major parties – in most cases, the Australian Labor Party and the Liberal Party of
Australia (an exception being Queensland, where the Liberal and National parties
merged in 2008) – Australian parliaments are usually dominated by three, and
sometimes four, established political parties.
Even non-governing parties and members of parliament – including minor
parties, ‘micro parties’ and independents – can exert influence on policy, especially
when governments do not enjoy a numerical majority in both the upper and lower
parliamentary chambers (the exceptions being Queensland, the Australian Capital
Territory and the Northern Territory, which are ‘unicameral’, meaning they have
only one legislative chamber).
A strong indication of the policy predispositions of Australia’s major political
parties can be found in their platform statements:
• Australian Labor Party: ‘Labor members continue to work towards a goal of
better services, greater opportunity and a fair go for all Australians.’
• Liberal Party of Australia: ‘In short, we simply believe in individual freedom
and free enterprise.’
• The National Party: ‘The Nationals are dedicated to delivering future security,
opportunity and prosperity for all regional Australians.’
• The Australian Greens: ‘Peace and Non Violence, Grassroots Democracy, Social
and Economic Justice, Ecological Sustainability.’
• Pauline Hanson’s One Nation: ‘To bring about the necessary changes for fair and
equal treatment of all Australians within a system of government recognising,
and acting upon, a need for Australia to truly be one nation.’
It must be admitted that when in power governments do not always adhere faith-
fully to the ideological positions they espoused when in opposition. Governments
are usually obliged to take a pragmatic view and work within constraints imposed
by the political, social and economic environment in which they are situated.
A contest of interests
Public policy is also the concern of particular interests in society, and it can be said
that some policy settings can become captive to particular interests.
Policy is often vigorously contested within political parties, a prime example
being the internal debate within the federal Liberal Party around the question of
climate change and strategies to reduce carbon emissions; within the federal Labor
Party one finds sometimes rancorous debate about the treatment of asylum seekers.
Policy proposals from government might also be challenged by a variety of
interests, including industry sectors (e.g. the Minerals Council of Australia), pro-
fessional groupings (e.g. the Australian Medical Association), trade unions (e.g. the
Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union or CFMEU), civil
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society organisations (e.g. the Australian Council of Social Service) or consumer
lobbies (e.g. CHOICE). These interests represent stakeholders that stand to be
affected in some way by government policy. In general, policy makers seek to consult
with affected interest groups (usually through their representative organisations)
in the formulation and implementation of policy. Politically powerful interests can
wield significant – and sometimes disproportionate – influence. Australian examples
include the first Rudd Labor government’s attempt to introduce a Minerals Resource
Rent Tax and the Gillard Labor government’s national gambling reforms – these
measures were staunchly resisted by industry interests and subsequently wound back.
An evidentiary basis?
In an ideal world, policy responses would have some kind of evidential basis. This
might mean a combination of empirical research, statistical analysis, comparative
policy studies, public consultation, evaluation studies or other forms of evidence
that can be made available for independent scrutiny.11 However, ours is not an
ideal world, and the evidence base for many public policy choices is often selective,
sometimes even to the point where decision makers find themselves accused of
‘policy-based evidence making’ – a pejorative converse of the term evidence-based
policy making.
‘Policy-based evidence making’ means working backwards from a predefined
policy position with the aim of finding evidence that supports decisions that have
already been made.12 It is possible that the growing trend of governments engaging
private consultancy firms to produce commissioned research as an input into policy
development has contributed to the perception that evidence is often crafted to fit
policy preferences.13 It is also not unknown for special interests or lobby groups to
produce commissioned research (of varying quality) in support of their advocacy
for policy change.
Policy making is subject to bounded rationality – meaning that the decisions of
policy makers are constrained by a variety of factors, such as the tractability of the
problem at hand, the availability of information and the time frame within which
decisions must be made. There will be times when the ‘evidence’ either fails to
support, or directly contradicts, the preferred policy positions of governments, and
it is not unknown for contradictory evidence to be suppressed in order to ‘protect’
policy settings that are based more in ideology or moral conviction than in any
objective appraisal of the circumstances.
Finally, if evidence is to have an impact on policy governance and management,
systems that are capable of incorporating new information into decision making are
11 Davies and Nutley 2000; Pawson 2006.
12 Marmot 2004; Sanderson 2002.
13 Howlett and Migone 2013.
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required. This is a perennial problem for public sector organisations, which often
fail to use evaluative data generated in the course of delivering public policy to
make adjustments to policy settings and/or to the service delivery architecture.14
Practical policy formulation
It is government’s role to set policy objectives, and it is the duty of the public
service to advise government about the technical, political and economic feasibility
of those policy objectives, including any risks that might arise in their imple-
mentation. Having ‘advised’ government, the public service is obliged to give effect
to government policy by developing an implementation strategy (in consultation
with the government), including formulating a budget, identifying relevant internal
and external capability and undertaking appropriate consultations with affected
stakeholders.
It is also the responsibility of the public service to manage any risks arising in
the implementation and operational phases. Policy implementation can be subject
to a wide variety of constraints, such as short time frames, availability of resources,
technical practicability, a lack of appropriate legal authority (an example being the
Gillard government’s ‘Malaysia solution’, which aimed to develop a regional strategy
to redirect boat arrivals in Australia), inability to pass enabling legislation in
parliaments (an example is the Turnbull Liberal–National Coalition government’s
withdrawal of proposed corporate tax cuts legislation in 2018) and community/
stakeholder resistance. The public service often bears the brunt of any fallout
associated with ineffectual or misguided policy formulations (such as the Rudd
government’s GROCERYchoice and FuelWatch initiatives).
In Australia, public servants typically acquire their policy skills ‘on the job’ in
the form of ‘craft knowledge’.15 Indeed, it is unusual for Australian public servants –
unlike their North American counterparts – to enter the public service with formal
training in public administration, public policy or political science. Although
increasing numbers of public servants now undertake postgraduate qualifications
in disciplines related to public policy, there remains a degree of scepticism among
public servants about the relevance of academic learning to the ‘craft’ of public
policy making.16
Policy practitioners who seek to learn about the policy process will discover
an extensive theoretical literature, aimed primarily at academics, that is not easily
translatable to the real world situations confronting them.17 This literature is also
14 Banks 2018; Stewart and Jarvie 2015.
15 Adams, Colebatch and Walker 2015, 104; Rhodes 2016, 638.
16 See Katsonis 2019.
17 Cairney 2015, 23; Maddison and Denniss 2009, 82.
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characterised by vigorous – and often acrimonious – debate about the limitations
of certain models.
Until the late 1950s, policy making was predominantly portrayed as a process
of rational analysis culminating in a value-maximising decision. However,
American political scientist Charles Lindblom (1917–2018) regarded the rational
policy process as an unattainable ideal and proposed an alternative model,
incrementalism, which focused less on abstract policy ideals and placed greater
emphasis on solving concrete problems.18 Often described as ‘muddling through’,
incrementalism describes an iterative process of building on past policies and
reaching broadly agreed positions among diverse stakeholders.19 Incrementalism
offers a plausible account of the policy-making process. In particular, Lindblom’s
emphasis on ‘trial and error’ would resonate with many contemporary public
servants.20
The ‘Australian policy cycle’
Originally developed 20 years ago specifically for an Australian practitioner
audience, the ‘Australian policy cycle’ is an enduring – if somewhat idealistic –
model of the policy development process. The model is a signature feature of The
Australian policy handbook, first published in 1998. Published in its 6th edition in
2018 and billed as a ‘practical guide to the policy making process’, the handbook has
been described as a ‘popular “go to” policy survival manual for public servants’.21
Whereas theoretical models of the policy process seek explanations through
investigations of institutional, political, organisational and cultural factors that
shape the policy environment, the ‘Australian policy cycle’ is more of a ‘how to’
guide and presents policy making as a sequence of practical actions. It is intended
as ‘a pragmatic guide for the bewildered’; the handbook’s authors assert that ‘good
policy should include the basic elements of the cycle’.22 The strength of the model
is its practical approach, which captures the entirety of policy development and
implementation, although it does not supply causal explanations of policy.
A policy cycle approach can help public servants develop a policy and guide
it through the institutions of government. The policy cycle starts with a problem,
seeks evidence, tests proposals and puts recommendations before Cabinet. Its
outcomes are subject to evaluation and the cycle begins again. The policy cycle
offers a modest and flexible framework for policy makers.23
18 Lindblom 2018.
19 Cairney 2015, 17.
20 Cairney 2015, 31.
21 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018.
22 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018, 45.
23 Bridgman and Davis 2003, 102.
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The policy cycle model has been criticised for suggesting a far more linear and
logical progression of activities than would ever be observed in practice.24 Critics
also point out that the model does not accurately capture the lived experience of
policy professionals.25 The Australian policy handbook’s authors, Althaus, Bridgman
and Davis, have engaged openly with such critics and have responded to their
criticisms in the following terms: ‘The policy cycle does not assert that policy
making is rational, occurs outside politics, or proceeds as a logical sequence rather
than as a contest of ideas and interests’.26
In simple terms, the policy cycle entails eight logically sequenced steps:
1. identify issues
2. analyse policy options
3. select policy instruments
4. consult affected parties
5. co-ordinate with stakeholders
6. decide preferred strategy
7. implement policy
8. evaluate success/failure.
Notably, the policy cycle offers little guidance to the aspiring policy practitioner
about the technical feasibility and integrity of the policy development and
implementation phases. In this regard, we might wish to consider the ‘policy value
chain’ (presented in Figure 1).
Based upon a concept developed by Michael Porter,27 value chain analysis takes
account of the primary activities that need to be undertaken to produce value for
customers, and the supporting activities and systems necessary for primary activities
to occur. Porter’s model was developed to guide the commercial decision making
of enterprises; however, it can be recast as a policy value chain that can be used
to help policy practitioners understand the activities that need to be undertaken
sequentially to shepherd a policy from conception through to implementation, as
well as the organisational capabilities or functions required to support those activ-
ities. In the policy value chain, primary activities are analogous to the steps set out in
the ‘Australian policy cycle’. Supporting activities encompass the following essential
organisational and management capabilities and assets:
• organisational infrastructure (including research capability and knowledge
management systems)
24 Howlett, McConnell and Perl 2017; Maddison and Denniss 2013, 87–89; Scott and Baehler
2010, 29.
25 Adams, Colebatch and Walker 2015, 108; Colebatch 2006, 26; Gill and Colebatch 2006, 261–2;
Head and Crowley 2015, 4.
26 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2015, 112.
27 Porter 1985.
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Figure 1 The policy value chain. Source: adapted from Porter 1985.
• human resources (capacity to assign people with relevant knowledge and skills
to a task and support them in that task)
• technical capability (including information technology, communications and
business platforms)
• capacity to procure external capability (including the ability to recruit people
with relevant skills or to engage consultants with relevant expertise).
Where Porter’s original model posits margins (profit) as the primary value
produced by the deployment of capability to support the creation of value, in the
policy value chain we might substitute outcomes and public (or stakeholder) trust as
the primary value created by public policy. The public value of policy is sometimes
overlooked by policy theorists – who focus instead on the character of political
or power relations culminating in a particular policy – and by those analysts who
look only at the ‘craft’ aspects of the policy process, while being agnostic about the
impact of policy on the public good. Our adaptation of Porter’s value chain model
expressly invites the policy maker to keep public value creation ‘front of mind’.
Cross-portfolio policy co-ordination
Policy generated in one ministry or portfolio can have impacts on policy in other
ministries, portfolios and agencies. Similarly, policies originating in one jurisdiction
can have consequential implications for intergovernmental relations, including
between national (federal) and subnational (state, territory and local) governments
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(one example being the impact of changes in revenue or spending decisions by
the Commonwealth government upon state/territory governments) and between
nations in respect of multilateral or bilateral agreements (examples being trade
agreements or United Nations conventions).
In Australia, central agencies of government – Departments of Prime Minister
and Cabinet or Premier and Cabinet/Chief Minister – perform an essential policy
co-ordination role. It falls to these agencies to review policy and budget proposals
emanating from ministers and their departments and to seek comment from other
ministries and agencies in order to identify any unintended consequences that might
arise. Once comments have been compiled from affected agencies – including other
central agencies, such as Departments of Treasury and Finance as well as agencies
responsible for government revenue – a briefing, together with recommendations,
will be prepared for the consideration of Cabinet. Vetting of this nature often
requires specialist knowledge of particular policy domains and of the statutory basis
for government programs and services. It also depends less on political theory and
more on an appreciation of the practical and pragmatic dimensions of public policy.
Policy analysis
The aphorism ‘the best is the enemy of the good’, commonly attributed to the
French Enlightenment writer and philosopher Voltaire (1694–1778), neatly encap-
sulates a key challenge of public policy. At some level, all policy decisions represent
compromises between different interests and involve considerations about political
acceptability as well as economic and technical feasibility. To quote the 19th-
century German statesman Otto von Bismarck, ‘politics is the art of the possible’ –
likewise, policy is the art of the achievable.
Policy analysis is an important part of the ‘craft’ of policy making. The task of
the analyst is to understand the implications of policy decisions in terms of their
impact on the policy problems being addressed; any unintended consequences for
government or the community; and their legal, economic and technical soundness.
Policy analysis is essential for the provision of policy assurance and enables the
analyst to provide answers to the following key questions:
• Is the policy well targeted?
• Is the policy delivery architecture well designed?
• How will performance be measured?
• How will we know if the policy is working?
• If the policy is not working, what corrective action is available?
In order to make reliable pragmatic judgements about such matters, it is impor-
tant for the analyst to give close consideration to a wide range of factors. The kinds
of questions the astute policy analyst might ask include:
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• Is the policy framed within a particular political or philosophical perspective,
and is it consistent with the values and policy platform of the governing party
or parties?
• Is the policy genuinely directed towards solving a problem in public policy, or
does it primarily seek to solve a ‘political’ problem by creating the impression
of action while having little tangible effect?
• Have similar policies been pursued in other jurisdictions and to what effect?
How might past experience inform policy implementation?
• What are the competing options to achieve the policy aims, and how do they
compare? Does the policy require enabling legislation? What policy instru-
ments or tools are available to give effect to the policy? What are the expected/
hoped for impacts of the policy, and how might these be reliably measured and
reported?
• Which groups or communities of interest – including classes of workers, trade
unions, professional associations, advocacy organisations, industry groupings,
communities and/or geographical regions and expected beneficiaries – stand to
be affected by the policy and in what manner,?
• Does the infrastructure exist to give effect to the policy? Is there a functioning
market framework within which the policy might be delivered? What skills
base is necessary to deliver the policy? Is an appropriately skilled workforce
available? What capacity exists within the public and non-state sectors to give
effect to the policy?
• What will policy implementation cost? Is it affordable? Will delivery be
selectively targeted, means-tested or otherwise ‘rationed’? Is it possible to offset
expenditure through some form of cost recovery, such as user fees? What are
the principal cost drivers in the policy space?
• How will the policy be delivered and governed? What systems or frameworks
need to be established to provide assurance to government that policy
implementation and delivery will occur within prescribed timeframes and
budgets? What systems or frameworks are available to ensure that the policy is
performing in the expected manner?
• Has provision been made for periodic evaluations of the effectiveness of the
policy and/or the operational arrangements established to give effect to the
policy, and is there a capacity to make necessary adjustments to the policy and/
or management structures should evaluation findings so indicate?
Policy instruments
Policy instruments enable the application of policy decisions in practice and can be
grouped into the following major categories:
1. money (spending and taxing powers)
2. law (including regulation)
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3. government action (e.g. delivering services)
4. advocacy (e.g. educating, persuading)
5. networking (e.g. cultivating and using relationships to influence behaviour)
6. narratives (e.g. using storytelling and communication – including public
advertising)
7. behavioural economics (e.g. using economic incentives to induce behaviour
change, or ‘nudging’ as it has come to be known).28
It should be noted that in the real world these categories often overlap and a mix
of instruments is generally required. For instance, governments might elect to use
a form of direct service delivery (government action) to achieve policy aims; the
delivery of services requires statutory authority (law), is funded by government
appropriations (money) and employs ‘nudge’ strategies (behavioural economics),
advertising (narratives) and public education (advocacy) to achieve the govern-
ment’s policy aims.
Government policies aimed at reducing the harms from the use of tobacco
products provide a good example; they employ all of the instruments named above:
1. Money: the collection of excise tax on cigarette sales to provide a source of
funds for medical research and for non-government organisations involved in
anti-smoking programs.
2. Legislation/regulation: setting age restrictions on the purchase of tobacco prod-
ucts, banning smoking in public places and restricting the sale, advertising,
distribution and packaging of tobacco products.
3. Government action: funding the delivery of preventative health services aimed
at assisting smokers to quit.
4. Advocacy: there have been multiple education campaigns on the health risks
associated with tobacco and how to quit.
5. Networking: successive governments have entered into partnerships with
representative bodies, such as the Australian Medical Association, and non-
government organisations advocating smoking reduction.
6. Narratives: anti-smoking campaigns utilising various media and featuring
testimonials by former smokers and/or portraying the health and other impacts
of smoking on real people.
7. Behavioural economics: levying excise taxes to increase the purchase price of
tobacco products and/or offering financial incentives to quit smoking.
It is worth noting that the choice of policy instrument is all too often a function
of familiarity, as opposed to optimal fitness for purpose (in other words, policy
makers stick to what they know). Other factors influencing the choice of instru-
ments include:
28 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018.
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• the characteristics of the policy area in question (e.g. some policy areas might
have a long history of recourse to particular models of implementation, and
this predisposes policy actors in those areas to prefer those models)
• available resources (e.g. some policy instruments might entail significantly
higher establishment and running costs than others, or they might require
skills or technologies that are in short supply, leading to the selection of less
optimal but more feasible options)
• ease of administration and/or administrative traditions (e.g. some policy
instruments might be inherently easier to administer, while others entail greater
complexity and risk; in some policy domains particular traditions – say, central-
ised, hierarchical management frameworks, as opposed to decentralised, dis-
tributed frameworks – might predominate, predisposing practitioners towards
the selection of instruments that ‘fit’ with the existing administrative culture)
• the political dimension (e.g. recourse to particular policy instruments might be
precluded because they are not considered to be acceptable to the community
and/or they might be unacceptable to governments on ideological grounds).29
Policy implementation
The true test of any policy lies in its implementation. The Australian Department
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet sets out a structured approach to thinking about
how a policy or program will be delivered, framed around seven principles drawn
from lessons learnt by frontline staff involved in implementation and delivery:
1. planning
2. governance
3. engaging stakeholders
4. risks
5. monitoring, review and evaluation
6. resource management
7. management strategy.
Implementation gives practical effect to policy. It is a complex process requiring
application of a range of technical and management skills. Many seemingly ‘good’
policies fail in their implementation, resulting in a failure to achieve expected
outcomes or in unintended ‘perverse’ outcomes.
29 Peters 2005.
Making public policy
517
Implementation failure
Implementation failure can occur anywhere along the policy value chain and can
be caused by any combination of:
• inadequate research, design and planning
• poor co-ordination and inadequate consultation with stakeholders
• insufficient resourcing and capacity constraints
• legislative and regulatory gaps
• proceeding too quickly and/or failure to ‘pilot’
• failure to anticipate and/or effectively manage risks
• ineffective governance and/or administrative architecture
• multiple and/or incompatible policy goals.
Implementation failure entails significant costs in terms of finite resources (such
as money, labour and time), reputation and trust. These include a failure to realise
intended policy aims; loss of public confidence; costs of restoration, rectification
or redress; costs arising from bringing failed programs to a premature end; lost
opportunities (opportunity costs); and, for governments, loss of political capital
(with potential electoral consequences). It is important to recall that policy making
is, and remains, inherently ‘political’ and that ‘policy success’ will always be a
contested assessment. Indeed, it might be said that ‘failure’ has been ‘weaponised’
in Australia’s contemporary political culture.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have attempted to introduce readers to a spectrum of ideas about
the nature, formulation and ‘craft’ of policy making. In so doing, we have tried to:
• acquaint readers with the major theoretical approaches to understanding the
policy process
• equip readers to more effectively understand past and present policy debates
• enable readers to interrogate the processes of policy development, implement-
ation and evaluation.
Policy design and implementation is a complex and imperfect process that is
often seen as more of a ‘craft’ than a formal discipline. Policy professionals tend to
‘learn on the job’, and even those who have formal qualifications in public policy
or exposure to the academic study of policy often find that the pragmatic reality of
policy making aligns poorly with policy theory.
The Australian policy cycle and the policy value chain offer sound practical
templates for policy design and evaluation. Unfortunately, as will be attested by
many policy professionals working within government, ‘policy craft’ is seldom
conducted in full accordance with such orderly, rational models.
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In contemporary policy spaces, effective policy craft increasingly comes down to
working effectively within networks inside and outside government. Today’s policy
professional needs to be acutely aware that governments have many sources of policy
advice and that many of these sources have vested interests in particular outcomes.
Above all, a capacity for critical reflection and an ability to anticipate the risks and
consequences of policy choices provide the foundation of sound policy practice.
It is our hope that the concepts canvassed in this chapter will assist readers to
make sense of scholarly and media accounts of policy histories and policy making
in different domains and of the changing role, form and modus operandi of the
public sector.
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Communication policy
Jock Given
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Communication matters to people and organisations and Australian governments
do a lot to enable and manage it. Through much of the 20th century, they controlled
state-owned enterprises and statutory agencies that provided all the postal and
domestic telecommunications services. Government-funded broadcasters also
provided some radio and TV services under Australia’s ‘dual system’ of public
and private enterprises. Commercial operators dominated other media sectors –
movies screened in cinemas, and printed newspapers, magazines and books –
although governments were active there too, supporting public libraries to provide
equitable access to printed media and eventually supporting Australians to create
texts and audiovisual works. The private sector also played a big role in pioneering
international telecommunications services, until these were nationalised after the
Second World War, and in manufacturing equipment for networks and telephone,
radio and television receivers for consumers. Parliaments passed a growing body
of laws to regulate the activities of all these public and private communications
enterprises.
Given, Jock (2019). Communications. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune,
Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
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Late in the 20th century and early in the 21st, three major changes occurred.
The telecommunications market was liberalised, privatised then partly re-
nationalised. New entrants were allowed to offer services and build their own
infrastructure and the government’s shareholding in the incumbent Telstra was
sold in three tranches from 1997 to 2006. From 2009, the National Broadband
Network (NBN) returned the federal government to a large, direct role in the
local telecommunications market. Second, foreign ownership restrictions were
progressively removed, and particular transactions accommodated, in ways that
permitted a higher level of overseas participation in media sectors that had been
largely controlled by Australians. Third, from the mid-1990s, the internet trans-
formed the social and economic processes of communication. This eventually
affected all people and enterprises. For Australian policy makers, one of the most
important features of the new digital economy and society was that largely new
commercial organisations came to dominate it – Facebook, Apple, Alphabet/
Google, Amazon, Netflix and Microsoft. They became the world’s biggest corp-
orations, measured by market capitalisation, and they were based outside Australia.
This changed some of the targets and instruments of Australian communications
policy, though many of its broad themes have endured.
What’s at stake?
Communication raises at least four issues for politics and public policy. Citizens,
consumers, enterprises, defence forces, elected representatives and others require
information that is carried over communications networks. Those networks also
convey ideas, images, sounds and stories that shape culture and identity. Comm-
unications industries contribute directly to employment and economic activity and
provide vital inputs to other industries.
One of the first things the Australian parliament did after Federation in 1901
was create an information powerhouse by merging the six state post, telegraph and
telephone administrations into a single enterprise run by a federal department. More
than half the total sum appropriated under the first Consolidated Revenue Act, No. 3
1901 (Cth) was allocated to it. When television was introduced in 1956, expectations
about its cultural impact quickly prompted demands for policy measures to ensure
this new medium did more for Australian culture than the tiny local film industry
at the time. The scale and value of equipment purchased for telecommunications
networks encouraged governments to support local manufacturing, initially by tariff
protection and later by requiring carriers to have industry development plans. Since
then industry policy in the sector has continued but it has been redirected towards
creative, service industries rather than equipment manufacturing.
Digital networks have accentuated the role of communications as an input to
other industries. Recent analysis of investment in Australia from the mid-1960s to
2011 found a higher rate of return for information and communications technology
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(ICT) than non-ICT capital investment, and that the impact of ICT investment
was more profound over the longer term.1 ICTs have come to be seen as ‘general
purpose technologies’. These are ‘characterised by the potential for pervasive use in a
wide range of sectors and by their technological dynamism’. According to Bresnahan
and Trajtenberg, ‘As a [general purpose technology] evolves and advances it spreads
throughout the economy, bringing about and fostering generalized productivity
gains’. Earlier examples include the steam engine, the factory system, electricity, and
semiconductors.2 The perceived breadth, depth and scale of the impact of networked
digital technologies have attracted the attention of politicians and policy actors
well beyond the domain of ‘communications’. So, for example, the initial members
of the working group established in 2017 to consider 5G wireless developments
included representatives from federal departments responsible for agriculture and
water resources (especially for ‘precision agriculture’); infrastructure and regional
development (autonomous vehicles); Prime Minister and Cabinet (smart cities and
digital transformation activities); industry, innovation and science (digital economy
strategy); as well as communications and arts.
Australian consumers have been spending more on communications in recent
years. Even though the cost per gigabyte of data fell between 2014 and 2018, the
share of household income devoted to internet services grew because more time
is being spent online and much more data is being downloaded.3 For industry,
communications plays a central role in future transformations encompassed by
terms like the ‘Industrial Internet’, the ‘Connected Enterprise’ and the ‘Internet
of Everything’. This is what consulting firm Deloitte and others call a ‘Fourth
Industrial Revolution’, to follow the revolution in power generation in the late 18th
century, industrialisation in the early 20th century, and electronic automation from
the 1970s to the 2000s. This next phase, according to Deloitte, will be about ‘smart
automation’, where machines no longer simply create products, but ‘product[s]
communicate with the machinery to tell it exactly what to do’.4
A report prepared by the OECD for a 2017 meeting of the G20 found adoption
and use of digital technologies varied across the group’s members, which together
account for about 85 per cent of the world’s production and two-thirds of its
people. This ‘rais[ed] concerns about the inclusiveness of the digital transformation’.
The report’s authors made many recommendations about policies that should be
pursued, including encouraging take-up of digital technologies among small and
medium-sized enterprises; better access to finance for innovative enterprises; open
and voluntary standards; addressing the economic and social as well as technical
dimensions of digital security; improved generic, specialist and complementary
1 Shahiduzzaman and Khorshed 2014.
2 Bresnahan and Trajtenberg 1995, 84.
3 Thomas et al. 2018, 12.
4 Sniderman, Mahto and Cotteleer 2016, 2–5.
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ICT skills; better protection of consumer rights; and regular reviews of legal
frameworks and broadband infrastructure.5
Characteristics of the policy space: what do we know
Because communication is so central to all aspects of social and economic life, it is
not easy to fix boundaries around the policy space it occupies. The rhetoric of rapid,
revolutionary change that so often accompanies discussion and debate is not always
matched by the prosperity of the largest Australian enterprises or the industry as
a whole. Networked digital services create rich sources of data about consumer
behaviour but increasingly sophisticated and personalised patterns of use complicate
the task of making sense of it. New policy issues arise but old themes endure.
In recent years, expenditure on communications devices and services has grown
steadily and data downloaded over fixed and mobile networks has soared. Australia’s
communications industry, however, has not been buoyant. According to the
Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘gross fixed capital formation’ by Australia’s ‘infor-
mation media and telecommunication’ enterprises doubled from 2007/08 to 2016/
17, driven by public investment in the NBN and private investment especially in
mobile networks, cloud storage facilities and backhaul networks. Yet total emp-
loyment in 2016/17, at 171,000 people, was unchanged from 10 years earlier, and
profits (measured by ‘earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and abnormal items’,
EBITDA) were just 5 per cent higher. Across the whole economy over the same
period, employment grew by 15 per cent and profits by 54 per cent. That means
the proportion of the workforce employed in ‘information media and telecomm-
unication’ fell from 1.8 per cent to 1.6 per cent, and the sector’s share of profits
declined from 6.3 per cent to 4.3 per cent, while its share of investment grew from
5.4 per cent to 8.5 per cent.6
The composition of the industry has also changed, with important implications
for the issues and actors of policy. Traditional telecommunications, broadcasting
and publishing have grown slowly or declined; internet or cloud-based services
including streaming video-on-demand have grown sharply. Landline telephony has
fallen steadily while fixed and mobile broadband has grown.7 The challenge of
profiting from the apparent boom in communications is reflected in the share price
of Australia’s largest telco, Telstra: down from over $4 in November 2008 to less
than $3 a decade later, after rising above $6 in early 2015.8 The 2018 takeover of
5 OECD Directorate for Science, Technology and Innovation 2017, 6–10.
6 Author analysis of data in ABS 2018. This publication provides annual estimates of the
performance of Australian industries by combining data from the ABS’s annual Economic
Activity Survey (EAS) and Business Activity Statement (BAS) data provided to the Australian
Taxation Office.
7 ACMA 2017.
8 Australian Stock Exchange 2018.
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Fairfax Media by Nine Entertainment Corporation was justified as a merger of
old newspaper and TV assets to create a media company for the future, but it
was also an opportunistic acquisition of the currently faster-growing Domain (real
estate advertising) and Stan (video streaming) businesses at a moment of ‘elevated
valuation’ of Nine’s stock.9
The tech giants that have risen to such prominence in the communications
and media landscape – Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix and Google/Alphabet,
the so-called FAANGs, as well as the durable Microsoft – are based overseas,
unlike so many of the telecommunications, television and newspaper companies
that dominated in Australia in the second half of the 20th century. Traditional
measures of the scale of foreign involvement in domestic markets, like ‘foreign
direct investment’ and numbers of local employees, are not good proxies for the
level of influence achieved by US-based platforms. A large part of their power arises
from the data they are able to collect and analyse about their users. This data has
itself become an economic resource, ‘the oil of the digital era’. Some argue it has
changed the nature of competition so fundamentally that it necessitates a ‘radical
rethink’ of competition policy.10 At the same time, the corporate behemoths of the
formal ‘data economy’ borrow from and interact with an informal economy of user-
generated content, open source software, crowd-funded projects, unremunerated
labour and organisational cross-subsidies.11 The scale and sophistication of the
data and analytical tools promise new levels of knowledge for policy makers, while
the complexity of online and offline behaviour reinforces the fundamental
unknowability of social practices.12
Actors and politics of the domain
The Australian Policy Handbook’s summary of the institutions of Australian public
policy lists various elements of government (the executive, the Cabinet, public
servants, ministerial advisers) and opposition, the ‘third sector’, the ‘fourth estate’,
social movements, lobbyists and stakeholders.13 In communications, several
specific institutions deserve particular attention. Publicly funded regulators (the
Australian Communications and Media Authority, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission) and industry-funded complaints-handling organisations
(the Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman, the Australian Press Council)
play significant roles. The prevalence of state-funded organisations, discussed in
the next section, means governments still play a major role in providing
communications services as well as regulating service providers. The fourth estate,
9 Hewett 2018.
10 ‘The world’s most valuable resource’ 2017.
11 Lobato and Thomas 2015.
12 Given 2012.
13 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018, 18–31.
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the media, is part of the field itself, not just the conduit for disseminating
information about it. Citizens who are the ultimate focus of all policy need to
be conceptualised also as consumers, users and audiences for communications
services.
An important addition to the list of public policy institutions in communica-
tions are international organisations like the Universal Postal Union, International
Telecommunication Union (ITU), and World Intellectual Property Organisation
(WIPO) – all of which are United Nations agencies – and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN). Domestic policy has to be co-ordinated with these organisations. For
example, local laws have to be amended to translate commitments made in
international agreements; auDA manages the .au domain space allocated through
ICANN, the non-profit corporation, incorporated in California that, among other
things, manages the internet’s global domain name system. These institutions reflect
the longstanding international dimensions of communications policy. From the
earliest days of postal and telegraph services, protocols were needed to manage
and share the costs and revenues of delivering physical articles across national
borders and interconnecting electronic networks. The ITU now also co-ordinates
the international management of radiofrequency spectrum and satellite orbits as
well as standardisation of technologies for things like internet access, transport
protocols, home networking and video compression. WIPO and the WTO oversee
the global agreements put in place over many decades to manage intellectual
property and trade. They also handle disputes that arise under them.
These global arrangements are complex and overlapping: there are many
regional (like the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) and bilateral (like the
Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement) trade agreements
as well as the WTO’s multilateral ones, and trade agreements now often include
detailed provisions about intellectual property that are not necessarily consistent
with WIPO agreements. Alongside these longstanding international dimensions,
networked digital technologies have accentuated the global nature of many other
policy issues. Global communication is not new – Australians have always read
books, listened to music and watched movies from elsewhere and sent messages
over networks owned and controlled by overseas-based organisations – but the
current phase has rendered nationally based policy measures less effective in areas
like taxation of multinational corporate activity, competition, consumer protection
and policing child pornography.
High-level public policy goals for communications in Australia are expressed in
the objects of legislation, the outcomes specified for government funding programs
and the charters of public institutions. Statutory objects emphasise several broad
areas: first, equitable access to reliable basic services and innovation in the
development of new services; second, content that reflects Australian identity,
character and cultural diversity, covers issues of local significance, treats matters
of public interest fairly and accurately, and respects community standards; and an
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industry that is efficient, competitive and responsive to Australian needs. These
are enduring themes, articulated in distinctive policy responses in different eras.
So regular mail deliveries and public payphones have been overtaken by fast fixed
broadband and wide mobile coverage as the most important basic services.
Broadcast radio and television are now less important to emerging generations
than to older media users. The High Court’s 1992 Mabo decision14 rewrote the
political and cultural framework within which ‘Australian content’ needs to be
imagined. Existing mechanisms for dealing with fairness and accuracy in news
and current affairs have been overwhelmed in the digital era: policy responses to
‘fake news’ are a work-in-progress.15 Communications networks have always been
instruments of defence, national security and law enforcement but the rules and
tools of surveillance have changed constantly: foreign shareholding in Telstra is still
capped at 35 per cent and in 2012 and 2018 the federal government banned Chinese
telecoms equipment makers Huawei and ZTE from supplying equipment for the
NBN and 5G networks.16
There is a strong element of bipartisanship in these broadly expressed goals but
communications is often a heavily contested, highly political field. This is partly
because the goals themselves sometimes conflict with each other: introducing a
major overhaul of broadcasting law in the early 1990s that introduced statutory
objects for the first time, the minister acknowledged ‘there are some tensions
between the objects that will need to be balanced by the regulator and the courts’.17
Suppliers, regulators and customers can legitimately disagree about the benchmark
set in the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth): ‘accessible and affordable carriage
services … supplied at performance standards that reasonably meet the social,
industrial and commercial needs of the Australian community’.18 The National
Classification Code says ‘adults should be able to read, hear, see and play what
they want’, but also that ‘everyone should be protected from exposure to unsolicited
material that they find offensive’. The Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)
is ‘by far the nation’s most trusted media organisation’, according to a Roy Morgan
survey in May 2018,19 although some in politics deeply distrust it: ‘our enemies
talking to our friends’, said former Howard government adviser Graeme Morris in
1997.20
The broadening and deepening of the social and economic role of networked
digital technologies has changed the politics of communications in at least two
ways. First, the political power of particular media forms, especially commercial
TV, newspapers and talkback radio, has diminished, along with the unrivalled
14 Mabo and others v Queensland (No. 2) [1992] HCA 23; (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Mabo).
15 Nelson and Taneja 2018; Viner 2016.
16 Slezak and Bogle 2018.
17 Collins 1992, 3600.
18 Telecommunications Act 1997, section 3.
19 Roy Morgan 2018.
20 Hartcher 2009.
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influence of their owners. Former editor-in-chief of the Herald and Weekly Times,
Les Carlyon, described Australia’s media policy in the 1980s and 1990s as ‘founded
on notions of mates [especially Kerry Packer and Rupert Murdoch] and enemies
[especially the old owners of the Fairfax and Herald and Weekly Times newspapers],
just like the third world’.21 The decline in the power of old media’s owners was
especially apparent through the long process of switching broadcast television to
digital transmission from 2001–13, which freed a large amount of radiofrequency
spectrum for mobile broadband.22 The technological migration enabled both an
economic and a political transition.
Second, the libertarianism of the early internet has moderated. In 1996, Elec-
tronic Frontiers Foundation co-founder John Perry Barlow asked the ‘Governments
of the Industrial World’ to leave cyberspace alone: ‘You are not welcome among
us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.’23 Since then, as the internet has
been integrated into almost every aspect of life, communication and commerce,
governments have moved to treat online and offline activities more consistently,
even in areas like taxation and content regulation which were once argued to be
firmly off-limits. The ACMA’s chair, Nerida O’Loughlin, said in 2018: ‘Government
regulation has started, particularly in Europe. I think the days of saying we won’t do
anything because of a US-based view of free speech are well and truly over.’24
How policy is made for communications
Communications policy uses three main tools: law, money and ownership. It is
made by governments and parliaments that make and amend laws; regularly decide
to allocate money through annual budget processes; and occasionally decide to
create, redesign, privatise or otherwise disband the activities of public institutions.
Laws can directly prohibit or require certain behaviour, or permit it subject to
conditions. They can also create markets for commodities like radiofrequency
spectrum and intellectual property, and rules to be observed by anyone trading
them. Money can be allocated to individuals or organisations as grants, invest-
ments, loans, minimum guarantees or tax concessions to meet the cost of doing
particular things: making a movie, erecting a mobile phone tower, conducting
research about consumer needs or advocacy on behalf of specific types of
consumers. Institutions can be created to carry out public missions with varying
degrees of independence from the governments that establish, fund and oversee
them: public broadcasters, a national library, a national broadband network.
21 Cited in Barr 2000, 1.
22 Given 2009.
23 Barlow 1996.
24 Day 2018.
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Laws
Parliaments pass laws to prohibit or require conduct by individuals or
organisations. General prohibitions about communications are set out in the
Commonwealth Criminal Code. It outlaws many kinds of interference with
‘national infrastructure’, including tampering with or stealing mail, intercepting
electronic communications and accessing data on a computer without author-
isation.25 In recent years, federal and state laws have been introduced to deal
with various forms of cyberbullying and online abuse, including ‘revenge porn’.
Legislation passed in 2015 established a complaints mechanism and an eSafety
Commissioner to administer it, under which individuals, websites and social media
services can be asked or required to remove cyberbulling material targeted at an
Australian child. Amendments in 2018 established civil penalties and criminal
offences for sharing intimate images without consent. Perpetrators can be
imprisoned for up to seven years and substantial monetary penalties can be
imposed on individuals and corporations that do not remove offending content
when directed by the eSafety Commissioner.26
Some forms of interference with communications that would otherwise be
prohibited are allowed for law enforcement purposes, subject to safeguards.
Communications service providers are now required to keep records to assist
enforcement agencies. The government argues these ‘data retention’ rules are
necessary to support serious criminal and national investigations: data gathered
can be used to identify suspects and networks, rule out innocents, and support
applications for warrants needed for more intrusive forms of investigation. From
April 2017, the scheme has required telecommunications service providers using
infrastructure in Australia to retain and protect specified data about individual
communications for at least two years: subscribers’ names, addresses, phone
numbers, email and IP addresses, as well as the source, destination, time and
duration of any communication, and the physical location from which they are
made, though not the content of messages. More than 20 law enforcement and
national security agencies can generally obtain access to this data without warrant;
a warrant is required to access journalists’ data. The scheme is subject to
independent oversight by the Commonwealth Ombudsman, or, for ASIO, by the
Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. The attorney-general reports
annually to parliament on its operation.27
The main bodies of law about telecommunications, radiocommunications and
broadcasting services in Australia pursue policy goals through licensing schemes.
These work by prohibiting certain conduct without a licence, and then imposing
conditions on different licence types. For example, it is unlawful to use particular
25 Chapter 10, Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).
26 Enhancing Online Safety Act 2015 (Cth); Enhancing Online Safety (Non-consensual Sharing of
Intimate Images) Act 2018 (Cth).
27 Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (Cth).
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parts of the radiofrequency spectrum known as the ‘broadcasting services bands’
without a licence. One form of licence permits holders to transmit ‘community
broadcasting services’. These are only available to non-profit corporations, who can
accept revenue from sponsorship but not advertising. Another example is the ‘class
licence’ that authorises the use of mobile and cellular telephone handsets. Each
device does not need its own licence: instead, manufacturers have to ensure their
handsets comply with the conditions of the single, standing licence for that class.
Some laws are designed to influence behaviour indirectly by creating markets
or rules that participants must observe. In communications, two crucial examples
are the markets for radiofrequency spectrum and intellectual property. The laws
about spectrum empower the minister and the regulator, the Australian Comm-
unications and Media Authority (ACMA) to decide who gets to use spectrum,
for how long, how much they pay, the technical conditions and whether or not
they can trade their rights. Intellectual property is created by law: without statutes
that give rights to those who create copyright works, patentable inventions and
protected designs, these forms of intangible property would not exist at all. Within
bodies of law that apply across the whole economy, special rules are sometimes
written for particular industries thought to have unique characteristics. Australia
has a national ‘access regime’ allowing third parties to seek access to ports, airports,
railway tracks and sewerage pipes,28 as well as an ‘industry-specific’ access regime
for telecommunications, designed to promote easy interconnection, competition,
and efficient use and investment in fixed and mobile networks.29 In this way,
‘mobile virtual network operators’ can offer services over other telcos’ networks
without having to build their own.
Money
Money can be spent or collected to encourage or discourage behaviour. Hundreds
of millions of dollars have been spent since the late 1960s supporting Australians
to make and distribute films, TV programs and other forms of audiovisual content
that governments thought would not be produced otherwise. Concerned about the
decline of mainstream news media, the federal government established a Regional
and Small Publishers Innovation Fund in 2018 to assist ‘innovative and trans-
formative’ public interest journalism projects ‘with an Australian perspective’:
money is being given to projects designed to help publishers increase revenue,
reduce costs or broaden audiences through new digital applications. Government
money need not be provided by direct expenditure from the budget; it can also be
provided by offering concessions on taxes that would otherwise be due. Most of
28 Part IIIA of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).
29 Part XIC of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. Part XIB sets out further
telecommunications-specific rules about anti-competitive conduct and record-keeping by
telcos.
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the assistance to the film and TV industry is now provided this way, as tax ‘offsets’
or rebates encouraging production (‘Producer Offset’), large budget film and TV
projects shot in Australia (‘Location Offset’) and post-production, digital and visual
effects production in Australia (‘PDV Offset’).30
Institutions
Australian governments have created many organisations to undertake commun-
ications activities. Their forms differ widely. Australia Post and National Broadband
Network Co are government-business enterprises whose shares are wholly owned
by the Commonwealth. One is old, the country’s oldest continually operating
organisation; the other is young, created only in 2009. The national broadcasters
(the ABC and SBS, into which the National Indigenous TV service was merged in
2012), the National Library and the Australian Film, Television and Radio School
do not have shares, but are corporate Commonwealth entities set up under their
own legislation. Their boards are appointed by the responsible ministers and
funding is provided mainly from the federal budget. Another, different kind of
organisation is the National Relay Service, a non-government organisation that has
a contract with the federal government to run a call centre enabling people with
hearing disabilities to make telephone calls. The contract is re-tendered when it
expires and is funded by a levy on telecommunications carriers imposed under
federal legislation.
Making policy
The ‘Australian policy cycle’ described in The Australian Policy Handbook31 is a
useful way of conceptualising the way issues are identified and responses
developed, implemented and evaluated, but it is rare for communications policy
to proceed in so orderly a manner. The field is rife with large, detailed reports
from government agencies and parliamentary committees that had little immediate
impact, and relatively brief ministerial media releases that announced fundamental
changes. In telecommunications, the NBN, announced by the Rudd government
in April 2009, was an example of the latter. The ‘Beazley Statement’ that ended
Telecom Australia’s monopoly in the early 1990s was another, although it can also
be interpreted as a delayed response to the recommendations of the Davidson
Committee, which was shelved by the Fraser Coalition government that
commissioned it.32 The big changes to spectrum management implemented in the
Radiocommunications Act 1992 (Cth) were a rare example of a neat ‘policy cycle’:
a report from the federal government’s Bureau of Transport and Communications
30 Screen Australia n.d.
31 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018, 43–53.
32 Raiche 1997, 2.
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Economics, then a public parliamentary inquiry, then draft legislation attracting
bipartisan support.33
The NBN was a response by a new Labor government frustrated about the state
of play in fixed line broadband. All three of the main tools of communications
policy were deployed. The legislative changes that opened up the local tele-
communications market to new players in the 1990s had not generated rapid take-
up of high-speed broadband. Successive governments offered to provide money
by way of co-investment with Telstra to build a ‘next generation network’ but had
been unable to agree terms. Better broadband was an important element of Labor’s
pitch in the ‘Kevin07’ election campaign which emphasised ‘the future’ to contrast
Rudd and his agenda with ageing incumbent John Howard. Even more frustrated
with the state of Australian broadband after two years in office, Rudd announced
the NBN, a wholly new, state-owned institution that would build the mainly fibre
network itself, as well as new constraints on the infrastructure others could build.
This was a striking return to the days of infrastructure monopoly that had ended
with such policy fanfare just over a decade earlier, effectively a renationalisation of
the last mile of the fixed line network connecting exchanges to customers.34 At the
2010 federal election, the expensive commitment to an all-fibre network reaching
more than 90 per cent of Australian households and business premises was a
decisive policy for independent members of parliament representing traditionally
conservative-held country seats. It persuaded them to support Labor ahead of the
Coalition, enabling Prime Minister Julia Gillard to form a minority government.
An analysis of the selection of NBN early release sites and voting patterns at the
2007, 2010 and 2013 elections found significant political economy dimensions to
this big public intervention into infrastructure planning: the selection process was
‘skewed up for potential political gains’ and the heavy swing against Labor in the
2013 election was ‘highly mitigated in the NBN early release sites’, although the
authors acknowledge their research method identifies correlation, not necessarily
causation.35
A further example of a complex communications policy demonstrating the
challenges of long-term planning and implementation in a fast-changing and
politically charged field was the migration of TV broadcasting from analogue to
digital transmission. Formal policy reports were produced in the 1990s by the
broadcasting regulator (then the Australian Broadcasting Authority); major
packages of legislation were passed in 1998 and 2000; a formal review of the
policy was undertaken by the Productivity Commission as part of a wholesale
reconsideration of broadcasting law;36 large amounts of money were provided
over many years to fund new equipment required by the ABC, SBS and country
33 Productivity Commission 2002, 41.
34 Given 2010.
35 Tooran and Farid 2017.
36 Productivity Commission 2000.
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commercial stations, and to track the take-up of digital receivers and assist low-
income consumers; and legislative changes were made to remove some of the
original constraints and impositions on broadcasters and others. Analogue TV
transmissions were eventually switched off progressively from 2010 to 2013 and
vacated spectrum was reallocated. Total revenue from the sale of that ‘digital
dividend’ spectrum was $3.7 billion in 2018/19 dollars, $1.3 billion more than
the total government expenditure outlaid to make the whole project happen. The
experience provided at least three lessons for communications policy. It showed
that a long-term government policy project could be undertaken, and achieve its
major objectives, despite considerable disagreement over the detail. It also showed
how much past policy decisions (in this case, about spectrum allocation) shape
future possibilities, and the potential benefits and conceptual difficulties of early
cost–benefit analysis, which was done in some countries but not Australia.37
These two examples demonstrate both the possibilities and the limits to radical
policy action. Established institutions, infrastructure and people exert profound
influence over policy decisions, especially through often long-running processes of
transition from the old to the new.
Federal, state, local and international interactions
Communications is generally seen as a federal government responsibility in
Australia. Using its constitutional power to make laws about ‘postal, telegraphic,
telephonic, and other like services’,38 the body of law that began in 1901 with
post, telegraphs and telephones soon expanded to cover wireless telegraphy. Radio
broadcasting was initially regulated as a form of wireless in the 1920s and 1930s
before specific legislation was passed, first to create the Australian Broadcasting
Commission in 1932 and then to regulate radio and later television broadcasting as
a whole. High Court cases confirmed that the constitutional power encompassed
these novel forms of communication, while leaving some doubt about pre-existing
forms, especially printed media.39
Three principal statutes now cover telecommunications, radiocommunications
(including the allocation of spectrum for mobile telephony and broadband) and
broadcasting services. The power has also been used to make other federal laws; for
example, prohibiting tobacco advertising from the 1970s, and to restrict interactive
gambling from the early 2000s. The Constitution also empowers the Common-
wealth to make laws about intellectual property, which it began to do in 1905 when
the first copyright legislation was passed.40 By ‘covering the field’ in these areas, the
37 Given 2018.
38 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth), section 51(v).
39 See La Nauze 1968.
40 Section 51(xviii) of the Constitution covers ‘copyrights, patents of inventions and designs, and
trade marks’.
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exercise of Commonwealth power has effectively excluded the states from policy
measures that might, for example, have given the institutions of broadcasting a
more regional flavour, as occurred in Germany.41
Beyond these areas, the Constitution leaves considerable room for the states
to make laws about other matters relevant to communications. In areas such as
classification of content, defamation and advertising, separate state laws were
eventually integrated into more-or-less uniform national schemes. In areas like
racial, religious and other forms of discrimination and vilification, the reporting
of court proceedings, whistleblower protections, and freedom of information (or
‘right to information’), significant differences in state and territory laws remain.42
Federal, state and local laws interact in regulating the construction and main-
tenance of networks by telecommunications companies, especially mobile towers
and overhead cables. The aim here is to strike a balance between the comm-
unications policy goal of reliable, affordable services and the desire of landowners,
local communities and councils to shape the sometimes intrusive infrastructure of
their own spaces.43
State governments have also chosen to spend money to pursue communi-
cations policy goals where federal government policy is regarded as falling short,
or where co-investment can deliver better outcomes. For example, the Victorian
government has invested in free public wi-fi in large regional centres. It has also
funded mobile base stations in areas with poor or no mobile coverage and to
improve coverage along busy regional rail lines. Aiming to support community
activities, to assist public safety particularly during emergencies, and to boost
economic activity and employment including through the ‘visitor economy’, state
and territory governments have often co-invested in such programs with telecoms
carriers, local councils and the federal government. Around 35 local councils in
New South Wales hold equal shares in Southern Phone, a provider of commercial
fixed and mobile phone and internet services designed to bring competition, and
hence improved services and lower prices, to regional areas. It was set up in 2002
with federal funding from the Telstra sale proceeds. Councils have also used their
planning and licensing powers in creative ways to support cultural activities and
infrastructure, such as the Special Entertainment Precinct in Brisbane’s Fortitude
Valley.
Research into the relationship between the federally funded NBN and local
government, especially in the areas of e-governance, socio-economic development
and spatial planning, found ‘a raft of mostly unscrutinised policy initiatives’
developed to guide the early rollout and post-construction phase. This included
‘some policy development regarding the socio-economic implications of the new
41 Tworek 2015.
42 Pearson and Polden 2019 is a detailed, practical account of these and related laws and ethical
principles.
43 Australian Government, Department of Communications and the Arts 2018.
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infrastructure’, but ‘limited understanding’ of the possibilities of e-governance and
lagging focus on land use planning.44 The findings highlight the policy challenges
that digital networks provide to political structures that were crafted a long time
ago – a feature shared with other overarching issues like climate change.
Debates and non-agenda issues
New forms of media and communication have often had dramatic impacts on
existing practices and institutions. The rise of social media platforms is particularly
significant for politics and policy in Australia for at least three reasons. First,
these platforms have undermined the business models for news organisations,
broadcasters and telcos that have been such important vehicles for achieving public
policy goals. The seriousness of the challenges was demonstrated by the decision
to have the ACCC conduct a Digital Platforms Inquiry in 2018, with a final report
published in 2019. Second, social media have changed the ways issues make it onto
and off policy agendas and how people and politicians respond. Mainstream media
remain important but they are less dominant conduits for communication between
electors and their representatives. Third, social media platforms have themselves
become important policy-making institutions. Facebook and Google and their
wholly owned subsidiaries Instagram and YouTube, for example, are now among
society’s most powerful information and cultural intermediaries. The terms and
conditions of service they specify and the decisions they take in response to
complaints now comprise jurisdictions with at least as much influence as law, the
courts and formal systems of industry co- and self-regulation. An example of this
agenda-setting and policy-making role is the decision by the rental accommodation
app Airbnb to remove listings in Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank
‘that are at the core of the dispute between Israelis and Palestinians’. Acknowledging
Airbnb itself was ‘certainly not the experts when it comes to the historical disputes
in this region’ and that the listings were not illegal under US law, Airbnb
nonetheless developed a five-point framework to guide decisions about listings in
occupied territories generally and decided, in this case, to remove the 200 listings
on its site.45
Much of the revolution in digital communications has not been controllable
by the telecommunications and broadcasting institutions that managed so much
technological change in Australia in the 20th century. New services like online
and mobile search, streaming audio and video, social media and smartphone apps
arrived without the government policy inquiries, public funding or legislative
change that accompanied direct-dial telephones, AM and FM radio, television, the
domestic satellite and digital TV. Yet old debates about the role of government
44 Tooran 2015.
45 Airbnb 2018; Kershner 2018.
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– to intervene in markets or let them take their course – are never far from the
surface. To the extent that the internet and Australia’s most popular social media
platforms all originated in the USA, it is unsurprising that policy debate about
them occurs against a background of American ‘First Amendment’ jurisprudence:
‘Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press’.
The USA, however, is also home to antitrust laws, first enacted in 1890. When
finally replicated in Australia in the 1970s, these imported a similar principle
(consumers are best served when businesses compete freely) along with a different
policy stance – the state might need to intervene in markets, rather than stay
out of them, to ensure competition is free. In communications policy, aggressive
antitrust action, like the break-up of the dominant telephone company AT&T in
the 1980s, offer American precedents as significant as the long line of Supreme
Court decisions striking down laws held to infringe free speech. ‘Free markets’ and
‘government’ intervention’ are not universal policy solutions but ‘two caricatured
abstractions’.46
Tracing the development of the policy settlement in Australian broadcasting
from the 1950s, when commercial stations and their interests dominated,
regulatory agencies were weak, public trust obligations were unevenly applied, and
the forces for change were weaker than those favouring institutional continuity,
Terry Flew argued more than a decade ago that the scale of changes in the media
landscape meant it was already inadequate to construct a social-democratic media
policy that was ‘essentially defensive’.47 Considering communications policy in the
future, policy makers may have less – and less-effective – tools available to address
challenges, because so many of Australia’s most influential communications ser-
vices are now provided by corporations that are not licensed, funded or owned
by Australian governments. The liberalisation and privatisation of communications
markets and enterprises and the migration of broadcast television from analogue to
digital transmission provided once-off opportunities to recraft policy settlements –
to spend some of the proceeds of Telstra privatisation improving communications
in under-served communities, and to create a satellite platform that finally equal-
ised the availability of free-to-air TV services across the country. Beyond the likely
privatisation of the NBN once construction is complete, big moments of rupture
like these, providing scope for sweeping policy change and especially trade-offs
among different constituencies, may be harder to identify.
Conclusions
Networked digital communications and the liberalisation, privatisation and partial
renationalisation of Australia’s communications markets and institutions have
46 Gruen 2018.
47 Flew 2006.
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changed some of the targets and instruments of Australian communications policy
while preserving many of its broad themes. In a sector typified by rapid change
in technologies and social and economic practices, policy makers, politicians and
the Australian people need to be aware of the possibilities of both radical trans-
formation and incremental adaptation along familiar lines. Old orthodoxies can
provide irrelevant templates as well as durable wisdom.
The dramatic rise of networked digital media platforms has undermined
business models for communications incumbents, fundamentally altered the
processes of political communication, and created new corporate behemoths that
are now potent policy actors in their own right. Predicting the political impacts
of these changes is highly uncertain. Arguing for Indigenous recognition to be at
the heart of any Australian republic, Megan Davis notes that no referendum has
been held in the era of social media. ‘It can happen quickly with campaigns’, she
says. ‘The old adage that, by and large, Australians trust and defer to politicians’
judgement on referendum questions may not hold up to scrutiny … Being afraid of
the constitutional amendment process in section 128 is to be scared of the demos.’48
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Economic policy
Alan Fenna
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It is ‘the economy’ that provides the goods and services we consume. It is also
the economy that provides the jobs and business opportunities that enable us
to purchase those goods and services. And it is the economy that provides the
tax revenue to fund the activities of government. It is easy to see, then, why
managing the economy is one of the most important tasks of government. At the
macroeconomic level, the task is to keep economic growth up and unemployment
and inflation down. At the microeconomic level, the task is to optimise the structure
of the economy for longer-term performance, ensuring that it remains inter-
nationally competitive.
In a ‘market’, ‘free enterprise’ or ‘capitalist’ system, dominated by private owner-
ship and free exchange such as Australia's, the government can only influence how
well the economy functions. Moreover, a small national economy such as Australia’s
is often at the mercy of events in the world economy. The main tools government
has at its disposal to influence the economy are:
• fiscal policy: the way it taxes and spends
• monetary policy: setting official interest rates
• financial regulation: the rules governing banking and investments
Fenna, Alan (2019). Economic policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune,
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• trade policy: regulation of the flow of goods, services and capital in and out of
Australia
• industry policy: support and promotion of particular economic sectors or
activities.
In Australia’s federal system, most of these functions – particularly the main
fiscal ones – are the responsibility of the Commonwealth government. The Com-
monwealth Treasury is the lead agency, and treasurers are the central figures.1
Monetary policy is decided by a separate Commonwealth agency, the Reserve Bank
(RBA). In some important microeconomic areas, the states retain a significant role,
with each state promoting its own economic development as best it can.
While there is little opportunity to explore the broader context of economic
policy here, it must be remembered that other policy areas, such as social policy and
labour market policy, have direct implications for the economy and, reciprocally,
social policy has a strong economic rationale.2 Among other things, ‘human capital’,
or the quality of the workforce and business people, is an increasingly important
factor in economic performance.3 Likewise, the tax and expenditure systems that
are key instruments of economic policy have direct implications for the distribution
of economic wellbeing or levels of economic inequality in society.4
The market economy
The challenges of economic policy are defined by the nature of the economy itself –
a system of production and exchange that has, to a large extent, its own dynamics.5
In tandem with the development of industrial capitalism has been the development
of economics as a theory of how markets function.
The invisible hand
An economy such as Australia’s is based on the free exchange of goods and services
between businesses and individuals. This exchange is driven by the profit motive.
What is produced and what price can be charged are not dictated by government
(as they were under the communist system that once prevailed across a good part
of the world but that has now retreated to Cuba and North Korea). Rather, they
are determined by what demand exists or can be generated by the creation of new
products or by advertising. The problem of balancing supply and demand is solved
by the price mechanism: when demand exceeds supply, prices rise, prompting more
production and reduced consumption, and when suppliers have too much stock,
1 Bowen 2015.
2 Barr 2012.
3 Becker 1994; Edwards 2016.
4 Fenna and Tapper 2015; Fenna and Tapper 2012; Tapper, Fenna and Phillimore 2015.
5 Lindblom 2001.
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they can reduce the price until the surplus is cleared. Millions of economic activities
are thus co-ordinated in the most efficient way possible by what the founder of
modern economics, Adam Smith, called the ‘invisible hand’.6
Innovation
Not only does the market system solve the economic co-ordination problem, it also
has built into it a relentless drive to innovate, since there are potentially great profits
to be made from developing new products or more efficient ways of producing
existing products.7 The epitome of this in today’s world is, of course, information
technology – where one hardly masters a new device before it is superseded by
the next generation. The downside to continuous innovation is the ‘gale of creative
destruction’ that relentless change brings: firms and industries die or decline as new
ones push forward.8
In combination with the Industrial Revolution, which harnessed natural science
and inanimate energy sources to create modern manufacturing and technologies,
the market economy created the entirely unprecedented increase in wealth, living
standards and social mobility in the past two hundred years.9 These developments
solved mankind’s material needs problem, but created what many see as new issues
of consumerism and environmental destruction.10
Trade
The market economy places a premium on exchange or trade, the logical extent
of which is global free trade and integrated global economy. Recognition of the
value of international trade was integral to the postwar international order, as
leading Western countries signed up to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) – now the World Trade Organization (WTO) – and set about progressively
dismantling barriers to trade in the 1950s and 1960s. Tariffs had been implicated in
the economic difficulties of the prewar period.11
International trade has, however, been a contentious issue since long before
Adam Smith, with governments often under pressure to protect the local economy
against ‘unfair’ competition or international divisions of labour that leave them
producing less valuable goods or lead to the painful demise of existing industries.
Sometimes government action takes the form of outright ‘protectionism’, through
such measures as import tariffs, as US President Donald Trump has recently been
6 Smith 1776.
7 Baumol 2002.
8 Schumpeter 1942.
9 Appleby 2012; Clark 2007; McCloskey 2016; Mokyr 2016; Pomfret 2011.
10 See, for example, Hamilton 2003; Hamilton and Denniss 2006.
11 Irwin 2012
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implementing in the world’s leading economy. Other times it takes the form of
subsidies for local industry and other assistance measures.
Role of government in a market economy
Few people have any illusions that the market economy works perfectly, and
economists have long recognised the tendency towards various forms of ‘market
failure’.12 One form of failure is the inability of the market to supply those goods for
which it is difficult to charge – what Adam Smith referred to as ‘public works’ and
‘public institutions’ – such as roads or schools.13 Another is insufficient competition
in some industries. And a third is the problem of ‘externalities’: the tendency for
the costs or benefits of an economic activity to spill over onto third parties or be
left for future generations to deal with.14 Since the Industrial Revolution in the 19th
century, the most significant negative externality has always been the pollution that
an individual firm may inflict on the environment and society.
The consequence of such market failures, as Adam Smith originally suggested,
is the need for some government intervention. Sometimes that means government
stepping in to provide essential infrastructure. Other times it might involve
protective or prudential regulation, such as environmental protection laws or
financial systems regulation. How active a role government should play is, however,
unavoidably an ideological question of individual values and preferences, ranging
from those on the left supporting intervention to those on the right opposing it.15
Ideologies and the mixed economy
As market failures have increased in modern industrial society, so has the role
of government. Since the mid-20th century, it has been common to refer to the
resulting state of affairs as the ‘mixed economy’ – one combining both market
and government. The mixed economy is based on the free exchange of goods and
services in ‘the market’, but the market is supported, regulated, moderated and, in
some areas, replaced by government action.
The balance between the private and public sectors is always going to be
contentious and shifting. From a left-wing or social-democratic viewpoint, market
failure is widespread and serious, requiring extensive governmental correction.
From a right-wing, or liberal (sometimes ‘neoliberal’) viewpoint, market failure
is often less of a problem than ‘government failure’ resulting from intervention.16
The left’s support for intervention is reinforced by their conviction that market
outcomes are unfair and lead to gross inequalities in income, wealth and wellbeing.
12 Pigou 1932; Quiggin 2019.
13 Smith 1776, book V, chapter 1.
14 Coyle 2011.
15 On ideologies, see Fenna 2013a.
16 Anomaly 2015; Cowen and Crampton 2002; Winston 2006; Zerbe and McCurdy 1999.
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The right’s scepticism about government, meanwhile, is reinforced by their belief
that those inequalities reflect the way the market rewards effort, ability and
investment. A related philosophical debate takes place around the question of what
aspects of life should be insulated from the market.17
The ‘dismal science’
By postulating economic actors as rational, self-interested individuals, economics
has developed a framework for understanding the functioning of markets based
on a handful of simple but powerful concepts and propositions.18 That framework
plays a central role in government decision making in the area of economics –
generally considered to be the area most central to perceived success or failure of
governments.19 In the 19th century, economics was dubbed ‘the dismal science’
because it insisted that public policy could not avoid the implacable realities of
economic life.20 To this day, one of the challenges of economic policy making is the
extent to which voters are ‘deeply resistant to the messages of mainstream economic
analysis’.21
Smith’s An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations was
a treatise in favour of minimal government – or what became known as laissez
faire. The story of economics over the past century has been, in many ways, the
story of the clash between that free market perspective and more interventionist
approaches.22 Each new economic crisis presents the discipline with fresh chall-
enges of explanation and sometimes with accusations that it has failed public policy,
often by placing too much faith in the benign operation of markets.23
Macroeconomic policy
Government’s most prominent concern today is with macroeconomic policy –
or the short- to medium-term performance of the economy as a whole. Macro-
economic policy has three aims. First and foremost, ideally, everyone who wants
or needs a job should have one – full employment. Second, prices should be stable
over time – low inflation. Third, the value of what the economy produces must
increase by at least a few per cent each year – economic growth.
17 Barber 2008; Sandel 2012; Satz 2010.
18 For example, Coyle 2004.
19 Kane 2016.
20 Groenewegen 2001. Cf. Coyle 2010.
21 Garnaut 2013, 79.
22 Backhouse 2010; Backhouse 2002; Wapshot 2011.
23 For example, Balogh 1982; Blanchard et al. 2016; Cassidy 2009; Easterly 2014; Krugman 2018;
Quiggin 2012; Rodrik 2015; Stiglitz 2018; Taylor 2011.
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Economic growth
Economic growth is an increase in gross domestic product (GDP) – a flawed but
essential measure of economic activity.24 A rapidly developing economy, such as
China’s, might grow at 6 to 9 per cent per year, while a typical developed economy,
such as Australia’s, can be expected to grow at a much more modest 2 to 3 per cent
per year. Even that can exaggerate the degree of ‘real’ growth, since it may simply
represent population growth. When there is per capita increase in GDP, we can
say that the ‘standard of living’ is going up. Over the longer term, growth and the
resulting increase in the standard of living is driven by the economy’s increased
productivity – more is being produced for the same amount of effort or input. If
productivity is increasing, there is room for workers to receive increases in their
real wages. The main factor in increased productivity is innovation – its dynamic
contribution to capitalist economies was noted above.
Growth and the business cycle
Growth rates vary from year to year, often building to a high point and then stalling,
in a pattern referred to as the ‘business cycle’. When growth slows, unemployment
rises; if growth ceases altogether and the economy shrinks, the result is an
economic recession, or, if it persists, an economic depression. The most recent
recession globally was the ‘great recession’ in the USA and other advanced countries
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that
was set off by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008.25 The great recession
resulted in burdensome government debt loads in a number of OECD countries;
those, in turn, led to politically, and perhaps economically, painful spending cuts
referred to as ‘austerity’ policy.26 Australia narrowly escaped that recession; its last
serious downturn was in 1990–91 and its last depression was in the 1930s.27
The financial sector and the ‘real economy’
The GFC of 2008 was a crisis not in the ‘real’ economy, where goods and services
are traded, but in the financial sector, where money is traded. The financial sector
– with its periodic banking crises and speculative investment ‘bubbles’ – has always
been a weak point in the capitalist system, and that weakness sparks efforts to
24 Coyle 2014; Stiglitz, Fitoussi and Durand 2018.
25 Garnaut and Smith 2009; Lybeck 2011. The OECD is a club of 36 mainly developed economies
including Australia that undertakes shared research to enhance economic performance and
social welfare.
26 Atkinson 2014; Blyth 2013; Clark 2015; Quiggin 2018; Tooze 2018; Wanna, Lindquist and de
Vries 2015.
27 Macfarlane 2006; Keating 2015.
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impose more effective regulation.28 Australia escaped the great recession in no
small part because, by dint of good fortune, it avoided a financial crisis.29
Growth and inflation
If the economy grows too quickly, demand for certain goods and services starts
to exceed supply, forcing prices to rise in a process known as inflation. A low and
stable rate of inflation, where prices increase by a few percentage points a year, is
fine – indeed, quite healthy. If inflation starts to spiral upwards, however, difficulties
quickly emerge. Along with a number of other OECD countries, Australia had
difficulty containing inflation through the 1970s and 1980s. Economic policy
making is heavily constrained under such circumstances, since, rather than
stimulating the economy, further spending simply stokes inflation. Ideally, an
economy stays in the sweet spot, where everything is in balance – but we don’t live
in an ideal world.
Keynesianism and the economic cycle
Until the Great Depression of the 1930s, it was an article of faith that, if left to their
own devices, markets would function to keep unemployment and prices stable. The
economy should naturally move towards ‘equilibrium’ through the action of the
price mechanism. That did not seem to happen in the Great Depression, and since
the revolution in economic thinking sparked by English economist John Maynard
Keynes,30 it has generally been accepted that governments have an essential role to
play in smoothing the economic cycle.31 They must counteract tendencies towards
either unemployment or inflation by adjusting levels of effective demand. When
economic activity slows and unemployment rises, demand needs to be stimulated
by putting more money into people’s hands. Conversely, when the economy is
in danger of overheating and causing inflation, demand needs to be reduced by
tightening the supply of money.
Counter-cyclical demand management is known as ‘Keynesianism’ and is
implemented through some combination of monetary and fiscal policy. Reducing
interest rates, reducing taxes and increasing government spending are the three
mechanisms for stimulating the economy by increasing demand. In Australia, as in
many other Western countries, responsibility for monetary policy has been assigned
to the Reserve Bank – the banker to the banks. Under legislation, the RBA is tasked
with keeping inflation within a 2 to 3 per cent band, raising interest rates when
the inflation rate threatens to rise above that and lowering them when inflation
28 Arcand, Berkes and Panizza 2015; Minsky 1986; Rajan 2006; Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Shiller
2016.
29 Bell and Hindmoor 2019.
30 Keynes 1936.
31 Backhouse and Bateman 2011.
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threatens to fall below. Fiscal policy, meanwhile, is up to the government of the day,
which may decide to increase or decrease spending or taxation at any point.
Monetary policy has three great advantages: raising or lowering the official
interest rates (the 'bank rate') costs nothing, takes immediate effect and can be
reversed or fine-tuned at any time. However, it may not always be effective and is
constrained by the ‘zero-bound’ limit – interest rates can only be lowered so far.
In the past few years, official interest rates have been close to or at zero in several
countries. Once rates are that low, central banks can only stimulate the economy by
printing money – ‘quantitative easing’, as it is somewhat euphemistically known.
Co-operation or conflict?
Ideally, fiscal and monetary policy work together, complementing and reinforcing
one another. However, this is not always the case. There are times, for instance,
when central banks respond to what they see as economically reckless fiscal policy
by raising interest rates even though such a move might be unpopular and
embarrassing to the government. Given that it is almost always politically easier to
spend money than to make budget cuts, the ability to play this role is precisely why
many countries, such as Australia, moved towards central bank independence in
the 1980s and 1990s. The RBA thus operates independently from the government
of the day to insulate rate-setting from political pressures.32
Even when acting in concert, it is not easy to get the balance between fiscal
and monetary policy right. Australia, for instance, used aggressive fiscal policy
to fight off recession in 2008–09, but it might have been better off spending less
and lowering interest rates further instead.33 Meanwhile, both fiscal and monetary
policy have difficulty addressing conditions that vary across the country. They
represent a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that creates dilemmas if one region or sector
is booming and others struggling, as is sometimes the case in Australia.
Keynesianism in practice
In many cases, what sounds good in theory may be rather more difficult in practice.
In the Keynesian view, there are times when risk of an economic downturn is so
great that governments should not hesitate to run deficits and accumulate debt to
stimulate the economy. This is particularly the case when, as happened in some
countries during the GFC of 2008–09, interest rates have been lowered as far as
they can go. When times are good, governments need to be running equivalent
surpluses to stop the economy from overheating and to pay down that debt.
To some extent this happens automatically. In today’s world, with substantial
levels of taxation and an extensive ‘welfare state’, government spending goes up and
32 Bell 2004.
33 Walter 2017, 125.
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tax revenue goes down when the economy declines, and the reverse occurs when
the economy improves. However, these ‘automatic stabilisers’ may not be sufficient
on their own, and economic fluctuations still may require ‘discretionary’ policy
decisions to increase or cut spending or taxes.
When Australia faced what looked like an economic abyss with the GFC in
2008, the circumstances were highly favourable for a Keynesian response, and the
newly elected Labor government, led by Kevin Rudd, launched a series of spending
initiatives to boost demand.34 That vigorous response seemed to be vindicated when
Australia emerged as one of the very few OECD countries to avoid recession. To
what extent the policy initiatives themselves can be credited with that success, and to
what extent they were well calibrated and designed is, however, difficult to judge.35
Economists debate how effective or realistic Keynesian notions of ‘demand
management’ are, and some also point out that how well the economy performs
may be influenced as much by supply-side factors as by demand-side ones. If taxes
are too high or hiring and firing regulations too strict, for instance, businesses
will be less likely to respond to increased demand by hiring more workers.
Keynesianism has experienced its own ups and downs, depending on how well it
seemed to be working. It was broadly accepted in the postwar boom conditions of
the 1950s and 1960s; but it fell out of favour when Western economies experienced
simultaneous slowing growth, rising unemployment and high inflation – ‘stag-
flation’ – in the 1970s. It then enjoyed a great revival with the onset of the GFC and
ensuing recession in 2008.36
Ideology again
While the discussion so far could give the impression that managing the economy
is a technical question of pulling the right levers to get the optimal outcome,
the reality is far more complex and contested. Macroeconomic policy is a deeply
political issue, where perspectives and priorities are unavoidably shaped by interest,
ideologies and values. As with interventionism generally, the Keynesian demand-
side approach has always been favoured by the left, while supply-side consider-
ations have typically been prioritised by the right.
It is not surprising, then, that the Rudd Labor government enthusiastically
embraced a Keynesian solution in 2008–09. Likewise, it is unsurprising that the
Liberal–National (Coalition) parties warned that the result would be wasteful
spending and a large increase in government debt, which represented an ongoing
constraint for future governments. The Coalition parties tend to favour supply-side
measures, such as tax reductions, particularly for business enterprises, on the basis
that this will create greater incentives for investment, innovation and job creation.
34 Fenna 2010.
35 Fenna and ’t Hart 2019.
36 Clarke 2009; Fenna 2010; Macfarlane 2006; Skidelsky 2009.
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Microeconomic policy
In addition to the challenges of managing the economy over the cycle, there are
the questions of how the economy is structured, how competitive local industries
are internationally and how well the economy can be expected to perform over
the medium to long term. These microeconomic issues have been a major focus of
policy in Australia throughout the country’s history. They are important because
our standard of living – how wealthy we are as a country – depends on our ability
to sell into export markets and attract investment capital in a way that finances the
goods we import. Some of those imports are for Australian businesses to use for
their own production, such as machinery for factories or mines. Many imports,
though, are consumption goods bought by individuals.
The resource economy dilemma
Since European settlement, Australia has developed via the export of primary
products. In other words, Australia exploited its resource and agricultural wealth
– most famously in the form of gold and wool. Those exports financed the import
of investment capital and of the wide range of manufactured goods integral to
an advanced economy and society. Consistent with the teachings of classical
economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo,37 Australia thrived by
exploiting its comparative advantage – focusing on what it could produce most
profitably and importing the rest. A country is seen as having a comparative
advantage in primary products if it is abundant in resources, or a comparative
advantage in manufactured goods if it is abundant in capital and labour. Australia’s
situation remains similar today. ‘After more than 150 years of sustained high
incomes, the comparative advantage of this economy still lies in its resources’.38
Eight of Australia’s top 10 exports today are primary products: iron ore, coal,
natural gas, gold, aluminium ores, beef, wheat and petroleum. The two exceptions
are services: tourism and education.
Although ‘Australia prospered’ from its primary products, as McLean puts it,39
a major theme of Australia’s economic policy has been the concern that resource
exports provide an unreliable basis for long-term wealth and that the country should
diversify to establish a more ‘normal’ export profile for an advanced economy. That,
however, requires the development of a manufacturing sector that is capable of
competing, first, in the domestic market against imports, and second, in overseas
markets. The limitations of resource dependence first became apparent when the
colonial gold rush ended in 1860. In response, Australia turned to a policy of tariff
protectionism, beginning in the colony of Victoria and subsequently implemented
37 Ricardo 1817; Smith 1776.
38 McLean 2013, 5.
39 McLean 2013.
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on a national scale immediately after Federation This was intended to shelter the
country’s ‘infant’ manufacturing industries and thereby diversify the economy.
Tariff protectionism complemented a heavy reliance on government for the
provision of key infrastructure, which was inevitable in a developing country such
as Australia.40 It was reinforced by the introduction of provisions such as
centralised wage fixing and the principle of the ‘living wage’ through the arbitration
system and of the White Australia policy protecting Australian workers from an
influx of low-wage Asian labour. It was ‘a strategy of domestic defence’41 that has
also been called ‘the Australian Settlement’.42 Diversification was also encouraged
by the two world wars, which reduced access to imported manufactured goods and
increased the demand for military materiel.
The end of the protectionist road
While the ‘fortress Australia’ model was highly successful for several decades, it
became anachronistic by the 1960s and untenable by the 1980s.43 Other advanced
countries were signing up to the GATT and reducing tariffs on manufactured goods.
Then, from the 1970s, the value of Australia’s primary product exports relative to
the country’s manufactured imports started to languish. The result was rising current
account deficits, showing that Australia was failing to earn enough to cover its import
costs. At one point, the Labor government’s treasurer, Paul Keating, declared that
Australia was at risk of becoming a ‘banana republic’ if the slide was not averted.44
Government control of the Australian dollar’s exchange rate with overseas currencies
had only recently been removed, and market sentiment was decreasing the dollar's
value by the minute in response to Australia’s poor trade performance.
Almost all elements of the fortress Australia model have been dismantled,
with much of the reform being introduced under the Hawke–Keating Labor
governments that held office from 1983 to 1996. Extensive privatisations of major
government-owned businesses, the progressive removal of protective tariffs,
liberalisation of the wage bargaining system, introduction of National Competition
Policy and a variety of other reforms shifted the balance much more towards an
open market economy.45 This was controversial at times and a focus of ideological
debate.46 However, it has been credited with underpinning the extraordinarily
strong performance of the Australian economy in the last quarter of a century – ‘the
longest unbroken period of economic expansion of any developed country ever’.47
40 Butlin, Barnard and Pincus 1982; White 1992.
41 Castles 1988, 93.
42 Kelly 1992. See also Fenna 2012.
43 Fenna 2013b.
44 Kelly 1992, 196–7.
45 Borland 2015; Fenna 2019.
46 Fenna 2013b.
47 Garnaut 2013, 5. For a contrary view, see Cahill and Toner 2018.
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The end of protectionism exposed Australia’s extensive manufacturing sector
just as globalisation was increasing the quality, quantity and competitiveness of
overseas manufacturers. A range of industrial policy initiatives sought at first to
assist with the necessary restructuring, but in the end many firms, and indeed entire
industries, shut down. This was particularly the case in the labour-intensive textile,
clothing and footwear sectors, where advanced countries struggled to compete
against Asian manufacturing at the best of times, and in the ‘metal bashing’
industries such as whitegoods and motor vehicles. In 2017, Australia’s last car
manufacturer closed its doors, and an industry that had begun with great fanfare
in 1949 came to an end. Australia still manufactures sophisticated industrial goods
as well as some traditional core industrial goods, such as steel. However,
manufacturing now contributes only a small part of Australia’s overall GDP, and
even then, what is officially counted as ‘manufacturing’ is often merely the
processing of primary materials.
Back to the future
The difficulties of a declining manufacturing sector prompted questions about why
governments were not pursuing more imaginative and ambitious industry policy.48
However, the need for active intervention to promote manufacturing was swept
aside by the extraordinary recovery in Australia’s traditional area of comparative
advantage that occurred from 2004. After a long period of stagnation or decline
in the ‘terms of trade’ (the value of one’s exports versus the cost of one’s imports),
Australia’s mineral wealth suddenly became the road to riches again with the
mining boom. Other than requirements for local construction of major new
defence acquisitions, such as submarines and destroyers, there remains little by way
of national industrial policy in Australia. That is likely to remain the case for as long
as Australia continues to prosper from its agricultural and natural resource wealth.
Trade agreements in lieu
In this context, it is not surprising that Australian governments have seen trade
agreements as the way forward. Trade agreements are, in some ways, the industrial
policy you have when you are not having an industrial policy – supporting local
industry by enhancing its access to larger markets, but nothing else. Again, ideology
plays a role here, with the tendency to equate industrial policy with trade policy
being stronger on the Coalition than Labor side of politics.49 As we noted earlier,
Australia was reluctant to participate in the GATT process of multilateral tariff
reduction that was such a large part of global economic relations in the 1950s
and 1960s.50 Australia’s recently developed manufacturing sector was seen as too
48 Bentley and West 2016; Fenna 2016a; Fenna 2016b; Phillimore and Leong 2017; Stewart 2016.
49 Thurbon 2017.
50 Snape 1984.
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fragile to face the world without tariff protection and, at the same time, the GATT
was offering no reduction in tariffs for the goods that Australia could export
competitively – agricultural products.
Australia is now a full participant in the WTO, the GATT’s successor; however,
most trade policy attention in recent times has been on preferential trade agreements.
These are typically bilateral, rather than multilateral. Australia controversially
entered into a bilateral free trade agreement with the USA that took effect in 2005.
Since then, it has negotiated arrangements with individual Asian countries, such as
Korea, Japan, China and Indonesia, and entered into the multilateral ‘Trans-Pacific
Partnership’.51 The prospect of ‘Brexit’ – the UK’s departure from the European
Union – has led, in turn, to moves towards separate trade agreements with the EU
and the UK.
Trade agreements liberalise trade between participating countries, but, at the
same time, inevitably involve elements that tie the hands of participating
governments in terms of how much support they can give their domestic firms.
Governments might also exaggerate those limitations as a pretext for inaction on
industrial policy.52
Conclusions
Economic policy lies at the heart of what government does, and no government
can survive for long if the economy is not performing. Through a combination
of demand- and supply-side measures, governments engage in macroeconomic
management to maintain rates of growth that will keep unemployment to a
minimum. At the same time, they also have to be wary about the danger of
inflation. Ideally, a combination of low interest rates and increased spending and/or
decreased taxation would increase effective demand and thus stimulate economic
growth when the economy was slowing. And ideally a combination of rising
interest rates and decreased spending and/or increased taxation would ‘cool’ the
economy when it was in danger of ‘overheating’. Ideally, too, any debt accumulated
as a result of deficits incurred when trying to stimulate the economy would be paid
down by equivalent surpluses achieved during the good times. At the same time,
it must be remembered that this is a gross simplification of a very complex reality,
where countless other factors intrude, including debates in economic theory, the
overlap between economics and ideology, the intersection between economic
policy and other policy areas, and the interaction between the domestic and the
international economies.
51 The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which came into
effect in late 2018 after the USA had controversially withdrawn from the original agreement.
52 Thurbon 2016.
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And that’s just macroeconomic policy. As discussed on at the end of this
chapter, governments also have economic responsibilities of a more structural
nature, concerning the operation of specific markets, the path of economic
development and the industrial focus and international competitiveness of the
economy. These microeconomic issues confront policy makers with a fundamental
question of whether market forces should generally dominate or whether
government should seek to play a strategic role. The latter requires considerable
political will and entails a number of difficult questions about what tools and
approaches work best to foster innovation, retain and promote investment and
achieve export success.
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Environmental policy is a highly contested, critically important, and intellectually
interesting area of politics and policy. Environmental policy not only concerns the
relations between people and the forms of social co-ordination that they create
(i.e. the relations between states, markets and civil society) but also concerns the
fundamental relations between humans and other species (what is our place in
the web of life). Environmental policy re-energises the age-old question of ‘How
should we live?’ by reframing it as ‘How should we live on this planet, in ways
that sustain it, others, and ourselves?’ Put another way, environmental policy is
important because everything that we do as humans (as individuals, as employees
of companies, as consumers of goods and services, as members of a community, as
citizens of a country, and as inhabitants of planet earth) directly or indirectly has
environmental implications – we are part of nature and rely on it to survive.
A good example of the connection between how we live and the environment
can be seen at a very simple level. At a local level, have you ever considered the
environmental implications of something as simple as washing your face? First,
where does the water come from, how is it treated, and what is involved in getting it
to your tap? Second, how often do you wash your face and what with (what packaging
Coffey, Brian (2019). Environmental policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David
Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian
politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/sup.9781743326671
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does it come in, and how is it disposed of), what ingredients are in the cleanser,
where was it manufactured, where did you buy it, and how did you get it home?
Third, how is the ‘waste’ water disposed of, where does it go, and with what effects?
(e.g. microplastics in cleaners may end up in the stomachs of fish and other marine
life.) By contrast, the issue of coal mines raises more obvious questions regarding our
relationship with the environment. The proposal by the company Adani to develop
a coal mine in central Queensland has attracted considerable opposition in terms of
both the local (possible impacts on water systems and some native species such as
the black-throated finch) and global (greenhouse gas emissions associated with the
burning of the coal extracted) consequences of the mine.
Origins of the policy domain
While our relationship with the environment and how human behaviours impact
the environment may seem more commonplace in contemporary society,
environmental policy is a relatively new phenomenon. What we now know of as
‘environmental policy’ only emerged as a significant, and distinct, field of public
policy interest since the late 1960s.1 Influential books such as Rachel Carson’s
Silent Spring2 contributed to raising public awareness about the environmental
consequences of human activities, and the emergence of the environmental
movement provided a political constituency around which concern about
environmental issues was mobilised.3 Many of the major environmental non-
government organisations, such as Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have
their origins in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Further, it is important to realise
that environmental thought contains threads from many different intellectual
traditions,4 and that major political ideologies, such as liberalism, conservatism,
Marxism and anarchism, have developed their particular perspectives on the
politics of the environment.5 A distinctly ‘green’ political ideology – ecocentrism
(aka ecologism) – has also emerged in recent decades.6
Significant shifts in environmental policy debate and practice have occurred
during a period of major technological, social, political and economic change.
The widespread influence of neoliberalism and the development of information
and biological technologies go hand in hand with increasing knowledge of human
impact on the environment. Scientific knowledge now provides abundant evidence
about the impacts of human activities as demonstrated by issues such as
biodiversity decline, climate change and the pervasive spread of plastics in the
1 Dryzek 2012.
2 Carson 1962.
3 Doyle, McEachern and MacGregor 2016.
4 Hay 2002.
5 Hay 1988.
6 Dobson 1992; Eckersley 1992.
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environment.7 Alongside these concerns is the necessity of better meeting the
development needs of the marginalised and disadvantaged people living in Africa,
South America and Asia, as well as in Western societies.
Within this broad context, environmental policy debate revolves around widely
divergent views about how serious environmental issues are, why they are important,
what has caused them, and what may need to be done to address them. What is at
stake are competing conceptualisations of the ‘proper’ relationships between humans
and the non-human world and between humans and other humans, which have
profoundly important implications for how the environment is governed.
This chapter explores these issues and draws on Australian examples. The
chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1 provides a brief overview of what is at
stake in environmental policy debate; Section 2 considers some of the major actors
involved in Australian environmental policy; Section 3 explains the place of the
environment in Australia’s federal system of government; and Section 4 highlights
some areas of ongoing debate/non-debate.
Understanding what is at stake in environmental policy debate
Environmental policy is challenging! According to leading international policy
scholar B. Guy Peters, environmental policy is characterised as politically and
technically complex.8 Reflecting this, Stephen Dovers proposed that environmental
issues have attributes which make them particularly challenging for policy makers,
namely: temporal scale (issues emerge over time and responses may take time to
work); spatial scale (what happens in one place can affect somewhere else); limits
(irreversibility – extinction is forever); urgency (timely responses can be critical);
connectivity and complexity (ecological and biophysical systems are complex and
connected – e.g. water cycles); uncertainty (there will never be complete certainty);
cumulation (some issues are like ‘the straw that breaks the camel’s back’ or ‘death
by a thousand cuts’, where a large number of small actions can have large
consequences); moral and ethical dimensions (they involve important philo-
sophical questions about who or what is worthy of consideration); and novelty
(humanity hasn’t faced the kinds of questions that we now face – e.g. major climate
change). For Dovers, these attributes matter because:
Existing processes, which have evolved around problems that do not as commonly
display these attributes, can be suspected to have limited ability in coping with
problems that do [such that] the shortcomings of current responses to sustain-
ability have a structural basis, being the products of unsuitable processes.9
7 Crowley and Walker 2012.
8 Peters 2015, 24.
9 Dovers 1996, 313.
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Dovers suggests that such responses result in policy being ‘ad hoc’ and exhibiting
‘policy amnesia’, which means that policy making is not systematic and policy
learning does not occur.
According to Carter, environmental issues have seven core characteristics that
distinguish them as policy problems, as summarised in Table 1. In broad terms,
these views are informed by the understanding that humans are dependent upon
nature for their survival and that ecological systems and processes do not conform
with human boundaries.10
To provide insight into how these complexities play out in environmental
policy debate, this section sketches some of the types of responses that can be made
to simple questions (which feature – implicitly or explicitly – in all environmental
debate) such as:
• What is the nature of ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’?
• Why should we be concerned about the environment?
• What is the cause of environmental problems (and who is responsible)?
• What should be done about them?
Considering these questions, and their associated responses, helps to identify the
ways in which different ideas about the environment and environmental policy are
made tangible in political debate. Importantly the different responses are associated
with different interests, and so are inherently political, and have implications for the
types of responses put into place.
Perspectives on ‘nature’ and the ‘environment’
Appreciating the different ways in which ‘nature’ or ‘environment’ can be represented
is critical for understanding environmental policy. For some people, the environment
is simply ‘our surroundings’, which means that our cities, suburbs and homes are part
of ‘the environment’. Similarly, nature is often considered to be anything that is non-
human, but, as we are mammals, we are also part of nature. In other words, it can be
difficult to conclusively separate us from nature. A good example is that our survival
requires the presence of beneficial stomach bacteria which call our bodies home. For
the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to simply illustrate some of the many ways in
which ‘nature’ and ‘the environment’ can be understood, and to highlight that these
are often deeply ingrained, and so frequently taken for granted.
In terms of ‘nature’, environmental historian William Cronon considers that
‘the natural world is far more dynamic, far more changeable, and far more tangled
with human history than popular beliefs about the “balance of nature” have
typically acknowledged’ and that ‘nature is not nearly so natural as it seems’.11
For example, viewing nature as ‘Edenic’ portrays it as something that is pure and
10 Carter 2018.
11 Cronon 1996, 24–5.
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Table 1 Core characteristics of environmental problems
Characteristic Description
Public goods Many environmental resources can be described as public goods,
whereby one person’s consumption of the good does not impact upon
another person’s (e.g. clean air).
Transboundary
problems
Environmental systems and environmental problems cross
administrative boundaries (e.g. migratory species, water catchments,
climate change, marine pollution).
Complexity
and
uncertainty
Ecological and biophysical systems are complex, as captured in the
phrase ‘the web of life’. In nature everything is connected, but this makes
it difficult, if not impossible, to know exactly how it works or what
might happen.
Irreversibility Species extinction is forever, and non-renewable resources can be
exhausted.
Temporal and
spatial
variability
Impacts may not be experienced immediately, or in the place where they
are caused (e.g. the hole in the ozone layer and the effects of acid rain
are spatially and temporally displaced, which means the people who
cause the problem may not be the ones who suffer from it).
Administrative
fragmentation
Different departments have different responsibilities, which means that
the activities of some departments can impact negatively (or in some
cases positively) on the portfolio responsibilities of others.
Regulatory
intervention
Addressing environmental issues can impose costs on those causing the
problem.
Source: compiled from Carter 2018.
perfect. Clearly, such a view would be unlikely to be held by people who experience
natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods and droughts.
In relation to the ‘environment’, Barry identifies four ‘environments’: wilderness,
countryside/garden, urban environment, and global environment.12 These suggest
that the environment can be partitioned in different ways for different purposes.
These kinds of themes are evident in a study by Coffey, whose investigation of
national park policy and management in Victoria, Australia, revealed nature vari-
ously thought of as: something to be managed; something to be improved upon;
a frontier or source of adventure; Eden; and a source of balance, calmness and
12 Barry 1999.
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harmony. For Coffey, these representations, which were associated with neoliberal-
inspired reforms to national park management, were evidence of a commodification
of nature, whereby ‘nature was portrayed in ways which targeted consumers for
whom a visit to national parks had become synonymous with a recuperative respite
from urban life’.13
This raises the question about where the environment begins and ends: for
example, are suburban backyards or nature strips part of the environment? Further,
the environment is often considered simply as a ‘resource’ which is there solely
for the benefit of humans. It is very commonplace to hear waterways, forest
ecosystems, landscapes and minerals considered simply as natural resources, which
brackets and therefore minimises consideration of important ecological (e.g. rare
and endangered species) and cultural (e.g. Indigenous cultural heritage) factors. In
effect, positioning the environment as a resource privileges economic value over the
intrinsic ‘value’ of the environment. In other words, it assumes the only thing that
matters is whether or not someone can make money out of them. Such viewpoints
are often a feature of debates about mining in Australia, where proponents may
emphasise the revenue to be gained from selling gold, coal, bauxite, iron ore, or
some other mineral, while overlooking the other ‘values’ associated with the site.
More conceptually, there is interest in ‘social-nature’, which can be understood
as a perspective that seeks to break down the barriers between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’,
and which instead focuses attention on the various ways in which humans influence
how we might conceptualise nature and how nature might influence humans.14
Relatedly, given the longstanding relationship between Indigenous Australians and
the environment,15 it is critically important that their knowledge and deep cultural
connection to country is given due consideration in environmental debate.
Clearly, there are many ways of understanding and categorising the world in
which we live, and our place in it, each with strengths and weaknesses. Politically,
views about nature and the environment are enlisted in particular ways to either
promote or marginalise environmental concerns. Some of these diverse under-
standings and perspectives are clearly summarised in the work of Dryzek, who
identifies and discusses nine different overarching approaches to environmental
issues, as summarised in Table 2.16
Why care about it?
Peoples’ concern for the environment may be informed by diverse motivations,
which reflect different philosophical foundations.17 For this discussion it is sufficient
to highlight five broad sources of environmental concern discussed by Eckersley
13 Coffey 2001, 75.
14 Lockie 2004.
15 Gammage 2012; Pascoe 2014.
16 Dryzek 2012.
17 Fox 1990.
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Table 2 Major environmental discourses
Limits to growth and their denial
Looming tragedy: Survivalism (limits to
growth)
Growth forever: The Promethean response
(infinite growth)
Problem solving approaches
Administrative rationalism: Leave it to
the experts (technocratic)
Democratic pragmatism: Leave it to the
people (mainstream democracy)
Economic rationalism: Leave it to the
market (neoliberalism)
The quest for sustainability
Sustainable development: Environmentally
benign growth (having our cake and eating it)
Ecological modernisation: Industrial society and
beyond (pollution prevention pays)
Green radicalism
Changing people: Green consciousness
(deep ecology)
Changing society: Green politics (social
ecology)
Source: compiled from Dryzek 2012.
and summarised in Table 3. Debates around whether or not native animals (e.g.
kangaroos) should be used for human consumption illustrate why it is important
to be aware of the diverse philosophical motivations underpinning the different
arguments being made. For example, resource conservationists may support human
consumption of kangaroo meat (it would be wasteful not to eat them), animal
liberationists may oppose culling (on the basis of animal rights), while some
ecologists may not oppose human consumption of kangaroo meat because kangaroo
farming may be less ecologically damaging than grazing sheep.
In recent years there has been growing use of the concept of ecosystem
services (which encompasses the resource conservation, preservation, and human
welfare ecological positions). This is illustrated in the United Nations (UN)
sanctioned Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, where ecosystems services are
considered as the benefits people obtain from ecosystems, with these benefits
encompassing provisioning services (food and fibre); regulating services (floods,
drought); supporting services (soil formation and nutrient cycling); and cultural
services (recreational, spiritual, religious and other non-material benefits).18
However, a number of authors critique the use of ‘ecosystems services’ and
associated economic terminology because these terms frame nature narrowly and
serve to commoditise the way in which we understand and govern the world in
which we live and share with other species.19
18 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005.
19 Coffey 2016; Sullivan 2016; Turnhout et al. 2013.
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Table 3 Sources of environmental concern
Approach Major characteristics
Resource
conservation
Resources should be used efficiently because it is wrong to be wasteful.
Preservationism Parts of the environment are unique, inspire awe, or are highly aesthetic
and should be protected from development.
Human welfare
ecology
The environment provides us with goods and services and therefore it
is in our own long-term self-interest to look after it (enlightened self-
interest).
Animal
liberation
If animals can feel pain or suffer, then we have no moral right to cause
them harm.
Ecocentrism The various multi-layered parts of the biotic community are valuable
for their own sake.
Source: compiled from Eckersley 1992.
Clearly, having an appreciation of different sources of environmental concern
provides insight into the motivations informing different perspectives in environ-
mental debate. This is important because environmental conflict frequently involves
debates about competing philosophical positions, and the desirability of different
responses. For example, approaches to biodiversity management will vary depending
upon whether decision making is informed by a ‘hands off ’ (resource preservationist)
approach or a ‘wise use’ (resource conservationist) approach. Further, debates about
the live export of sheep and cattle or the culling of native animals are more concerned
with issues of animal rights than they are with ecocentrism.
What causes environmental problems?
Another important element of environmental policy debate concerns the ‘identi-
fication’ of the cause, or causes, of environmental problems. For Stone, such debates
involve competing ‘causal stories’ which means that part of what is at stake in
political debate about environmental issues is what is considered to be the cause
of the problem: identification of the cause of the environmental issues is as much
political as it is technical.20
20 Stone 1989.
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At a systemic level, environmental degradation has been attributed to factors
such as overpopulation, technology, production and consumption, Western science
and patriarchy, and the Judeo–Christian tradition. Paterson’s analysis of inter-
national relations literature discusses some of the different ‘causes’ of global
environmental issues identified and the implications of these different framings
for the types of solutions advocated. For example: liberal institutionalists see global
environmental issues as being caused by an inter-state ‘tragedy of the commons’21
with no systematic pattern of winners and losers, with these issues able to be
addressed through the building of international institutions. Realists see discrete
trends such as population growth or technology as the cause, with these amenable
to solution through a focus on security. Eco-socialists see capital accumulation as
the cause of global environmental issues, with the solution being the overthrow of
capitalism. Deep ecologists have philosophical outlooks which see the domination of
nature as being the cause, with their response being grassroots resistance to create
decentralised, egalitarian, self-reliant communities.22
Further, Caldwell identified three different ways in which environmental
problems can be interpreted as a political issue. First, environmental disruptions
can be seen as accidents or miscalculations and thus amenable to admonition,
education, indoctrination and a few legal sanctions such as anti-litter laws (which
may be amenable to incremental responses). Second, environmental problems can
be seen as largely inadvertent but caused by inadequate or inappropriate organ-
isation and management of economic and public affairs (which can be amenable
to operational responses). Third, environmental issues can be seen as a direct
consequence of the socio-economic systems currently in operation (which require
systemic responses).23
Responsibility for environmental problems can also be assigned to individuals,
groups and organisations, such as past and present governments, the failings of
bureaucracy, or the operations of particular businesses or industry sectors. For
example, Coffey and Marston explored how the causes of environmental issues
were represented in a sustainability framework developed by the Victorian govern-
ment in 2005. Their analysis showed that the Victorian government placed the
primary responsibility for Victoria’s environmental challenges on the everyday
choices made by Victorians, rather than the policy settings established by govern-
ments or the activities of industry and business.24
Clearly, how the causes of environmental problems are interpreted influences
how environmental problems are understood. Analyses of environmental policy
therefore need to be alert to the implications of different causal stories, because of
21 Hardin 1968. The notion of ‘the tragedy of the commons’ was popularised in an article by
Garrett Hardin. In broad terms, it suggests that the pursuit of rational self-interest may produce
collectively irrational outcomes. For example, overfishing of global fish stocks.
22 Paterson 2001, 4.
23 Caldwell 1993.
24 Coffey and Marston 2013.
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the way in which they focus attention and enable and constrain the possibilities
for taking action. For example, economic interests will seek to have environmental
issues defined in ways that avoid them being blamed, whereas environmental
interests will seek to define issues in ways that emphasise the need for greater
priority to be given to environmental objectives.
What should be done, and by whom?
Environmental issues also involve debate around what should be done and by
whom. At its simplest, such debates centre on what type of policy instrument, or
instruments, should be used to address an issue. Policy instruments are ways in
which governments take action and may involve:
• Advocacy: advocating for something or providing information and advice to
inform and educate people
• Networks: bringing people together to develop collective responses
• Money: spending and taxing
• Government action: direct provision of services and infrastructure by
government
• Law: regulation.25
For example, reducing water consumption in cities during times of drought may be
achieved by: encouraging people to take shorter showers and turn off dripping taps
(advocacy); charging people according to how much water they use or providing
subsidies for the installation of water tanks and other water-saving devices
(money); introducing water restrictions so that people are no longer allowed to
water their lawns using sprinklers or wash their cars using a hose (regulation); or
constructing a water desalination plant to produce fresh water (direct provision).
There is also considerable debate about the merits or otherwise of regulation,
subsidies, carbon taxes and emissions trading as preferred mechanisms to manage
greenhouse gas emissions. In such debates, economists are likely to advocate for
market-oriented approaches and ‘user pays’, while welfare advocates may advocate
for subsidies, regulation and information-oriented approaches. Importantly, ideo-
logical underpinnings inform policy actors’ views about the merits or otherwise of
different policy tools, even if they deny this is the case.
Environmental policy debate is also concerned with how much change is
required, as is illustrated in the three types of responses – incremental, operational
and systemic – identified by Caldwell.26 An analysis of policy change in the UK
under the Thatcher government by Peter Hall provides a similarly useful frame-
work. It focuses on three distinct kinds of policy change:
25 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018.
26 Caldwell 1993.
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• First order change: policy instrument settings are changed in light of experience
and new knowledge, while overall policy goals and instruments of policy
remain the same
• Second order change: the instruments of policy as well as their settings are
altered in responses to experience although the overall goals of policy remain
the same
• Third order change: a simultaneous change in all three components of policy:
the instrument settings, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals
behind policy.27
Drawing on this typology, Carter suggests that ‘although incremental changes in
environmental policy are possible within the traditional paradigm [i.e. incremental
approaches to policy] an accumulation of first and second order changes will not
automatically lead to third order change, because genuinely radical change requires
the replacement of the traditional policy paradigm with an alternative’.28 Debates
about what should be done also inevitably involve debates about who should be
doing it. In broad terms, in recent decades the relative roles and responsibilities of
government (the institutions of the state), the private sector (private companies and
industry sectors) and the community (the general public or members of particular
groups or communities) have attracted considerable attention.29
In relation to government and the broad apparatus of the state, central
questions relate to the role and capacity of government (and the state) in dealing
with environmental issues. Views about the role and capacity of the state are
contested.30 There are questions about the disposition of governments to intervene
in policy matters, as highlighted by debates between Keynesian and neo-classical
economic perspectives on the role of government.31 However, there are limitations
in using these terms in discussing the role of government in environmental policy
issues, as they both remain wedded to promoting economic growth, and only differ
in terms of the role of government. By contrast, some environmentally oriented
economists highlight the need for government to encourage a shift beyond the
paradigm of economic growth.32
The ‘public’ may also occupy various roles in relation to environmental matters
and can be viewed as either consumers (where their only form of agency is through
spending decisions), or citizens (where people have important rights and responsib-
ilities within democracy).33 Finally, the role of the private sector in environmental
matters is also subject to considerable debate, with a central issue being whether
27 Hall 1993, 278–9.
28 Carter 2018, 196.
29 Rhodes 1997.
30 Marsh, Smith and Hothi 2006.
31 Fenna 2004.
32 Jackson 2009.
33 Dobson 2003; Latta 2007.
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business is ‘part of the problem’ or ‘part of the solution’. Business is often viewed
as central to economic growth, and hence the cause, or at least part of the cause,
of environmental problems, although some people consider the potential role of
business positively (e.g. free market environmentalists).
Actors and politics of the domain
Given the diversity of environmental issues (e.g. biodiversity decline, climate
change, water pollution, water quantity, air quality, soil erosion, invasive species,
toxic waste, microplastics, etc.) and the range of levels at which environmental
policy debate occurs (e.g. local, regional, state, national, international and global)
it should come as no surprise that environmental issues involve a diverse and
dynamic range of ‘policy actors’, where policy actors are understood as ‘any
individual or group able to take action on a public problem or issue’.34 Effectively
every person, individually or as part of a group, has the potential to inform
environmental policy debate. Within the context of Australian environmental
policy, Table 4 illustrates some of the actors involved.
This diverse range of policy actors, particularly non-government organisations
(NGOs) and think tanks, not only occupy different niches within the environ-
mental policy ecosystem, they also draw on diverse resources (e.g. economic power,
information and expertise, capacity to mobilise people or attract attention) and
deploy, either willingly or by necessity, particular strategies35 in their efforts to
shape environmental policy. For example, NGOs may seek to influence policy using
direct and indirect strategies. Contacting a relevant minister or public servant,
making a submission to an inquiry, or responding to a call for comment are
direct forms of influence, while contacting reporters, writing letters to the editor,
arranging strikes or marches, or holding public meetings and so forth are indirect
ways to influence policy actors.
One thing to note is that environmental policy debate is not the sole preserve
of ‘environmentalists’. Many policy actors with sectional/sectoral interests are also
actively involved, and arguably in many instances are substantively more influential
in shaping environmental policy. This would seem to be the case with respect to
Australia’s policy position on climate change. High-profile contributions from Clive
Hamilton36 and Guy Pearse37 identify various actors that they see as having played
a noteworthy role in shaping climate-change debate and policy in Australia.
34 Considine 1994, 6.
35 Binderkrantz 2005.
36 Hamilton 2007.
37 Pearse 2007.
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Table 4 Overview of policy actors involved in Australian environmental policy debate
Type of actor Examples
Elected officials Members of parliament in federal, state, and territory parliaments, who
may occupy roles in government (prime minister, minister,
backbencher) or opposition (e.g. shadow minister, etc.). At June 2019
the federal minister for the environment was the Hon. Susan Ley MP.
Members of parliament may be elected to either the lower or upper
house in their jurisdiction (Queensland only has a lower house).
Local government councillors.
Appointed
officials
Ministerial advisers and electorate officers are appointed to support
members of parliament.
Public servants undertake policy, planning, management and service
delivery roles in public organisations including federal, state and local
government departments (e.g. environment departments) and
statutory bodies (e.g. environment protection agencies).
Judges (although formally their role is to adjudicate on legal matters
rather than make law) appointed to various courts are sometimes
called upon to adjudicate on environmental matters brought before
their courts. For example, in 1983 the High Court considered the
constitutional validity of federal laws introduced to protect the world
heritage values of the Franklin River.
Political parties Political parties generally exist to get candidates elected.
Established political parties include the Liberal Party, Labor Party,
National Party, and the Greens.
Other ‘minor’ parties include Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, the
Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party, and the Sustainable Australia
Party.
Non-
government
organisations
(including
interest groups,
industry
associations,
and trade
unions)
Non-government organisations represent the interests of their
members, and seek to influence policy rather than be elected to
parliament.
Prominent environmental interest groups include the Australian
Conservation Foundation, Wilderness Society, Friends of the Earth,
and World Wildlife Fund. Such groups are often viewed as promotional
as they tend to promote some general agenda.
Prominent national industry associations include the Business Council
of Australia, Minerals Council of Australia, National Farmers’
Federation, National Association of Forest Industries, Australian
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Beverages Council, and Australian Food and Grocery Council. Such
groups are often viewed as sectional as they tend to promote their
sectional interests.
Prominent national trade unions include the Australian Council of
Trade Unions (which is the peak body for the union movement), and
the Construction, Forestry, Maritime, Mining and Energy Union, and
the Electrical Trades Union.
Think tanks and
research
organisations
Think tanks are understood as independent organisations (i.e. non-
government) who seek to influence policy through the provision of
ideas, information and research, although specific think tanks are often
aligned with a particular perspective on policy matters.
Think tanks include the Institute of Public Affairs, Grattan Institute,
Australia Institute, and Centre for Independent Studies.
Some think tanks are also established as research centres at
universities.
Media The role of the media is generally understood as a mechanism for
informing debate and holding policy makers to account, and so has an
important role in environmental policy debate.
The actual contribution of the media in environmental policy debate is
contested, as evident from debates about the influence of the Murdoch-
owned media on climate change debate.
There is also considerable debate about the contribution of new forms
of media to environmental policy.
Grassroots
groups
People get involved in environmental policy debate as individuals and
as part of small informal grassroot campaigns, such as campaigns for
the protection or enhancement of locally significant sites.
How is environmental policy made in Australia?
Australia’s Constitution provides the formal institutional context within which
environmental policy is made. The first thing to appreciate about this is that there
is no explicit head of power in our Constitution, which formally articulates the
role of the federal government in environmental matters. This is because state
governments existed before Australia (as a nation) existed and negotiations to
establish the Commonwealth resulted in the federal level of government only being
granted specific powers (these powers are specified in section 51 of the Australian
Constitution).
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By contrast, state governments create the basic legislative settings relating to
development, such as land tenure, planning schemes, primary industries, public
utilities and the environment; for example, national parks legislation. Hence, many
environmental policy decisions are made at the state level within decision-making
processes established by the state government.
Nonetheless, the federal government has come to have considerable influence
on environmental matters, should it choose to exert itself, by virtue of its dominant
financial position (termed the vertical fiscal imbalance), and decisions by the High
Court. In effect, a range of strategies have increased the reach of the federal
government on environmental matters, through levers such as the powers over
external affairs, foreign investment, and corporations. In this context, Buhrs and
Christoff argue that:
Over the past three decades the Commonwealth government has gained greater
formal control over environmental protection and resource development through
the Constitution’s powers relating to external affairs. These enable national laws
enacting treaties including international environmental agreements to ‘override’
the States. But, the States retain the capacity for policy implementation, and there-
fore real influence in these matters largely remains with them.38
However, the federal government’s willingness to exert influence has waxed and
waned since the 1980s when there was considerable conflict between the federal
government and subnational governments over issues such as the proposed
damming of the Franklin River and protection of wet tropical rainforests in Far
North Queensland. An Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment was
negotiated in the early 1990s as a way to improve intergovernmental consideration
of environmental issues (including through Ministerial Council processes). In
addition, a significant attempt was made to establish a national strategy for
ecologically sustainable development (NSESD) in the early 1990s, although it is
clear that much more could have been achieved.39
Importantly, Australia’s federal system of government may not be the sole, or
even primary, cause of Australia’s inability to make effective national environmental
policy. While challenges such as those associated with the Murray Darling Basin
Plan, the lack of a coherent national waste strategy and the absence of a nationally
coherent policy on energy (and climate change) point to the role of government
and politics, further factors must also be considered. For example, the scarcity of
effective environmental policy may be due as much to the influence of economic
interests such as policy actors advocating for the interests of industries as it is to the
features of Australia’s federal system of government.
38 Buhrs and Christoff 2006, 235.
39 Curran 2015; Hollander 2015; Macintosh 2015.
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Another feature of environmental policy making in Australia is that each state
has a relatively unique approach to local government, and there is no recognition
of local government in the Constitution. This shapes the ways that council-level
environmental issues play out, with the major tensions being between state and
local governments.40 Put simply, local governments are the creature of state
government, and so state governments determine what roles and responsibilities
are granted to local government: for example, in Queensland the Brisbane City
Council has a role in water management, whereas in Melbourne it is primarily
managed by Melbourne Water and various government-owned water retailers.
Environmental policy in Australia is also influenced by the ways in which
the federal government participates in international negotiations and processes,
such as those dealing with climate change (the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change) and biodiversity (the Convention on Biological Diversity, and
other treaties dealing with migratory species, wetlands of international importance,
and ozone depleting substances). Australia’s contribution to such processes varies
considerably depending upon the orientation of the government in office at the
time. This variation in commitment to being a ‘good global citizen’ is clearly
captured in both the title of an article by Christoff, ‘From Global Citizen to
Renegade State: Australia at Kyoto’, and the vignette used to begin the article:
In 1992, Australia was one of the most progressive advocates of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), so much so that at the Earth Summit
in Rio de Janeiro Ros Kelly, then Labor Minister for Environment, almost signed
in place of Afghanistan in her enthusiasm to see Australia become the first of
some 160 signatories to the multilateral Convention. Yet merely five years later, by
the Third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) held in Kyoto from 1–11 December
1997, Australia distinguished itself by refusing to accept binding greenhouse gas
emissions reduction targets and by pushing for a mandate to increase its emissions
by up to 18 per cent.41
More recently, Australia’s inability to submit its national progress report on
biodiversity to the UN Convention on Biological Diversity by the required due date
provides a further example of Australia’s retreat from being a good global citizen.42
Environmental policy making in Australia involves diverse issues and actors
and plays out in multiple settings with inconsistent results. Given this, it is not
possible to provide any simple explanation of how environmental policy is made
in Australia, beyond stating that it is political and involves particular actors
advocating particular ideas, through particular processes, in particular circum-
40 Thomas 2010.
41 Christoff 1998, 113.
42 Haslam 2019.
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stances: the devil really is in the detail, and this is why detailed analyses of different
issues is so useful.
Debates and non-agenda issues
Environmental policy debate in Australia is almost invariably couched in terms of
development versus the environment, which serves to frame environmental debate
in a very narrow and conflictual way – you are either ‘pro’ or ‘anti’ development,
there are no shades of grey. Useful insights into how these terms of debate play
out in particular cases are well canvassed in a variety of edited collections.43 Read
together these collections provide excellent introductions to the major lines of
debate and non-debate that animate the politics of the environment in Australia,
with useful coverage of issues such as climate change, the Murray Darling Basin,
natural resource management, forest conflict, and coastal management, to name
but a few.
Two clear themes from this literature are particularly worth noting because they
highlight recurring issues. First is Walker’s notion of ‘statist developmentalism’44
which he considers is both a ‘state of mind’ and a ‘development strategy’ in that:
It embodies the assumptions that ‘development’ is (1) imperative, (2) popular,
and (3) has self-evident advantages [which] ignores evidence that development
damages ecologies and diminishes amenity for the population at large [and
instead] assumes that ecologically rational policies will be costly and will eliminate
jobs.45
Walker’s accounts explore the dominance of ‘statist developmentalism’ in Australia
from the First Fleet through to the recent times. Statist developmentalism is still
alive and well, if recent debates about the Adani mine and other mines in the
Galilee Basin are any indication.
Second is Dovers’ view that Australian environmental policy suffers from
policy ‘ad hockery’ and amnesia, the idea that ‘what we do at a given time often
appears uninformed by previous experiences, and often, previous policy and
management attempts are not even recognised’.46 This highlights that it is not
possible to consider environmental policy making in Australia as proactive or
systematic in any way. Even worse is the sense that this ‘forgetfulness’ may not be
accidental but may instead be part and parcel of statist developmentalism. Such
an interpretation is supported by the fact that many of Australia’s environmental
achievements (e.g. halting sandmining and logging on Fraser Island, preventing
43 Such as Crowley and Walker 2012, Dovers and Wild River 2003, Walker and Crowley 1999 and
Walker 1992.
44 Walker 2012; Walker 1999.
45 Walker 1999, 40.
46 Dovers 2003, 3.
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the damming of the Franklin River, establishing the Wet Tropics World Heritage
Area, and not proceeding with gold mining at Coronation Hill) were only achieved
through extensive public campaigns by the environmental movement.
Conclusions
This chapter has introduced the politics and policy of the environment,
highlighting that environmental issues are not only incredibly interesting, but are
also fundamentally important: our survival as a species depends upon how well
we learn to live on this planet with other people and species. In broad terms
this chapter has introduced some of the major questions that are debated in
environmental policy, outlined some of the key types of policy actors and the
institutional context they operate within (i.e. Australia’s federal system of
government), and discussed some of the themes that seem to be a recurring feature
of environmental policy debate. While this may make for bleak reading, it should
not be imagined that it has always been this way, or that such a situation is set in
stone.
Progressive environmental politics and policy making can, has, and hopefully
will occur, with glimmers of hope evident in both successful grassroots campaigns
and some government supported actions. For example, there are clearly
considerable numbers of Australians with an interest in, and concern for, making
Australia more sustainable if the following initiatives are any indication: the
widespread adoption of solar panels (because of, or despite, government policy
settings and associated programs); the ‘Lock the Gate’ campaign to oppose
widespread fracking; the Victorian government’s renewed efforts on climate
change; local councils declaring climate emergencies; the activist energy behind
campaigns such as ‘Extinction Rebellion’; and the mass mobilisation of young
people as part of the ‘School Strike for Climate’ movement.
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Foreign and defence policy
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The foreign and defence policies of Australia have been marked by periods of
continuity and change since the country slowly decoupled from the UK and forged
a more independent international posture from the postwar period to the present.
This short introductory chapter cannot do justice to the full scope of Australian
foreign and defence policy, which is a process of immense complexity, but rather
seeks to highlight the key actors, events and enduring issues that face Australian
policy makers from the present and into the future. By necessity, an introductory
chapter cannot be comprehensive, and examples are therefore chosen represent-
atively and selectively. Before proceeding to the main text of the chapter, which
examines a range of selected contemporary aspects of Australian foreign and
defence policy, it is necessary to provide some relevant historical background since
current issues all have their historical antecedents.
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Historical background
Contemporary foreign policy making takes place against a historical backdrop
which informs current mindsets and policy. Australia relied upon the UK for
defence, trade and even foreign affairs until the Second World War, despite the
‘tyranny of distance’ from the motherland. This dependence was cruelly exposed by
the Japanese defeat of Imperial forces in Singapore in 1942, marking a watershed in
Australian thinking. Prime Minister John Curtin famously declared that ‘Without
any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America,
free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom’1
and soon after, he belatedly ratified the 1931 Statute of Westminster that devolved
full sovereignty over international policy to the Dominion of Australia. During
the postwar period, leading diplomats such as H.V. Evatt sought to carve out a
greater role for Australia and other medium-sized powers in the shaping of global
governance, for example, through the foundation of the United Nations (UN) and
the San Francisco Peace Treaty settlements in 1951. At the same time the pivotal
ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–US) alliance treaty was inaugurated, indicating a
shift from the UK to the USA in terms of defence reliance.
During the Cold War, Australian foreign and defence policy focused on the
putative communist threat emanating from Soviet and Chinese expansion. Canberra
acceded to the ANZUS alliance at the same time as the Second World War San
Francisco Peace Treaties in 1951. This was tied to the ongoing process of decolon-
isation as European powers sought to preserve their influence in South-East Asia
against nationalist, and often Marxist, independence movements and conflicts.
Canberra provided diplomatic and military support for the UN-led coalition in
the Korean War (1950–53), the British in Malaya against ‘communist terrorists’
(1948–60) and against the Indonesian ‘confrontation’ policy in Borneo (1963–66),
and deployed substantial military force to support the USA in Vietnam into the
1970s (including through membership of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation
Pact). At this time Australia also withdrew from its own colony in Papua New
Guinea (1975) and sought to manage relations with the diverse array of newly
independent countries in the South Pacific making up the British Commonwealth.
Serious challenges arose around this time. President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine
(1969) signalled that America’s allies would henceforth have to provide more
resources for their own defence, prompting a more self-reliant defence policy in
the 1970s and 1980s. Japan’s postwar economic recovery had also encouraged
increasing Australian economic engagement with Asia. But continuing Australian
economic prosperity was undermined by protectionist policies, the economic
rupture with the UK when the latter joined the European Economic Community in
1973, and a series of Middle Eastern ‘oil shocks’. At this time, Prime Minister Gough
Whitlam also ended the isolation of communist China by his visits to Beijing,
1 Curtin 1941, 10.
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which ultimately ended in the recognition of the Peoples Republic of China in 1973,
and the removal of the Australian Embassy from Taipei in the Republic of China.
The 1970s therefore saw a ‘torrent of change in Australian foreign policy’.2
Against this backdrop, the Department of Foreign Affairs was established in
1971 (replaced with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 1987). These
economic problems also led to a reappraisal of trade and financial policy and the
embrace of a ‘neoliberal’ economic agenda in the 1980s: a progressive elimination
of tariffs, privatisation, and opening of markets under the Hawke and Keating
governments. These moves re-established Australian economic competitiveness
and encouraged closer engagement with the Asian region, avoiding the possibility
– in Keating’s words – that Australia might become a ‘banana republic’.3 Australia
also drove the building of regional multilateral institutions such as Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and was at the forefront of peace-keeping oper-
ations in Cambodia (1992–93) and East Timor (1999).
The long-running Howard Coalition government (1996–2007) continued these
regionalist and globalist policies, while simultaneously taking a ‘hard-headed’
approach to the national interest despite its nostalgia for the UK–USA ‘Anglo-
sphere’. By the 21st century, Australia’s firm attachment to the American alliance
and active participation in the Asia-Pacific region was firmly established and
deepened. But the post–Cold War and post-9/11 periods unleashed a range of new
and unfamiliar policy challenges such as the rise of China, international terrorism,
migration, and climate change. While Australia benefitted from the rise of Asian
power and prosperity, the longstanding certainties upon which its foreign policy
settings had been predicated have been called into question.
Australian foreign and defence policy: a thematic approach
In his seminal study of Australian foreign policy from 1942 to the present, Allen
Gyngell identified three perennial aspects of Australian policy: a ‘great and
powerful friend’, ‘regional engagement’, and a ‘rules-based international order’.4
These have also been officially expounded as ‘three pillars’ (the US alliance,
engagement with Asia and membership of the UN) under the Rudd–Gillard Labor
governments. Moreover, subsequent Coalition governments have not significantly
departed from these aspects, even if their emphases have differed. This introductory
chapter takes these three elements as a point of departure and expands upon them
to cover 10 key themes through which Australian foreign and defence policy can be
understood and appraised. Indeed, former Ambassador to the USA, Kim Beazley,
2 Gyngell 2017, 102.
3 Kelly 1992.
4 Gyngell 2017.
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suggests that the ‘dramatic shift from state-centric diplomacy and the rise of non-
state challenges has meant foreign policy must be dealt with thematically’.5
The 10 themes treated here are grouped under four sections. The first section,
‘contexts’, looks at: foreign and defence policy machinery, Labor versus Liberal
Party policy traditions, and liberal internationalism; all of which set the stage for
Australian policy engagement. The second section investigates three core platforms
of foreign policy engagement: economic diplomacy, defence strategy and non-
traditional security. The following section concentrates on Australia’s regionalist
policies through Asian engagement and foreign aid. The final section considers
Australia’s relations with the two superpowers in the Asia-Pacific: China and the
USA, before offering conclusions. These themes interrelate and overlap, and should
be considered as such – they are presented separately for analytical convenience
and do not reflect any order of priority.
Section 1: Contexts
Australia’s foreign and defence policy machinery
Australian foreign and defence policy making primarily resides within three major
organs: the Prime Minster and Cabinet (PM&C), the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Defence (DoD). At the apex of policy
making, the government, headed by the prime minster and their foreign and
defence ministers, as well as other portfolios, will normally play a significant role
in shaping policy directions. Indeed, with the ongoing trend towards a more
‘presidential’ system of government, power has become more concentrated in the
PM&C. Yet prime ministers have varied in their inclination and ability to put their
stamp on foreign and defence issues. For example, at one end of the spectrum was
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who effectively usurped the role of his foreign minister
during his tenure, while his successor Julia Gillard, who had scant interest or
experience in foreign affairs, found herself substantially delegating to her ministers
(including her foreign minster: Kevin Rudd!). Indeed, the relationship between the
prime minister and their foreign ministers has been a key aspect in executing a
harmonious and cohesive foreign policy posture, with great combinations such as
Prime Minister Paul Keating and Foreign Minister Gareth Evans juxtaposed with
highly fractious ones such as Prime Minister Gillard and Foreign Minister Rudd.
The National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSC) is the peak decision and
policy-making body for security. It conducts high-level consultations aimed at
shaping and implementing broader security policy and brings together the prime
minister, relevant ministers, PM&C, heads of the Australian Defence Force (ADF)
and key national intelligence organisations (Office of National Intelligence [ONI],
5 Beazley 2017, vii (emphasis added).
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Australian Security Intelligence Organisation [ASIO], Australian Secret Intelli-
gence Service [ASIS]). This is in line with the trend towards ‘securitisation’ of
foreign policy, indicated throughout this chapter. The objectives of foreign and
defence policy are also periodically outlined in government commissioned white
papers, which are indispensable for a full understanding of current affairs.
The government of the day is supported by DFAT and the DoD, permanent
bureaucratic organs that are designed to advise and implement foreign and defence
policy respectively. Other actors, such as the Department for Homeland Affairs
(DHA), which was established in 2017, also play a significant role in selected issues.
DFAT is charged with the implementation of foreign policy, foreign relations,
foreign aid, consular services, trade and investment. Yet, in the last two decades
DFAT has been subject to significant budget cuts, organisational restructuring,
loss of oversight to a range of other agencies, and a revolving door of foreign
ministers (and prime ministers) at its helm, despite its apparently pivotal role in
the foreign policy process. Though the department saw a measure of revitalisation
under Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and head of its policy planning unit, Peter
Vargese, it is still affected by resource shortages, poor morale, and lack of strategic
focus.6 The DoD, on the other hand, forms part of the Australian Defence
Organisation (ADO), along with the ADF. Its remit is more narrowly focused
upon defending Australia and its citizens and engaging in overseas coalition and
peace-keeping activities. DoD has also suffered from attacks upon its ‘bloated
bureaucracy’ that has emphasised ‘front-end’ material capabilities but has remained
relatively unscathed from the cuts that DFAT has experienced due to its unique
bureaucratic culture and enormous size.7
Generally speaking, foreign policy issues do not attract great attention among the
Australian public (with some exceptions, such as asylum seekers), and civil society
groups have traditionally struggled to influence the foreign policy establishment
just described. An exception are think tanks such as the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute (ASPI) and the Lowy Institute, which command some influence. However,
in the age of social media and activism, foreign policy increasingly needs to take into
account civil society preferences on one side and the ramifications of external polices
on the domestic landscape on the other (a process known as ‘intermestic politics’).
Labor versus Coalition leadership and foreign policy traditions
The Coalition’s and Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) foreign and defence policy
traditions are frequently thought to conform with the international relations
paradigms of realism and liberalism respectively.8 The Coalition is commonly
associated with international relations realism, which assumes that the competitive
6 Australian Public Service Commission 2013.
7 Claxton 2014.
8 Frydenberg, Parke and Langmore 2014.
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interaction of states, acting in their self-interest in an anarchic international system,
results in ‘a politics of power and security’.9 Both scholars and Liberal Party
members alike tend to agree that the Liberals reflect elements that can be
characterised as ‘realist’: a strong preference for alliances to ensure security, a
scepticism towards the utility of multilateral forums and agreements, and a
tendency towards pragmatism, rather than idealism in decision making.10 Prime
Minister Howard’s government epitomised such an approach to foreign and
defence policy. His government’s 1997 Foreign Policy White Paper, entitled In the
National Interest, made the argument that the Coalition’s approach was ‘the hard-
headed pursuit of the interests which lie at the core of foreign and trade policy’.11
More recent foreign and defence policy decisions from Prime Ministers Abbott,
Turnbull and Morrison have continued to reflect the realist mindset with the
continuing centrality of ANZUS to defence strategy, the ongoing proliferation of
bilateral defence co-operation and free trade agreements (FTAs) since the Coalition
returned to power in 2013, and the ‘pragmatism’ of the Liberal Party approach
evident in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.12
In contrast, the ALP is often linked with international relations liberalism,
which assumes democracy, free trade, and multilateral institutions and norms are
viewed as the most conducive means of achieving co-operation between states
and international peace.13 The ALP has thus placed faith in international law, the
UN, and global/regional organisations as a means for pursuing Australia’s national
interests and values. ALP Prime Ministers Gough Whitlam, with his rapprochement
with China, and Paul Keating, with his drive for Asian engagement, set the
precedents for such approaches. The Rudd–Gillard governments continued to
evince these tendencies – the championing of multilateral forums like the G20,
the bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and norm
entrepreneurship and activism at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in
Copenhagen. This approach has often been referred to, especially in Labor rhetoric,
as ‘middle power diplomacy’ – and scholars have adopted the ‘middle power’
framework to characterise and understand such behaviour.14 The ‘middle power’
concept emphasises a combination of sufficient power resources (normally
measured as the countries ranked globally from about 6th to 30th in terms of
GDP), with an inclination towards foreign policy activism on key global or niche
issues, such as climate change or disarmament. Middle powers have traditionally
viewed themselves as good international citizens, supporting international laws and
norms through multilateralism, rather than as self-interested mercantilist or military
powers. Former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s initiative on creating an Asia Pacific
9 Wohlforth 2008.
10 McCraw 2008.
11 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1997, iii.
12 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2017, 11.
13 Jahn 2013.
14 Wilkins 2014.
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community (APC), a new multilateral pan-regional grouping to improve stability
and security among the region, was exemplary of such self-styled creative middle
power diplomacy. It has become firmly established in the lexicon of Australian
foreign policy, despite the Liberal’s distaste for the middle-power descriptor itself.
This fact, and further similarities between the parties, reflect the structural
constraints that guide the decision making of middle powers like Australia in the
international system. A core of bipartisanship regarding Australian defence policy
can be identified ‘including a focus on defending the Australian continent, an
alliance with the United States, and the capability to contribute to regional and
global coalition efforts’.15 Similar levels of bipartisanship exist regarding issues of
foreign policy – trade policy is broadly neoliberal in orientation and supports the
principles of free trade and marketisation (not to be confused with international
relations liberalism or the Liberal Party). As such, the differences between the
Labor and Liberal foreign and defence policy traditions may be better characterised
as different means to similar middle-power ends.
Liberal internationalism
There is considerable bipartisanship between Australia’s major parties regarding
how to engage with the international system. This may be captured by the principle
of ‘liberal internationalism’.16 Yet, liberal internationalism stands more broadly
for the extroverted role of Australia in engaging with international institutions,
participating in free trade and upholding a ‘rules-based international order’
(anchored in US global primacy). This has its basis in the identification of Australia
as a liberal democratic country with associated interests and values that should be
pursued and defended. This liberal internationalism – defined as an ‘activist foreign
policy that promotes liberal principles abroad, especially through multilateral co-
operation and international institutions’17 – reflects Australia’s self-perception as a
‘good international citizen’.
Australia has been active in foreign policy spheres aligned with its national
interests and has pursued its values and support for an international rules-based
order in areas like trade and finance, global governance, human rights and justice,
the environment and aid. For example, the Rudd government played an entrepren-
eurial role in encouraging the elevation of the G20 to a leader’s summit in the
context of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Such multilateral forums have reflected
the consensus that Australia’s economic needs are best served by free trade and
open markets,18 but also that better global governance can be achieved through such
forums, too. Australia has been similarly active pursuing international action on
15 Carr 2017, 256.
16 Jahn 2013.
17 Paris 1997, 59.
18 Fenna 2016, 263.
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environmental issues that affect Australia, including the Montreal Protocol of 1987
that addressed the role chlorofluorocarbons played in ozone depletion and anti-
whaling action against Japan in the International Court of Justice in 2010 (though
Australia has had a more mixed record regarding climate change negotiations).
These actions demonstrate the liberal internationalist belief in institutions to provide
opportunities for dialogue, mediate disputes and promote good global governance.
Similarly, Australia identifies the liberal world order established by Pax
Americana (the relative international peace ensured by US hegemony) as a key
security interest, with the 2016 Defence White Paper arguing: ‘The growing pros-
perity of the Indo-Pacific and the rules-based global order on which Australia relies
for open access to our trading partners are based on the maintenance of peace
and stability.’19 Australia has been active in multilateral agreements that uphold this
‘rules-based order’, such as pursuing service as a non-permanent member of the
UN Security Council, sanctioning illiberal states like North Korea or Syria, and
advocacy for the Responsibility to Protect, a principle that seeks to prevent mass
atrocity war crimes.
Australia has also defended such principles, including participation in
operations in Afghanistan and Syria against global jihadism; humanitarian
intervention in Timor Leste in 1999 and again in 2006; a long history of peace-
keeping efforts; and attempts to hold Russia accountable for the downing of the
airliner MH17 in 2014 while on the UN Security Council. Australia has also trod
a ‘middle path’ on nuclear weapons – advocating for a South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, supporting international efforts
to control horizontal proliferation by actors like North Korea and Iran, but not
supporting recent multilateral pushes to eliminate nuclear weapons, as seen
through the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and
Disarmament. Australia’s actions demonstrate the liberal intolerance of non-
democratic countries and their attendant challenge to the liberal order.20
Section 2: Core policy platforms
Economic diplomacy
Soon after Federation, Australian policy makers agreed to regulate and protect the
economy with tariffs, wage arbitration, state-led development, and British Imperial
Preference for Australian goods. This Australian Settlement and Keynesian eco-
nomic management underpinned the long postwar boom.21 The collapse of British
Imperial Preference, the problem of slow economic growth combined with high
19 Department of Defence 2016, 15.
20 Doyle 1986.
21 Stokes 2004.
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inflation known as ‘stagflation’, and the unravelling of the Keynesian orthodoxy in
the 1970s challenged this consensus. The Hawke–Keating governments responded
by liberalising the Australian economy and opening it up to international market
forces in an effort to ensure economic security.
These policy shifts also advocated multilateral agreements to lower tariffs for
Australian resources and agricultural goods – an area where Australia retained
a comparative advantage. The record here was mixed – the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1994
did contain successes for Australia, but the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which set
the framework for the EU single market, the creation of the North America Free
Trade Agreement (now USMCA), and moves by ASEAN (Association of South-
East Asian Nations) to negotiate a free trade agreement that excluded Australia,
concerned Australian policy makers.22 Reducing trade protection barriers further
was of particular concern given the increasing importance of Japan, China and
South-East Asian countries as growing economies and important markets for
Australian exports. APEC was therefore a forum that Labor has embraced to
promote liberalisation in the region, but a pan-regional APEC free trade agreement
remains elusive.
The Howard government faced many of the same challenges as Labor and,
acting upon a preference for neoliberal principles, took the view that bilateral
trade negotiations could supplement multilateral efforts. This was informed by
the difficulties of the Doha Round of the GATT and was especially a concern
about trade access in East Asia, where Australia was making little headway with
ASEAN+323 and signs were developing of regional and bilateral trade agendas that
excluded Australian participation. The Howard government negotiated bilateral
FTAs with Thailand, Singapore, and more controversially the USA (AUSFTA),
where political imperatives to solidify the Australian–USA relationship seemed
to be as paramount as economic considerations.24 Multilaterally, the Howard
government was instrumental in the negotiation of the ASEAN–Australia–New
Zealand free trade agreement25 and provided funds to the International Monetary
Fund as part of the bailout package during the Asian Financial Crisis (1997–98).
Since then, further bilateral FTAs have been negotiated with Chile, Malaysia,
South Korea, Japan and China and multilaterally with the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) after the withdrawal
of the USA from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations in 2016. This ref-
lects the continuing significance of the neoliberal consensus in trade policy that has
22 Meredith and Dyster 1999, 290.
23 ASEAN+3 is a forum for cooperation between ASEAN members and the East Asian
nation-states Japan, China and South Korea.
24 Capling 2008, 36–7.
25 Firth 2011, 251.
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remained even after the shocks of the GFC. Australia particularly championed the
CPTPP, pushing hard to revive negotiations after the US withdrawal from the TPP.
This story of Australia’s international economic engagement reflects its position
as a middle power. Canberra has attempted to ensure the comparative advantage
of its resources, services and agricultural goods in the international marketplace,
but has also reflected its geographic position by negotiating key bilateral and
multilateral agreements centred in the Asia-Pacific rim. This has been especially
important as the resources boom is a story closely intertwined with China’s rise. In
the context of growing regional rivalries and US rejection of the free trade agenda
under President Trump, strategic security begins to come to the fore just as much
as economic security. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the abandonment of the
TPP by the USA will continue to concern Australian policy makers worried about
challenges to the orthodoxy of the international rules-based order.
Defence strategy
Australia’s defence strategy has undergone several iterations since Federation, but
its strategic interests have remained largely in the Indo-Pacific arc as, historically,
threats to the Australian continent have emerged from South-East Asia.26 While the
area of interest has remained consistent across time, the nature of the threat, the
balance of power among great nations, and Australia’s own capability to respond
have not remained the same, leading to different strategies being adopted since the
Second World War: the expeditionary school of ‘forward defence’ until 1972; and
the ‘continental defence’ of Australia school until 9/11.
The Second World War demonstrated that the British were no longer the pre-
eminent power in Asia. But the war also crushed Japan and saw China consumed by
civil war. This left Australia in the peculiar situation of continuing its alliances with
powerful allies, but also capable of projecting power with these allies into South-
East Asia to resist communism.27 This ‘forward defence’ policy led to Australian
military commitments to Korea and Vietnam with the US, and to Malaya and
Borneo with the British. Australia was able to defend the continent far from its
northern approaches due to the relative weakness of the states in South-East Asia
and the relative strength and commitment of Australia’s allies in the region.
The forward defence era ended when the fear of the spread of communism in
the region reduced, the relative power of South-East Asian nation-states increased,
and Australia’s allies reduced their commitment to the region in the 1960s.28
Australian policy makers worked through the implications in the 1976 Defence
White Paper, the 1986 ‘Dibb Report’ and the 1987 Defence White Paper.29 Dibb
26 Lockyer 2017, 193.
27 Lockyer 2017, 161
28 Fruhling 2009, 44; Lockyer 2017.
29 Dibb 2007.
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argued for the self-reliant defence of the Australian continent in two ways: treating
geography as an independent variable with an enduring effect on Australia’s
strategic interests; and that Australia should maintain a regional technological
edge.30 These ideas were meant to discipline defence planners: Australia could
contribute to overseas deployments with allies, but had to prioritise a military
geared towards the air and sea defence of Australia’s northern approaches and
relative de-emphasis upon the traditional prioritisation of the army.
Critics argue that there is a disjuncture between continental defence and what
the ADF actually does.31 The liberal internationalist nature of Australia’s strategic
culture has been reflected in its deployments and security priorities against global
jihadism, humanitarian intervention, and providing backing to failing states in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor Leste or the Solomon Islands. Such issues permeated
the 2003 Defence Update.32 More recent white papers have been criticised for
planning a force structure that is too thin to credibly deter a rising China from
operating in areas of strategic interest to Australia’s north, even with new capability
upgrades like the F35 joint strike fighter and the planned doubling of submarine
capabilities.33 How to deal with these problems has yet to be fully resolved. The
2016 Defence White Paper’s prioritisation of a ‘stable Indo-Pacific region and a
rules-based global order’34 demonstrates how far removed current Australian
strategic thinking is from actual continental defence. Such debates reflect the
changing regional balance of power.
Given these facts, the size of the defence budget, the affordability of defence
procurements, the question of value-for-money when purchasing interoperable
defence capabilities from alliance partners, and even the effective deliverability of
an Australian defence industry, come to the fore as crucial issues for policy makers.
Defence is a department that ultimately needs to compete with other departments
for government funding and against cutbacks. Further, policy makers must balance
these strategic aims with domestic political contests, as the recent decision to build
new submarines in South Australia at considerable additional cost demonstrates.
Addressing these competing priorities will continue to confront defence chiefs and
their ministers in the future.
Non-traditional security challenges
The ‘almost complete alignment of Australia’s foreign policy priorities with its
national security agenda’35 reflects a broadened definition of ‘security’36 and the
30 Dibb 2006.
31 Evans 2005, 105.
32 Dupont 2003.
33 White 2019; White 2006.
34 Department of Defence 2016, 33.
35 Wesley 2012, 264.
36 Buzan 1991.
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increasing ‘securitisation’ of foreign policy evident since the Howard government.
In this respect it is more appropriate to employ the broader term security policy
rather than defence policy. These policy shifts are demonstrated by budget cuts
to DFAT and corresponding expansion and strengthening of the security-oriented
institutional apparatus, including the ONI, ASIO, ASIS, the NSC and the DHA.
This reflects the securitisation of a new range of problems such as terrorism
and migration, in addition to traditional concerns about the regional strategic
environment. Cyber security has also been an area of increasing concern, with
attacks launched by both state and non-state actors upon Australia’s political,
economic and defence sectors.37 Added to this are less obviously defence-related
threats such as climate change and other environmental disasters, financial risks,
pandemics and societal/political instability, typically described as ‘non-traditional
security challenges’.38 As such, challenges such as terrorism and irregular migration
are increasingly considered as national security threats, sometimes demanding a
militarised response.
In the wake of the 2001 al-Qaeda attacks upon the USA (which for the first
time activated ANZUS), Australians were subjected to attacks in Bali (2002 and
2005) and Jakarta (2003 and 2004), followed by other incidents and foiled plots
in Australia. Canberra responded by deploying military force alongside the USA
in the Middle East. Canberra also ramped up its security apparatus domestically
and regionally and initiated major counterterrorism co-operation with regional
partners like Indonesia. Australia has thus provided training, equipment, and direct
military and police support overseas, and is engaged in surveillance and de-
radicalisation programs among domestic would-be Jihadists.
Irregular population movements have also assumed an outsized presence in
Australian security policy, often involving asylum seekers. While Australia has
accepted refugees from Vietnam or China in the past, such ‘illegal arrivals’ have
since been criminalised and military assets are now used to apprehend them in
tandem with Indonesia (Operation Sovereign Borders), and arrivals detained in
offshore processing centres (earlier known as the ‘Pacific Solution’). Such policies
violate Australia’s obligations under various human rights treaties and international
law and damage its reputation as a ‘good international citizen’, but the Australian
public sees asylum arrivals as a security threat39 and such policies now receive
bipartisan support.
Nature itself is sometimes conceived of as a ‘security issue’, especially the risk
of global climate change. Kevin Rudd called it ‘the great moral challenge of our
generation’.40 Yet Australian governments have been ambivalent in their response
37 Hanson et al. 2017.
38 Baldino et al. 2011.
39 Lowy Poll 2018 – 77 per cent agreed that large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming
into Australia was a ‘critical threat’ or an ‘important, but not critical threat’ (Lowy Institute and
Oliver 2018, 8).
40 Rudd 2007.
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to this issue, initially refusing to ratify the Kyoto Protocols (though eventually
ratified in 2008) and reluctant in implementing meaningful domestic legislation
such as carbon capping/trading schemes. In contrast, Australia has been proactive
in providing humanitarian assistance and relief to regional counties that have been
affected by natural disasters (e.g. the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami) and assisting others
with capacity-building to improve their resilience against future occurrences. This
is partly driven by fears that climate/disaster affected local states will become
destabilised resulting in increased migration flows to Australia itself.
Section 3: Regionalism
‘Asian engagement’
Australian recognition of its geographic place at the southern tip of South-East Asia
occurred glacially, as it clung to its European roots. The gradual replacement of
fading British power with the greater strength of a fellow Anglo-Saxon American
ally allowed Australia to continue its limited embrace of its Asian neighbours (with
exceptions, such as the 1950 Colombo Plan). Australia found itself engaged in
wars of decolonisation at the behest of the UK and USA in the postwar era, and
Australian contact with Asia remained confined mainly to strategic issues, even as
trade with a revitalised Japan started to become increasingly important from the
1960s. One major impediment to Australia’s acceptance in the Asian region was the
‘White Australia’ policy, which was officially ended by Gough Whitlam in 1973.
This policy realignment was catalysed by the 1989 government report by Ross
Garnaut entitled Australia in the Northeast Asian Ascendancy.41 However, it was
not until the Labor prime ministership of Paul Keating that Canberra truly faced
the reality that its natural home was as part of Asia, and not simply as an isolated
‘cultural outpost’ of an Anglo-Saxon protector.42 Keating, with the support of his
foreign minister, Gareth Evans, carved a path – sometimes controversial – of ‘Asian
engagement’, and the country has assumed a strong role not only in the economy
of the Asian region, but also in its institutional arrangements. Indeed, Keating
and Evans were instrumental in the creation of pan-regional organisations such as
APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ‘region’ in which Australia resides is
referred to variously as ‘Asia’, the ‘Asia-Pacific’ and more recently the ‘Indo-Pacific’.
While Labor governments have typically been more proactive on this, and though
Liberal Prime Minsters such as John Howard and Tony Abbott have sought to place
a stronger accent on ‘Anglosphere’ partners, they have not interrupted the process
(a dynamic identified as the ‘Howard paradox’).43 Even Liberal Prime Minister
41 Garnaut 1989.
42 Keating 2000.
43 Wesley 2007.
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Tony Abbott talked about ‘more Jakarta, less Geneva’ as the guiding principle for
foreign policy.44
Canberra’s regional efforts have naturally focused upon the major powers in
Asia, with which Australia has successively built deep trading, and in some cases,
security ties. Successive government white papers have identified Japan, India,
South Korea, India, as well as China, as the main foci of engagement. First came
Japan from the 1960s onwards, as Australian natural resources played a major
role in that country’s economic boom and rise to regional pre-eminence into the
1980s–90s. From a long-term foundation of economic and cultural ties, more
recently the relationship has taken on a strategic aspect with the ground-breaking
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2007, which has since been reinforced
and is now described as a ‘Special Strategic Partnership’.45 Second, India’s economic
liberalisation in the 1990s paved the way for its greater presence in Asian affairs and
indicated the importance of strengthening long-neglected bilateral ties. With the
reframing of Australian strategic policy under the mantra of ‘Indo-Pacific’, and its
accompanying ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy, the possibilities of enhancing
bilateral co-ordination with New Delhi, especially in the maritime sphere, have
gained increased attention.46 The ‘Quad’ dialogue between Canberra, Tokyo, India
and the USA, also reinforces Australian engagement with these two leading Asian
powers. Third, South Korea is a significant Australian trading partner and Canberra
remains deeply engaged with the question of North Korean nuclear proliferation.
Fourth, managing relations with Indonesia has presented a major challenge in
Australian foreign policy, particularly as this emerging power acts as a fulcrum of
both ASEAN and the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept, and ties with Jakarta have been subject
to a series of highs and lows related to human rights concerns, terrorism, irregular
migration, and pronounced cultural differences.
Moreover, Canberra is now deeply embedded in the ‘regionalism’ process in
the Indo/Asia-Pacific. Australia can count membership in a plethora of multilateral
regional organisations, mainly centred upon the ASEAN, such as the East Asia
Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, which it helped found, and the Five
Power Defence Agreement (including Singapore and Malaysia).47 In 2005, a
reluctant Howard government even signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation. Notably, due to the rise of China and India, and the now recognised
importance of Indonesia and other South-East Asian states, Canberra has even
sought to shape the very regional architecture itself through initiatives such as
Kevin Rudd’s ‘Asia Pacific community’ and participation in the ‘Free and Open
Indo-Pacific’ strategy of Japan (since joined by the USA, and potentially India).
Indeed, the Labor government’s Australia in the Asian Century white paper in
44 O’Neil 2018.
45 Wilkins 2018.
46 Brewster 2016.
47 He 2017.
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2012 emphasised the need for deeper integration and engagement with Asian
neighbours (included the neglected task of developing ‘Asian [language] literacy’).48
Thus, Canberra is acutely aware that its relations with key countries such as China,
India, Japan, Indonesia and the ASEAN countries are vital to its regional diplomatic
interests.
Foreign aid
Aid is an extension of Australia’s national interest, with a regionally directed focus.
Prime Minister Howard once reflected upon the regional basis to this notion:
‘Australia’s most immediate interests and responsibilities will always be in our
region’49 – the South Pacific (Pacific Island countries) and South-East Asia. This
area is sometimes described as an ‘arc of instability’,50 a term that conveys the
connection between aid, security and the national interest. Aid was not always
conceived of in this securitised fashion. Aid thinking prior to the mid-2000s was
primarily development centred, with an emphasis upon economic growth and
market-based solutions.51 But global jihadism and the danger of failing states in the
region shifted Australia’s approach to aid to one that sought to manage ‘the spill-
over to Australia of transnational risks, potentially festering within the borders of
“ineffective” states’.52 The primary means to influence the region has largely been
through foreign aid or overseas development assistance, through forums like the
Pacific Island Forum, and, in extreme situations, military intervention.
Australia’s aid budget 2018–19 reflected this regional prioritisation, giving $1.3
billion to the Pacific region, $1 billion to South-East and East Asia, and smaller
amounts to regions with more pressing needs – $284.8 million to South and West
Asia and $258.5 million to the Middle East and Africa.53 If aid was given on the
basis of need it would be geared towards Africa and South Asia, which contain
most of the world’s 47 least developed countries (LDCs). Comparatively, only five
countries in the Pacific and three in South-East and East Asia are listed as LDCs.54
But regional dangers have been brought into sharp relief post 9/11, epitomised
by Australian intervention in Timor Leste, the Regional Assistance Mission to the
Solomon Islands, and ongoing governance issues and political instability in Papua
New Guinea and Fiji. Chinese influence in the Pacific region has also framed
Australia’s recent foreign aid commitments and prioritisation.
The securitisation of the region, coinciding with the increasing revenues
garnered from the mining boom, ushered in a ‘golden consensus’ of bipartisan
48 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2012, 167–71.
49 Howard 2005 (emphasis added).
50 Ayson 2007.
51 Corbett and Dinnen 2016, 89–91.
52 Hameiri 2008, 357.
53 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018a, 6.
54 UNCDP 2018.
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support for an 80 per cent increase in aid from 2003/04 to 2012/13,55 aiming
to minimise risk and improve governance and state capability. Howard began
the budget increases and Rudd continued, aligning aid spending with the UN
Millennium Development Goals in the process, a framework that committed states
to reducing extreme global disadvantage and poverty.
The GFC of 2008 broke this consensus. The Gillard government cut aid in the
pursuit of budget repair and the incoming Abbott government cut even deeper,
merging the stand-alone statutory body AusAID into DFAT in 2014 and cutting aid
spending dramatically – $7.6 billion over forward estimates and an additional $1
billion in the following financial year.56 The government was able to do this as aid
was only shallowly embedded in political discourses and institutions, and the cuts
failed to attract public opprobrium.57 The Coalition has subsequently argued that
aid ‘both supports the strong and direct national interest we have in stability and
prosperity in our region and reflects our values as a nation’.58 The securitisation of
aid, its regional focus, and recent budgetary cuts, demonstrate that the aid program
is strongly geared towards the national interest as much as it is towards Australia’s
liberal internationalist values.
Section 4: The superpowers
Rise of China
Since its official ‘opening up’ under Deng Xiaoping in 1979, China has risen to
economic pre-eminence in the region. The Chinese economy grew from US$178
billion in 1979 to US$12 trillion in 2018, accounting for 15 per cent of the global
economy and is set to eclipse that of the USA in the near term by any measure.59
Australia has been a major beneficiary of Chinese economic development as it
has provided raw materials, and increasingly services, to China. Bilateral trade with
China now amounts to $164 billion, representing 27 per cent of total Australian
trade in 2017.60 This has boosted the economy immeasurably, even more so than
Japanese trade did during its 1960s–1980s boom period. Australia has engaged
Beijing diplomatically (through the Australia–China annual Foreign and Strategic
Dialogue) and joined regional initiatives spearheaded by China such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership. The important tertiary education sector in Australia has also seen an
55 Day 2016, 641–2.
56 Day 2016, 643–4.
57 Day 2016. Also, a 2015 Lowy Institute poll found majority public support for 2015–16 aid
budget cuts (Lowy Institute and Oliver 2015, 4).
58 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018a, 1.
59 World Bank 2018.
60 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018b.
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influx of mainland Chinese students, and the establishment of Confucius Institutes,
exposing the nation to contact with all things Chinese as never before. Beeson and
Hameiri attest to ‘the game-changing nature that China’s rise has had on nearly
every aspect of Australia’s foreign policy and much domestic policy, too’.61
But Australian policy makers have been somewhat uncomfortable with China’s
meteoric rise to power,62 and Australian economic dependency upon China is a
double-edged sword as Beijing’s national interests and values are, in many ways,
inimical to those held by Australia. In the past, Australia enjoyed the happy
concurrence of its trade and security centred upon the USA and its allies (especially
Japan), but efforts to ‘compartmentalise’ trade and security initiated under Howard
have now run their course.63 In contrast to Australia’s liberal democratic capitalist
democracy, China is a (nominally) communist authoritarian government which
holds different views on domestic practice and regional affairs. For example,
Australia is mindful of Chinese ‘core interests’ and refrains from aggravating
Beijing over the status of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet (e.g. receiving the Dalai
Lama), subdues its criticism of human rights, and weighs the support it gives to
Washington and Tokyo when this conflicts with Beijing’s views.
Of particular note is Australia’s opposition to Chinese assertiveness in the
South China Sea, where Beijing has territorial disputes with neighbouring
countries and is engaged in a process of militarising artificial land features, against
the strong protests of the USA and others. Australia risks both diplomatic
chastisement and economic retaliation (‘punishment’) for diplomatic missteps in
Beijing’s eyes – such as decrying China as a ‘threat’ (as in the 2009 Defence White
Paper). Moreover, Chinese influence on Australia’s domestic politics has not always
been benign. The revelation of expansive industrial and defence espionage activities
and attempts to shape political dynamics within the country (known as ‘influence
operations’) have revealed the stark divergences in political and cultural mores
among the two.64 Australia has since sought to increase its resilience to such efforts
and has passed legislation to scrutinise Chinese investment due to linkages with
state-owned enterprises. Thus, Beeson and Hameiri conclude that ‘for better or
worse, however, attempting to manage relations with China is going to be the litmus
test of policy efficacy for any Australian government for the foreseeable future’.65
US alliance
The US alliance has remained a central pillar of Australian foreign and defence
policy planning since its codification in the ANZUS Treaty of 1951, which served to
shield the country from the communist threat of the USSR and China. The ANZUS
61 Beeson and Hameiri 2017, 7.
62 Gill and Jakobson 2017.
63 White 2013.
64 Hamilton 2018.
65 Beeson and Hameiri 2017, 9.
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Treaty created a trilateral Australia–USA–New Zealand arrangement, but is now
effectively bilateral since Wellington was excluded by the USA in 1986 over its non-
nuclear policy.66 The alliance retains strong elite and public support in Australia
and the country remains ‘dependent’ upon Washington for its ultimate national
defence, including the important function of the US nuclear capability to deter
armed attack upon its territory (‘extended deterrence’).67 Indeed, without American
military support Australia would need to raise its defence budget significantly, and
perhaps even contemplate developing an independent nuclear deterrent to secure
its national defence.68
Sustained Australian commitment and ‘loyalty’ to the alliance has been
demonstrated through its unfailing military contribution to coalitions led by the
USA in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the broader ‘War on Terror’ against
al-Qaeda/ISIS. The capabilities of the ADF are closely interoperable with those
of their American counterparts and utilise much of the same US technology.69
Australia also hosts a range of ‘joint facilities’ such as the Pine Gap intelligence
facility and ‘rotational’ deployment of the US Marine Air–Ground Task Force near
Darwin. Finally, recent white papers have indicated that Canberra is committed to
deepening its alliance interdependence through increased military integration.70 As
such, Canberra has been a resolute diplomatic supporter of US foreign and strategic
policy in a bid to ensure its own national security through the maintenance of
US primacy in Asia (e.g. through the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ strategy). This
is enshrined in Australian defence thinking as necessary ‘payment of an alliance
premium’ to assuage ‘fear of abandonment’, thus theoretically ensuring that the
USA reciprocates should Australia find itself under attack in some future
unspecified contingency.71
Yet, debates regarding the reliability and desirability of the US alliance have
been sparked when Washington has engaged in internationally controversial and
destabilising policies such as the invasion of Iraq or President Trump’s rejection of
international norms. Though bipartisan support for the alliance is resolute, and the
benefits are clearly enumerated above, the alliance is not without its academic and
political critics, many of whom point out that the ANZUS Treaty itself is less than
unequivocal about automatic American military support for Australia.72 Indeed,
the shifting power dynamics in Asia and President Trump’s disruptive ‘America
First’ foreign policy have demonstrated that ‘the credibility of US primacy has been
visibly diminished’.73 Some Australian analysts have consequently pondered if the
66 Hensley 2013.
67 Bell 1988.
68 Frühling 2018.
69 Dean, Frühling and Taylor 2016.
70 Department of Defence 2016; Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2017.
71 Gyngell 2017.
72 Fraser and Roberts 2014.
73 Bisley 2017, 45.
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attachment to the USA is removed from a clear appraisal of genuine Australian
national interests, and perhaps impedes the development of a more ‘independent’
or ‘mature’ foreign policy for the nation: ‘The long-term efforts binding Australia
to the US have decidedly narrowed Australia’s policy options’, according to Nick
Bisley.74
Moreover, the dominant concern is that unalloyed support for the USA raises
difficulties with Australia’s primary economic partner and rising regional power:
China. According to Dibb, ‘China wants to be acknowledged as the natural
hegemon of Asia and to see an end to America’s alliance system in the region,
including ANZUS’.75 Not only is Beijing on record as opposing the US bilateral
alliance system in the region, but, as USA–China rivalry sharpens, Canberra risks
being drawn into a conflict (‘entrapped’) in support of the USA, over a flashpoint
like Taiwan or the South China Sea.76 Hugh White, whose earlier work discussed
‘choosing’ between Washington (security) and Beijing (economy), points out that
the dependence upon the USA for protection is a fading asset as Chinese power
eclipses that of the USA in, at least, the Asian region.77 As such, the credibility
of American commitments in Asia are increasingly drawn into question, all while
Washington continues to demand greater support in return.
Conclusions
This chapter highlighted a range of key themes central to the thinking and practice
of Australian foreign and defence policy. Many of the long-term issues are familiar
– how to balance the US alliance with good international citizenship and Asian
engagement – but these issues may develop in new ways into the future, and new
pressing issues may emerge that create serious challenges to existing foreign policy
settings. The stresses between these central factors are increasing as US power
and purpose in the Indo-Pacific is undermined both by American policies and
structural decline (the end of ‘unipolarity’), but also by the rise of China and
other Asian powers, which will substantially reshape the regional environment that
Australia inhabits.
Added to this is the prospect that Australia itself will become relatively less
powerful over time and thus less able to influence events into the future – a fact
exacerbated by the diminution of the institutional apparatus, especially DFAT – and
the seemingly unstable pattern of government that has emerged in recent years.78 In
brief, though Australia will retain a strong state capacity, including military forces,
it will face the future from a weaker position than it has in the past. At the same
74 Bisley 2017, 52.
75 Dibb 2018.
76 Allison 2017.
77 White 2013; White 2017.
78 Lowy Institute 2018.
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time, Australian policy making has become increasingly ‘presidential’, with greater
power invested in the office of PM&C and increasingly ‘securitised’ through the
operation of multiple new or strengthened security/intelligence organs, mentioned
above. Shifts in the international environment and the domestic policy-making
terrain in Australia will combine to shape how foreign policy is directed in an
uncertain future, full of ‘wicked’ problems – i.e. challenges that defy easy resolution,
and often demand co-ordinated ‘whole of government’ responses. And yet Andrew
Phillips reminds us that ‘Australians have also proved remarkably adept in adjusting
to changing international circumstances’.79 Time will tell.
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Health policy
Ian McAuley
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A fundamental concern of governments is the health of their citizens, and all
governments have policies directed to, or having an effect on, people’s health. Most
policy concern is with health care – that is, the provision of services, ranging from
general practitioner (GP) consultations through to high-intensity care for those
suffering severe accidents or life-threatening diseases such as cancer.
But in terms of health outcomes – the capacity of people to enjoy many years
of healthy life – provision of health care is only one factor. Governments have
programs promoting healthy lifestyles to reduce the need for health care, and
almost all government policies contribute to or detract from people’s health directly
or indirectly.
Health care, however, tends to dominate policy considerations. For reasons to
do with social equity and failures of market mechanisms to deliver health care,
governments of all persuasions, ‘left’ or ‘right’, are heavily involved in health care,
McAuley, Ian (2019). Health policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher, David Clune,
Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds. Australian politics and
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which commands a large and growing proportion of government budgets. In
Australia one-fifth of government outlays are for health care.
Governments and the health of nations
Public health
Many government interventions that contribute to (or detract from) people’s health
take place in areas other than the health portfolio. Regulations such as those
applying to firearms, food safety, air quality and use of seat belts all have an effect on
health. So too do provision of infrastructure such as clean water and sewerage, and
town planning (do our cities encourage walking, are there enough playing fields?).
Policies to do with slowing the rate of climate change or mitigating its effects may
seem to be distant from health policy, but climate change can have profound effects
on the incidence of heat stress, food supply, the spread of diseases, air quality,
natural disasters and dislocation of entire populations.1
Then there are specific measures that are generally described as ‘public health’.
These include vaccinations, and campaigns on safe sex, discouragement of smoking
and on responsible use of alcohol. The reach of a government’s ‘health’ portfolio
varies between states or other divisions within nations: governments may, for
example, include sport in the health portfolio.
Social determinants of health – unsung but effective policies
Sound health and socio-economic conditions are strongly correlated. Those who
enjoy connections to the community, well-paid and meaningful work, social
support and control over their lives enjoy better health than those who don’t.
The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) points out that ‘people in
lower socio-economic groups are at greater risk of poor health, have higher rates
of illness, disability and death, and live shorter lives than those in higher socio-
economic groups’.2
Correlation does not prove causation: those who suffer poor health cannot
easily find well-paid employment, for example. But there is strong evidence that
there is also causation in the other direction: people’s health over their lifetimes
is influenced by their socio-economic conditions. Among what are known as the
‘social determinants of health’ are early childhood development, education attain-
ment, people’s occupation (those with more control over their work enjoy better
health), job and financial security, and people’s degree of social integration.3
1 McMichael 2017.
2 AIHW 2018a, 256.
3 Wilkinson and Marmot 2003.
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Figure 1 Life expectancy at birth and health spending per capita, 43 countries. Source: data
from OECD 2017, data as for chart 3.3, page 49, excluding South Africa.
There is also evidence that those who live in societies with more economic
inequality, regardless of their individual income or wealth, have poorer health
than those in more equal societies.4 Therefore policies relating to early childhood
education, employment, and income distribution, which may be distant from the
health portfolio, can have a profound effect on people’s physical and mental health.
There is also evidence that once countries reach a high level of prosperity, and
have been able to afford significant spending on health care, additional spending
has diminishing returns. Figure 1, derived from Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) data for 43 middle- and high-income
countries, shows the relation between health spending per capita (predominantly
health care) and life expectancy, with certain countries, including Australia,
marked. Apart from the USA, all countries in the right-hand two-thirds of that
graph have much the same life expectancy, even though spending varies by a factor
of about two to one. The USA, it can be seen, does not appear to have achieved good
value-for-money spent on health care – an ongoing issue with dysfunctions in its
private health insurance model.
This is not to underplay the importance of devoting resources – government
or private – to health care, but it is a reminder that while policies to do with
health care command attention in the political arena, in high-income countries like
Australia people’s health is influenced by many policies other than those within the
health portfolio.
4 Wilkinson and Pickett 2009.
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Australia’s health
By world standards Australians enjoy good health, but so do those who live in
other high-income ‘developed’ countries. Australians’ life expectancy at birth, a key
indicator of a nation’s health, is close to the highest in the world.5
An important factor contributing to Australia’s good health is its young
population. Most high-income countries have an aged population, but in Australia’s
case a sustained high rate of immigration has kept our population comparatively
young. In 2018 the median age of Australians was 39; by contrast the median
age of Italians, Japanese and Germans was above 45.6 Our comparatively young
population has kept demand for expenditure on health care under control. Also,
because immigration policies are selective, immigrants tend to be healthier than the
Australian-born population.
Nationwide indicators such as life expectancy can mask significant variations
within population groups, however. Indicators of ‘disease burden’ show that people
living in non-metropolitan regions have significantly poorer health and die younger
than those in cities. Indigenous Australians have around 10 years lower life expect-
ancy than other Australians (although the gap is closing) and they experience high
rates of child mortality (twice the national average).
In terms of health risk factors Australia scores well on smoking but poorly on
obesity (28 per cent of Australians aged 15 and over are obese), and our alcohol
consumption is high by international standards.7
Mental health has become an area of increasing policy concern in recent years.
According to the AIHW almost half of Australians between the ages of 16 and
85 ‘will experience a mental disorder such as depression, anxiety or substance use
disorder at some stage in their life’.8
Mental health disorders tend to peak in late teenage years, but for almost all
other conditions the prevalence of poor health is strongly correlated with age.
Readers of this textbook are probably among those least likely to have more than
occasional first-hand experience with health care services. Figure 2 shows the
incidence of Medicare services (consultations with GPs and specialists, operations,
and certain services provided by other health professionals) by age.
Government involvement in health care
Within health portfolios governments’ main concerns are generally about the
funding of health care – either through public budgets (such as Australia’s
Medicare) or through private insurance, which is generally subject to regulation,
tax concessions or direct subsidies. Also in some cases, most notably state
5 OECD 2017.
6 World Population Review 2018.
7 AIHW 2018a.
8 AIHW 2018a, 83.
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Figure 2 Medicare services per capita by age group, 2011–12. Source: data from
Department of Health 2019, Medicare statistics 2011–12.
government-owned public hospitals, governments are involved in delivering health
care. It is notable that what passes for public debate on health care often confuses
governments’ roles in funding and providing health care.
There are two broad principles driving government involvement. First, people
seek some mechanism to share their outlays for health care through insurance,
public or private. And second, there are reasons why there would be socially and
economically unacceptable outcomes if health care were left to private markets.
Community-rated health insurance
In times long past, those who could not afford health care went without, or
depended on the meagre offerings of charities. Colonial governments financed
services to provide care ‘for the hospital care or indigent class of the community’,
but such services provided in public hospitals were basic.9 Also medical prac-
titioners would see it as a noblesse oblige (the paternalistic idea that those with
means had an unwritten obligation to help the less fortunate) to provide care for
the poor.
There has been a slow transition in health care from a ‘charity’ model, whereby
the poor or those with high needs had to rely on religious or similar charitable
institutions, to one of community sharing, whereby through contributions to
insurance-type arrangements, or through taxes, communities share all or part of
their health care expenses. The first mutual benefit societies developed in New
South Wales in the 1830s, but they covered only a minority of the population. It
9 Sax 1984, 25.
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wasn’t until the period after 1945 that mechanisms for widespread sharing of health
care costs were developed with increasing levels of government involvement.
Worldwide the development was along two paths. One path, in Britain and
the Nordic countries, was for governments to take the prime role in funding, and
in some cases providing, tax-financed health care for all. Many other European
countries relied more on mutual benefit societies, which slowly extended their
reach to become not-for-profit health insurers. The USA, by contrast, relied on
insurance provided by for-profit companies. Some countries’ policies were guided
by the principle that whatever one’s means, health care would be accessible to
everyone on the same terms (‘universalism’) while others directed health care
funding more at the poor or indigent, using means tests.
Much is written on the difference between these funding systems. There are,
indeed, important differences: in particular America’s reliance on for-profit
insurance has resulted in that country having high-cost health care and in many
people being uncovered. (As a proportion of GDP, America’s total health care
costs, private and government, are the highest of all OECD countries, and almost
double the OECD average.10) But there are also important similarities in different
countries’ policies, the strongest being people’s choice, generally backed through
political processes, to share health care costs with one another, through some form
of insurance, private or public.
Whatever our ‘left’ or ‘right’ political orientation, our acceptance or otherwise
of the outcomes of competitive markets, and whatever our general norms on
sharing, for health care we tend to be communal in our values, and we seek
mechanisms of sharing and redistribution.
Individuals may believe that because they have good education and the reserves
of accumulated savings they can weather most economic contingencies, but when
it comes to health care most people have little knowledge of their risks. No matter
how fit we are, life-changing illness or accident can occur at any time.
For our health care needs we are in what philosopher John Rawls calls an
‘original position’.11 When people are asked to choose the rules which should
govern the distribution of wealth and income in a society, but when they don’t
know what place they will occupy in that society, they are in an ‘original position’.
In such situations people tend to favour rules that result in some degree of levelling
– a redistribution from the well-off to the not so well-off.
At first sight there seems to be a simple way to fill this need: if people seek
to share their health care costs with one another, then they should be free to do
so through private insurance or through mutual societies. But such laissez faire
arrangements fail to meet community needs.
In the comparatively unregulated markets of general insurance, where we
insure our houses and cars, markets can work reasonably well. Insurance firms,
10 OECD 2017.
11 Rawls 1971.
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using indicators of risk, charge according to those indicators. Someone with a safe
driving record pays a lower premium than someone with a string of accidents and
offences. This practice is known as ‘risk rating’.
But risk rating for health insurance would be extremely difficult because for
many high-cost contingencies there are no clear risk indicators: debilitating
conditions such as cancer can occur without any prior indicators.
The other main problem with risk-rated health insurance is political unaccept-
ability. Private insurers would set prohibitively high premiums for older people,
and could refuse to cover people who have pre-existing chronic conditions, who
work in hazardous occupations or who have known risk factors. This would be
unacceptable by most people’s norms of social justice, remembering that the poor
are often those with highest health care needs.
Therefore, through political processes that override market mechanisms,
governments generally intervene to achieve what is known as ‘community rating’
for health insurance. That is a system where there is partial or complete equalisation
of insurance premiums across the community, or even forms of subsidies from
those with low needs to those with high needs.
Government-financed ‘single-payer’ systems, such as those in the Nordic
countries, the UK and Canada, achieve community rating through their taxation
systems. In terms of administrative costs these are by far the most efficient systems,
because they tap into the scale economies and powers of compulsion of the taxation
system, and to the extent that their taxation systems are progressive they achieve an
equitable distribution of health care financing.
Achieving community rating through private insurance is more difficult.
Private insurers incur high administrative costs, including the costs of competing
for customers, and the regulations that are designed to achieve community rating
are complex, often leading to perverse incentives.
Public or private insurance
It may seem odd that many governments should choose to use private insurance to
do what the tax and public expenditure system, with all its controls and account-
ability, can do more efficiently and equitably. When private health insurance is
compulsory (as in Japan and the Netherlands), or highly subsidised and incentivised
(as in Australia), it can be considered as a ‘privatised tax’. In terms of the impact on
people’s pockets, there is little difference between a tax collected by a body such as
the Australian Taxation Office and a compulsory or near-compulsory payment to
a health insurer: a cut in official taxes may be more than offset by a rise in private
health insurance premiums.
The explanation lies partially in the politics of public accounting. Governments
are often driven by a simplistic agenda of keeping taxes (official taxes as revealed
in public budgets) low, and politically it is easier to blame private insurers for high
and rising premiums.
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But even in countries ideologically committed to private mechanisms,
governments still become involved in at least partially funding health care. Table 1
shows how health care is funded in high-income ‘developed’ countries.
Whatever form insurance takes, those seeking health care usually have to
make some out-of-pocket outlays. Such payments may be in the form of a fixed
partial contribution (as with pharmaceuticals in Australia) or in the form of
payments that accumulate before the insurer, usually a government insurer, covers
all or a large part of further expenses. In high-income ‘developed’ countries,
including Australia, out-of-pocket expenses are generally around one-fifth of total
health care expenditure, although they can vary tremendously between different
services.
Market failures in health care
Government involvement in health care isn’t just about achieving some form of
equity through community rating. There are also ‘market failures’ in the provision
of health care. In the economists’ model of well-functioning competitive markets
there are many conditions to be satisfied, including easy and free exchange of
information between suppliers and customers, and the absence of monopolisation
or concentration of market power. Markets for clothes and fresh fruit come close
to the ideal competitive model, but health care is far removed from it in three
important ways.
First it is almost impossible for consumers to judge the quality of services on
offer. Although there is no shortage of websites with health advice, in health care
the consumer is generally in a position where he or she must place a high degree
of trust in the professional judgement, education and expertise of the medical
practitioners or other health professionals providing services. Economists refer to
this as a situation of ‘information asymmetry’.
Second, there is the potential for service providers, particularly medical
specialists with highly specific skills, to exert a high degree of market power. We
expect medical specialists to be well qualified, with tough university admission
requirements and many years of rigorous training. This, in itself, makes for scarce
supply, and when the professional bodies themselves have some power over
accreditation they can restrict supply even further. Such supply limitations give
service providers the power to set high prices.
Similarly for pharmaceuticals there is an inbuilt degree of market power
enjoyed by large corporations. Bringing a new pharmaceutical to market involves
large outlays on science and discovery and on clinical trials, easily running into
hundreds of millions of dollars. In order to encourage firms to make such
investments, governments offer pharmaceutical firms patent protection – usually
in the order of 20 years. Without patent protection there would be little incentive
for development of new medicines, but with patent protection pharmaceutical
firms would be able to use their market power to charge very high prices for
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Table 1 Health care funding by source of funds (%), 2015
Government
schemes
Compulsory
health
insurance
Voluntary
health
insurance
Out-of-
pocket
Other Total
1 Denmark 84 0 2 14 0 100
2 Sweden 84 0 1 15 1 100
3 UK 80 0 3 15 2 100
4 Norway 74 11 0 14 0 100
5 New
Zealand
71 9 5 13 3 100
6 Ireland 70 0 12 15 3 100
7 Canada 69 1 13 15 2 100
8 Australia 67 0 10 20 4 100
9 Finland 61 13 3 20 3 100
10 Iceland 52 29 0 17 2 100
11 Austria 31 45 5 18 2 100
12 USA 27 23 35 11 4 100
13 Switzerland 22 42 7 28 1 100
14 Belgium 18 59 5 18 0 100
15 Netherlands 9 71 6 12 1 100
16 Luxembourg 9 73 6 11 1 100
17 Japan 9 75 2 13 1 100
18 Germany 7 78 1 13 2 100
19 France 4 75 14 7 1 100
Source: OECD Health Statistics (http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.htm),
data for high income OECD countries (GDP per capita > $US $40 000 in 2017 at PPP).
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pharmaceuticals. Therefore as a quid pro quo for patent protection governments
generally intervene to control prices pharmaceutical firms can charge.
Third, when transactions are covered by insurance – public insurance such as
Medicare or private health insurance through commercial or mutual bodies – there
are incentives for both users and providers for overuse. When a service is free or
heavily subsidised at the point of provision, the price signals which act as rationing
mechanisms in most markets are absent. Economists refer to this phenomenon by
the quaint term ‘moral hazard’.
Health economists argue about the extent of moral hazard in health care. Most
(but not all) health care procedures involve some pain or discomfort, which tends
to rule out frivolous demand on the consumer side. And there is evidence that even
modest prices can deter people from using therapeutically necessary services.12
An enduring debate among health economists has been about the appropriate-
ness of what is known as ‘fee-for-service’ health care. Fee-for-service care is a
familiar and established system of payment, particularly for outpatient services.
In Australia Medicare pays medical practitioners fixed fees for defined items of
service. A common such service is ‘Item 23’ on the Medicare benefits schedule – a
GP consultation of less than 20 minutes.
Some argue that fee-for-service encourages overservicing by practitioners and
overdependence on health care by patients, suggesting in their place that other
forms of payment should be used, such as what is known as ‘capitation’, where a
medical practitioner or health clinic is paid according to the number of people
in their catchment area (adjusted for age and known risk factors). Unsurprisingly
critics of capitation argue that it can provide incentives for under-servicing.
Drivers of health care expenditure
Whichever measure is used – real expenditure per capita or expenditure as a
proportion of GDP – health care expenditure is rising in almost all countries.
During 2003 to 2016 real per-capita health care expenditure growth in OECD
countries averaged 2.4 per cent a year, a rate that would see a doubling every 30
years.13 Australia’s growth in health care expenditure has been only a little lower.14
Because governments directly fund a large proportion of health care, and try to
control the prices charged by regulated insurers and by those with market power,
rising health care expenditure is a significant political concern.
The main driver of expenditure growth is usage, rather than the cost per
service. So long as services are free or heavily subsidised at the point of delivery,
there will be some pressure for overuse.
12 Corscadden et al. 2017.
13 OECD 2017.
14 AIHW 2018b.
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Unless there is an increase in the supply of resources dedicated to providing
health care, the result of unmet demand will be ‘queuing’. People will find they
cannot make an immediate GP appointment and people with non-urgent needs
will be put on to hospital waiting lists while more important cases are attended
to. Although waiting times command media attention and political criticism (the
media often confuse queue lengths with waiting times), a health care system in
which everyone could be attended to immediately is neither practical nor afford-
able. A waiting list allows scarce and expensive resources (medical specialists,
nurses, diagnostic equipment) to be allocated to those who benefit the most. If
there were so much spare capacity and those resources were underutilised for want
of demand, that would be wasteful.
As we age we use more health care, and Australia’s population, although young
by world standards, is ageing. Over the long term Australians are having fewer
babies, immigration as a proportion of the population is falling, and we are living
longer. It should be noted, however, that older Australians now are much healthier
than they were a generation or two ago. Some health care costs, such as those
associated with treatment of cancer, tend to be concentrated in the last few years of
life, and if we live longer those costs are deferred.
Another driver of health care costs, often mentioned, is new technology. In
most industries new technologies result in unit cost reduction, and it is certainly
the case in health care, as in other industries, that information and communication
technologies have helped reduce administrative costs. But there is also a flow of
expensive technologies that offer new opportunities to diagnose or cure diseases
or to ameliorate their effect, particularly pharmaceuticals. Technologies based on
genetic manipulation and bespoke treatment for individuals are just emerging.
Some technologies that have developed and been refined in recent years, such
as magnetic resource imaging (MRI), allow for earlier detection of conditions
than would have been possible in times past. Early detection of conditions can
save lives, allowing for timely and low-cost interventions (such as the removal of
small cancerous growths) or can promote changes in lifestyle. But such diagnostic
improvements can also lead to excess treatment of conditions that pose little threat
in themselves, such as slow-growing tumours that would be overtaken by other
causes of death.
Achieving value-for-money in health care
Both in their own role in funding health care, and in their broader role in helping
people make well-informed decisions with their individual resources (a consumer
protection function), governments are concerned with achieving value-for-money
in health care.
A prime concern is to ensure that health care interventions – pharmaceuticals,
operations – are effective. Do they achieve what they are intended to achieve?
Clinical trials of pharmaceuticals are about establishing a new drug’s effectiveness,
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including detection of unexpected or undesirable side-effects. Similarly, there can
be evaluations of operations to find which surgical procedures are most effective or
whether pharmaceutical treatments can substitute for surgery, for example.
As a general rule, governments seek evidence on the effectiveness of health
care interventions. The gold standard, as in other areas of public administration, is
‘evidence-based policy’. But it is a tough standard in health care. Research is difficult
and expensive, in part because there are not standard conditions and there are not
standard procedures. And there are ethical considerations in experiments involving
people: is it ethical to conduct control experiments in which some patients are
given one form of operation while others are given another form?
Even when the effectiveness of a form of treatment is established, the question
of value-for-money arises. A new pharmaceutical may be very effective in pro-
longing the life of cancer sufferers, but if the drug is very expensive, and if the
prolongation of life is only short, could scarce public money be better directed to
where more health benefits could be enjoyed?
Such considerations concern the basis of policy-makers’ job assignment in a
democracy. In the regulations they design or implement, or in the advice they give
governments, can they differentiate between the needs of different people? Can they
make hard and cold evaluations that would lead to a certain person being denied
a life-extending pharmaceutical so that a limited budget can be spent on suicide
prevention for adolescents for example?
In one frame, such considerations involve the policy maker having to say one
life is worth more than another. In another frame, however, it is simply a question
of the best allocation of scarce resources. A road authority with a limited budget
and a brief to make roads safer would be remiss if that money were not spent on
areas where the best outcomes could be achieved. Similarly, in evaluating health
interventions, policy makers strive to find value-for-money in terms of outcomes.
Such is the essence of cost–benefit analysis, a basic technique in the policy maker’s
toolbox.
What therapies give the best outcomes and what do they cost? One measure is
to consider how many extra years of life, on average, result from a therapy with a
given cost. A more refined analysis is to apply some weighting based on the quality
of those life-years. One such metric is the health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE)
– the average time an individual can live without disease or injury.15 Another is the
quality-adjusted life year (QALY), where a weight between 0 (death) and 1 (ideal
health) is assigned, and yet another is the disability-adjusted life year (DALY).
While such metrics implicitly put a value on life, the Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare (AIHW) qualifies the use of such metrics with the statement:
‘However, the use of health state preferences and DALY or QALY measures to
quantify loss of health or health gain carries no implication that society will
15 AIHW 2017a.
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necessarily choose the maximisation of health gain as the main or only goal for the
health system.’16
Whatever form of evaluation is used, it is probable that in coming years, as
techniques of data capture and analysis improve, more evaluative material will
become available in the health systems.
The changing nature of health care – from acute conditions to chronic conditions
Partly as a result of changed lifestyles, and partly as a result of new therapies, the
nature of health care has been changing over the long term.
Over most of the 20th century health care was mainly about curing what
are known as ‘acute’ conditions, such as infections and injuries. As new pharma-
ceuticals became available, and as regimes of treatment improved, conditions which
were once fatal became curable, or at least manageable. For example, in the 50
years to 2017, the cardiovascular disease death rate in Australia has fallen by 82
per cent.17 Some of this improvement is because of lifestyle improvement, some is
because of early detection, and some is because of clinical management of people
with heart disease or risk factors.
This means that many more people, particularly as they age, are living with
conditions that in earlier periods would not have been survivable. Much of the
task of health care has been a shift from curing acute conditions to management of
‘chronic’ conditions such as diabetes, hypertension and dementia.
As people live longer with manageable chronic conditions, the boundary
between health care and care of the aged becomes less clear. This blurring of
boundaries is described by a former head of the Health Department as a ‘major
shift in demand underway because of Australia’s ageing population, with chronic
illness and the frail aged now dominating the burden of disease’.18 In high-income
countries, while heart disease and stroke remain the leading eventual causes of
death, the incidence of death from Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease and
other dementia has trebled over 20 years.19
The political economy of health care
Australia’s set of health care arrangements is complex – so complex that it would
be inaccurate to call it a ‘system’. The term ‘system’ implies a degree of deliberate
design to ensure that all the parts come together and that they operate according to
the same principles. But Australia’s health care arrangements are fragmented, each
of the main parts having its own provenance.
16 Mathers, Vos and Stevenson 1999, 12.
17 AIHW 2017b.
18 Podger 2018, 197.
19 WHO 2018.
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These arrangements have been shaped by competing ideologies, competing
interest groups, the inertia of established practices, historical division of
Commonwealth–state responsibilities, and constraints imposed by interpretations
of the Australian Constitution.
Civil conscription and the British Medical Association
Although the Commonwealth had been involved in public health and in health
care for soldiers and veterans, it was in the postwar years that it was to become
strongly involved in health care. Well before the Pacific War ended, the federal
government had been planning a comprehensive national welfare scheme that was
to include health services, a basic feature of which was provision for a salaried
(rather than fee-for-service) medical service, similar in ways to Britain’s National
Health Service.
Such an extension of Commonwealth powers met with fierce opposition from
the British Medical Association (BMA), the organisation representing Australia’s
medical practitioners. Calling on the emotionally charged conflicts about military
conscription in the 1914–18 war, the BMA presented the idea of a UK-style single-
payer national scheme as a form of ‘civil conscription’.
Partly to buy peace from the BMA, and partly to consolidate its authority,
following a High Court disallowance of the Commonwealth’s authority to make
laws on certain social services, the Chifley Labor government put forward a
constitutional amendment to give the Commonwealth powers to make laws for
‘the provision of maternity allowances, widows’ pensions, child endowment,
unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental
services (but not so as to authorise any form of civil conscription), benefits to
students and family allowances’. The amendment, with its ‘no conscription’ carve-
out, was easily passed.
At the same time the Menzies Liberal opposition was strongly opposed to any
tax-funded scheme, preferring a contributory scheme for health insurance.
Hence were established the ideological and interest-group divisions which
frame health policy to the present.
The other constraint on coherent policy has been division of Commonwealth–
state responsibilities, because long before the Commonwealth even existed the
states were involved in funding and providing public hospitals.
So rather than a coherent, integrated health system, with all components
working together under the same design principles, Australia has a set of
arrangements, some private sector, some government, some Commonwealth, some
state, some free at the point of delivery, some with out-of-pocket expenses, some
universal, some means-tested. They come together in a process that health
economist Sidney Sax called ‘a strife of interests’.20
20 Sax 1984.
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Seventy years of muddling through
Charles Lindblom coined the term ‘muddling through’ to describe a policy
development process whereby policy makers build on what has gone before, even
if the resulting policy does not align with what they have designed from a blank
slate.21 It’s analogous to the way a series of additions may be made to an old house,
in preference to pulling it down and starting from scratch.
While the Chifley government was thwarted in its attempts to develop a
universal tax-funded health system, in 1948 it managed to introduce the
Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), initially providing a limited number of
free life-saving and disease-preventing drugs, using the purchasing power of
government to secure reasonable prices. The Menzies (Liberal–Country Party
Coalition) government, elected in 1949, pragmatically retained and extended the
PBS, and, apart from the introduction of a co-payment in 1959, the essential
architecture of the PBS remains largely unchanged.
An important provision of the PBS is the use of cost–benefit analysis to decide
the price at which pharmaceuticals will be listed and therefore subsidised. If the
supplier cannot meet the Commonwealth’s price, the drug does not become listed.
Because the manufacturing cost of most drugs is low, most companies agree to
listing at the Commonwealth price. Pharmaceuticals are similar to computer
software, in that almost all of the cost is in development, while the per-unit cost is
very low.
This is the only case of the Commonwealth using its purchasing power to set
prices and to regulate what will and will not be paid for or subsidised. Politically
it’s easier to take on the largely foreign pharmaceutical firms rather than the local
medical lobby.
The next major initiative was by the Whitlam (Labor) government, in office
from 1972 to 1975. It introduced a universal tax-funded scheme known as
‘Medibank’ (not to be confused with the private insurance firm of the same name).
Its main elements were free access to public hospitals and a range of other services,
most notably free or heavily subsidised access to medical services. Medical
practitioners would be paid on a fee-for-service basis, and would remain in private
practice, thus avoiding the ‘no conscription’ constraint. Hospitals and their funding
remained under state control, with funding negotiated in a series of agreements
between the Commonwealth and the states.
When it was introduced to parliament Medibank met with furious opposition,
from the medical lobbies, the private health insurers and the Coalition opposition
who effectively controlled the numbers in the Senate. Medibank became law only
in 1974 following a double dissolution election and a joint sitting of parliament.
The Fraser (Coalition) government, in office from 1975 to 1983, demolished
Medibank in a series of small steps, and by 1979 health funding had essentially
21 Lindblom 1959.
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reverted to the pre-1974 model, relying on private insurance. Publicly funded
medical benefits were reduced, free access to public hospitals was restricted to those
meeting means tests, and an income tax rebate of 32 per cent was introduced for
people with private health insurance.
The Hawke–Keating (Labor) government, elected in 1983, reintroduced
Medibank under the name ‘Medicare’, and eliminated subsidies for private health
insurance. Private health insurance had achieved 68 per cent coverage under the
previous government’s incentives. By the time the Hawke–Keating government lost
office in 1996, coverage had fallen to 33 per cent.
The Howard (Coalition) government set about restoring a raft of incentives to
support private health insurance, many of which were designed to entice younger
people to take insurance to subsidise older members. Almost straight away
coverage rose to 45 per cent of the population and it peaked at 47 per cent in 2015
before starting to fall back. The Howard government’s reversal of Labor’s policy
was less severe than the reversal that had occurred under the Fraser government:
notably it did not apply a means test to access public hospitals, which remained
free, but there was a subtle expectation, encouraged by taxation incentives, that
the better-off would use private insurance to buy private care in private hospitals.
Ideologically it was a partial shift from health care as a universal service, to a service
for the needy, sometimes referred to as a ‘two-tier’ system.
The Rudd–Gillard (Labor) government, in office from 2007 to 2013,
maintained support for private insurance and the Abbott–Turnbull–Morrison
(Coalition) government essentially maintained the status quo. The election of 2016
had seen the retention of Medicare as a major issue.
Labor governments are inclined to stress universalism as a principle
underpinning health care policy. That is, the idea that all should have access to
health care, regardless of means, and that clinical need rather than income or
wealth should determine allocation of scarce resources. Coalition governments
tend to stress ‘choice’, and the idea that government services should be more
directed to those in need. Some policy analysts tend to classify health care policy
as ‘social expenditure’, evaluating it in terms of equity outcomes, while others tend
to see health care in terms of correcting market failure, assessing it on economic
criteria.
The muddle
While in most high-income ‘developed’ countries there is a degree of stability in
health care financing, that is not the case in Australia. A series of policy reversals,
modifying but not redesigning existing policies, has left Australia with a patchwork
and complex set of arrangements.
Figure 3 shows one face of this complexity – the ways different health care
programs are funded. In aggregate terms Australians draw on governments, mainly
the Commonwealth, for about 70 per cent of their health care costs, private insurers
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Figure 3 Health expenditure by source of funds, 2016–17. Source: data from AIHW 2018b,
table A3. Recurrent expenditure only, not including research, administration, public health
and funding from other sources comprising 3% of expenditure.
for another 10 per cent, and their own pockets for the remaining 20 per cent.
But this varies tremendously between programs. Public hospitals are essentially
free, funded through joint Commonwealth–state agreements. For pharmaceuticals,
patients must make a capped co-payment, with the co-payments varying according
to patients’ means. For dental services, most of the payment is from patients’
own funds, with some through subsidised private insurance and programs for
targeted groups. Private hospitals are funded mainly through private insurance, the
Commonwealth contribution a set of subsidies which make up about a third of the
net cost.
Such complexity inevitably leads to duplicated bureaucracies and high trans-
action costs. It leads to gaming and perverse incentives when different government
agencies (sometimes in different tiers of government) try to meet their own
financial targets by shifting costs to different programs. For example, payments for
pharmaceuticals come out of state budgets for patients in state hospitals, but out of
the Commonwealth-funded PBS for others. And it probably leads to people seeking
some care from services that are free or low-cost at the point of delivery (either
through Medicare or private insurance), when other services with higher out-of-
pocket costs would be more efficient in terms of overall costs and benefits.
Further, a lack of system integration means that people do not receive the
timely attention. The Productivity Commission reported in 2015 an opportunity to
get far more out of our health system through better use of measures that come
into play before people become involved in expensive hospitalisation.22 Effective
22 Productivity Commission 2015.
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promotion of healthy lifestyles can reduce the overall demands on health care.
Similarly, well-designed primary care – particularly care by GPs – can avoid some
hospitalisations.23
Then there are problems in defining ‘health care’ and therefore what procedures
are to be eligible for public subsidy. Should dietary supplements be included?
Gyms? Acupuncture? Should some presently subsidised procedures be excluded?
The boundary enclosing ‘health care’ can never be well defined, because it is
determined not only by cost–benefit considerations, but also by community values.
Each part of our health care arrangements may be working well, but the
concern of the Productivity Commission and of many health economists is whether
these arrangements are coming together in the best way.
Those who are familiar with economic concepts would recognise the issue as
one of the difference between technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Each part
may be operating in the most cost-effective way possible – that is, they may be
achieving technical efficiency – but there could possibly be better outcomes overall
if there were some reallocation of resources to achieve better performance from an
overall perspective. That would be an improvement in allocative efficiency.
For example, there have been great strides in use of what are known as
‘diagnostic related group’ or ‘casemix’ payments in the way governments pay for
public hospital services. Although the staff themselves may be salaried, the relevant
state government pays a set amount for each defined procedure – so much for
surgical treatment of a heart attack, so much for a caesarean section, and so on. It’s
a form of ‘output-based funding’, aimed at making sure hospitals achieve best value-
for-money or technical efficiency.
But even if public hospitals are doing as well as they can in terms of technical
efficiency, it is still possible that there could be better health outcomes if more
resources could be put into primary care or into promotion and prevention.
Managerialist techniques concerned with efficiency in individual parts of a system
can distract attention from the need to attend to the performance of the entire
system, can lead to cost-shifting, and can often lead to a sub-optimal allocation of
resources.
Improvements in technical efficiency will probably proceed with uptake of
administrative technologies (where the health care sector still has some need for
catch-up), such as electronic health records and better use of data, but there will
always be constraints imposed by privacy concerns and the need for individual
attention. Some aspects of health care, particularly where health care merges into
aged care, will remain labour intensive, which means that as other sectors become
lower-cost through labour-replacing technology, the cost of health care may rise
faster than costs in other sectors of the economy, with implications for funding.
Economists know this phenomenon as the ‘Baumol effect’.24
23 Starfield 2005.
24 Baumol and Bowen 1966.
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Conclusions
Despite inconsistencies, boundary problems and messy funding, Australians
achieve good health outcomes. In an evaluation of the health care arrangements in
11 high-income countries, the Commonwealth Fund gave Australia fourth place –
behind the UK, Switzerland and Sweden. Australia scores well on quality of care,
but comparatively poorly on access. The access problems in Australia relate mainly
to costs and difficulties paying medical bills, particularly relating to co-payments in
private insurance.25
Many decades of incrementalism have delivered Australia a set of arrangements
which work, but which, by most measures, could work better if the parts could be
brought together as an integrated system, particularly in terms of Commonwealth–
state divisions and in developing more coherent and equitable funding arrangements.
The adjustment of our arrangements from a focus on acute care to one based
on chronic care is ongoing. Also there is still a slow transition from what once was
a labour-intensive set of individual professional practices to a more technology-
intensive service industry model, which will still have to meet community
expectations of high-quality individual care and compassion. Some emerging
technologies, based on genetic manipulation, could have profound effects on our
health care arrangements, as well as opening up new ethical questions.
There may be scope for those with means to contribute more from their own
pockets to their own health care. This is a normative question, which needs to be
put to the community. Australians may opt for more sharing, or they may opt to
pay more from their own pockets.
Whatever the outcome of such deliberations, there will almost certainly be a
need to provide more collective funding for those with high needs or limited means.
If governments are determined to pursue a ‘small government’ policy, they will
probably try to achieve this collective funding through private health insurance,
in spite of its costs and difficulties in achieving community rating, cost control
and administrative efficiency. Otherwise the most equitable and efficient means of
funding growing health care expenditure is through higher taxes.
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Australia has been shaped by immigration. Nearly half of today’s Australian
population consists of immigrants born elsewhere or their first-generation
descendants. As a consequence of its pattern of immigration, Australia is also
a multicultural country. This chapter examines the policy evolution that has
produced this situation. It also examines the distinctive political dynamics of the
policy-making process pertaining to immigration and multiculturalism.
What’s at stake?
Immigration and multicultural policies directly shape Australia’s social composition
and the social relations between and within its constituent communities. At the
national level, the immigration policy settings mould the evolution of Australia’s
overall ethnic character, an impact which can stir deep emotions. Over time,
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immigration numbers and the resultant multicultural transformation of the elec-
torate have affected the nature of Australian political processes.
At the community level, immigration and multicultural policies shape and
structure a potentially awkward social and political balance. On the one hand,
there is a need to respect the multiple ethnic, cultural and religious identities
with which Australians collectively now identify. On the other hand, harmonious
and productive intercultural relations among Australians depend on some
transcendence of these particularistic identities.
While it is shaping Australian society at its broadest levels, the implementation
of immigration policy is also deeply personal for those affected. People’s life
trajectories are potentially transformed by the decisions emerging from the
administrative process established by the policy parameters.
Characteristics of this policy domain
Probably more than in most policy domains, an appreciation of the historical
evolution of immigration policy is needed for a full understanding of the challenges
and dilemmas characterising today’s policy debates.
Historical context
The history of Australian immigration policy implementation is embodied in the
sequence of annual ‘net immigration’ numbers, encompassing more than a century
and a half, reported in Figure 1. ‘Net immigration’ here means the number admitted
to Australia each year less the number recorded as emigrating out of Australia in
the same year.
The sequence in Figure 1 begins in the early 1860s, a period when a ‘White
Australia’ policy was becoming established. Until the late 1940s, periods of
substantial net immigration were episodic and intermittent. These immigrants
came almost entirely from the British Isles, including Ireland, and can be described
in ethnic terms as Anglo-Celtic. They and their descendants overwhelmed the
Indigenous population and established the basic political institutions and processes
which Australia still features.
There were some exceptions to the Anglo-Celtic predominance (such as
German and Italian immigrants) but the most notable perceived challenge was the
arrival of a significant number of Chinese during the gold rushes of the 1850s.
It was this challenge which led the Australian colonies, and from 1901 the new
Australian government, to formalise the so-called White Australia policy. The
policy precluded immigrants from Asia and later proscribed the continued use
of indentured Pacific Islander labour. Various motivations explain why the White
Australia policy was adopted; these include the protection of wages and working
conditions from the potential impact of low-wage competition as well as a racist
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or ethnocentric distaste for population diversity.1 The USA and Canada, likewise
emerging in this period as prominent immigration-based ‘new world’ nations,
adopted similar policies.
Significant change began in the late 1940s. The Chifley Labor government,
followed by supportive Coalition governments thereafter, embarked on a mass
immigration program that transformed Australia. The change instigated in the late
1940s is clearly visible in Figure 1 as an immigration surge that continues today.
Britain was no longer the exclusive source; the new immigrants also came from a
wide range of European countries, beginning with postwar refugees from eastern
Europe, followed by substantial numbers from northern and later southern Europe
(most notably, Italy and Greece). From the mid-1960s, the admission of small
numbers from Asia signalled a quiet abandonment of the White Australia policy.2
The modern period
In 1973, the Whitlam Labor government formally discontinued the White Australia
policy.3 It also instituted a new domestic policy of multiculturalism which,
overturning a rhetoric of assimilation which had accompanied the post-1940s
ethnic diversification, celebrated Australia’s growing cultural diversity.
Immigration numbers surged again under the Fraser Coalition government
from 1976. It was the Fraser government that elaborated the aspirational notion of
multiculturalism into a range of policies supporting ethnic communities.
This period also saw the formalisation of the immigration policy regime which,
in essence, still prevails today. It involves selection criteria which do not formally
discriminate on the basis of race or national origin. It also involves three principal
selection categories permitting immigrant admission on the basis of occupational
skills (measured by a ‘points test’ scoring such factors as qualifications, English-
language proficiency and age), family connections (mainly admitting the spouses,
fiancées and dependent children of Australian residents) and humanitarian con-
siderations (including refugees as narrowly defined under international conventions
and others deemed in humanitarian need). This formally non-discriminatory and
category-focused immigration system has now been in place in Australia for more
than 40 years. The social impact of Australia’s immigration experience over the
past 70 years has been transformative. The 2016 Census revealed that 26 per cent
of Australians had been born elsewhere; 40 per cent of these immigrants had a
national origin somewhere in Asia with 10 per cent originating in the Middle East
or Africa.4 Australia’s cultural transformation has been particularly dramatic in the
major metropolitan areas, especially Sydney and Melbourne.
1 Hardcastle 2010, chapter 5.
2 Betts 1999.
3 Tavan 2004.
4 ABS 2017a.
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An immigration-driven transformation is also revealed in Australia’s religious
profile. Whereas in the late 1940s nearly all Australians professed affiliation with
some version of Christianity, the proportion identifying as Christians in the 2016
Census had fallen to just over half. While 30 per cent of Australians now profess
no religious affiliation (another radical change from the late 1940s), around 8 per
cent (and nearly a third of immigrants arriving over the past ten years) identify with
non-Christian traditions.5
The immigration regime
Figure 2 charts how categorical preferencing within the immigration program has
played out over recent decades. It reveals that immigrants admitted on the basis of a
family connection predominated during Labor’s lengthy period in office under the
prime ministerships of Hawke (March 1983 to December 1991) and Keating (from
then until March 1996). The Howard Coalition government, in office from March
1996, at first lifted the proportion admitted on the basis of occupational skills to
about equal prominence as those with family connections. Then a decisive relative
shift took place, preferencing applicants in the occupational-skills category. That
decisive relative shift, consistent with a neoliberal policy emphasis on promoting
economic growth and investment, has been maintained ever since. It survived
the replacement of the Howard Coalition government by the Rudd–Gillard–Rudd
Labor governments (December 2007 to September 2013) and has been maintained
since then by the Abbott–Turnbull–Morrison Coalition governments.
Figure 2 also reveals the maintenance since the mid-1980s of a ‘humanitarian’
intake in the range of 11,000 to 20,000 per annum. The humanitarian program
has two main components: an offshore component under which resettlement in
Australia is offered to refugees and others with a humanitarian case located outside
Australia, and an onshore component providing for claimants assessed to be
refugees after arriving in Australia on a valid visa.
The humanitarian program looks relatively small in comparison to the family
and occupational-skills categories, and over time represents a diminishing
proportion of the total immigration intake. In comparison to other countries’
involvement in international efforts to resettle those stranded in refugee camps
around the world, the Australian humanitarian program is one of the more
generous.6 However, this sound record contrasts markedly with the harsh regime
applying to asylum seekers seeking to enter Australia and claim refugee status
outside the parameters of the humanitarian program. This is despite the number of
such claimants reaching Australia being relatively low compared with the numbers
seeking to enter other target countries, for instance in Europe.
5 ABS 2017b.
6 ABC 2018.
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In the late 1970s, Australia’s acceptance of Indo-Chinese ‘boat people’ had
signalled a decisive end to the old White Australia policy.7 Over time, however,
political tolerance for the management of undocumented asylum seekers arriving
by sea waned, especially as it began to be associated with organised ‘people
smuggling’ networks.
The Keating Labor government in 1992 initiated the mandatory detention of
asylum seekers after facing a resumption of maritime arrivals largely driven by
events in Cambodia. A new flow of arrivals (sourced mainly from Afghanistan, Iran
and Iraq) began in the 1999–2000 period under the Howard Coalition government.
Campaigning for re-election in 2001, Prime Minister Howard capitalised on his
government’s refusal to accept a vessel, the Tampa, which had been diverted to
Australia by asylum seekers. These asylum seekers were sent into detention, notably
in Nauru and Papua New Guinea, instituting an offshore processing regime which
has continued thereafter. The draconian approach did produce a virtual cessation
of the maritime asylum-seeker arrivals.
After returning to government in December 2007, Labor under Prime Minister
Rudd suspended the mandatory detention of maritime asylum seekers. Maritime
arrivals (mainly Afghan, Iranian and Sri Lankan asylum seekers) later surged to
unprecedented levels, including an extraordinary tally exceeding 25,000 arrivals
in 2012–13. Many others tragically drowned at sea.8 The Rudd and Gillard
governments grappled with the cruel conundrum around what Prime Minister
Rudd described as ‘our responsibility as a government … to ensure that we have a
robust system of border security and orderly migration on the one hand as well as
fulfilling our legal and compassionate obligations … on the other’.9
Eventually, Labor reintroduced mandatory offshore detention10 but this did not
stave off defeat in the September 2013 election to Coalition parties whose ‘stop
the boats’ and ‘border protection’ rhetoric dominated the campaign. The incoming
Abbott Coalition government matched that rhetoric with further policy action.
It launched Operation Sovereign Borders11 under which unauthorised boats were
intercepted at sea and not permitted to enter Australian waters. Asylum-seeker
maritime arrivals again virtually ceased under this regime which has continued
through the succeeding Coalition governments headed by Turnbull (September
2015 to August 2018) and then Scott Morrison (from August 2018).
In early 2019, political attention turned to the management of the asylum
seekers, numbering more than a thousand, who had been sent to the offshore
locations of Nauru and Papua New Guinea’s Manus Island. An agreement with the
USA allowed hundreds of these asylum seekers to be voluntarily transferred to the
7 Higgins 2017.
8 Refugee Council of Australia 2018a.
9 Rudd 2013.
10 DIBP 2013a.
11 Australian Border Force 2014.
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USA.12 The Morrison government was forced, by a parliamentary majority in both
houses comprising the Labor opposition, independent and minor-party MPs, to
allow detainees certified as needing medical treatment to be treated in Australia.
Temporary immigration
The fraught politics around mainstream immigration and asylum seekers has
perhaps obscured the significance of the substantial increase in what is termed
‘temporary immigration’.
There are three principal categories of temporary immigrants, each of them
carrying eligibility (under variable rules) to work in Australia:
• International students have become a prominent feature of the Australian edu-
cation systems, most notably in the tertiary education sector. Some interna-
tional students have post-study entitlements to remain temporarily in Australia
for further work experience.
• Temporary skilled immigrants are admitted to work in what are supposed to
be specific occupations or positions where employers find it difficult to recruit
locals.
• Working holidaymakers are typically young adults permitted to undertake
short-term paid work (such as seasonal work in regional horticulture).
Figure 3 shows the substantial, and increasing, scale of temporary immigration.
Over the 20-year period since the late 1990s, temporary immigrant numbers have
more than tripled. There is a connection between the temporary and permanent
intakes, with a recent analysis finding that ‘about half of the permanent visas grants
are to people who are already in Australia as temporary immigrants’.13
Temporary immigration has attracted some political controversy. Some critics
are concerned about its claimed impact on the integrity of, and job competition
within, the Australian labour market; they might be assured by a Productivity
Commission finding that ‘recent immigration has had a negligible effect on the
labour market outcomes of the local labour force’.14 Many international students
have evidently been exploited through underpayment of wage entitlements and
poor working conditions.15 An inquiry put in place by the Australian government
has endorsed a finding that ‘as many as 50 per cent of temporary migrant workers
may be being underpaid in their employment’.16 Some critics are uncomfortable
with temporary immigrants being treated in effect as ‘not quite Australian’.17
12 Lewis 2019.
13 Productivity Commission 2016, 30.
14 Productivity Commission 2016, 191.
15 Howe, Stewart and Owens 2018.
16 Migrant Workers’ Taskforce 2019, 5.
17 Mares 2016.
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Figure 3 Australia’s annual temporary immigration admissions by category, 1996–2018
(number of persons). Source: data from DHA 2018c; DHA 2018d; DHA 2018e; Phillips
2016; Phillips and Simon-Davies 2017, 3.
There have been claims that the temporary skilled program too readily over-
looks the availability of qualified local recruits and/or permits an undesirable
under-investment in the education and training that would support an upskilled
local workforce.18 Responding in part to such misgivings, the rules governing the
temporary skilled program were significantly revised in April 2017, with the aim
of ensuring, according to Prime Minister Turnbull, that ‘temporary migration visas
are not a passport for foreigners to take up jobs that could and should be filled by
Australians’.19
Multiculturalism
Immigration policies over the past few decades have mostly been characterised
by a reasonably firm, though occasionally unsteady, bipartisan support from the
two major party groupings of Labor and the Coalition. A similar combination
of substantial consensus interspersed by occasional vacillation has characterised
the ongoing acceptance of multiculturalism as the policy framework for managing
Australia’s immigration-driven ethnic diversity.
There has long been some ambiguity about the degree to which multi-
culturalism has been intended to promote greater social cohesion and integration
18 Kell 2014.
19 Turnbull 2017.
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or for maintaining cultural diversity and empowering cultural minorities. In
general, the bipartisan position has favoured social cohesion and integration.20
The Fraser Coalition government (December 1975–May 1983) set in place
much of the national administrative and institutional infrastructure for multi-
cultural policies. Under the Hawke Labor government in 1989, a National Agenda
for a Multicultural Australia proposed three justifications for multiculturalism: its
respect for cultural identity, its alignment with social justice and its utilitarian
virtues in facilitating economic efficiency. Importantly, the document also specified
‘limits’ which, in effect, asserted the necessity for a set of common values within
‘an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia’.21 This kind of careful
specification of both the claimed virtues and necessary limits of Australian
multiculturalism has enabled the concept to adapt and survive ever since.
Perhaps the most serious challenge took place during the period of the Howard
Coalition government (1996–2007). The Howard government seemed to downplay
the terminology of multiculturalism and emphasised instead terms like ‘social
cohesion’ and ‘citizenship’.22 It introduced a ‘citizenship test’ under which immi-
grants seeking Australian citizenship would need to demonstrate a ‘working know-
ledge of the English language’ and ‘an understanding of basic aspects of Australian
society, our culture, and our values and certainly some understanding of our
history’.23 Yet the Howard government’s policy documents also mirrored the Hawke
Labor government’s in balancing the celebration of diversity with the affirmation
of common values. Moran concludes that multiculturalism survived the Howard
government ‘in practice if not in name’.24
The Rudd and Gillard Labor governments (2007–2013) reintroduced a com-
mitment to multiculturalist terminology while also maintaining the now-familiar
balancing of ‘shared rights and responsibilities’.25 Continuity along these lines
essentially continued under the Abbott–Turnbull–Morrison Coalition govern-
ments from 2013.26
Prime Minister Morrison lauded ‘our incredibly diverse multicultural society’,
‘an open, tolerant, multicultural Australia’ and ‘the most successful immigration
country … in the world’ while also cautioning against a ‘retreat to tribalism’.27
An interesting consequence of fluctuations over time in the preferred
terminology and in political priorities is the name bestowed on the government
department responsible for immigration. Table 1 reports the succession of names
since the mass immigration program began in the late 1940s. The recent rhetorical
20 Pakulski 2014, 23.
21 OMA 1989, vii.
22 Moran 2017, chapter 4.
23 Howard 2006.
24 Moran 2017, 109.
25 Australian Government 2011, 7.
26 Australian Government 2017.
27 Morrison 2019; Morrison 2018.
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Table 1 Departmental nomenclature 1945–
1945–1974 Department of Immigration
1974–1975 Department of Labor and Immigration
1976–1987 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
1987–1993 Department of Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs
1993–1996 Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs
1996–2001 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
2001–2006 Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
2006–2007 Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
2007–2013 Department of Immigration and Citizenship
2013–2017 Department of Immigration and Border Protection
2017– Department of Home Affairs
Source: DIBP 2013b.
emphasis on citizenship and border protection is readily apparent; for one critic,
the changed nomenclature reveals an unwelcome shift in focus, a ‘move from
planning the nation’s future to policing its frontier’.28
Policy actors
Policy development and political debates around immigration and multiculturalism
are shaped by a range of policy actors.
Political parties
Policy convergence and bipartisanship, rather than partisan conflict, has mostly
characterised the role of the major political parties within this policy domain.
There have been instances where this major party bipartisanship has wavered a little
or where alleged differences have been exaggerated for tactical advantage in the
heat of election campaigns (such as recent arguments about which side is tougher
or more effective on ‘border protection’). Nonetheless, in broad terms, the major
party bipartisan consensus has generally prevailed, especially on the fundamental
structure of the immigration system.
28 Button 2018.
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However, bipartisan consensus is tested from time to time. Within the Coalition
parties, there can be some sentiment which is sceptical of multiculturalism and
instead favours the maintenance of common values. Within the broader membership
of the Labor Party, reservations about the ethics of draconian ‘border protection’
policies and empathy for the plight of affected asylum seekers are not infrequently
expressed.29
Minor parties and independents represented in the federal parliament offer
a broader spectrum of perspectives: the Australian Greens have adopted a stance
consistently favourable to higher immigration levels and sympathetic to asylum
seekers while Pauline Hanson’s One Nation has consistently supported a lower
intake and is unwelcoming to asylum seekers.
Public opinion
The range of views among Australian voters is somewhat more polarised. There is
some dispute about whether survey data over time show majority support for or
against current levels of immigration, with the answer probably dependent on the
wording of the questions put to survey respondents.
The respected Australian Election Study (AES) national survey is conducted to
coincide with each Australian national election. Figure 4 reports the findings for
each AES since 1996 on the matter of whether respondents think the immigration
levels at the time should be increased, kept the same or decreased. Of the three
options, a decreased intake has mostly procured the highest level of support and
has consistently been substantially better supported than an increased intake. On
the other hand, advocates of a generous immigration intake could combine the
‘increased’ and ‘kept the same’ tallies to claim (with a few exceptions) majority
support for at least maintaining the intake.
A Scanlon Foundation study through Monash University noted that, during
2018, ‘a number of polls … reported majority negative sentiment, in the range of
54–72 per cent, favouring a cut in immigration’. The Scanlon Foundation’s own
2018 survey confirmed ‘an increase in the proportion concerned at the level of
immigration’ but also indicated that ‘support for a reduction remains a minority
viewpoint’ at 45 per cent of respondents.30
The same Scanlon Foundation 2018 survey found generally strong support for
the proposition that ‘multiculturalism has been good for Australia’. The Scanlon
Foundation study also noted ‘the level of negative sentiment towards those of the
Muslim faith, and by extension to immigrants from Muslim countries’ as ‘a factor
of significance in contemporary Australian society’.31
29 Bramston 2018.
30 Markus 2018, 2.
31 Markus 2018, 3.
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Figure 4 Attitudes to immigration levels: Australian Election Study surveys 1996–2016
(%). Source: data from Cameron and McAllister 2016, 100.
Business
Business interests have generally supported relatively high levels of immigration. It
creates a larger supply of potential workers, reduces upward pressure on wages and
creates a larger consumer demand for business products.
Betts and Gilding have identified specific business sectors which receive a fairly
direct stimulus from immigration as particularly vocal advocates of high intake
levels; these sectors include ‘property developers and operators in the housing and
construction industries’, ‘the Australian media [which] derive a large part of their
advertising revenue from developers and real estate agents’ and ‘other businesses
with a domestic market – ranging from gambling to financial services’.32
During public debates in 2018 about whether immigration intakes should be
reduced, the business sector’s major umbrella organisations – the Business Council
of Australia, the Australian Industry Group, the Australian Chamber of Commerce
and Industry, and the Property Council of Australia – each declared its opposition
to any cuts.33
Business organisations also tend to favour a relatively large occupational-skill-
based intake in comparison with the family-based intake, because this can advan-
tage them in the recruitment of staff. For particular corporations and business
ventures, negotiating favourable arrangements to enable them to access temporary
immigrants is also a priority.
32 Betts and Gilding 2006, 43–4.
33 McCauley and Koziol 2018.
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Trade unions
The business sector’s favourable stance towards high levels of immigration might
be expected to be counterbalanced by scepticism from a trade union movement
presumably focused on job protection for the current workforce. Australian trade
unions have indeed been vocal critics of high levels of temporary immigration for
its association with ‘exploitation and denying job opportunities to local workers’.34
However, the trade union movement has generally been supportive of Aust-
ralia’s permanent immigration program. This was historically important in relation
to Australia’s radical shift to mass immigration from the late 1940s.35 More recently,
the ACTU and the union United Voice have joined the Australian Industry Group
business lobby in a statement declaring that ‘Australia’s permanent migration
program is essential to Australian society and economy’ and that ‘we … do not
support any reduction to the scheme’.36
Ethnic communities
Australia’s immigration program has fostered the creation of ethnic-minority
communities of first-generation members and descendants. These communities
naturally have an interest in immigration policy, especially as it applies to rights of
admission for other family members, and a particular stake in multicultural policy.
They do not necessarily harbour a different range of views on other immigration-
related issues; for example, according to Jupp and Pietsch, ‘[s]ome polling suggests
that many “ethnic” Australians were just as unsympathetic as the “Anglo” majority
to asylum seekers who were perceived to be jumping the gun, especially when that
affected family reunion for their own group’.37
Seventy years of large-scale immigration have not changed the basic structure
of the Australian political system, particularly its domination by the two major
party blocs (the Liberal–National Coalition and Labor). However, the political
process, and especially the parties, have adjusted to the changed nature of the
electorate. Parties now actively court ethnic-minority communities.
Sometimes the policy preferences arising from ethnic-minority communities
are articulated through ethnic community organisations, co-ordinated nationally
through the Federation of Ethnic Communities Councils of Australia (FECCA).
FECCA and its allies were claimed to have had a significant influence over the
Hawke Labor government in securing a high proportion of immigration places
for family-connection applicants.38 If that outcome is a test of the influence of the
‘ethnic lobby’, then its influence seems to have since waned.
34 McManus 2018.
35 Warhurst 1993.
36 Migration Council of Australia 2018.
37 Jupp and Pietsch 2018, 665.
38 Betts 1991; Birrell and Betts 1988.
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There is evidence that the same waning impact also applies to patterns of ‘ethnic
voting’. The Labor Party had been quite successful during the 1980s and 1990s
in disproportionately attracting voting support among members of the Italian
Australian, Greek Australian and Maltese Australian communities. Labor’s relative
advantage within those communities, however, seems to have declined since then.
Australia’s diverse Asia-origin communities likewise seem to have been dispro-
portionately attracted to Labor in the 1990s but again that partisan distinction
seems to have since declined.39
Nonetheless, an association between ethnic minorities and support for Labor
remains visible on the electoral map. An analysis of the 2016 election identifies
a raft of electorates in ‘central and eastern Sydney … and in northern, western
and south eastern Melbourne … [as] the true Labor heartland and the core of
multicultural Australia’.40 There may be impacts in particular parliamentary seats;
the loss by then Prime Minister John Howard of his own seat at the 2007 federal
election was attributed in part to the relatively high proportion of Chinese Aust-
ralians in that electorate.41
Advocacy and support groups
The issues around humanitarian immigration, and particularly asylum seekers,
have mobilised an articulate, informed and often passionate network of advocacy
groups pursuing what they regard as more humane policies. The scale of this sector,
ranging from faith-based organisations42 to social-movement activists,43 can be
gauged from the 200 organisations affiliated with the umbrella Refugee Council of
Australia.44
Making immigration and multicultural policy
Each year, Cabinet determines an immigration intake target for the coming 12
months and the actual intake normally comes out reasonably close to the announced
target. This is an impressive degree of precision in view of its basis in hundreds
of thousands of individual applications and in view of some international evidence
of other countries finding it difficult to match immigration policy intentions with
actual outcomes.45
39 McAllister 2011, 134–6.
40 Jupp and Pietsch 2018, 671.
41 Jupp 2009.
42 Wilson 2011.
43 Tazreiter 2010.
44 Refugee Council of Australia 2018b.
45 Boucher 2013; Burstein, Hardcastle and Parkin 1994.
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In recent years, there has been a formal opportunity for stakeholder input into
the setting of targets.46 However, the encapsulation of the target/ceiling within the
annual budget process, and its implementation thereafter through administrative
channels, gives it some insulation from the scrutiny that accompanies processes
requiring more specific parliamentary approval. Policy making about Australia’s
response to asylum seekers, both potential arrivals and those later held in
detention, is somewhat more open in terms of public debate, but is constrained in
practice by the general bipartisanship characterising the policy response.
International and intergovernmental interactions
Constitutionally, the arena of Australian immigration policy making is focused
at the national level. Section 51(xxvii) of the Australian Constitution gives the
Australian national government clear and unambiguous authority over immi-
gration policy. International law provides unambiguous recognition of national
sovereignty in relation to the rights of countries to determine their own policies.
Nonetheless, in practice, the Australian government needs to take into account
both external/international and internal/domestic nuances.
National sovereignty is potentially subject to international influence if a
country chooses to enter into international treaties. For example, Australia has long
been a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention. Australia is also a signatory
to the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea which governs
interactions in international waters beyond the jurisdiction of Australia’s own
maritime boundaries.47 There have been persistent claims that some of Australia’s
policies and practices in relation to the interdiction of asylum-seeker boats and
the indefinite offshore detention of asylum seekers violate some of its international
obligations under such treaties.48 The only recourse, even when the complainant is
the UN,49 is essentially via public condemnation and political protest.
Foreign policy and trade considerations provide another international con-
straint. For example, Australia’s policies and practices on maritime asylum seekers
can be a particularly sensitive issue affecting its important relationship with
Indonesia, from where most of the boats depart. Australia’s immigration-driven
cultural diversification can assist international trade by opening up, through
detailed local knowledge and personal contacts, new export markets. International
trade agreements to which Australia is a party may in turn carry obligations to
grant temporary entry and employment rights to the citizens of trading partners.50
46 DHA 2019; DHA 2017.
47 Klein 2014.
48 AHRC 2017.
49 United Nations 2017.
50 Sherrell 2017.
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An important international detail about Australia’s immigration policy is that
there is no restriction on the entry of New Zealand citizens. They are not considered
as part of the immigration program if they decide to settle permanently in Australia.
Turning to intra-national considerations, there are considerable consequences
for Australia’s state governments which are largely responsible for the provision of
infrastructure and services to an expanding population. The strong tendency for
immigrants to gravitate to Australia’s metropolitan centres, and especially Sydney
and Melbourne, has been an important factor behind recent arguments for the
intake to be reduced. Attracting or directing immigrants to regions or states within
which population growth would be more welcome would help to remedy this
situation. There is a well-established ‘regional’ subcategory within the occupational-
skills immigration intake which favours applicants willing to reside in specified
regions or states. In late 2018, Prime Minister Scott Morrison proposed inserting a
formal role for state governments into the setting of immigration targets based on
the willingness of each state to accept additional residents.51
Debates and issues
This chapter has already canvassed a number of policy debates around immigration
and multiculturalism. Here two other controversies are discussed: the security and
environmental sustainability implications of immigration policy settings.
Defence and security
National security had been a foremost consideration as a justification for the policy
shift in 1945 towards large-scale immigration. In this context, Australia’s relatively
low population and empty spaces were regarded as liabilities for national defence:
‘populate or perish’ was adopted as something of a national slogan.52
As the decades passed, Australia’s defence thinking, its relationship with Asian
neighbours and the role of military technology had evolved to the point that the
1940s invocation of a direct link between immigration and questions of national
security no longer seemed persuasive. By the late 1980s, there had developed
‘something of a consensus, articulated in several reviews of Australian defence
policy … that the size of the Australian population has little military relevance’.53
Security considerations have re-emerged forcefully as part of recent debates
about maritime asylum seekers. A new lexicon of security-laden terminology
(border protection, border security, Operation Sovereign Borders) has character-
ised political discourse in recent years. The deployment of Australian military
forces (notably the Navy) in the interdiction of asylum-seeker vessels, along with
51 Elton-Pym 2018.
52 For the seminal speech by the then minister for immigration, see Calwell 1945.
53 Parkin and Hardcastle 1990, 332.
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the formation in 2015 of the Australian Border Force as a kind of paramilitary
agency within the Department of Home Affairs, have likewise contributed to the
security-centric tone of recent immigration management. To some observers, this
has been an overreaction to the actual level of security threat posed by asylum-
seeker vessels.54
Environmental sustainability
In October 2009, Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd effusively declared his support
for ‘a big Australia’ arising from the ‘good news that our population is growing’.55
Less than a year later, his successor as Labor prime minister, Julia Gillard, pointedly
abandoned the ‘big Australia’ aspiration, instead declaring support for ‘a sustainable
Australia’.56 This short-cycle policy oscillation illustrates an unresolved policy
debate about whether considerations of sustainability, environmental and other-
wise, ought to impose a constraint on the scale of immigration.
An increasing population, and/or a rapid rate of population increase, have
been argued by some to endanger the natural environment, to impact on resource
depletion and energy consumption, and produce increased congestion in the urban
environment. This perspective is backed by organisations such as Sustainable
Population Australia and by individuals like the entrepreneurial philanthropist
Dick Smith.57
Nonetheless, the population restraint perspective has secured less traction
among mainstream environmental lobby groups. Some years ago, the Australian
Conservation Foundation (ACF) endured some internal turmoil over taking a
position on the scale of immigration.58 The ACF’s National Agenda 2018 makes no
mention of immigration or population matters.59
It has been the claimed impact on the urban rather than the natural environ-
ment, in the context of the historically high levels of immigration, which has led in
recent years to a stronger voice advocating a reduction in the immigration intake.
The Morrison government responded in 2019 by lowering the immigration target.60
Until 2019, Australia had not developed, at least not since the ‘populate or
perish’ era of the late 1940s, a formal long-term ‘population policy’ addressing the
scale, pace and impact of population growth. A number of inquiries and reports
had canvassed the issue.61 In March 2019, the Morrison government moved
54 Refugee Council of Australia 2014.
55 Rudd 2009.
56 Gordon 2010.
57 Smith 2011.
58 Warhurst 1993, 199–202.
59 ACF 2018.
60 Morrison Government 2019.
61 DSEWPC 2011; Treasury 2015.
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towards a more formal population policy, with a notable emphasis on infrastructure
provision, by releasing a report entitled Planning for Australia’s Future Population.62
Conclusions
A startling contrast is evident in how Australia’s immigration and multicultural
policies have recently evolved. On the one hand, a generally expansive and
cosmopolitan orientation predominates in the immigration and humanitarian
programs and in domestic multicultural policies. On the other hand, a tough-
minded approach prevails in relation to asylum seekers arriving by sea. Observers
discomforted by the asylum seeker policies might be further discomforted to
contemplate that the two dimensions may be politically interdependent.
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull appeared certain of this interdependence.
He lectured along these lines in April 2018 to an audience in Germany, a country
then facing the consequences of a surge in asylum seeker arrivals. ‘We manage our
immigration program very carefully’, Turnbull explained. ‘Migration programs, a
multicultural society, need to have a commitment, an understanding and the trust
of the people, that the government, their government, is determining who comes
to the country’. This means, according to Turnbull, that ‘being in control of your
borders is absolutely critical’ and is ‘a fundamental foundation of our success as a
multicultural society, as a migration nation as people often describe us’.63
The contrasts and possible contradictions embedded within Australia’s
immigration and multicultural policies, evolving over time and shaping the country
in fundamental ways, add to the fascination and intrigue of this crucial policy
domain.
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‘Law and order’ policy
Garner Clancey and Brenda Lin (with Brendan Delahunty)
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‘Law and order’ policy refers to the decisions and actions of governments relating
to issues of crime and justice. Policy in this area has traditionally been referred to
as criminal justice policy but is more commonly being referred to as ‘law and order’
policy – reflecting the increasing punitive nature of debates, laws and policies in the
criminal justice domain. In the interests of simplicity, reference will be made to law
and order policy throughout this chapter.
In Australia, states and territories are responsible for law and order policy.
Consequently, the laws and procedures used in each state and territory to define
criminal conduct and determine how crimes are investigated, arrests made,
evidence gathered, charges brought, defences raised, trials conducted, sentences
rendered and punishment carried out will be slightly or significantly different. Laws
determining what types of conduct should be the subject of the criminal justice
system are shaped by the social, political and moral concerns of the day.
The criminal justice system is (mainly) composed of three key government
institutions: the police, courts and prisons.
• Police: the primary role of police is to enforce the criminal law, maintain public
order and ensure community safety by investigating criminal activity and
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apprehending suspected offenders. Policing agencies are made up of numerous
branches and sections, often with particular cultures, ways of operating and
priorities. For example, most state policing agencies will have (among many
others) separate investigation, traffic, water, air, counterterrorism, intelligence,
education, community engagement, policy and management units.
• Courts: the court or judicial process is concerned with determining whether an
individual is guilty or not guilty of the offence(s) they have been charged with.
If there is a finding of guilt, the magistrate or judge decides on a sentence to
impose upon the offender that adequately reflects the seriousness of the crime
committed and the circumstances surrounding the offence. Criminal courts
operate at different levels, with higher courts presiding over trials for more
serious crimes that attract more severe penalties. Courts manage significant
numbers of cases annually and are the gatekeepers that decide who is sentenced
to prison.
• Prisons: imprisonment is a form of punishment that is reserved for those who
have (generally) engaged in very serious offending and when no other form
of punishment is appropriate. Prisons are places of confinement, where the
offender is deprived of their freedom and autonomy. Prison services have to
manage the prisoners and alleged offenders (in the case of remand) sent to
them by police and the courts. Prisons operate according to security levels, with
more serious or protected inmates being housed in more secure facilities.
This brief overview of the criminal justice system highlights the role of key (but
not all) institutions and points to the different functions of each institution. It also
shows that different parts of the criminal justice system can be heavily impacted by
other agencies. For example, if police assume a pro-arrest policy, which brings more
alleged offenders into the system, it is likely that the courts and prisons will need to
deal with a greater number of cases and entries into custody.
Law and order policy has become increasingly punitive over time. This has
been referred to as ‘hyper-criminalisation’1 and has provided greater opportunities
for police to interact with and sanction people, a greater likelihood that someone
entering the criminal justice system will receive harsher penalties and a greater
likelihood that people will remain in or return to the criminal justice system.
Political cycles and news media play critical roles in law and order policy
making. Political parties often seek to appear ‘tough on crime’ through various
announcements, most frequently prior to an election. Promising more police, and
the introduction of sophisticated technologies to detect and help arrest offenders
and of tougher criminal sanctions are often the stock-in-trade of major political
parties at election times.
News media facilitates the communication and reinforcement of political law
and order messages, while also exacerbating public fear by disseminating endless
1 McNamara and Quilter 2016.
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stories featuring horrific and extraordinary incidences of crime. Crime stories are
designed to capture the public’s interest and intensify public discussion on the issue
in question, often by eliciting feelings of fear and insecurity or creating moral panic
within society.2
Hogg and Brown3 thematically summarised the ‘common sense’ assumptions
about crime that underpin the beliefs held by a significant proportion of the
Australian population. These ‘common sense’ assumptions still ring true in modern
society. Their essence is epitomised by the following commonly held views:
• crime rates are at an all-time high – we currently live in a society characterised
by unprecedented levels of crime
• more police officers with more police powers and tougher penalties on
offenders are needed to combat the crime problem.
Popular misconceptions of the current ‘crime epidemic’ and need for harsh crime
control and punishment have been largely disseminated in the public domain by
news media, politicians and other influential figures.4 A fearful public demands or
requires governments to take law and order policy seriously – or so we are told.
What’s at stake?
There is a lot at stake in the context of law and order policy making. Those who
come into contact with the criminal justice system can lose their liberty (through
imprisonment), their ability to move freely (through place restrictions and
conditions attached to various sanctions) and their ability to work in particular
industries (e.g. an individual may not be allowed to work for a fire service if they
have been convicted of arson), not to mention the impact on victims of crime. Some
of the additional human and financial costs are considered here.
Human costs
Law and order policy has significant ramifications for those entangled in the
criminal justice system. Below are some examples of the ways in which law and
order policy can impact lives:
• expanded police powers and ‘zero tolerance policing’ result in greater numbers
of people being searched, fined and charged, often for minor offences
• the use of electronic monitoring and urinalysis in the supervision of
community-based offenders means that people are being tracked and surveilled
in increasingly intense ways
2 Lee 2007.
3 Hogg and Brown 1998.
4 Hogg and Brown 1998.
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• the rise of ‘supermax’ prisons means that some prisoners are being confined for
long periods with little or no contact with other prisoners or the outside world
• sex offender registers mean that those convicted of particular sex offences will
have their movements monitored for lengthy periods following their release
from prison.
Taken together, the rise and intensification of these practices means that more
people are entering the criminal justice system, staying in it for longer and
returning more frequently, instigating a vicious cycle of offending.
Financial costs
The criminal justice system operates at great economic expense. The Australian
Productivity Commission5 calculated expenditure on the criminal justice system in
2016–17 as follows:
• $10.9 billion on policing (not including federal police)
• $1.4 billion on courts
• $4.1 billion on corrective services (prisons and community corrections)
• $769.5 million on youth justice services (detention-based supervision,
community-based supervision, group conferencing).
To put some of the above figures in context, it costs approximately $391 per day
to keep an adult in prison, whereas community-based supervision only costs
approximately $18 per day.6 The costs of detaining juveniles are exponentially
higher than adults; the cost of detaining one young person averages $1,482 per day
and the cost of community-based supervision averages $140 per day.7
In Western Australia (WA), more than 1,000 people each year are imprisoned
for unpaid fines, with an average imprisonment period of four days.8 In addition to
the cost of $345–$770 per day to detain them in prison, such short imprisonment
periods have negligible, if not negative, impacts on rehabilitation or deterring
future fine defaults.9 Expenditure that does not serve an outcome is bad economics
– and imprisonment for unpaid fines appears to fall under this category.
Given these significant costs, it is important that law and order policy uses
public funds in the most efficient and effective manner. Every dollar spent on
inefficient law and order policy represents one less dollar spent on education, public
infrastructure, welfare and so on.
5 Productivity Commission 2018.
6 Morgan 2018.
7 Productivity Commission 2018.
8 Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia 2016.
9 Aboriginal Legal Service of Western Australia 2016.
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Table 1 Incidents of crime in Australia in 2000 and 2017
Incidents in 2000 Incidents in 2017 % change
Homicide and related offences 989 414 ↓ 58%
Sexual assault 15,630 24,957 ↑ 60%
Kidnapping and abduction 688 482 ↓ 30%
Robbery 23,314 9,599 ↓ 59%
Unlawful entry with intent 436,865 176,153 ↓ 60%
Motor vehicle theft 139,094 51,869 ↓ 63%
Other theft 674,813 510,083 ↓ 24%
Source: ABS 2018a; ABS 2001.
The context and characteristics of ‘law and order’ policy
There are a number of characteristics of law and order policy that require attention.
First, it is important to reflect on some recent significant trends in crime. The first
is (generally) falling crime rates. The second, perhaps counterintuitively, is the rise
in criminalisation and punishment, especially through imprisonment.
Crime trends
It is important to give some consideration to crime trends. It might be expected that
crime trends drive law and order policy making, but, as will be shown, this is not
necessarily the case.
Many major crime categories in Australia, as in many other Western societies,
have been experiencing consistent declines since the turn of the 21st century.
Incidents of some crime types in some Australian jurisdictions are at historic lows,
meaning that there has never been a safer period of time to reside in these parts of
Australia. Table 1 compares the number of reported incidents of particular crimes
(by category) that occurred in Australia in 2000 and 2017.
Every major category of crime included in Table 1, except sexual assault,
has shown a substantial decline between 2000 and 2017. Given the significant
population growth in Australia during this period, these declines are even greater
when considered as rates. These trends are generally not well known and are often
lost in heated debates about the incessant need for more law and order policy.
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The increase in reported incidents of sexual assault does not necessarily signify
a proportionate increase in the prevalence of sexual assault or a greater likelihood
of becoming a victim of such crimes. The reporting rate of sexual assault has
historically been extremely low. Greater awareness and education surrounding
sexual assault among the general public in recent years raises the probability that its
statistical increases may (at least partially) be attributed to an increased willingness
to report incidents and better police recording practices.10
Furthermore, official crime statistics do not represent an objective truth; one
must be mindful of taking them as an accurate reflection of reality. Numerous
factors will affect crime statistics, including the quality of data collated, counting
rules, police practices both in reporting and in the activities they target, and
whether the statistics are intended to be used to frame political or other agendas.
An increasingly punitive society
Despite the significant declines in many crime types, there has been rapid growth
in criminalisation and punishment. This has been referred to as the ‘punitive turn’.11
It has occurred through the proliferation of new laws, which has been described as
‘hyper-criminalisation’, and the increasing use of punishment.
Throughout the last decade, a significant number of hastily crafted laws have
passed through various state and territory parliaments, resulting in the expansion
of law enforcement powers, the creation of new offences, the amendment of the
rules of criminal procedure and increased maximum penalties for offences.12 These
laws are often responses to the ‘problem of the day’ and are designed to alleviate
public concern, rather than resolve the underlying causes of crime.
Below are some examples of punitive law and order policies that have been
introduced in recent years:
• revival and expansion of consorting offences13 in New South Wales (NSW)
• creation of ‘one-punch’ homicide in NSW, Queensland and Victoria
• creation of an organising an ‘out-of-control’ party offence in WA and
Queensland.
It has been argued that the effect of these (and other) laws and powers is to
further criminalise marginalised groups in society, such as the poor and ethnic
minorities.14 Furthermore, there has been increasing co-ordination of criminal
laws between jurisdictions – one announces a new policy to get tough on crime,
10 Weatherburn 2004.
11 Garland 2001.
12 Loughnan 2009.
13 Consorting laws prohibit the act of habitual association with convicted offenders. NSW
consorting laws have been in operation since 2012; they were introduced in response to outlaw
motorcycle clubs and other organised criminal networks.
14 McNamara and Quilter 2016.
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and others will follow or attempt to introduce policies that are even tougher on
crime. This is a form of ‘policy transfer’, which will be discussed later.
In concert with the growth in these and other criminal laws and sanctions has
been the growing use of punishment, especially imprisonment. The daily average
imprisonment rate in Australia in 2018 was 222 prisoners per 100,000 population.15
In 1976, before law and order policy began to take hold in Australia, there were
just 77.8 prisoners per 100,000 population.16 On average, there were 42,878 people
in prisons in Australia during the April–June quarter of 2018 – up from 30,835 in
2013 and 26,640 in 2008.17
This growth has been driven, at least in part, by the rising remand population
(i.e. those held in custody while awaiting resolution of their court matters) and the
imposition of longer prison sentences by courts. To provide some context, in the
June 2018 quarter, 13,182 people were held in prison awaiting finalisation of their
matters in court. This is more than double the 6,482 prisoners on remand a decade
earlier.18 Of particular concern, around half of all people on remand are released
without having to serve further time in prison because they are either found not
guilty, given a community order or deemed to have served their time while on
remand.19
The increased remand population is at least partially explained by changes to
bail laws. Historically, there was a uniform presumption in favour of bail for those
who had been charged with an offence but not yet convicted – thus, unless there
were good reasons to refuse bail, it would be granted. Over time, bail laws have
undergone numerous waves of reform, gradually removing the presumption in
favour of bail for more and more offence categories. It varies between jurisdictions,
but at present there is a presumption against bail for a number of offence categories,
including:
• terrorism
• violence
• sex
• domestic violence
• drug
• bushfire
• blackmail
• organised crime
• driving.
15 ABS 2018b.
16 Mukherjee 1981, 98.
17 ABS 2018b.
18 ABS 2018b.
19 New South Wales Law Reform Commission 2012.
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Moreover, legislative amendments to parole and sentencing laws – for example,
mandatory non-parole periods and mandatory sentencing – have curtailed the
discretion of parole boards and courts, contributing to longer periods of
imprisonment. Most Australian jurisdictions have passed ‘no body, no parole’ laws
that do not permit parole to be granted to offenders convicted of murder or
manslaughter if they have not revealed the location of the victim’s body. The
controversial ‘truth in sentencing’ laws introduced in NSW in 1989 require
sentenced offenders to serve a minimum of three-quarters of their sentence before
they are eligible for parole. Since the enactment of this legislation, prison numbers
and average sentence lengths have risen dramatically.
It is also important to note that the imprisonment rate for the Indigenous
population is 15 times higher than for the non-Indigenous population. In the
June 2018 quarter, 28 per cent or 11,963 of Australia’s inmates were Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people.20 By comparison, Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people constitute just 3.3 per cent of Australia’s overall population.21 This
has been further exacerbated by many of the previously mentioned crime trends,
and it continues to be a stain on Australian criminal justice systems and policies.
Unsurprisingly, the combination of all the above conditions has led to
significant prison overcrowding; in 2016–17, on average, secure prisons in Australia
held 21 per cent more prisoners than their maximum design capacity.22 Prison
overcrowding compromises inmates’ ability to access adequate programs, services
and facilities as well as their right to privacy – all of which may impede their
rehabilitation progress and increase their risk of reoffending. Furthermore,
overcrowding increases the likelihood that disagreements will escalate into violent
situations, presenting a danger for both staff and inmates.
Moving away from penal welfarism
Law and order policy has not always been excessively punitive. The majority of
the 20th century was characterised by welfare-focused public policy. From a crime
reduction perspective, it was believed that the provision of social welfare services
would not only reduce poverty but also reduce the crimes that stemmed from social
and economic disadvantage. The objectives of welfare-style policies were twofold:
first, welfare support would address the underlying structural causes of crime (such
as poverty, social inequality, community disharmony), and second, the state had
a duty to rehabilitate offenders through the provision of welfare support, care and
assistance. The term ‘penal welfarism’ has been used to describe the integration of
20 ABS 2018b.
21 ABS 2018c.
22 Productivity Commission 2018.
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welfare and rehabilitation principles in punishment practices.23 The ethos of penal
welfarism is evident in policies such as:
• early release from prison
• parole supervision
• juvenile courts and their child welfare philosophy
• individualisation of treatment based upon expert assessment
• research on treatment effectiveness
• post-release support for prisoners
• education in prison.
This penal welfare approach to crime and punishment faced a predicament
during the ‘law and order crisis’ of the late 20th century. The 1970s and 1980s saw
a significant surge in violent and property crime rates. The efficacy of rehabilitation
focused penal welfare policies came under question. Moreover, governments had
to devise solutions that would allow them to maintain social control and state
legitimacy in an environment that was perceived to be experiencing a crime
epidemic. Under such conditions, the welfare state was gradually eroded by
neoliberal rationalities (the reassertion of market principles and minimal state
intervention), which resulted in a hybrid political economy that subscribed
predominantly to neoliberal principles but retained elements of penal welfarism.
Neoliberalism shifted how people thought about the nexus between crime and
the state. Less emphasis was placed on the perception of crime as a by-product of
the social and economic deficits of the individual; rather, crime is now considered
to be the result of individual autonomy and free choice. Individuals are held to
account for their actions and penal sanctions are seen as the appropriate response
to crime. Neoliberalism and the rise of the penal state place the onus of respon-
sibility on the individual, and access to welfare assistance is conditional on one’s
compliance with societal rules.
The modern hybrid penal welfare policies have shifted focus towards:
• efficient management of the criminal justice system and its agencies through
the use of key performance indicators, the competitive tendering process and
privatisation of services
• effective risk management of ‘dangerous groups’ of people – which has been
termed ‘new penology’ or ‘actuarial justice’ – instead of focusing on individual
needs
• harm minimisation and crime control, instead of preventing the occurrence of
all criminal activity
• fear reduction and improving the public perception of crime
• retribution in punishment, instead of offender rehabilitation.
23 Garland 2001.
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Many of the examples found in this chapter also reflect the shift towards neoliberal
tendencies and developments.
Actors and politics of ‘law and order’ policy
Law and order policy making is a complex process that operates in a highly
politicised public arena and involves a multitude of interrelated actors – each with
differing degrees of interest, power and influence over the policy-making process
and its ultimate outcomes.
Political actors
‘[A] harsh criminal justice system – in particular, more prisons and people behind
bars – has apparently become a hallmark for good government.’24 Ministers for
criminal justice-related portfolios and their advisers play a critical role in
determining law and order policy. Politicians have strategically utilised the public’s
fear and misconception of crime to elicit popular political support and to legitimise
punitive policies. During state and territory election campaigns in Australia,
politicians compete to outdo one another with policies that are ‘tough on crime’.
The frequent use of punitive measures seems to be more focused on allaying public
anxiety about crime and certain groups of offenders, rather than on tackling the
underlying causes of offending behaviour.
‘Tough on crime’ policies have great political and community appeal; they
supposedly provide an easy and quick solution to the perceived crime problem.
Building more prisons to incapacitate ‘dangerous’ offenders is seen as an immediate
and tangible solution; in comparison, rehabilitation programs are perceived as
expensive, and their outcomes will not be realised until many years later.
News media
The news media consistently plays a prominent role in defining and heightening
public anxiety about ‘lax’ laws and ‘soft’ government responses to the perceived
crime problem. Television and print media are important sources of crime
information for more than 80 per cent of Australians.25 But unfortunately, their
coverage of crime is too often an inaccurate reflection of reality. Rare incidents of
violent and serious crime are extensively publicised, with great dramatic flair and
sensationalistic reporting.
There are multiple examples of the media abusing official crime statistics by
habitually distorting, misrepresenting and exaggerating the extent of crime. For
instance, in 2008, a misleading newspaper article titled ‘Kid crime rampage’ was
24 Cunneen 2016.
25 Roberts and Indermaur 2009.
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published. The title leads readers to believe that kids are engaging in vast amounts
of illegal activity. However, crime statistics reveal that the number of young people
coming to the attention of police has been declining over time, and less than 1 per
cent of the population aged 8–9 in NSW had any contact with police in the 12
months prior to the publication of the newspaper article.26
Public perception of crime has far reaching consequences for the criminal
justice system and the wider community. Public confidence in the criminal justice
system is undermined by mistaken views about crime, which, in turn, negatively
impacts the efficient operation of the criminal justice system. Furthermore, public
perception of the legitimacy of the criminal justice system is an influential factor in
policy decisions and judicial sentencing.
Criminal justice professionals
This group includes an extensive range of professionals who work in the criminal
justice system, such as judges, police, lawyers, prison staff and social workers.
Criminal justice professionals implement and enforce law and order policy in
carrying out their daily responsibilities. A significant amount of their work involves
discretionary decision making; formal organisational policies, informal norms and
personal values are likely to influence the way in which discretion is exercised.
Ultimately, professional discretion determines the way in which criminal justice
policies are implemented and the impacts they have on others.
Penal reform groups
Penal reform groups are cause-specific organisations that often advocate for human
rights and better treatment of offenders. Many of these groups seek to correct
the injustices faced by offenders by bringing them to the attention of the public
– creating media campaigns, lobbying politicians and making formal submissions
on policy issues. Some of the issues that are of concern for penal reform groups
include:
• poor living conditions and degrading treatment experienced in prisons
• lack of post-release support for offenders
• high incarceration rates of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.
Victim interest groups
Some victim interest groups are primarily focused on providing practical and
emotional support to victims of crime, while others campaign to enact policy
change. Victims of crime have a powerful voice when it comes to influencing law
and order policy. A victim’s anecdotal experiences can have considerable public
26 Weatherburn 2011.
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appeal – stories of injustice have the capability to arouse sympathy and evoke
intense feelings of anger and moral indignation among the general public.
Furthermore, victim groups often have insider access to politicians and the policy
consultation process, and may be invited to make policy submissions.
Single-issue campaign groups
Single-issue campaign groups are similar to penal reform groups and victim
interest groups, except that campaign groups generally arise out of widely
publicised perceived injustices and seek to influence law and order policy
pertaining to a single issue of concern.
Case study: Thomas Kelly
In July 2012, Thomas Kelly was killed in a ‘one-punch’ attack in NSW. The incident
drew extensive media coverage and sparked intense public outcry on the danger of
alcohol-fuelled violence. On 8 November 2013, the perpetrator, Kieran Loveridge,
was sentenced to a total of seven years and two months imprisonment. This
punishment was deemed to be grossly inadequate by many, and it further fuelled
public outrage about the problem of alcohol-fuelled violence and the supposed
inability of the judiciary to respond in a way that reflected community sentiment.27
Shortly after the sentence, Kelly’s family and their supporters called for tougher
sentences for violent offenders and lobbied the government to introduce mandatory
sentencing laws. On 19 November 2013, a public rally was held in Sydney’s Martin
Place. By 30 January 2014, a new homicide offence had been created – the offence of
‘assault causing death’. The aggravated version of the offence, ‘assault causing death
when intoxicated’, carries a mandatory sentence of eight years imprisonment. All of
this was achieved in great haste; the Bill was passed in parliament on the same day it
was introduced and with minimal expert consultation.28
General public
Members of the general public can influence law and order policy by expressing
their views through a variety of mediums, including:
• voting at state elections
• participating in opinion polls
• signing petitions
• publishing comments on social media
• providing feedback or comments on talkback radio
• contacting the local member of parliament.
27 Quilter 2014.
28 Quilter 2014.
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Given that politicians are in the business of staying in or attaining office, it is in
their interests to align their policies with widely held public sentiments. Moreover,
politicians do not merely react to public sentiment; public sentiment is heavily
influenced by political agendas and media coverage on crime.
Criminal justice experts
Criminal justice experts are often involved in the policy-making process in some
capacity. They may include: academics, commercial research companies and think
tanks. Criminal justice experts will often advocate for policy changes in response to
system deficiencies that have come to their attention as a result of their professional
work. Experts may be consulted in the process of drafting policy documents or be
asked to advise ministers on issues within their field of expertise. They may also
make submissions to parliamentary inquiries. At times, governments will utilise
expert opinion to legitimise their policy decisions.
Private-sector firms
Governments contract out some of their responsibilities to the private sector. For
example, although the punishment of offenders is a state responsibility, the
government has contracted private-sector firms to operate prisons in Australia.
Private-sector firms who provide criminal justice services have a vested interest in
any policy developments that may impact how they operate in this area.
How ‘law and order’ policy is made
Various approaches, theories and models have been developed to explain and
analyse the law and order policy-making process. The different actors and the
extent of their respective contributions and influence on law and order policy are
contingent on the policy-making model adopted. A small number of models, and
‘policy transfer’ in law and order, will be considered here.
Models of law and order policy making
Table 2 provides an overview of the core models of law and order policy making,
drawn from Hobbs and Hamerton.29 The law and order policy-making process
does not strictly follow any of these models; rather, it combines different elements
from each model. For less contentious law and order issues, policy makers generally
employ more elements of the rational decision model, which focuses on evidence-
based policy making. Issues that elicit greater political contestation or are hasty
29 Hobbs and Hamerton 2014.
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responses to extraordinary criminal incidents tend to result in the adoption of the
elite model of policy making.
Policy transfer
The formulation of purely original and innovative public policy rarely occurs in the
criminal justice space; rather, policy makers often draw inspiration from policies in
other jurisdictions, both within and outside their country.30 This practice is known
as policy transfer. Policy transfer occurs in multiple forms. Policies from another
jurisdiction may be:
• directly copied and transferred to the target jurisdiction
• emulated by copying some elements and adapting them to suit local conditions
• used to inspire the final policy outcome
• combined to achieve the policy outcome.
Below are some examples of Australian law and order policies that have been
imported and adopted from other jurisdictions:
• Prison privatisation: traditionally, all Australian prisons were operated by state
and territory governments. But over time the private sector has been given
responsibility for operating prisons. The privatisation of criminal justice
services first originated from neoliberal ideals in the USA. The growing
acceptance of neoliberal ideas saw a remarkable shift in the way the population
thought about state ownership and control, suggesting that the operation of
state institutions should be subject to market forces of competition and
efficiency. Thus the concept of private prisons was born, resulting in the
commodification of punishment.
• Risk instruments: a range of risk assessment tools that first emerged in the USA
are used in the Australian justice system. These tools assess the level of risk a
person poses to society. This then largely informs the way in which they are
dealt with in the justice system – for example, whether bail or parole is granted.
• Political law and order slogans: law and order style rhetoric from the USA and
UK has been often transferred into the Australian context. Examples include:
▪ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of
crime’ political slogan and rhetoric
▪ US President Ronald Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’ political campaign.
In addition to importing policies from foreign jurisdictions, Australian policies have
also been exported. Restorative justice31 is an example of a policy that first emerged
in Australia and New Zealand that has since gained traction in the USA and UK.
30 Ogg 2015.
31 Restorative justice is an approach that aims to heal (or minimise) the harm caused by the
offender upon the victim. Examples of restorative justice include family group conferencing,
youth justice conferencing and circle sentencing.
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Table 2 Overview of models for the law and order policy-making process
Model Example
Elite model (policy as elite preference): this
model suggests that policy making is a role
reserved predominantly for political elites
(e.g. ministers and their advisers). This
small group of elite individuals have the
power and ability to create, implement and
enforce public policy that regulates the
behaviour of the rest of society.
A minister observes graffiti on the journey
to parliament and decides that measures
must be taken to get tough on such
offences. Relevant department agency staff
are summoned and told to develop
measures to tackle the scourge of graffiti. A
graffiti hotline to encourage reporting and
tougher penalties are swiftly introduced
and implemented.
Pluralist model (policy as diverse
perspectives): this process is based upon
the idea that society is comprised of a
diverse range of actors and stakeholders, all
of whom have an interest in contributing to
and influencing the public policy-making
process and its ultimate outcomes.
Numerous reviews, inquiries and research
reports highlight the importance of tackling
alcohol and other drug use to prevent
offending. A working party is established
with representatives from key criminal
justice agencies and victim and penal
reform groups to develop policy responses.
A specialist drug court is proposed as one
possible solution, which the government
backs through the provision of funding for
a trial.
Incrementalism model (policy as variations
of the past): many aspects of criminal
justice policy making reflect the traditions
and histories of the system, with minor
reforms being introduced over time. Policy
making in this context is a process whereby
existing policies are incrementally modified
and revised. Policies are continually
improved upon in response to the problems
that have arisen from their implementation.
The juvenile justice system has largely
operated the same way for many years –
children appearing in closed children’s
courts are sentenced to serve time in
juvenile justice detention facilities and are
then released into the community with case
management support. A new approach to
assessing and addressing risk factors for
offending is introduced into the system to
augment existing practices.
Institutional model (policy as institutional
output): this model emphasises the
organisational norms, culture, structures
and procedures (both formal and informal)
that develop within institutions and the
ways in which they impact public policy.
Corruption within the police force has
prompted a widespread review. In
developing a blueprint for a new approach
to policing, careful consideration is given to
existing institutional cultures and how
reform of the organisation will be achieved
in this context.
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Model Example
Rational decision model (policy as
maximum social gain): this model of policy
making utilises a problem-solving approach
that is characterised by rationality,
impartiality, fairness and analysis.
Detailed analysis of the mental health of
prisoners reveals mental illness is steadily
rising within this population. It is
recognised that preventing early onset of
mental health problems among this cohort
will produce significant cost savings over
time. A policy response that includes a
spectrum of interventions in place in
community, court and custodial settings is
endorsed.
Source: adapted from Hobbs and Hamerton 2014.
Intergovernmental interactions
The process of law and order policy formulation and implementation in Australia
is further complicated by the country’s constitutional and jurisdictional structure.
State and territory governments have predominant control over law and order
policy, but the Commonwealth government has gradually encroached upon these
traditional state-based responsibilities. Additionally, international agreements and
guidelines for best practice may be considered in the policy formulation and
implementation process.
Commonwealth–state
The Constitution gives state and territory governments the power to enact,
implement and enforce law and order policy within their borders. The Common-
wealth is responsible for law and order policy that extends beyond state and
territory borders or crosses those borders – for example, drug importation, customs
fraud and illegal immigration. The significant overlap between Commonwealth and
state responsibilities can be a source of tension.
State and territory governments are heavily reliant on Commonwealth funding
– more than half of their funding is provided by the Commonwealth government.32
Often Commonwealth funding will be conditional, or tied to a certain project,
policy area or outcome. This has the effect of enabling the Commonwealth to
influence the way in which resources are allocated in the criminal justice system.
32 Parliamentary Education Office 2018.
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International–national
United Nations (UN) resolutions, declarations and treaties promote universal
human rights and can be employed as tools to protect against punitive law and
order policy.33 Australia, as a UN member state, has ratified a number of UN
treaties and is accountable to the international community in its compliance with
its treaty obligations. Table 3 summarises one of the major UN treaties that protects
against excessively punitive policies.
In addition to the ICCPR, below are examples of other UN treaties and
resolutions that have the potential to protect against punitive law and order policy:
• Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Mandela Rules)
(2015) https://bit.ly/2pc54bg
• Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) https://bit.ly/2pRZE52
• Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the
Beijing Rules) (1985) https://bit.ly/2Nem4Wn
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (1985) https://bit.ly/2WjtR9y
While Australia has ratified several UN treaties, for the most part the government
does not recognise these treaties to be legally binding and often treaty obligations
are not enforceable. However, even without legal status, these treaties have an effect
– they can influence and guide law and order policy and provide an antidote to
punitive policies.
Non-agenda issues: corporate crime
Much of the preceding commentary demonstrates a preoccupation with what
might be categorised as ‘street crime’ – crimes that take place in public spaces, such
as assault, theft and drug crimes. The nature of street crime can be contrasted with
‘corporate crime’ and ‘white-collar crime’ – abusing one’s profession to gain specific
access to a crime target.34 Often, such crimes are motivated by financial gain and are
non-violent in nature. Corporate crime covers a diverse range of activity – ranging
from short-changing customers, employee theft, enticing bribes and violating client
privacy to falsifying insurance claims, dumping toxic waste, tax evasion, money
laundering and insider trading.
It can be argued that corporate crimes are the most harmful category of crimes
– such crimes likely account for a greater number of deaths than those committed
by ‘common’ murderers,35 and corporate decisions made in the interests of profit
can have a series of harmful effects that are borne by the wider public. For example,
33 Hogg 2008.
34 Felson 2002.
35 Geis 1996.
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Table 3 Compatibility of Australian law and order policy with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
(adopted by the UN in 1966, ratified by Australia in 1980)
Articles that protect against punitive policies Incompatible Australian policies
Physical integrity
Article 7: prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishment
Liberty and security
Article 9: prohibits arbitrary arrest and
detention; deprivation of liberty must be
according to law; restricts the use of pre-trial
detention (remand)
Article 10: individuals deprived of liberty must
be treated with dignity and humanity; prisons
must be focused on rehabilitation, as opposed
to retribution; prisoners on remand must be
separated from convicted prisoners; children
must be separated from adults in prison
Procedural fairness
Article 14: trials should be completed in a
timely manner; the presumption of innocence
Individual liberty
Article 12: right to freedom of movement – can
only be restricted to protect national security,
public order, health or the rights/freedoms of
others
Article 17: right to privacy
Articles 21 and 22: right to freedom of
association
Counterterrorism laws
Indefinite post-sentence detention for
people convicted of terrorism
Control orders to restrict an individual’s
movements and communications – no
requirement for individual to be
charged or to have previously been
involved in an act of terrorism
Punishment and prison conditions
Mandatory sentencing
Presumption against bail
Lack of culturally appropriate
diversionary options for Indigenous
offenders
Prison overcrowding raises concerns
about privacy, dignity and hygiene
Solitary confinement for extensive
periods of time
Excessive routine strip searches
Preventative detention of serious sex
and violent offenders
Children
Curfews for children (e.g. Northbridge,
WA, does not allow children under 12
and without supervision to go outside
after dark, Miriam Vale, Qld, does not
allow children under 15 and without
supervision to go outside after 8pm).
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James Hardie Industries manufactured asbestos building products throughout
Australia from 1937 to 1986, despite becoming aware of the health complications
caused by asbestos in the 1960s.36 It has been projected that 18,000 Australians will
have died from asbestos-induced cancer (mesothelioma) by 2020.37
A more recent example occurred on the Gold Coast in 2016, when
Dreamworld’s ‘Thunder River Rapids’ ride malfunctioned and caused the deaths
of four people. In the pursuit of profit, Dreamworld reduced its maintenance and
repair expenditure. The theme park ride was overdue for maintenance by seven
months and had malfunctioned on prior occasions (including on the day of the
fatalities).38
In the above cases, it can be argued that both corporations engaged in negligent
behaviour (at the very least) and disregarded the sanctity of human life, yet no
criminal charges were brought against their executives. Nor did these events
instigate a ‘tough on corporate crime’ political campaign or punitive reform of
corporate regulations. In fact, Australian regulatory bodies rarely employ the
criminal law when policing corporate entities and their behaviour.39 Corporate
breaches are often resolved with monetary settlements, and there is relatively little
media attention paid to them. News media are largely uninterested in reporting
corporate crime – often the facts are complex and hard to convey to a lay
audience.40 Corporate crime does not evoke comparable degrees of moral outrage
and intense emotions among the public to ‘traditional’ forms of crime.
Consequently, law and order policy often targets the urban poor, working-class
youth and non-white minorities, while placing the wealthy and powerful above the
purview of the law.41
The legal impunity surrounding corporate crime suggests that a death caused
by corporate greed is more forgivable and less morally offensive than a death caused
by a murderer driven by self-interest. But is there really any material difference?
Conclusions
In recent decades, law and order policy in Australia has become excessively
punitive despite the consistent decline in crime. Numerous policies have been
introduced in the name of community safety and social order, but, when applied
in practice, they unnecessarily criminalise a broad range of behaviours and impose
disproportionately harsh penalties upon those who engage in (some forms of)
criminal behaviour.
36 Prince, Davidson and Dudley 2004.
37 Prince, Davidson and Dudley 2004.
38 Sibson 2018.
39 Hogg 2013.
40 Levi 2006.
41 Geis 1996.
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The formulation of law and order policy is fraught with complexities,
contestations and political power plays. It involves an array of actors with diverse
and often conflicting perspectives, all seeking to influence the direction of law
and order policy. Amidst these debates, politicians have been able to exploit the
public’s (somewhat irrational) fear of crime, which has been predominantly driven
by sensationalistic media coverage, to elicit popular support for ‘tough on crime’
policies.
Punitive law and order policy is costly – in both human and financial terms.
Consequently, it is important to ask whether the benefits gained from ‘getting
tough’ on the supposed crime problem can justify the damage it creates.
Furthermore, it is important to recognise the disproportionate adverse effects of
punitive policies on the most vulnerable groups in society. Law and order policy, as
it currently stands, has the effect of excessively criminalising and punishing poverty
and desperation. More needs to be done to ensure that there is equality before the
law and punishments imposed are proportionate to offences committed.
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Regional policy
Fiona Haslam McKenzie
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Regional Development Commissions
Australia’s regions are the backbone of the nation’s exports sector. The major
industries of regional Australia – agriculture, forestry, fishing and resources
extraction – accounted for nearly 60 per cent of Australia’s exports in 2017.1
However, despite its consistent economic contribution to the country’s prosperity,
regional Australia – like regional areas in other First World economies – has
experienced significant social shifts over the last 50 years.
The influence of globalisation, trade liberalisation and the application of neo-
liberal policies since the 1980s have accelerated urbanisation, and ageing population
trends are apparent in most, although not all, non-metropolitan regions. Rapid
technological change and capital investment in industry have amplified these trends,
which have both driven and been driven by rationalisation and centralisation of
services and infrastructure. This has consequently compromised liveability in
Haslam McKenzie, Fiona (2019). Regional policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R. Butcher,
David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga, eds.
Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 Reserve Bank of Australia 2018.
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regional areas and pushed people into cities. These changes have had profound
impacts on rural, regional and remotely located businesses, communities and people.
Regional policy has the potential to shape economic, social and environmental
outcomes by setting priorities and developing initiatives to achieve outcomes.
Depending on government goals, policy frameworks can facilitate or impede
community and regional development. The implementation of regional policy over
the last 70 years has been haphazard, with many shifts in policy direction.
Consequently, the outcomes have been uneven, often causing considerable angst
and even voter backlash.
This chapter commences by outlining the spatial boundaries of rural and
regional Australia and how data about non-metropolitan Australia is recorded.
Regional policy is then explained, followed by its practical application in Australia,
focusing particularly on the decades since the Second World War. The discussion
of policy highlights the often blurred responsibilities of the different spheres of
government. The following section examines the reorientation of Australian
political and economic policies in the later decades of the 20th century, shifting
from Keynesian influenced initiatives, the hallmark of which is government
intervention and regulation to policies that reoriented Australian industries to
global markets and reduced the role of government as the source of infrastructure
investment and provider of services in rural, regional and remote communities.
Australian regional development policy in the opening decades of the 21st century
is then examined, framed by increasing regional voter dissatisfaction but also by
considerable national wealth from regionally based industries, which saved
Australia from being drawn into the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Concessions
given to the National Party and to regionally based independent politicians by
the major parties have avoided the real threat of hung parliaments and redirected
spending to regional areas. The chapter concludes with an assessment of current
regional policy arrangements.
Defining rural and regional Australia
Unlike other jurisdictions, in Australian political and public policy discourse
‘regions’ and ‘regional’ are often understood as synonyms of ‘rural areas’.2 In most
other countries, cities are considered discrete regions and regional development
policies usually address their needs in the same way as farming, mining and other
non-metropolitan regions. In Australia, regional policy focuses on non-
metropolitan places.
Regional Australia is not homogenous; it includes a large, spatially diverse
area with considerable economic, climatic, social, environmental, population and
settlement diversity. However, regions are generally assumed to have something
2 Brown and Bellamy 2007; Paül and Haslam McKenzie 2015, 10.
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in common, such as topographical features (for example, the Snowy Mountains)
or industry (like the Wheatbelt, known for its agricultural products, or the wine
region of South Australia). Territorial boundaries are usually politically significant
and may influence the distribution of power and resources. For example, state
boundaries often delineate particular funding arrangements or policies.
From a policy perspective, there are a variety of regional administrative
designations. There are multiple agencies, such as the Commonwealth government
Regional Development Australia (RDA) committees, Western Australian Regional
Development Commissions, local government regional zones and local govern-
ment areas, each of which have defined roles with particular boundaries and
funding arrangements.
The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Census of Population and Housing is
held every five years. Because participation is compulsory, it provides a consistent
range of information about the economy and populations for all Australia. ABS
boundaries occasionally change with population fluctuations but are consistent
enough to provide useful baseline information about places and people. The data
are divided into geographic areas, defined by the Australian Standard Geographical
Classification (ASGC). The ASGC determines statistical areas based on population
densities, geographical structures, such as remoteness, and urban/rural defin-
itions.3 Most states have multiple regions.4
The ABS divides Australia into five classes of remoteness (Remoteness Areas
[RAs]) based on the Accessibility and Remoteness Index of Australia (ARIA). This
employs road distance measurements to the nearest service centres. The RAs are:
• major cities
• inner regional
• outer regional
• remote
• very remote.
Regions and regional Australia are not static; there is constant change, driven by
market forces, climatic conditions, social trends and even political arrangements.
These influence where people live and what livelihoods they pursue. Policy
decisions are also fluid but influential; how and where public and private
investment is directed impacts job prospects, liveability and accessibility and
therefore the links between people and places.
A Commonwealth Government Standing Committee5 noted that, from a
national perspective, regions in Australia have been defined in a number of ways,
including as:
3 ABS 2018.
4 With the exception of Tasmania. The Northern Territory is also counted as one region.
5 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Transport, Regional
Development and Local Government 2009.
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• 85 biogeographic regions, identified co-operatively by federal and state
government scientists
• 69 statistical divisions, based on agreed definitions of a ‘region’ and identified
co-operatively by federal and state statisticians and used by the ABS
• 64 regions identified by the formation of voluntary Regional Organisations of
Councils (ROCs), which are groupings of approximately 560 local governments
• 57 regions of the federal–state natural resource management regional bodies
administering the Natural Heritage Trust and National Action Plan on Water
Quality and Salinity
• 54 regions of the nation’s RDA committees (formally ‘Area Consultative
Committees’).
Regions can also be functional economic areas with specialisations and competitive
advantage, meaning that they have physical or resource attributes that give them
advantages over competitors. Another type of functional region is defined by
natural resources, such as a water catchment or natural endowments. However,
even though rural and regional Australia can be defined in many ways, in broad
policy terms, regional Australia is assumed to be all the towns, cities and comm-
unities outside Australia’s six largest capital cities.6
Regional policy: what is it?
Collits explains that regional policy ‘typically responds to regional disparities and
often focuses on economic development, jobs and investment’.7 This focus is not
particular to Australia. In most international jurisdictions, regional policy is viewed
as economic policy with the objective of setting policy levers to avoid regional
disparities and uneven development.8 In its Europe 2020 Strategy,9 the European
Commission states that regional policy is an investment policy, supporting and
promoting job creation, competitiveness, economic growth, improved quality of life
and sustainable development. In Australia, in addition to its strong economic focus,
regional policy also seeks to address liveability and ensure comparable services for
those living outside the large cities.
In the current Australian context, neoliberal policy settings encourage capacity
building and economic growth through harnessing regional attributes, rather than
through external investment and government-led initiatives. Where there is
recognised regional disadvantage, it is expected that regional policy has the
potential to be a strategic intervention, rather than directly investing in initiatives.
6 Productivity Commission 2017.
7 Collits 2012, 206.
8 Harrison 2006.
9 European Commission 2010.
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Policies impacting regional Australia
Traditionally, the Commonwealth has viewed regional development as a state
responsibility because the states have constitutional responsibility for transport,
resource management, infrastructure, land use activities, planning, the environ-
ment and local government, all of which are important to rural, regional and
remote places. The distinction between regional policy and other general policies
that have impacts on regional Australia is often blurred. Some national policies
have more of a regional impact or focus than others, but they are not necessarily
referred to as regional policies. For example, water and climate policies, energy
and transport policies and National Competition Policy have all had a considerable
influence on regionally based industry sectors and, in some cases, the liveability
of rural, regional and remote communities, but their influence is not limited to
the regions. Aboriginal interests, for example, are rarely specifically articulated in
regional policy, partly because of the different ways these interests are incorporated
into institutional structures. Generally, there is a separation of responsibilities and
governance structures for regional development and Aboriginal affairs.
Even at the state level, regional policy has had decreasing prominence as
businesses and populations have gravitated to the capitals. However, there have been
some exceptions when, for political or market reasons, governments have re-focused
their policy and investment attentions on the regions. Perhaps the most outstanding
example of this was the introduction of the Royalties for Regions program by the
Western Australian (WA) government in 2008, which will be discussed below.
Postwar period
There have been periods when the Commonwealth has taken a more overt regional
policy position, imposing policies that have had significant influence on regional
Australia. The post–Second World War period was the first time the Common-
wealth specifically used regional policy as an economic mechanism to assist
Australia to transform from a wartime to a peacetime economy through domestic
reconstruction and a national regional development program. The Commonwealth
encouraged postwar migrants to relocate to regional areas by sponsoring jobs on
major infrastructure projects such as the Snowy Mountains Scheme and hydro-
electricity projects in Tasmania. Returned servicemen were incentivised to take up
soldier settlement blocks throughout rural areas to repopulate the hinterlands and
reinvigorate Australia’s agricultural industry.
At the same time, the Australian government encouraged particular sectors to
develop, which had both direct and indirect impacts on regional areas and local
economies. This was done through various reconstruction policies, rather than
specific regional development policies. For example, tariff protection and import
controls in the postwar period enabled manufacturing and new factory jobs, some,
but not all, of which were in regional towns, such as Geelong, Newcastle, Whyalla
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and Gladstone. This significantly boosted the populations of those towns and their
role as regional centres.
From about 1950 Keynesian economics (promoting government’s role in
sponsoring economic growth through government expenditure and lower taxes
to stimulate demand) became the principal ideology in Western nations.10 In
Australia, public investment in regions was justified as it stimulated growth and
sought to achieve spatially equitable development.11 This was not necessarily
viewed as regional policy, but rather as regional development for the benefit of the
entire nation. The Ord River irrigation scheme in WA, regulation of production
and protection of commodities, fuel subsidies and cross-subsidisation of transport
and communications infrastructure are examples. Until the mid-1970s, Australian
industry was largely protected through subsidies and state regulation. The
agricultural sector was a particular beneficiary with a range of subsidies and
bounties to protect and support farmers. In addition, many regulatory authorities,
statutory marketing and price support schemes were in place that shielded the
agricultural sector from market fluctuations. Regional towns and communities
were strongly supported by government-funded infrastructure on the principles
of equity rather than market forces. Costly services such as transport networks,
schools, health centres and other facilities were established throughout rural,
regional and remote Australia, boosting communities and primary industry
development. Despite the small and scattered towns and communities, the
investment in rural, regional and remote places was justified by the notions of ‘state
paternalism’12 and ‘countrymindedness’, which Lockie describes as the ‘association
of Australianness with rurality and the broad acceptance of the importance of rural
activities for the Australian economy’.13
As early as 1890, the rural population was lamenting the ‘evil of centralisation
which would seek to advance the capital city … at the expense of the country
districts’.14 From the 1920s, countrymindedness was manifested politically through
the formation and electoral success of the Country Party, now National Party.
Despite the dominance of the coastal cities since European settlement, the
egalitarian notion of the archetypal, usually male, Australian who ‘had a go and
built the nation’ had considerable electoral cache throughout Australia, with broad
acceptance of ‘agrarian socialist policies’.15 As a result, voters in rural, regional
and remote areas had a disproportionate advantage at the ballot box in many
jurisdictions. It was only in 2005 that WA finally secured one-vote-one-value
legislation; until then rural votes were worth almost twice the urban vote,16 much to
10 Tonts and Jones 1997.
11 Haslam McKenzie and Tonts 2005.
12 Tonts and Jones 1997, 173.
13 Lockie 2000, 17.
14 Black, quoted in Davies and Tonts 2007, 211.
15 Lockie 2000, 19.
16 Davies and Tonts 2007.
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the chagrin of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) whose electorate was traditionally
urban-based.17
In 1972, the Whitlam Labor government established the Department of Urban
and Regional Development (DURD) and, once again, the Commonwealth overtly
engaged in regional development policy. DURD’s initiatives were based on specific
policies aimed at improving co-ordination between the Commonwealth, states and
local government. DURD formalised planning regions and developed a population
distribution plan identifying growth centres.18 However, the Commonwealth’s
regional policy focus was short lived. The Fraser government’s election in 1975
ended the federal regional development policy foray, leaving it to the states to
look after regional matters until the 1990s. Since then, the importance of regional
policy at the Commonwealth level has waxed and waned. As noted by Eversole, ‘the
imperative to act in favour of Australian regions ebbs and flows with the political
climate, creating a fragmented landscape of regional policy initiatives’.19 Politics,
therefore, has considerable influence over what policies are implemented and where
they are applied.
The late 20th century and neoliberalism
Until the late 1970s, Australia’s regional policy was framed by a commitment to
equity, which supported communities throughout rural, regional and remote
Australia but did not necessarily elicit efficient industries. The 1980s saw significant
restructuring of policies and entire industry sectors after the election of the Hawke
Labor government in 1983. Australia began to engage with global conditions and
the international marketplace, and the broad government policy was reoriented to
efficiency and market forces, which underpin neoliberal principles. The hallmarks
of neoliberal policy principles are privatisation and state deregulation, increased
reliance on market forces, rather than government intervention, to drive change,
and devolution of responsibilities and functions from governments to the private
and community sectors. Government, therefore, began to withdraw from its tradi-
tional role as a source of infrastructure investment and provider of services.
The shift to neoliberal principles was not limited to regional Australia, but its
impacts were deeply felt in rural, regional and remote communities. The viability
of regional communities came under scrutiny and government services and
infrastructure expenditure began to be rationalised and/or centralised, shaped by
user-pays and self-help ideals. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, rural, regional
and remote communities experienced reduced service delivery and infrastructure
investment, as government responded to market demands rather than equity
considerations. Communities were increasingly expected to more self-reliant. At a
17 van Staden and Haslam McKenzie 2019a.
18 Tonts and Haslam McKenzie 2005.
19 Eversole 2016, 5.
Regional policy
675
government level, the Commonwealth began to devolve responsibility to the states,
and the states shifted many service provision responsibilities to local government –
the least resourced tier of government.
Australia’s industries are now some of the most globally engaged and efficient
in the world, but there are fewer people involved due to greater dependence on
technical and capital investment, often at the expense of the labour force. Farmers,
for example, use capital-intensive methods to maximise outputs; their farms are
bigger to take advantage of economies of scale, but they often employ fewer people.
The shift towards neoliberal principles in government policy boosted Australian
gross domestic product but had a catastrophic impact on many rural, regional and
remote communities as people left to access services in larger population centres
or were squeezed out by the scale of many of the businesses left behind. This
began a prolonged period of depopulation across all Australian rural, regional and
remote communities, with the exception of those either on, or very close to, the
coastline. By 2000, more than 80 per cent of the Australian population lived within
50 kilometres of the coast.20
The Hawke and Keating Labor governments (1983–96) implemented compre-
hensive neoliberal reforms, deregulated many sectors, including the finance
industry, and sold off government entities such as Telstra, Qantas and the
Commonwealth Bank to the private sector, all of which had immediate impacts
on services at the local level, with many withdrawn because the private sector
was not prepared to underwrite unviable businesses. Commonwealth and state
governments were keen to re-orient the economy to capture the perceived benefits
of an increasingly deregulated global marketplace. The Commonwealth govern-
ment initiated several different regional development programs, purportedly to
assist regional businesses and communities, but the emphasis was on economic
efficiency, competitiveness and entrepreneurialism. The expectation was that self-
directed and largely self-funded regional development programs would drive
change. The commitment to laissez-faire (market-led) policies also led to the sale of
state government assets, the privatisation of public services and the devolution of
some public services to local governments. By selling off, contracting out or shifting
the responsibility to private consultants and local government for inefficient
publicly owned and operated assets and services, governments were able to reduce
overall levels of expenditure and emphasise the role of markets in achieving an
‘efficient’ allocation and provision of services. In effect, neoliberalism privileged
economic efficiency above social equity or, as Stilwell argued, ‘structural efficiency
first, redistribution later’.21
Australia was in recession in the early 1990s, and ‘interest in regional
development policies … experienced somewhat of a resurgence’ due to two
20 Salt 2004.
21 Stilwell 1994, 61.
Australian Politics and Policy
676
interrelated causes.22 First, the neoliberal reforms’ contribution to regional socio-
economic disadvantage was becoming apparent, and second, the government was
forced to consider the adverse implications of their reforms on the 1993 federal
election.23 Government was increasingly challenged by regional voter dissatis-
faction as services and infrastructure were rationalised or withdrawn and local
capacity in the regions was compromised.
The Hawke and Keating governments prepared numerous regional devel-
opment reports between 1990 and 1993, emphasising bottom-up, local entrepren-
eurship but with limited funding support. The Kelty Report (Developing Australia:
a regional perspective) on regional economic development24 was launched in
December 1993 by the federal government, with high hopes that employment
difficulties and low incomes being experienced in many regional communities
would be addressed. The report proposed the establishment of Regional Economic
Development Organisations (REDOs) (later Regional Development Organisations
[RDOs] and Area Consultative Committees [ACCs]) across Australia to develop
individual regional strategies, promote regional development and improve policy
co-ordination between federal, state and local governments, a strategy that was
subsequently taken up in the federal government’s Working Nation program in
1994.
Working Nation was a departure from previous approaches as it viewed
‘government as facilitator, rather than the driving force’,25 but the overarching
message was still self-reliance. Australia’s geography, its spatial imbalances and
the high concentration of its populations on the coastal fringes raised particular
problems for government. In the absence of a coherent national policy for urban
and regional development, jointly implemented by federal and state governments,
there was limited manoeuvrability for the redress of regional inequality.
The agricultural sector was particularly hard hit by the transition from a
favoured, government-supported industry sector to one that was expected to
compete internationally without government subsidies or other protection.
Economies of scale, technological primacy and increased harnessing of scientific
and economic efficiencies demanded capital investment, and inevitably caused
the failure of inefficient operations. These changes, over a relatively short period
of time, accelerated a process of decline in parts of regional Australia that had
historically been economically and socially dependent on agricultural production.
22 Tonts and Haslam McKenzie 2005, 187.
23 Tonts and Haslam McKenzie 2005.
24 Taskforce on Regional Development 1993.
25 Kelly, Dollery and Grant 2009, 181.
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Regional environmental policy
One new area of policy that did attract broad political and funding commitment
was the environment. Since the early 1970s, environmental issues have increasingly
come to the forefront of discussion regarding sustainability. Debates regarding
the conflict between economic and environmental sustainability gained political
traction. The Brundtland Report26 crystallised the debates highlighting unsustain-
ability in terms of a threat to survival. The report overtly linked environmental
sustainability and the uneven distribution of economic benefits.27
After the Brundtland Commission emphasised the importance of sustainable
development and pushed it to the top of the agenda of the United Nations and
the multilateral development banks,28 environmental protection became a major
Australian government policy objective. In the late 1980s, the federal government
embarked on a series of sectoral ecologically sustainable development investi-
gations, which culminated in the adoption of the National Strategy for Ecologically
Sustainable Development in 1992.29
A national land care program was jointly proposed by the National Farmers’
Federation and the Australian Conservation Foundation, and in 1989 then Prime
Minister Bob Hawke, in the Statement on the Environment, announced the Decade
of Landcare. Water catchment and the management of salinity were two key areas.
Programs included in the Decade of Landcare focused on implementing eco-
logically sustainable land use around Australia, promoting research and action
regarding land degradation throughout rural, regional and remote Australia, and
raising awareness of the importance of conservation and sustainable practices.
Regional development policy in the 21st century
The policies driving regional development at the conclusion of the 20th century
aimed to maintain economic and social vibrancy through regional-scale govern-
ance and place-based solutions, in line with the ‘new’ paradigm that gained
considerable traction in the first decade of the 21st century. The ‘new’ paradigm
in regional policy has been strongly driven by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) since about 2006. It emphasises area-specific
or place-based approaches, rather than whole-of-government arrangements.
Much like other Liberal–National (Coalition) governments, the Howard govern-
ment (1996–2007) showed little inclination to drive a national regional development
agenda, maintaining ‘that local and regional development was a State responsibility’
and the Commonwealth was often a ‘competitor, rather than a partner of the States’.30
26 World Commission on Environment and Development 1987.
27 Ekins and Jacobs 1995; Kane 1999.
28 Daly 1990.
29 Godden 1997.
30 Tomaney 2010, 29.
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The place-based approaches, framing the regional development ‘problem’ as the lack
of regional competitiveness and underused potential, was a convenient reason for the
Howard government not to pursue a national regional policy agenda.
Despite the rhetoric that regional policy should be shaped by the regions
themselves, the control mechanisms of power and resources resided in the federal
and state parliaments and resources flowed according to political and centralised
policy commitments. Almost counterintuitively, the ALP has traditionally been
more committed to implementing regional policy than its more conservative
Liberal/Country/National Party opposition, continuing its long tradition of
bypassing the states. Between 1996 and 1998, the Howard government distanced
itself from ‘the Keating Government’s regional interventionism’31 and dismantled
the Regional Development Program. The REDOs and RDOs, were scrapped
although some RDOs survived as local corporations. The ACCs remained and
were restructured for the purpose of channelling federal funds to regional
communities,32 but they were usually small organisations with limited regional
impact.
Structural changes in the financial, transport, manufacturing and trade sectors
affected the geographic distribution of people, industries and wealth in regional
Australia, inducing new configurations. Under the Howard government, labour
and employment conditions were deregulated and flexible work arrangements such
as fly-in/fly-out (FIFO) and drive-in/drive-out (DIDO) became increasingly
popular. Long-distance commuting practices were used by many private and public
sector organisations, enabling employees to choose where they live, often in the
capital cities and larger, better-resourced regional centres, and travel to work in
other places, usually accommodated in employer-paid accommodation.33 Flexible
work arrangements reduced the need to continually invest in smaller, less resourced
communities, causing many benefits, such as income expenditure and housing
investment, to flow to the bigger centres instead.
Continued orientation of the Australian economy towards global markets
intensified the effect of market mechanisms, causing continual change in tech-
nologies, products, markets and modes of distribution. The impact of technological
change was double-sided: it increased demand and employment, but it also
displaced workers and made some jobs obsolete, particularly in the agricultural and
manufacturing sectors.
From a social perspective, restructuring was not achieved without pain and a
sense of loss for many in regional Australia. The consistent paring back of regional
development investment continued to incur voter backlash. This was particularly
evident in the rise of One Nation in the 1998 Queensland election. One Nation
received 23 per cent of the primary vote, and won 11 of 89 seats in the 1998
31 Collits 2008, 295.
32 Paül and Haslam McKenzie 2015.
33 Haslam McKenzie 2016.
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Queensland state election.34 The party’s success was generally attributed to its
appeal to rural voters, who were increasingly disillusioned with the major parties
and felt their lifestyles were under threat.35 The Commonwealth responded with
attempts to soften the non-interventionist policy direction, but once again there
was limited time and investment, resulting in policy fragmentation,36 and the
electorate was not convinced.
The resources boom
From 2001 onwards, Australia experienced a decade of outstanding growth and
prosperity, principally on the back of a resources boom, fuelled by almost insatiable
demand from China for resources, including coal, iron-ore, energy and agricultural
products. Many did not see this boom period coming and many rural, regional and
remote communities were unprepared, especially those at the centre of the mining
boom, in regions such as the Pilbara in WA and the Surat and Bowen basins in
Queensland. This boom period continued unabated for more than a decade, despite
the GFC (2007–09) dragging down the major global economies.
The boom had broad impacts across all of Australia, with many people and
communities, especially in the cities, where most long-distance commuting miners
resided and businesses and mining service providers were located, enjoying the
benefits. The outcomes for people living in rural, regional and remote communities
were mixed. For those communities close to mining activities, the impacts were
not always beneficial, with intense demand for housing, infrastructure, services
and labour driving up prices and displacing many who could not compete with
the wealthy mining companies. Furthermore, the decades-long neglect of regional
services and infrastructure impeded responsive development,37 causing housing
shortages and inadequate utility services.
The outcomes of the boom are a classic example of uneven growth and the two-
speed economy. Regional Queensland and WA bore the consequences of the boom
conditions; the former due to its large coal mining operations and the emerging
coal seam gas industry, and the latter principally due to its huge and rich iron-ore
resources, but also its offshore oil and gas reserves. In the Pilbara, at the height of
the boom, the overall cost of living was 37 per cent higher38 than that in Perth.
While the majority of Australia’s rich mining resources tend to be in remote
locations, some are located where agriculture is also well established and highly
productive – for example, the Darling Downs in Queensland, the Hunter Valley in
New South Wales and the Peel region in WA. Land use conflict, access to land and
water resources and pressure on services caused considerable antagonism between
34 McManus and Pritchard 2000.
35 Tonts and Haslam McKenzie 2005.
36 Beer 2007.
37 Haslam McKenzie and Rowley 2013; Lawrie, Tonts and Plummer 2011.
38 Department of Regional Development and Lands 2011.
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farmers and mining companies,39 and many state agencies and local governments
did not have the capacity and were not properly resourced to deal with the issues.
Critics of the status quo
Communities and industry leaders looked to government for regional policies that
would support towns and communities and help them retain the benefits from
boom economic conditions. Beer,40 along with others,41 contends that regional
development in Australia was hampered by a lack of long-term strategic directions
and the outcomes of the system of federalism.
Beer is particularly critical of political ideologies grounded in neoliberalism
that were wary of direct intervention in regional economies and emphasised short-
term political responses, rather than long-term strategic interventions. As
explained by Tiley, ‘the Australian Government had the financial capacity to
empower an effective regional development network; the state and territory
governments had the constitutional power; while local government had neither
the funding nor the power, but had the commitment needed to deliver change’.42
Beer claims that the division of powers between the three tiers of government
contributed to a clouding of the lines of responsibility and accountability, and
that the importance and role of regional development were not understood or
recognised.43 Consequently, resources and responsibilities are still abrogated by
the spheres of government with superior power, which instead focus on short-
term ‘political point scoring’. This was particularly evident in the Rudd and Gillard
governments.
In 2007, the Rudd ALP government sought a return to interventionism and
established Regional Development Australia (RDA) committees to administer
regional funds through local government authorities, rather than through state
government agencies,44 once again reverting to the traditional ALP practice of
bypassing state governments. RDA committees replaced REDOs (later RDOs and
ACCs), which were Commonwealth-funded offices in locations across regional
Australia. The committees’ purpose has generally remained the same since the
REDOs were established during the Keating government in 1993: identify key
regional economic and industry development issues, investigate the prospects for a
more even distribution of regional development and employment, examine actors
influencing regional investment and suggest appropriate policy changes.
The REDOs, RDOs and ACCs were ineffectual, however, because they did
not have the capacity to make a significant difference, lacking both resources and
39 Hoath and Pavez 2013; Zhang and Moffat 2015.
40 Beer 2007.
41 Collits 2012.
42 Tiley 2013, 12.
43 Beer 2007.
44 Sotarauta and Beer 2017.
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political continuity. The RDA committees were no different, although under Rudd
the budget allocation was reduced and the community members working on the
committees providing overarching governance were unpaid. The rhetoric of sup-
port for regional Australia was familiar, but the electorate was disgruntled, and
the 2010 election returned a hung parliament. The ALP finally formed government
after three independent, rural-based politicians gave their support in return for
generous concessions to regional Australia.
Royalties for Regions
The Rudd and Gillard governments were not the only governments responding
to voter backlash. As van Staden and Haslam McKenzie observe, ‘under the right
conditions, compounding socio-political and economic change can dramatically
alter government policy’.45 The intensity of the mining boom in WA and the ill-
preparedness of the state and communities for its social and economic impacts
caused considerable criticism to be directed at the ALP state government. In the
2008 state election, neither of the major parties won a majority, and the National
Party, a then minor party traditionally representing the non-metropolitan con-
stituency, became kingmaker in order to avoid a hung parliament
The National Party’s powerbrokers negotiated the implementation of the
Royalties for Regions program in a last-minute deal with the WA Liberal Party.
This was a significant departure from a non-interventionist, neoliberal and ‘new
paradigm’ policy agenda. The Royalties for Regions program allocated a further
25 per cent of the state’s resources royalty income to non-metropolitan regions,
over and above existing regional allocations. It transformed regional development
into a billion dollar effort, dwarfing previous government investment since the
1960s.46 While more $1 billion was allocated to upgrading facilities, infrastructure
and planning capacity in the Pilbara, the Royalties for Regions largesse was spread
throughout rural, regional and remote communities in WA.
Importantly, the National Party, in its negotiations with the Liberal Party after
the 2008 election, chose not to formalise a ‘coalition’, but rather argued that it was
an ‘alliance’,47 putting the Liberal Party on notice that the support of the National
Party could not be assured unless rural, regional and remote communities were
adequately looked after.
In 2017, the ALP won government again in WA, and while the Royalties for
Regions program has not been revoked, investment in rural, regional and remote
WA has been significantly pared back and the National Party’s parliamentary
influence has significantly reduced.
45 van Staden and Haslam McKenzie 2019b, 1.
46 van Staden and Haslam McKenzie 2019b.
47 Phillimore and McMahon, 2015.
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The Abbott and Turnbull governments’ regional policy agenda
Little changed with regard to regional policy under the Abbott and Turnbull
Coalition governments (2013–18). As noted, the hallmarks of 21st-century regional
development are intermittent commitment, blame-shifting, poorly resourced
policy and rebadging of old initiatives. In 2016, under the Turnbull government, the
Commonwealth reviewed the RDA committees, recommending their cessation.48
The review supported regional-specific solutions and the alignment of regional
development boundaries with those of states and territories. It also recommended
‘strengthening regional economies by promoting economic investment oppor-
tunities in regional Australia to the national and international market’,49 in line with
the global reorientation policies espoused since the 1980s.
However, the author of the review, Warwick Smith, considered the Common-
wealth commitment to regional Australia as piecemeal at best and perhaps even
tokenistic: ‘the Australian Government, along with most state and territory govern-
ments, have not shown total commitment to the RDA programme’.50 Smith
identified a range of structural inefficiencies that hindered the functionality of
RDA committees, but perhaps the most fundamental weakness of the program was
the lack of appropriate funding or support to enable the committees to deliver
the Australian government’s regional agenda: ‘The Australian government delivers
its broader policy and programs, even regional programs, in isolation to, and
separately from, the RDA programme.’51
The budget allocation for RDA committees has not changed for a decade,
despite costs increasing over that time. In large jurisdictions such as WA and the
Northern Territory, additional challenges such as the high costs of doing business
in many rural, regional and remote places, travel time over large distances, poor
connectivity and problematic telecommunications services, further undermining
the efficacy of RDA committees. The annual budget of $18 million is expected
to fund the entire national RDA program, across 52 committees. This essentially
pays the salaries of the executive directors, with little left to achieve the central
purpose of the committees: to support the development of regional Australia.
Funding allocations available for projects, and decisions regarding how and where
the funds will be spent, are often determined by other Commonwealth government
commitments or local federal politicians’ agendas, rather than the local RDA
committee or agreed funding priorities.
The arrangements reflect the ‘new’ paradigm of regional development,
exhibiting ‘the familiar mixture of unconnected regional programs; inadequately
resourced regional structures … and an unflinching faith that spending large
48 Commonwealth of Australia 2016.
49 Commonwealth of Australia 2016, 7.
50 Commonwealth of Australia 2016, 2.
51 Commonwealth of Australia 2016, 2.
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amounts on infrastructure projects big and small across most regions is the best
way to fund regional development’.52
In 2017, the Commonwealth released its ‘Regions 2030 – Unlocking
Opportunity’ policy.53 Despite its new name, the policy includes elements of many
of its predecessors and of the ‘new’ paradigm, focusing on local decision making,
tailor-made regional solutions and unlocking regional economies, all without a
new funding model. Despite various experiments, regional bodies with political
power have never become a fixed part of the regional administrative landscape and
Commonwealth regionalisation, in particular, has always been controversial.54
The lack of stable leadership in the federal ministry has undermined
commitment and policy coherence. Federal leadership changes since 2010 and
major political disruptions associated with citizenship credentials of politicians
have meant that regional development has not been a focus of successive
governments, and the portfolio has lacked ministerial and hence leadership
consistency. Since 2010 there have been ten ministers with responsibility for the
RDA network. Not surprisingly, regional development policy has been described as
‘fragmented’ by a range of commentators and researchers.55
Conclusions
Regional Australia is, as you would expect, unique. However, many of Australia’s
current regional development policies are not dissimilar to those of other First
World nations, despite Australia’s significant climatic, political, geographic,
environmental and economic differences. Nonetheless non-metropolitan areas are
often viewed as the policy periphery, struggling to maintain population, vibrancy
and viability as businesses and people are drawn to the political and economic
centres located in capitals.
While Australian regional development policy dictates that the regions should
have considerable autonomy because they understand local context, conditions and
potential opportunities, the resources and decision-making power tend to reside
in Canberra or the respective state capitals. Despite the Commonwealth claiming
that regional development is the remit of the states for most of the last 120 years, it
dictates overarching national policy by virtue of its fiscal dominance. Furthermore,
it has considerable power over the other spheres of government and the outcomes
for rural, regional and remote communities. The states also play a significant role
in regional development, dictating how resources will be spent and where; ‘thus
regional Australia’s organisations, institutions and governance mechanisms remain
52 Collits 2012, 28.
53 Commonwealth of Australia 2017.
54 Kelly, Dollery and Grant 2009, 181–2.
55 Beer, Maude and Pritchard 2003; Commonwealth of Australia 2016; Dollery, Buultjens and
Adams 2011.
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structurally on the periphery’.56 It is not surprising then that regional development
initiatives and policies have lacked consistency, causing duplication and widening
service gaps across multiple government levels.
According to Sotarauta and Beer, ‘to most observers, the regional development
system in Australia appears chaotic and underfunded relative to needs’.57 The lack
of uniformity and consistency of both Commonwealth and state regional
development agencies have contributed to a national regional framework that is
without coherence.58 Consequently, ‘fragmentation’ in regional development has
been a major problem, with policy responsibility frequently shared between the
federal, state and local spheres of government’59 and a slew of organisations,
including many from the private sector, involved in the delivery of regional
development programs. There are no signs that these trends are likely to change
while Australian regional development policy is characterised by ‘modest govern-
ment investment and locally provided inducements’.60
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Social policy
Greg Marston and Zoe Staines
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Social policy is guided by questions of distributive justice: who gets what in society,
under what circumstances, and how. Social policy is generally considered to be
synonymous with the ‘welfare state’, which sees government as a direct provider or
regulator of private and not-for-profit social welfare services including education,
health, community services, social housing, occupational welfare and income
support. These forms of welfare are usually underwritten by social insurance
schemes, which redistribute funds accumulated through taxes and levies to those
in need of support. They can also take other forms, like the provision of tax
expenditures and informal care provided through civil society.1
The various forms of welfare, provided through a combination of direct
government service delivery, markets, non-profits and civil society, are referred to
as a mixed economy of welfare. Social policies tend to interact and intersect in
a number of different ways, forming a complex web of enabling and disenabling
structures and systems. For example, the right to access and engage in meaningful
education is deeply linked with other areas of social policy, because policy
Marston, Greg, and Zoe Staines (2019). Social policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 Marston, McDonald and Bryson 2014.
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structures can either establish the architecture that enables or denies this access and
engagement (like promoting access to quality early childhood care).2 Social policy
can, therefore, have direct and substantial impacts on how people live their lives,
the choices available to them, and their overall standard of living. Social policy
decisions are also often highly politicised and deeply contested as the meeting of
human needs has both a moral and material dimension.
This chapter explores some fundamental characteristics of social policy
including a brief history of social policy in Australia, how it is made, by whom,
and key debates. As you will see, social policy plays a powerful role in shaping how
society operates, how it redistributes wealth, how it cares for and controls its most
disadvantaged members, and provides tax breaks for middle and upper income
Australians. Summing up the role of the conflicted welfare state in an essay titled
‘What is social policy?’, the pioneering scholar of social administration Richard
Titmuss wrote that ‘what is “welfare” for some groups may be “illfare” for others’.3
In this chapter we seek to draw out these dilemmas and contradictions.
Social policy in Australia: recent history
Prior to Federation in 1901, social welfare in Australia was largely the purview
of non-government charitable organisations. Smyth described Australian colonial
society as being ‘cool’ when it came to government-provided welfare, but ‘hot’ on
promoting equal opportunity.4 The focus was on supporting citizens to be self-
sufficient rather than looking to government for poverty relief. This represented a
contrast to the (often stigmatised) provision of state welfare under the Poor Laws in
Britain.5
Dickey described the years following Federation as being characterised by a
transition away from an age of charity to an age of rights.6 The Harvester Judgement,
handed down by Justice Higgins of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in
1907, established the first minimum ‘living wage’ for Australian workers.7 In 1908,
the new Australian government also introduced a fixed-rate old-age pension, though
this was not universal. For example, only those who passed the means test qualified
and some groups, like Indigenous Australians, were explicitly excluded.
Thereafter, around the Second World War, Australia’s welfare system was
dramatically redefined and expenditure increased exponentially.8 As Shaver
explained, ‘Australia entered World War II with only fragmentary welfare provision:
2 Gupta and Simonsen 2016; Lamy 2012.
3 Titmuss 1974, 4.
4 Smyth 2012, 2.
5 Smyth 2011.
6 Dickey 1980.
7 Lloyd 2017.
8 Watts 1999; Watts 1987.
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by the end of the war it had constructed a “welfare state”’.9 This was partly prompted
by the formation in 1941 of a Joint Parliamentary Committee on Social Security
by the Menzies government (1939–41), which reviewed existing social policies and
recommended new measures to improve postwar life.10
A series of new social policies were introduced during and in the aftermath
of the Second World War, including widows’ pensions, uniform income tax in
1942, and the National Welfare Fund in 1943–44, which funded the national
unemployment benefit.11 The provision of national unemployment benefits was,
at least in part, a response to the anticipated demobilisation of military personnel
in the post–Second World War period.12 However, the benefits were means-tested
rather than universal – a contrast to the approach then taken in Britain.13
In 1945, then-Treasurer (and later prime minister from 1945–49) Ben Chifley
referred to Australia’s growing social security system as a safety net much like that
used by a trapeze artist: ‘The net is not, of course, part of the main show … The
more competent the performer, the less the net will be used’.14 The underpinning
belief was that the best form of welfare was a job and, thus, the emphasis was on
ensuring equal access to fair employment. The social security system was perceived
as a ‘fall-back’ measure only. It is for this reason that Australia’s postwar welfare
state came to be characterised in the literature as ‘a wage earner’s welfare state’, or
more precisely given the nature of the labour market during this period ‘a white,
male wage earner’s welfare state’.15
During the 1950s and 1960s, there was only incremental social policy reform,
perhaps in part because of very strong employment throughout the period.16 This
preceded further widespread expansion of the welfare state during the 1970s, when
unemployment rates began to increase with the 1974 global recession.17 A series of
inquiries was also initiated to examine social welfare, including the Commission
of Inquiry into Poverty in Australia, or the ‘Henderson Inquiry’, established by the
McMahon Coalition government (1971–72) and whose terms of reference were
later expanded under the Whitlam Labor government (1972–75). Following this
(and other) public inquiries, a raft of changes were implemented, which had the
effect of moving welfare from being viewed as residual, as per Chifley’s description,
to becoming a fundamental aspect of citizenship.18
The Whitlam government’s reforms were undertaken on the basis that
domestic social policy should focus on achieving a more ‘just’ and ‘liveable’
9 Shaver 1987, 411.
10 Shaver 1987.
11 Marston, McDonald and Bryson 2014; Watts 1999, 92.
12 Dollery and Webster 1995.
13 Smyth 2011.
14 Chifley in Smyth 2012.
15 Bryson 1992; Castles 1985.
16 Regan 2014.
17 Gregory 2004.
18 Smyth 2011.
Australian Politics and Policy
690
Australia.19 They involved an extensive program, including increased expenditure
on public housing, a revision of school funding rules to recognise level of need,
the removal of all fees for tertiary students, and the introduction of the country’s
first universal health care, Medibank.20 Whitlam also established an Indigenous
land rights scheme in the Northern Territory (NT) and announced an explicit
shift in social policy focus for Indigenous Australians from ‘protection’ to self-
determination.21
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Australia experienced some further funda-
mental social policy shifts, including major pension reforms and the introduction
of the Working Nation policy, which signalled a transition away from the public
provision of unemployment support services to a quasi-market model.22 This was
coupled with the introduction of ‘active labour’ policies from 1986 onwards, which
placed increased conditions on unemployment benefits.23 Social policy under
recent Australian governments has been comparatively conservative and routinely
underpinned by neoliberal arguments about reciprocity, the benefits of market
provision and individual responsibility.24 However, the overall size of Australia’s
welfare expenditure envelope has nevertheless increased.
Recent social welfare expenditure in Australia
Australia’s welfare expenditure increased from $117 billion in 2006–7 to $157
billion in 2015–16, representing a growth of 3.4 per cent per annum.25 Simul-
taneously, expenditure on health between 1989 and 2014 increased from 6.5 per
cent to 9.7 per cent of Australia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).26 In 2015–16,
the Australian government also lost a total of $47 billion in tax expenditures, which
is additional to the total welfare expenditure reported above.27 Finally, the sheer
number of people involved in delivering welfare services has also increased, with
the ‘welfare workforce’ growing by 84 per cent since 2005 and representing 4.1 per
cent of the total Australian workforce in 2015.28
Klapdor and Arthur frame these increases as being largely a result of
‘population growth, population ageing, labour market changes and economic
19 McDougall 2015.
20 McDougall 2015. Medibank was later weakened under the Fraser government (1975–83) before
being revitalised as Medicare under Hawke (1983–91).
21 Sanders 2013.
22 Marston, McDonald and Bryson 2014; van Hooren, Kaasch and Starke 2014.
23 Deeming 2016.
24 For example, see Johnson 2011; Ryan 2005.
25 AIHW 2017.
26 AIHW 2016.
27 AIHW 2017.
28 AIHW 2017.
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circumstances as well as policy changes relating to eligibility requirements’.29 They
are also partially due to the addition of the National Disability Insurance Scheme
(NDIS), which is expected to increase expenditure on disability services from $4.7
billion in 2015–16 to around $24 billion in 2019–20.
Notwithstanding these overall increases, Australia’s social welfare expenditure
as a percentage of GDP continues to be comparatively lower than most other
countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).30 Welfare in Australia, in the form of income support payments, is also
highly targeted. In 2017, about 80 per cent of Australia’s spending on cash welfare
benefits was means tested, making Australia the highest means-testing country in
the OECD.31
Against this backdrop, the gap between rich and poor in Australia is growing.
The wealthiest 20 per cent of households accounted for 59 per cent of total
household wealth in 2004–5 and 63 per cent of total household wealth in
2015–16.32 In contrast, the poorest 20 per cent of Australian households only
accounted for around 1 per cent of total household wealth in 2004–5 and also in
2015–16. (The gap did, however, remain largely stable from 2013–14 to 2015–16.)
Wealth also tends to be distributed unequally across geographical regions and for
different groups. For instance, median disposable household income for Indigenous
households in urban areas between 2011–16 increased by $57 per week, but fell
by $12 per week in very remote areas where incomes were already far lower.33 In
general, Indigenous Australians are more likely to experience absolute as opposed
to relative poverty.34 Addressing these disparities requires political and policy
change. Ongoing policy debates about the means and ends of welfare are
underpinned by competing moral arguments, as the following section illustrates.
How is social policy made, and by whom?
The question of who is involved in making social policy is important, because
different policy actors will have different worldviews, moral beliefs, experiences
and agendas. This is particularly apparent when thinking about the different goals
and objectives of state actors (i.e. bureaucrats and elected politicians) and non-state
actors (e.g. individuals, collectives, not-for-profit and private-sector organisations).
State actors shape social policy through their direct role in the policy-making
process. Policy advisers in the public service or in ministerial offices have the role
of exploring social policy ‘problems’ or ‘issues’ as they arise, gathering research
29 Klapdor and Arthur 2015.
30 OECD 2016.
31 AIHW 2017.
32 ABS 2017; ABS 2005.
33 Markham and Biddle 2018.
34 Marston, McDonald and Bryson 2014.
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and evidence around different options, undertaking consultation, and providing
information and advice to elected officials about possible courses of action. In
Australia, elected officials then have the final decision-making power over govern-
ment social policy; it is up to members of parliament and Cabinet to decide which
policies are to be pursued, how, when and why.
Non-state actors also have an important role to play in shaping, delivering and
sometimes also designing social policy. For instance, they may:
• seek to influence the focus and development of government social policy
through advocacy, lobbying, and participation in consultation
• deliver government-led/designed social policy, particularly through new public
management (NPM) contracting arrangements
• initiate and develop social policy themselves, either with or without the
involvement of the state.
Processes for making social policy will inevitably differ between these groups.
There are, however, recognised standard processes for policy making in the public
sector – often articulated through the concept of policy ‘cycles’.35 Althaus,
Bridgman and Davis’ Australian ‘policy cycle’ proposes eight stages of policy
development: (1) issue identification, (2) policy analysis, (3) policy instruments, (4)
consultation, (5) co-ordination, (6) decision making, (7) implementation, and (8)
evaluation. The authors argue that policy makers do not necessarily step through
these stages consecutively, but that the policy process may instead be haphazard: a
kind of ‘policy dance’.36
Others have critiqued the Australian ‘policy cycle’ on the basis that it represents
an overly technocratic view of policy making and does not adequately grapple with
the complexities of real life, including political dimensions and other constraints.37
Indeed, the process of identifying and framing social policy ‘issues’, choosing which
issues demand a response (and which do not), identifying and interpreting evi-
dence, and making recommendations is inevitably political, demanding a series of
subjective and collective value judgements. Below, we turn to two aspects of this
process – the role of evidence, and the cyclical and iterative nature of policy making
– to illustrate its somewhat messy nature.
Evidence-informed social policy
As indicated by the ‘analysis’ and ‘evaluation’ steps of the Australian policy cycle,
social policy is not merely the end product of a contest between different
ideological perspectives. It is also influenced and informed by empirical evidence.
Although this is not a new concept, it gained prominence with the growth of the
35 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018; Lasswell 1951.
36 Althaus, Bridgman and Davis 2018; Edwards 2017.
37 For example, see Colebatch 2006; Howlett and Ramesh 2003.
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‘evidence-based policy’ movement in the 1990s and early 2000s.38 The movement
grew out of the UK and was also taken up in Australian policy circles, supported
primarily on the basis that it provides a foundation for improved public policy
decision making grounded in objective ‘truth’ rather than ideology, and can also
improve efficiencies and outcomes.39 However, what this commitment means in
practice remains somewhat murky. For instance, evidence-based policy raises
questions about which types of evidence should be relied upon, how well they
approximate ‘truth’, how they should be used, and to what extent they can or should
influence policy outcomes.40
There is a great deal of contestability regarding the value of various types of
evidence for policy development. For instance, there continues to be much debate
regarding the utility of ‘evidence hierarchies’, which generally place greater value
on evidence produced through experimental and quasi-experimental quantitative
studies41 over evidence produced through qualitative inquiry.42 This preference for
particular research methods over others, however, shapes and moulds the types of
knowledge that are able to be produced, often favouring positivist ontologies (that
is, those that perceive the world as objectively ‘knowable’ and ‘measurable’, typically
through rational scientific means). As Marston and Watts argued:
If knowledge operates hierarchically, we begin to see that far from being a neutral
concept, evidence-based policy is a powerful metaphor in shaping what forms of
knowledge are considered closest to the ‘truth’ in decision-making processes and
policy argument.43
There are many arguments for the inclusion of richer forms of knowledge in social
policy inquiry and design: forms of knowledge that do not necessarily appear at
the top of evidence hierarchies. This is particularly the case in the social sciences,
because despite common assumptions that particular policies or programs can
directly produce certain anticipated outcomes, trajectories of change are rarely
simple or linear when dealing with humans’ lived experiences.44 Any change in an
individual’s life is more likely to be the result of the intricate interplay of personal
and environmental factors rather than any policy or program alone.45 Thick
qualitative description can be particularly useful in teasing out these complexities
38 Nutley, Davis and Walter 2002.
39 Head 2009.
40 Marston and Watts 2003.
41 That is, studies that use either randomly or non-randomly sampled/allocated control groups to
isolate the effects of the variable(s) being studied.
42 For example, detailed qualitative case studies; see also, the Maryland Scientific Methods Scale in
What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth 2018.
43 Marston and Watts 2003, 145.
44 Woolcock 2013.
45 Lowe and Wilson 2015.
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and providing fuller accounts of the impacts of different policies, particularly when
individuals are exposed to and affected by multiple policies and programs at once.
The process of developing and framing research studies also involves implicit
assumptions that inevitably influence subsequent findings. For instance, the types
of research questions being asked in a study permit the researchers to ‘discover’
some forms of evidence, but ignore (or fail to discover) others. Furthermore, social
constructivists argue that all ‘truths’ are not necessarily discoverable or knowable.
Thus, there is inevitably an implicit bias in the types of knowledge that are able to
be produced through common and accepted research methodologies, regardless of
their specific methodological leanings.
The extent to which evidence influences policy outcomes is also a cause for
debate. As Colebatch and others have discussed, the policy development process
is inevitably a contest between different types of knowledge, different ideologies
and diverse ideas.46 It is not driven by evidence alone. Thus, it is unclear what role
evidence does and should play within this contest, and whether this depends on
changing contexts and circumstances (e.g. evidence availability).
In response to the potential shortcomings of evidence-based policy, some have
advocated a shift to the more pragmatic aspiration of being evidence informed.47
This involves an acknowledgement that there are various forms of evidence, that
evidence is not neutral, and that policy making is also guided by factors other than
evidence alone.
Social policy as an ongoing, iterative process, rather than an end ‘product’
There is an often-held misconception that once social policies are designed, they
move along the policy conveyer belt to be implemented in an apolitical and
exacting manner. However, this view treats social policy as an end ‘product’, which
arguably overemphasises the linearity of the relationship between agenda setting,
policy design and implementation. Ewig and Palmucci stated:
We know from previous studies of implementation that one cannot assume that
policies will simply be implemented as designed, nor is the process of
implementation a linear one from policy passage to simply successful or
unsuccessful. Instead, implementation is an interactive political process involving
political calculations and negotiations among diverse parties who often have
competing political stakes.48
Most social policies continue to be iteratively designed and redesigned, even if
only in an incremental sense, during their implementation and throughout their
46 Colebatch 2006.
47 For example, see Nevo and Slomin-Nevo 2011.
48 Ewig and Palmucci 2012, 2491.
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delivery – a sort of continual moulding and reshaping to suit different local
circumstances, match different stakeholders’ needs, respond to changing contexts,
and/or to align with the views and needs of those responsible for social policy
delivery. This can happen in a bottom-up way, where those delivering social policy
– the ‘street-level bureaucracy’ of social workers and other human service
professionals – adapt policies to suit local needs.49 It may also occur through top-
down changes as a result of feedback loops in the policy cycle (e.g. in response
to policy evaluation findings) or in response to other changes in context and
circumstances.
Moran and Elvin argued that ‘bottom-up’ policy adaptation can hold strengths
insofar as it nurtures feedback between social policy designers and the lived
experiences of those at the grassroots level.50 This can be helpful in democratising
the delivery of social policy, empowering social workers and other professionals
to redefine policy goals in a way that suits local circumstances, and lessening
the overall distance between high-level policy objectives and ground-level policy
experiences. However, local-level decision making can also shift the ways and
means of social policy in a manner that is less transparent and accountable, which
can lead to discrepancies and inequities across different jurisdictions. The increased
reliance on not-for-profit organisations to deliver social policy in Australia can also
serve to deflect political risk and responsibility away from governments.51
Debates and non-agenda issues
Social policy is often highly contested. Debates regularly invoke questions about
who is deserving of different forms of welfare, and the overall size of Australia’s
welfare funding envelope. There is also widespread debate about the nature and
strategy behind welfare in Australia, including disagreement concerning the ‘social
engineering’ objectives of some social policies in line with behavioural economics.
This is particularly apparent in unemployment policies, which embed productivist
assumptions about the pre-eminence of paid work over all other forms of work,
such as informal care and unpaid domestic labour. An ethics of care is margin-
alised, while the paid work ethic is eulogised in these debates.
Who are the ‘deserving’ beneficiaries of social policy?
Social policy is an avenue through which goods and services, both tangible and
intangible, can be provided to some members of society, while simultaneously
being denied to others. Decisions about the distribution of government-funded
welfare resources frequently require governments to draw boundaries around
49 Lipsky 2010; Moran and Elvin 2009.
50 Moran and Elvin 2009.
51 Wright, Marston and McDonald 2011.
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identities and social groups, labelling some as deserving and others as less so. These
boundaries are sometimes arbitrary and are often fraught.
The concept of legal citizenship provides an example, as it opens the door for
individuals to access a range of social resources that are otherwise unavailable to
non-citizens. Whether this is always fair or just is debateable. For example, before
being recognised as citizens in the 1967 constitutional referendum, Indigenous
Australians were largely denied basic rights on the basis of their non-citizen status.
This included being denied access to many forms of social welfare that were enjoyed
by settler Australians. Instead, Indigenous Australians were (and arguably still are)
subject to domestic policies and practices that problematised them as requiring
heavy modification and intervention to conform to the standards of settler society.
Who is deemed to be deserving of social welfare thus depends on how social
policy ‘problems’ are framed, and which individuals or groups are problematised
as a result of that framing. Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem?’ approach recognises that
policy ‘problems’ are not objective truths, but are instead socially and discursively
constructed and reproduced.52 According to Bacchi’s approach, social policy
responds to ‘problems’ that, just as they have been socially constructed, can also be
questioned, contested and disrupted.
With regard to gender equality, Bacchi and Eveline stated, ‘policies do not
simply “deal with” the “problem” of “gender inequality”. Rather, policies create
different impressions of what the “problem” of “gender equality” entails.’53 Bacchi
later discussed policy responses intended to address the pay gap between men and
women, focusing on one response that provided additional training to women.54
Bacchi argued that the response placed the blame for the gap on women’s shoulders,
implying that it was women’s lack of training that had caused the pay gap. This
framing, however, ignores other fundamental structural and historical issues that
also play a critical role.
Discourses around ‘welfare dependency’ also provide a pertinent example of
how framing can directly impact social policy responses. For instance, recent
discourse tends to frame welfare as being innately problematic, with dependency
on the state perceived as a moral bad, while dependency on markets is celebrated as
a marker of success and independence. Welfare ‘poison’ is now perceived as a core
contributor to long-term social disadvantage, rather than a potential solution.55
Therefore, the policy ‘problem’ shifts from claims that there is not enough welfare
to pull people out of poverty, to claims that there is too much welfare for people to
pull themselves out of poverty, thereby causing the ‘poverty trap’, where incentives
to remain on welfare outweigh incentives to move into paid work. This refocusing
of the issue shifts discussion away from historical, social and structural causes
52 Bacchi 2009.
53 Bacchi and Eveline 2010, 112.
54 Bacchi 2017.
55 Pearson 2009; O’Connor 2001.
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of poverty to the individual themselves, and leads to responses that focus on
overcoming perceived individual deficits such as laziness, lack of skills and moral
hazard.
The reframing of welfare in Australia has prompted increased calls for the
‘activation’ of welfare recipients by engaging them in welfare-to-work or ‘workfare’
programs. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of reforms to the provision
of unemployment support have resulted in an increased focus on ‘activating’ and
upskilling the unemployed. This has involved, for example, the introduction of
activation measures from 1986 (e.g. a requirement to register with the then
Commonwealth Employment Service) and an ‘activity test’56 in 1989 as a condition
of social security payments.57 Since then, active participation requirements have
continued to be strengthened through a range of incremental reforms to social
security and employment services.
This relatively recent history sits in contrast to the approaches of past
Australian governments, particularly between Federation and the Second World
War, which moved towards a focus on the demand (rather than supply) side of
the unemployment ‘equation’. In particular, historical policies primarily sought to
boost the availability of jobs through mechanisms like job guarantees and full
employment, and ensure suitable work conditions. Policies since the late 1980s
have, instead, recast the unemployed as the core ‘problem’ and site of possible
intervention. Australia’s current remote-employment program, the Community
Development Program, provides one example of how this sort of framing can
influence social policies and have significant implications for participants who are
subject to strict and coercive program rules.
Case example: Community Development Program
The Community Development Program (CDP) currently operates in 60 remote
regions across Australia, which include more than 1,000 separate communities.58
The program supports ‘job seekers in remote Australia to build skills, address
barriers to employment and contribute to their communities through a range of
activities’.59 According to the minister for indigenous affairs, Nigel Scullion, the
program also aims to ‘put an end to sit-down welfare’ and transition unemployed,
remote-living (mainly) Indigenous Australians into employment.60 By July 2018,
32,000 individuals were participating in the program, about 80 per cent of whom
identified as Indigenous.61
56 This required recipients of unemployment benefits to undertake job-search and job-preparation
activities.
57 Deeming 2016.
58 DPM&C 2018a.
59 SSCFPA 2017, 6.
60 Scullion 2014.
61 DPM&C 2018a.
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Under the CDP, participants are required to attend frequent appointments with
their service provider, actively look for jobs, and undertake up to 25 hours of work-
for-the-dole activities per week. If participants do not comply with program rules,
they can have their welfare income suspended until they re-engage.
The requirements under the CDP are more intensive and punitive than for
unemployed persons living in urban parts of Australia who operate in the urban-
equivalent program, JobActive.62 At least partially as a result of this, substantially
more financial penalties have been applied under the CDP than under JobActive
(despite JobActive having over 20 times more participants) and also under previous
remote programs.63 However, noncompliance with CDP rules can result from a
range of factors, including low English literacy (e.g. participants not being able
to communicate with program staff, who rarely speak Indigenous languages), and
cultural/family commitments.64 For at least some participants, noncompliance may
also result from poor health and wellbeing, which may not be properly assessed
or for which participants may not be able to provide adequate supporting docu-
mentation, due to poor access to medical facilities in remote communities.65
Nevertheless, the high rate of financial penalties under the CDP has led to reduc-
tions in income for some of Australia’s most socially disadvantaged and poorest
populations.66
The CDP seeks to address the perceived issue of welfare dependency by
‘activating’ and upskilling individuals, thereby implying that inactivity and poor
skills are the causes of unemployment. However, there are obvious silences in this
framing of the issue. For instance, remote economies where the CDP operates
are generally very weak, with relatively few job opportunities available. Thus, the
demand for jobs regularly outstrips supply, leading to entrenched high unemploy-
ment. However, this is not appropriately acknowledged in the design of the CDP.
As Jordan and Altman argued, ‘if one acknowledges the major structural barriers to
employment opportunity, it is difficult to accept that withholding welfare payments
unless recipients display the “correct” behaviours (judged according to mainstream
Australian norms) will be sufficient to lead to a job’.67
The CDP also does very little to address other barriers to employment, inc-
luding the multifaceted circumstances of disadvantage experienced by many CDP
participants, like poorer health, standards of living, and access to basic social
services. Much of this intergenerational disadvantage is the result of settler violence
and racist colonial policies. Thus, withholding payments for noncompliance with
the CDP punishes individuals for circumstances that are, in many cases, caused by
broader socio-political and historical issues.
62 Jordan 2016.
63 ANAO 2017; Fowkes 2016.
64 SSCFPA 2017; Staines 2018.
65 SSCFPA 2017.
66 Kral 2016.
67 Jordan and Altman 2016, 10.
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At the same time as remote-employment policies are becoming more coercive,
employment rates in remote Australia have remained largely stagnant and the
gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous employment in remote areas has
widened.68 Despite claims about the importance of evidence-based or informed
policy, there is little to no robust evidence available on the public record which
demonstrates that the CDP, or similar previous programs, have worked to improve
employment outcomes for remote participants, especially those experiencing
complex employment barriers.69 This suggests that factors other than evidence are
driving the design of social policies in this area, and indicates a need to reconsider
the framing of the remote-employment policy ‘issue’.
Social policy as a behavioural tool
Social policy can be used to enable and empower, but also to govern, coerce and
control. Social policies inevitably embed normative assumptions about suitable or
desirable ways of living and behaving, which can serve to restrain each individual’s
power over their own lives and identities. They can also explicitly contain
behavioural objectives, seeking to influence the ways that social policy ‘subjects’
view and interact with the world, including through behavioural economics and
‘nudge’ interventions.70 For instance, social policies often seek to influence how
individuals address their health, spend their time, grow their wealth, and more.71
Thaler and Sunstein discuss ‘nudge’ interventions as being grounded in a
libertarian-paternalist framework, which recognises the critical importance of
personal liberty, but which also acknowledges the potential benefits of ‘soft’
paternalism in influencing behaviour without restraining individual choice. ‘Choice
architects’ – those responsible for devising nudge interventions – seek to subtly
manipulate the context within which choices are made so as to encourage, but not
to require, certain choices over others. Thaler and Sunstein provide the example
of placing fruit at eye-level in school cafeterias to encourage students to choose
healthy food options. While this policy does not restrain their ability to choose
other options, it nevertheless subtly influences the likelihood that their choices will
be healthier than if the fruit was placed elsewhere.
At the other end of the scale are policies driven by hard paternalism. These
policies tend to limit individual freedom and choice, instead coercing individuals to
conform to particular standards of behaviour or ways of being. Extending Thaler and
Sunstein’s example, a hard paternalist approach to improving school students’ diets
might involve regulating the food options available in school cafeterias to exclude
unhealthy foods, thereby restricting choice and removing individual discretion.
68 DPM&C 2018d; Venn and Biddle 2018.
69 Staines 2018.
70 Thaler and Sunstein 2009.
71 Deeming 2016.
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Over the past decade, there has been an intensified interest in translating
behavioural economics theory into public policy development.72 Bonoli has
referred to this as the ‘active social policy paradigm’: one in which governments
routinely use social policy instruments to pursue the health and wellbeing of their
populations.73 In Australia, the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet now
has a dedicated behavioural economics team, ‘BETA’, established to enhance the
ability of the Australian public service to, among other things, ‘apply behavioural
insights to public policy and administration’.74 The team has worked on a range
of policy projects to date, including in relation to tax compliance, influencing
consumers’ energy choices, and ensuring compliance with labour laws.75 Though
there are arguments for and against the use of behavioural economics, behavioural
objectives are apparent in a range of social policies in Australia. Income manage-
ment (discussed in the below case study) provides one example.
Case example: income management in Australia
Compulsory income management involves ‘quarantining’ proportions of an indiv-
idual’s welfare income and diverting the quarantined amount to a ‘BasicsCard’, a
type of debit card where funds cannot be converted to cash, nor used to purchase
certain items that are deemed (by the state) to be morally hazardous, including
alcohol, tobacco, pornography and/or gambling services.
Having been first introduced in 2007 under the Northern Territory Emergency
Response, income management now operates in discrete jurisdictions across
Australia, including across the NT, and in parts of Western Australia (WA),
Queensland, New South Wales (NSW), South Australia and Victoria. By March
2018, there were around 25,270 participants across Australia (though this excludes
participants in the areas added since this time).76
These schemes operate differently, quarantining between 50 and 80 per cent
of an individual’s welfare income, and taking different approaches to the admin-
istration of income management. For example, individuals who live in Bankstown
(NSW) can have 50 per cent of their welfare income managed for at least 12 months
if they are referred by a social or child protection worker, are less than 25 years of
age and considered to be a ‘vulnerable welfare payment recipient’,77 and/or if they
volunteer.78
72 Oliver 2013.
73 Bonoli 2013; Deeming 2016.
74 DPM&C 2018b.
75 DPM&C 2018b. See also DPM&C 2018c for case studies of BETA projects.
76 DSS 2018.
77 That is, if they are in receipt of certain categories of welfare, live within a specified income
management area, experience financial hardship, fail to undertake ‘reasonable self-care’ and more.
78 Australian Government 2018; DHS 2018.
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Alternatively, income management under the Cape York Welfare Reform
initiative79 is delivered as one of multiple options (including referral to support
services) available to the Family Responsibilities Commission: a statutory authority
that undertakes restorative conferencing with welfare recipients who breach certain
social triggers.80 Conferencing is undertaken by Indigenous community Elders
(sitting as ‘local commissioners’) and the decision about whether to apply income
management, including what percentage and for how long, is also made by the
Elders. This model was ‘opted into’ by the participating communities as part of the
broader Cape York Welfare Reform initiative.
In Ceduna and the East Kimberley, trials of the cashless welfare card (a different
form of income management) are ongoing, with recent trials implemented in the
Goldfields and East Kimberley regions of WA, as well as the most recent trial being
implemented in Bundaberg and Hervey Bay in Queensland from January 2019.
Under the cashless welfare card, individuals are not referred. Instead, up to 80 per
cent of an individual’s welfare income is automatically redirected to a debit card,
which can only be used to purchase approved items (i.e. not alcohol, gambling
products or for withdrawing cash).
Although the models differ in their design and administration, they all involve
behavioural objectives, which seek to coerce certain behaviours by restricting or
removing individual choice over expenditure – a form of hard paternalism. In this
way, welfare income is used as a lever for behavioural compliance with selected
social norms. Welfare conditionality of this nature is also supported by broader
discourses around welfare dependency and, thus, it is hoped that by increasing
conditionality, individuals will ultimately be incentivised away from long spells on
welfare.
This social policy focus raises challenging questions around the roles of
different players in social policy design and implementation. For instance, income
management in all areas (aside from Cape York) has been conceived of and
designed by the Commonwealth government. However, it co-opts state-level
bureaucracy in its implementation by requiring child safety workers, for instance,
to make client referrals to the scheme. Its operation therefore depends on the co-
operation and compliance of state government level public servants. The case study
of compulsory income management, like so many social policy examples illustrates
the complexity of federalism, particularly the degree to which co-operative or
competitive federalism is at play in the design and delivery of social policies.
The Cape York trial, which has been ongoing since 2008 and was designed and
implemented through a partnership between four Indigenous communities (with
a fifth community added later on), an Indigenous not-for-profit organisation, and
the Queensland and Commonwealth governments, also raises questions around
79 This initiative has been implemented in the Far-North Queensland communities of Aurukun,
Coen, Hope Vale, Mossman Gorge and most recently Doomadgee.
80 For example, not sending children to school or being convicted of a crime.
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clashes between Indigenous self-determination and hard paternalism. Design and
governance of the trial has empowered some Indigenous groups and communities
in the policy-making process, while other voices have been marginalised. Neverthe-
less, this case study presents a conundrum for libertarians: to what extent can or
should Indigenous ‘communities’ (however defined) be free to choose and design
social policy for themselves, even if these social policies are paternalistic?
Conclusions
Social policy is a way of describing the actions and configuration of governments,
the family, markets and civil society in meeting the wellbeing of citizens and
residents. The formal and informal rules and regulations governing access to goods
and services create forms of inclusion and sites of exclusion. Invariably, the design
and implementation of social policies reflects and embeds value judgements about
the good life and the good society. As discussed throughout this chapter, the means
and ends of social policy are often controversial and highly contested. Political
debates frequently revolve around the overall size of the welfare funding envelope,
the shape of the welfare system, the forms of delivery and the identities of
‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ beneficiaries. Although Australia has a long history
of welfare conditionality, there has been an intensification of this in recent decades.
This has coincided with changing discourses around the role and impacts of
welfare, including an increased focus on the perceived toxic impacts of long-term
‘welfare dependency’. Where welfare was once viewed as an acceptable safety net
or fallback measure for alleviating poverty, it is now regularly described as a core
contributing factor to moral decay and decline.
The framing and reframing of welfare in Australian society has had, and
continues to have, a direct influence on how social policies are constructed,
implemented and monitored. Social policies themselves both reflect and are active
in the construction of these dominant narratives. They can be used as tools to
unite, enable and empower, but also to divide, govern and coerce. The history
and case studies contained in this chapter provide examples of this variability.
Debates around these aspects of social policy will likely continue into the future,
as Australia rapidly defines and redefines its national identity in both domestic
and international contexts. Being alert to the changing contexts within which
social policy is discussed, designed and implemented is an important first step in
being able to deconstruct and question social policy objectives – critical factors in
ensuring robust democratic debate among students and scholars of social policy,
but also among practitioners, beneficiaries and the wider public.
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Urban policy
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As urbanists from around the world often remind us, about 55 per cent of the
world’s population lives in cities. By 2030, that figure is likely to be over 60 per cent.1
Cities, therefore, will be increasingly important sites for managing the prosperity
of the world’s population. Since colonisation, Australia has had a strong urban
focus. This is partly the result of the physical geography of the continent, with a
rugged desert core surrounded by sections of agriculturally productive coastline.
For example, a little over 5 million people live in Sydney – Australia’s first city –
which is about 20 per cent of the nation’s population. But this is likely to grow by
one and a half million people over the next 20 to 30 years. While each Australian
state faces its own growth challenges, four common themes are emerging in every
city: How and where will we house everyone? How will we source enough food and
water for the city? Where will people work? And how will we move everyone into
and out of – and around – the city? In short, the four big and interrelated urban
Pill, Madeleine, and Dallas Rogers (2019). Urban policy. In Peter J. Chen, Nicholas Barry, John R.
Butcher, David Clune, Ian Cook, Adele Garnier, Yvonne Haigh, Sara C. Motta and Marija Taflaga,
eds. Australian politics and policy: senior edition. Sydney: Sydney University Press. DOI: 10.30722/
sup.9781743326671
1 United Nations 2015.
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policy challenges that confront Australian cities are housing, jobs, food security and
transport. A key task of urban policy is to build a network that allows different
people, sectors and organisations to work together, across their differences, to plan
and build a better city for every citizen. This raises critical questions about what a
city is and who a city is for.
This challenge is complicated by the urban policy domain itself, which is
shaped by the constitutional and statutory arrangements between federal, state/
territory and local governments in Australia. These arrangements determine how
‘the state’ (federal, state and local governments and their agencies) intervenes in ‘the
urban’, as an arena for the formulation, implementation and contestation of policies.
The development and realisation of effective urban policy is further challenged by
the complexities of urban governance and the messiness of urban space.
Urban governance is the process through which a city is governed. It involves
different government agencies at different levels with diverse interests and respon-
sibilities in relation to the urban arena, which they may pursue (such as major
infrastructure provision) or disregard (such as ensuring access to safe, secure
affordable housing). It also involves other, non-governmental actors and interests in
the private and third (non-profit or community) sectors. Urban policy is therefore
characterised by the ‘search for co-ordination’2 as the policy challenges cities face
are cross-cutting and multi-level and require multi-agency, cross-sector responses.
Policy co-ordination across the government portfolios of transport, infrastructure,
environment, housing, finance, education, health and social services would be
required to build a ‘multi-dimensional policy perspective’ on cities.3
The urban space of cities is also complex. In terms of politics and public policy,
we need to know who is responsible for what (where infrastructure is provided
and services delivered) and who has a say (who is involved in policy formulation
and delivery, who gets to vote). But this is complicated too. For example, urban
regions might comprise more than one local government area, so it makes sense
that public service provision, such as public transport, is co-ordinated at a higher
level to ensure there is a transport network that serves residents who live in one
local government area, work in another and use services or access amenities like
public open space in a third. In Australia, there is a renewed focus on long-term
metropolitan planning, with periodic discussion of a national, federal government-
driven urban agenda. But Australia does not have an elected metropolitan (between
local and state) level of government responsible for planning and co-ordination of
its urban regions. In turn, we know that people’s strongest attachments tend to be to
local places, rather than urban regions. Furthermore, while some policies explicitly
target ‘the urban’ in terms of the place or the people who live there, many policies
that are not urban-targeted have urban effects. Finally, cities are part of wider, often
2 Cochrane 2007.
3 Dodson 2015.
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global, socio-economic processes and flows of people, finance, goods and services.
Policy makers can seek to resist the effects of or capture the benefits of these flows.
In this chapter, we first establish why urban policy matters and then consider
the major theories that help us to understand urban policy. We then examine how
urban policy has evolved in Australia, particularly in relation to changing federal
emphasis on a national urban policy and in terms of the strategic planning and
governance arrangements for the metropolitan regions of the capital cities, in which
the vast majority of Australians live.
Urban policy matters in an urban society
Australia is a majority urban society. Over two-thirds of the population live in the
metropolitan regions of the state and territory capital cities (Table 1). Increases
in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane accounted for 70 per cent of Australia’s
population growth in 2016–17. These patterns reflect both the concentration of
economic opportunities and growth in urban areas and Australia’s unique urban
system, the pattern for which was set during European settlement, when the
majority of each colony’s population was concentrated in its capital city. During
the 20th century, the capitals continued to claim an ever-increasing population
share due to rapid suburban growth.4 Australia’s two largest cities, Sydney and
Melbourne, now have global city5 status, meaning they are significant nodes in
international networks of economic, political and cultural exchanges.
Australia’s urban concentration points to the policy challenges that affect
the quality of life in cities, such as congestion and the need for better public
transport, and gentrification and the need for greater housing availability and
affordability. These problems affect different parts of urban areas in different ways,
producing and reinforcing patterns of inequality across numerous domains, such
as income, health and mobility. Many of these challenges can be characterised as
spatial mismatches – for example, between where housing is affordable and where
jobs are located. But there is also often a mismatch between the local scale –
‘where people live’ – and the realms and flows that affect residents (which may
be global, national or metropolitan). These can range from the location decisions
of globally operating corporations to national imperatives to sustain and grow
economic productivity, or the need for co-ordination across local government
areas that make up the metropolitan region about the availability and accessibility
of housing, jobs and other services and amenities. Such policy challenges draw
attention to strategic planning focused on mobility and land use (for housing, for
employment, for open space) as a framework for and expression of urban policy.
4 Gleeson and Steele 2012.
5 Sassen 1991.
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Table 1 Resident population of Greater Capital City Statistical Areas (GCCSAs),6 June
2017
GCCSA total State total % of state total
NSW: Greater Sydney 5,131,326 7,861,068 65
Vic: Greater Melbourne 4,850,740 6,323,606 77
Qld: Greater Brisbane 2,408,223 4,928,457 49
SA: Greater Adelaide 1,333,927 1,723,548 77
WA: Greater Perth 2,043,138 2,580,354 79
Tas: Greater Hobart 226,884 520,877 44
NT: Greater Darwin 146,612 246,105 60
ACT 410,301 410,301 100
TOTAL Greater Capital Cities 16,551,151 24,598,933 67
Source: ABS 2018.
Urban policy matters because most people live in urban areas, and the policy
challenges we experience in these areas affect our quality of life. This gives rise to
questions about the extent to which urban policy tackles these challenges. Some
argue that urban policy is part of the problem, prioritising private investment
activities over efforts to tackle socio-spatial inequalities and create a more equitable
or just city. Others contend that private activities, assisted by state intervention,
ultimately create more opportunities for all.
Urban policy is politics
Urban policy lacks a singular definition. Its defining feature is state intervention in
the urban.7 While mainstream accounts regard such state intervention as a technical
6 GCCSAs are geographical areas delimited to represent the functional extent of each of the eight
state and territory capital cities. The functional extent is defined using travel to work data from
the 2011 Census as a proxy for the labour market of each capital city, its bounds containing the
majority of the commuting population. This definition includes the population within the
built-up urban area of the city, as well as people who regularly socialise, shop or work within the
city and live in small towns and rural areas surrounding the city.
7 Edwards and Imrie 2015.
Urban policy
711
process of making and implementing plans, or as part of an administrative,
managerial function of government, a critical approach to urban policy entails
understanding that (as with all forms of state intervention) it is inherently political.
Policy, planning and governance arrangements for the urban reflect political con-
testation and conflict between actors and interest groups with different levels of
power and different stakes in the city. These actors and interest groups, comprising
the federal, state and local levels of government, corporate interests and landowners,
as well as social movements, residents and community-based organisations, shape
urban policy.
Urban policy requires understanding of the underlying rationales for state
interventions and how these are contested by different interests seeking to assert
their vision for a city and to create and implement policy agendas guided by this
vision. In other words, while urban policy is characterised by policy objectives that
purportedly seek to enhance the quality of life of those living in cities, it propagates
specific values and visions for the city. In turn, the social construction of ‘the
urban problem’ that policy makers are trying to address has implications for what
policies are developed and implemented. Two kinds of challenges remain constant:
enabling the social reproduction of urban residents (the ability to reproduce the
means for people to live) and managing growth (including planning, land use
and redevelopment). Much debate occurs around what should be the overriding
priority of urban policy: equity (social redistribution) or efficiency (economic
growth).8 Equity goals suggest that everyone ought to be provided with equal
opportunity to access jobs, goods, services and amenities. Efficiency goals justify
urban policies that support urban economies by making the best use of land and
infrastructure to enhance productivity and wealth creation.
From 1945 until the late 1970s, equity concerns shaped policy in many Western
countries, with high levels of state intervention in the economy and society, including
provision of public housing, education, transport and infrastructure, along with
redistributive income support programs. But since the late 1970s, urban policy has
been primarily influenced by efficiency criteria, with a shift towards the pursuit
of private-sector-led strategies of wealth creation, or what David Harvey9 terms
urban entrepreneurialism. Thus political commitment has shifted from government
investment in public infrastructure and public control of significant assets to the
sale of assets and their control and management by quasi-governmental and private-
sector agencies as well as the outsourcing of service delivery to private or third-
sector providers. What some term a neoliberal political agenda, which aligns with
the practices of new public management, has promoted policies of privatisation,
fee-based services and a general rollback of government’s social welfare function.
For example, in terms of major urban redevelopment of former industrial areas, a
common approach is the creation of special purpose districts managed by arms-
8 Edwards and Imrie 2015.
9 Harvey 1989.
Australian Politics and Policy
712
length state agencies, which distance major projects from local accountability. The
influence of international examples such as the redevelopment of Baltimore’s Inner
Harbor in the USA and London’s Docklands in the UK are evident in Australia.
In Sydney, the redevelopment of Darling Harbour was overseen by a development
authority established in 1984, and the current central city waterfront redevelopment
is being led by a New South Wales (NSW) state agency, the Barangaroo Delivery
Authority, created in 2009.
Theories of urban policy
The ongoing tension between equity and efficiency goals is fundamental to debates
about urban politics and policy. Two broad theoretical positions aid understanding.
The first focuses on the role of cities in processes of social reproduction, and the
second emphasises cities’ role in processes of production or in realising profits from
property development.
Neo-Marxist debates of the 1970s stressed the role of cities in social reproduction
and collective consumption, or the delivery of services and goods – including those
which are or can be collectively consumed, such as transport, education, health care
and housing – by the state to support the reproduction of labour power. Politics stems
from the struggle between those propagating profit-seeking and those favouring
welfare via state support for collective good provision. For Manuel Castells,10 the lives
of many poor people in urban society are shaped by crises of collective consumption,
referring to the unaffordable nature of many goods and services necessary for their
sustenance. Collectively consumed goods and services, such as public transport and
policing, which involve the majority of households and especially wealthier groups
able to mobilise and be heard, tend to generate more public awareness. In contrast,
those allocated on the basis of need, such as public housing, and reliant on poorer
groups’ and their advocates’ ability to mobilise and be heard, tend to figure lower on
the political agenda.11
A second set of theories originating in the USA argues that the focus of urban
politics is economic growth and the realisation of profit through land and property
development. Growth coalition theory12 sees policy as part of the exercise of elite
power around economic growth objectives, with the city as ‘growth machine’. Urban
regime theory13 refines this, arguing that power is fragmented and that regimes
arise between local governments and private actors that need to combine power
and resources to be able to devise and enact a policy agenda. These theories, which
identify urban policy as a mechanism that seeks to promote economic growth and
10 Castells 1978.
11 Cochrane 2007.
12 Logan and Molotch 1987.
13 Stone 1989.
Urban policy
713
boost urban competitiveness, are consistent with the shift towards a neoliberal
political agenda.
Globalising the city
Another perspective on the shift from equity to efficiency goals is provided by
considering policy as attempting to globalise cities by positioning them within
global flows of people, finance, goods and services. Such understanding has been
used to justify major investment and infrastructure projects, accompanied by place
branding and marketing and the provision of incentives, including land and tax
breaks, to attract major global investors. The changing urban economy, charac-
terised by the proliferation of advanced services and knowledge-based industries,
has resulted in bifurcation between highly skilled, well-paid professional work and
low-paid, unstable, unskilled service jobs in those cities clamouring for or seeking
to retain global city status, including Sydney and Melbourne. By the late 1990s, in
such cities, house prices had already risen beyond the incomes of many people.
Gentrification, or the process by which urban neighbourhoods, usually the home
of low-income residents, become the focus of reinvestment and (re)settlement
by higher-income residents, is framed by some as urban renewal, but others see
it as displacement of poorer, vulnerable city residents and a reduction in their
opportunities to gain access to good quality urban areas.14 Rising house prices
and rents also attract property speculation, which fuels further inflation. In turn,
‘the urban problem’ has been socially constructed as one of poor city residents
lacking the skills to compete in job markets and generate the means to look after
themselves – a justification for cutting social welfare provision by promoting the
moral imperative of self-improvement. Others critique this construction as a form
of social pathology, where people are blamed for their problems, rather than
relating these to inequities resulting from global processes, compounded by state
withdrawal of social welfare. In contrast, the public goods and services consumed
by the wealthier are rarely framed as welfare benefits.15 For example, both public
housing for those in need and negative gearing tax concessions for the wealthy
are benefits, but the ways in which these are socially constructed indicates the
dominance of efficiency goals given public subsidy to encourage profit-making
from private property ownership.16
Certainly the city needs to be considered as part of wider processes. Flows (such
as of investment and people), intervention by higher levels of government (targeted
at urban areas or not) or international policy transfer shape what goes on within
urban areas. But the urban remains distinctive as a political realm, with its everyday
struggles about public services, housing and infrastructure, along with conflicts
14 Lees 2003.
15 Cochrane 2007.
16 Holden 2018.
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about urban renewal and redevelopment. These struggles focus attention on the
planning and governance of cities and on the scope for more equitable alternatives
that resist the increasing intrusion of private interests into the urban public realm.
Existing urban policy
These theoretical accounts of the shift in the state’s role, from helping to secure
social reproduction to assisting in capital accumulation, highlight key aspects of
today’s existing urban policy, under which economic success, rather than the
existence of an extensive welfare state, tends to be framed as the necessary
precondition for the wellbeing (or welfare) of citizens. Urban policy now seems
predominantly shaped by the pursuit of economic growth, and land and property
development as a means to boost profits and wealth creation. These objectives
follow the logic promoted in political rhetoric that people’s wellbeing is best secured
by disciplining individuals into accepting the efficacy of the market, from which
they will benefit due to the ‘trickle down’ of growth.
For some, this understanding constitutes the basis of normative policy making,
the ‘new conventional wisdom’,17 which, due to rapid policy transfer, has been
applied globally. For others, it forms the basis of a critique of urban policy visions
and values that do not represent or respond to the needs of the many. This leads to
questions regarding the right to the city:18 who is the city for, and what is the role of
policy in facilitating people’s access to, and uses of, the goods, services and spaces
of the city? Critical urbanists boil this down to the core question of whether urban
policy (and indeed the city) is for people or for profit.19 They argue that people’s
inhabitance of the city, rather than access to money, should form the basis for
holding the right to remake and remain in the city. These scholars stress that there
are progressive possibilities within urban policy, in terms of the locally specific
and flexible ways in which policies can be implemented and in terms of the scope
for development of alternative visions for the city that may lead to more equitable
urban policy goals and outcomes.
At what level of government?
In Australia, urban policy is further complicated by a federal system of government
that has tended to overlook the significance of cities and metropolitan regions,
which, as ‘orphans of public policy’,20 are ‘caught between the three tiers of
Australian government, hardly registering on the agenda of many politicians’.21
17 Gordon and Buck 2005, 1.
18 Lefebvre 1996.
19 See, for example, Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer 2009.
20 Harley 2014.
21 Kelly and Donegan 2015, 3.
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Although Australia is a vastly urban nation, attempts by the federal government
to articulate a national urban policy have been episodic. Urban planning is a key
tool in the urban policy toolkit. The intra-governmental arrangements around
urban planning are therefore important. In this context, it is important to note
that: 1) local government is not referred to in the Constitution of the Australian
Commonwealth – local governments' responsibility for managing regulatory
planning at the local level is deferred from the states/territories; 2) in the absence of
a national urban policy, the federal government does not have any direct political
oversight over urban planning at the state/territory level; but 3) the federal
government may provide funding to the states/territories for large-scale infra-
structure in cities, either as block funding or through one-off arrangements (such
as City Deals, below). Therefore, the states/territories are powerful actors in urban
and regional planning in Australia, but urban policy and infrastructure funding
tensions are present between the federal government and the states/territories.
National urban policy
Globally, interest in formulating national urban policy peaked in the 1970s, with
high levels of government intervention aimed at realising equity goals through
provision of public housing and other public goods. The highpoint in Australia was
the Whitlam government's (1972–75) urban and housing development initiatives,
which focused on the rapidly growing suburbs. During the 1972 election campaign,
Gough Whitlam famously explained that:
a national government which cuts itself off from responsibility for the nation’s
cities is cutting itself off from the nation’s real life. A national government which
has nothing to say about cities has nothing relevant or enduring to say about the
nation or the nation’s future.22
Following the shift to efficiency goals, the most notable federal interest in cities
was expressed in the Hawke–Keating government’s ‘Building Better Cities’ program
(1991–96), which focused on the renewal of former industrial sites in the inner
city to provide higher density housing (in Pyrmont and Ultimo in inner Sydney,
inner Melbourne and inner north-eastern Brisbane) as well as the redevelopment
of mainly government-owned land in East Perth.
However, more recently, cities have crept back up the national policy agenda,
reflecting growing understanding of their role as the underpinning drivers for
national economies. In 2011, the Rudd–Gillard government launched a national
urban policy, ‘Our Cities, Our Future’,23 which sought to guide public intervention
and private investment around four themes that remain widely deployed in
22 Whitlam 1972.
23 Australian Government Department of Infrastructure and Transport 2011.
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metropolitan strategic planning rhetoric: productivity, sustainability, liveability and
governance. In 2016, the Liberal–National Coalition government launched the
‘Smart Cities’ plan with the ambition to ‘rethink the way our cities are planned,
built and managed’.24 The plan, not a substantive policy document, reflects
internationally shared (and poorly defined) ‘common sense’ tenets that productive
cities are smart, innovative, connected and liveable. In the same year, the
government announced the Australian Infrastructure Plan, asserting that ‘the
Australian government should drive change in the planning and operation of
Australia’s cities’.25 Federal commitments comprise funding for infrastructure
planning and provision and seeking partnerships with state and territory
governments via City Deals, which are ‘bespoke’ place-based funding agreements
presented as boosting urban productivity while enabling the ‘value capture’ of
enhanced tax revenue from development. The deals are described as ‘driv[ing]
national priorities tailored to local needs’.26
Questions arise about the federal government’s engagement in matters that are
generally regarded as the states’ prerogative – metropolitan strategic planning and
infrastructure investment. The resurgence of national urban policy in Australia
contrasts with the approach in other Western countries, where intergovernmental
decentralisation is leading to the creation of institutions at the metropolitan level,
justified on the basis of enhancing metropolitan regions’ global competitiveness
while increasing democratic accountability. In the UK, where the City Deals
approach originated, the funding agreements are ‘devolution deals’ premised on the
creation of metropolitan governments that include representatives of constituent
local governments and a directly elected ‘metro mayor’.27 Australian conceptions
of national urban policy do not envisage representative, revenue-generating metro-
politan governments, perceived as a threat to state and federal power and influence.
Australia’s exceptionalism can be related to its extreme vertical fiscal imbal-
ance.28 This imbalance is based on which level of government has the power to
make decisions about public spending and taxation. Australia is atypical, given
the power of the federal level in collecting most taxation revenue before making
transfers to the states and territories in the form of general and tied grants. The
states/territories can levy limited taxes but derive nearly half their revenue from
federal grants.29 This imbalance enables the federal government to assert power
over planning for and infrastructure investment in cities, when it chooses to do so.
Major road projects such as the East West Link in Melbourne, Perth’s Roe 8 highway
extension and Sydney’s WestConnex have been highly contested but exemplify the
influence of funded federal priorities on state priorities. The projects are insulated
24 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2016, 4.
25 Infrastructure Australia 2016, 175.
26 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2016, 5.
27 Sandford 2018.
28 OECD 2016.
29 Galligan 2014.
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from local accountability as they are managed by public–private partnerships that
operate like private corporations but are authorised to use public funds to leverage
private investment. For example, WestConnex is managed by the Sydney Motorway
Corporation, a private company established by NSW government in 2014.
This poses questions about what level of government is best placed to resolve
contested urban policy challenges, how projects are funded and which urban actors
should be involved. Some argue that urban policy should locate responsibility
and funding for urban intiatives in the level of government where they are most
effectively addressed; urban scholars often conclude that this will be at the level of
metropolitan regions. In Sydney, bodies such as the Greater Sydney Commission
evidence the state government’s commitment to metropolitan city governance (but
not government).
Metropolitan planning and governance
Currently, state and territory governments have responsibility for creating strategic
plans for Australia’s metropolitan regions. Strategic planning at a metropolitan level
is a framework for and expression of urban policy. As such, it is highly political
and is subject to a great deal of contestation – such as debates over whether new
developments should replace farmland on the urban fringe, the provision and
location of public and social housing, and the gentrification of neighbourhoods and
displacement of poorer residents.30 Recent and ongoing struggles in inner Sydney
provide pertinent examples, such as the private transport-led redevelopment of
government-owned land and public housing in Waterloo and the sale of public
housing in Miller’s Point.
Metropolitan planning for Australia’s capital city regions is longstanding but
is increasingly subject to debates about whether it can meet the challenges posed.
Reflecting the shift from equity to efficiency goals, market-driven development has
led to rising socio-spatial inequality since the 1980s. In Sydney, the term ‘latte
line’31 has been used to describe the divide between the well-connected, affluent
and skilled jobs-rich inner suburbs and the poorly connected, highly car dependent
outer suburbs, which lack employment opportunities. In turn, the phrase ‘new
urban divide’ was coined to describe the spatial mismatches that strategic planning
seeks to address:
The housing market and transport systems in Australian cities [are] creating an
increasing divide between people and jobs, forcing people into trade-offs between
financial security and family time, and making social connection much harder.32
30 Howe, Nichols and Davison 2014.
31 Saulwick 2016.
32 Kelly and Donegan 2015, 76.
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Metropolitan plans tend to share a commitment to urban consolidation, seeking
compact cities by restricting new land released for development on the urban fringe
and implementing plans for densification within the existing built environment,
based around centres providing jobs and services and corridors of public transport.
High-rise apartments are increasingly evident in the inner city. But metropolitan
plans have generally failed to provide affordable housing. Plans do not meet their
goals of higher public transport use due to inadequate investment in infrastructure.
Where public transport use has increased, this has mostly involved radial journeys to
the CBD or within the better-served inner suburbs. Employment in middle and outer
suburbs remains sparse. Poor access to job opportunities in these areas has generally
added to labour market inequalities.33 Clive Forster describes:
the existence of parallel urban universes: one occupied by metropolitan planning
authorities and their containment-consolidation-centres consensus; the other by
the realities of the increasingly complex, dispersed, residentially differentiated
suburban metropolitan areas most Australians live in.34
Reasons cited for the relative failure of metropolitan plans relate to their
frequent revision due to changes in state government, leading to a lack of policy
certainty and consistency. The process is also often captive to private property,
infrastructure and financial interests. Strong representation from the property
industry has led to the perception of urban consolidation policies as raising land
and housing costs, to the detriment of housing affordability, which encourages
release of new land for development on the urban fringe.35 Calls for the
deregulation of planning to ‘streamline’ the system are also common,36 heightening
concerns about the downgrading of planning as a profession with ‘a weakening
of the influence of planning agencies in shaping metropolitan policy’.37 This is
combined with the lack of accountability in privately financed infrastructure
schemes, such as road tunnels in Sydney.38 Though the need for more affordable
housing is recognised in policy debates, policy change has not occurred to redress
inequalities. In considering why this is the case, Nicole Gurran and Peter Phibbs
conclude that the ‘busy work’ of policy discussion and review acts to defer any
substantial change. They describe this as an ‘expedient strategy for politicians
beholden to home-owning electorates, industry sponsors, or ideological interests’.39
It is also a ready tactic to shift blame to another level of government.40
33 Hamnett and Freestone 2017.
34 Forster 2006, 180.
35 Bunker 2015.
36 Ruming and Gurran 2014.
37 Dodson 2009, 110.
38 Haughton and McManus 2012.
39 Gurran and Phibbs 2015, 718.
40 Milligan and Tiernan 2012.
Urban policy
719
Here, it is useful to return to our consideration of the underpinning rationales
for state interventions in shaping urban economy and society. Metropolitan
strategies are an expression of urban policy and thus of urban politics. As such, the
strategies underline the shift from equity to efficiency and have made little progress
towards rectifying the spatial mismatches and inequities described above. However,
actually existing urban policy has an imperative (to an extent at least) to address the
key underlying tension between equity and efficiency. For example, in considering
strategic planning for the Sydney metropolitan region, Pauline McGuirk finds that
though its planning broadly reflects a neoliberal commitment to furthering Sydney
as a global city, redistributive compromises are necessary to achieve this. She
describes strategic planning as ‘an institutional site of negotiation’41 between
demands for economic development and redistribution. Other forces that shape the
urban realm, such as immigration policies and tax and finance policies like negative
gearing, underline the urban impacts of federal policies not explicitly targeted at
urban areas, which are not within the purview of metropolitan strategic planning.42
Much debate has occurred about how Australia’s metropolitan regions should be
governed. The current complex and fragmented governance arrangements are per-
ceived as lacking clear and effective institutional arrangements for strategic planning
and the co-ordination of urban services, including infrastructure. Co-ordinating
policy in a fragmented system of governance dilutes policy efficacy because it can
be unclear who has responsibilities for the different elements of policy development,
delivery and implementation. Advocates for metropolitan government see it as able
to rectify the perceived democratic deficit which enables private interests to exert
undue influence.43 Government at this level is viewed as giving metropolitan regions
a collective voice in debates about planning, resource allocation and major strategic
issues, such as immigration, economic development and sustainability. Metropolitan
governments are also perceived as being able to better tackle the perennial challenge
of urban policy co-ordination – across government policy siloes and government
levels (including local government areas) and between the public, private and third
sectors. But the introduction of a fourth level of government in Australia would face
considerable opposition from vested interests, including state and federal govern-
ments unwilling to cede power and responsibilities.
Greater Sydney, which has a population of 5.1 million and comprises 35 local
government areas, and Greater Melbourne, which has a population of 4.9 million
and 32 local government areas, are Australia’s two largest cities. Since 2015, metro-
politan planning for Sydney has been the responsibility of an independent
organisation created and funded by the NSW government, the Greater Sydney
Commission. Greater Melbourne does not have an equivalent agency. The extent to
which such a metropolitan planning commission comprises a step towards metro-
41 McGuirk 2007, 184.
42 Tomlinson 2012.
43 Gleeson 2017.
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politan government, with directly elected members or members elected by regional
local governments, clear responsibilities (such as for public transport) and tax
raising powers, remains to be seen.
Conclusions
The key tension in thinking about cities – as ‘where people live’ or as ‘growth
machines’ – plays out constantly in urban politics and urban policy. Urban policy
is redefined accordingly, ‘combining its elements in different ways at different times
and in different places’.44 A key debate in Australia is around the level at which
the state can best intervene to co-ordinate urban policy, but the debate tends to be
dominated by conventional understandings of state intervention as technical and
managerial rather than political, underlining the normative power of neoliberal
ideologies in shaping public policy. Debates about citizens’ role in the processes
of planning and governance seem subdued, perhaps because ‘many residents are
unwilling to consider the possibility that cities could get better’.45 However, cities
are also sites of struggle over social justice and equity that may lead to rebalancing
of priorities and redefining of policies.
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The employment relationship – that between employer and employee – is at the
heart of capitalism and a core issue for public policy. Governments create rules,
policies and institutions within which employees, their representatives, employers
and their representatives, operate. The interest to governments when creating
policy includes the form that bargaining takes, wage and employment levels, the
nature and effects of contracting and the rights of workers – much of this boiling
down to issues of power. In recent decades, major policy issues have included
the federal Labor government’s Prices and Incomes Accords in the 1980s and
1990s, the Coalition government’s ‘WorkChoices’ legislation, the shift to enterprise
bargaining, and developments in such areas as minimum wages and pay equity. In
this chapter we outline the matters at stake, the players, the policy processes and
some of the key issues.
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What’s at stake?
Central to policy decisions is the political ideology of the decision maker, and
the implications of that ideology for whose interests should prevail within the
employment relationship. Put simply, is the priority for government the interests of
business or the advancement of worker interests? Approaches to the management
of labour may be described as being ‘unitarist’ or ‘pluralist’ and these concepts are
manifested in policy and practice.
The imprecision of the employment relationship – the heart of capitalism
At the beginning of the employment relationship the worker agrees to sell their
labour to the employer in the form of an ongoing market transaction. However, it
is almost impossible for the contract of employment to specify everything that the
employee does in their work. In the service sector, where measurement of employee
output is harder, the imprecision of the employment relationship is especially high.
The power of capital and labour
The study of work and employment relations policy is also the study of power. The
groups and individuals with power are those who benefit most from policy making.
Public policy may also affect the power that various groups and individuals have.
The relative power of employers and unions at the workplace is not easy to
measure. A pluralist approach ‘accepts the rights of employers, employees and
unions to bargain over their separate interests’.1 It also recognises that the conflict
that occurs in the workplace is to be expected and managed. In a capitalist
economy, governments who wish to advance the interests of workers tend to create
policy from a pluralist perspective. Governments, seeking to implement a policy
that protects business interests, often adopt a unitarist perspective. This assumes
that employers and employees have the same objectives and any conflict that might
occur in the employment relationship is unusual. Unitarist policies often do not
support the existence of an independent umpire to provide arbitration of workplace
disputes. Conservative or ‘right-wing’ approaches of the state to industrial relations
are often associated with unitarist conceptions of this field. There are other
perspectives on employment relations (e.g. radical, Marxist, postmodern or
feminist approaches)2 but these are analytical perspectives, sometimes also held by
workers, but not by employers and rarely by government.
Governments, regardless of whether they espouse a unitarist or pluralist
perspective, claim to be interested in improved economic outcomes. This is an
objective that can appeal to everyone, and productivity growth, for example, affects
1 Alexander, Lewer and Gahan 2008, 22.
2 Peetz 2019.
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the level of resources available to distribute to capital and labour. However, there
is no agreement about how improved economic outcomes should be achieved,
and this objective is often just a guise for realigning the balance of power in the
workplace. Where policies, for example, support capital at the expense of labour,
they are more likely to entrench inequality. With unions being formally tied to
the Australian Labour Party (ALP), Coalition parties have long sought to discredit
the ALP through reducing the credibility of unions. Indeed, the conflict between
capital and labour is the core conflict within capitalism, so it should not surprise
us that it is also central to political conflict in Australia, though usually it is not
articulated this way.3 It is, though, common to think of and depict people, interest
groups or parties as being somewhere on a spectrum from ‘left’ (pro-labour) to
‘right’ (pro-capital). It is an idea that voters somehow manage to relate to in survey
questions, and surveys over the past two decades using this measure have detected a
gradual leftward shift, from the right towards the centre, in people’s self-assessment
of their political positioning.4
How the system works
Patterns of policy need not reflect patterns of public opinion. The ideology of
people in positions of power, the organisational ability of interest groups and the
nature of the institutional framework all shape the direction of policy and may do
so contrary to directions in public opinion.
There are three parties (groups) with a particular interest in the employment
relationship:
• employees and their representatives (commonly unions)
• employers and their representatives (employer associations)
• the state.
Each affects rule-making associated with the employment relationship.
Unions
The shape of the union movement today reflects how unions have developed over
the past 100 years. The trade union movement enables workers to act collectively, to
influence policy decisions affecting workplaces, and enables workplace negotiations
on pay and conditions of work.
The focus of trade unions is on the needs of members. However, their involve-
ment in decision making is not limited to the workplace level – it can also be seen
in their involvement in the community and in political lobbying. The Australian
3 Peetz 2018.
4 McAllister and Cameron 2014.
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Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) has been the sole peak body for unions since
the early 1980s, and it undertakes broad political and policy-based work as part of
its activities. It has initiated various equal pay and other wage cases to the body
now called the Fair Work Commission (FWC), and lobbied or negotiated with
governments. Outcomes achieved over many years include ‘occupational health
and safety laws, annual holidays legislation, superannuation, Medicare, the award
system, penalty rates for overtime and weekend work, and workplace amenities’.5
Under conciliation and arbitration, union density (the share of employees who
are members of a union) went from 6 per cent in 1901 to around 60 per cent by the
early 1950s.6 From the 1980s, union density declined (see Figure 1), beginning with
structural changes in the economy that favoured industries and occupations with
low density but were not met with effective union responses, such as organising in
new areas.7
In the 1990s, unions began a process of large-scale amalgamations to capitalise
on economies of scale, but union density continued to decrease in the face of attacks
by employers and various state and national governments. With the move to
enterprise bargaining, the focus of industrial relations shifted to the workplace, but
this was a level at which unions were often weakly organised, after focusing for many
years on advocacy in tribunals and action in a small number of ‘hot spots’. By 2018
density was around 15 per cent and, with a delay, collective bargaining also declined.8
Employers and employer associations
Employers also form collective organisations. Employer associations are often
regarded as the equivalent of unions for employers. Moreover, employers of most
people are themselves corporations, which are collectives of capital. Thus, employer
associations are industry-based collectives of collectives, formed to counter the
associational power of unions.
The roles of employer associations vary, depending on the way they developed
and the industry or region in which they traditionally operated. These roles have
evolved through amalgamations, but have largely centred around the represen-
tation of political parties and developing responses to industry or national issues
raised by unions. Their activities have changed as employment relations has become
increasingly decentralised. They may provide services to their members to assist
specifically with managing their employment relations issues.
5 Balnave et al. 2009, 126.
6 Gahan, Pekarek and Nicholson 2018; Peetz and Bailey 2012.
7 Peetz and Bailey 2012, 529.
8 Gahan, Pekarek and Nicholson 2018.
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The state
The term ‘state’ is used here to describe the various institutions used to regulate the
employment relationship. These institutions include the legislature, executive and
judiciary. The legislature consists of the parliament and is responsible for creating
legislation. The judiciary interprets and applies legislation and can be responsible
for ensuring that the executive and legislature act within the Constitution. The
executive consists of the elected government as well as the various institutions that
form part of the public bureaucracy.
The latter include the federal department responsible for employment relations
(in 2019, Jobs and Small Business), the labour inspectorate (in 2019, called the
Fair Work Ombudsman), Safe Work Australia, and the Australian Building and
Construction Commission (ABCC). In addition, there are quasi-judicial bodies
including the industrial tribunal (in 2019, called the Fair Work Commission), the
Australian Human Rights Commission, and the Remuneration Tribunal.
The state’s role has substantially varied over time. For most of the 20th century,
Australian industrial relations operated within the conciliation and arbitration
system. That system originated in the 1890s, before the nation was federated, in
response to bitter and costly disputes in several industries. Unions had strongly,
but unsuccessfully, resisted cuts to wages and conditions. Employers had been
unwilling to participate in voluntary conciliation or arbitration, and bloodshed had
occurred when employers, workers and law enforcement clashed.
By 1904, federal legislation was introduced to formally regulate and provide
a system for the negotiation of workers’ wages and conditions, and unions were
recognised as registered entities. This centralised system of multilateral rule-
making involved trade unions as representatives of workers, employer associations
representing employers, and the industrial labour courts and tribunals. Federal
and state governments did not directly determine labour standards at this time,9
but they did regulate some internal affairs of unions and employer associations, as
these were part of the system (some saw them as virtually an arm of the state10).
Tribunal decisions around wages and conditions became binding, and the details
were contained within instruments known as ‘awards’.
The central agency, originally the Conciliation and Arbitration Court, was split
in the 1950s into a court and a tribunal. The latter, the Australian Conciliation
and Arbitration Commission (ACAC), became the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (AIRC) and then Fair Work Australia (subsequently the FWC). In the
long run, the decisions of the tribunals, although often contested, appeared to be
similar to outcomes that the market would have delivered, apart from a tendency to
9 McCallum 2011.
10 For example, Howard 1977.
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produce a more egalitarian distribution of earnings, which also included progress
towards equal pay for women.11
At the parliamentary level, there are deep divisions between the major political
parties. In some ways these parties are the political manifestation of capital and
labour. The unions created the ALP, and still have a formal role in it, though there
are often wide political gulfs between them. The Liberal Party was established in
the 1940s in an attempt to reorganise the then non-Labor parties (i.e. the parties of
capital) to better fight the ALP, then in government. Its creation was facilitated by
the newly established Institute of Public Affairs.
Elements determining pay and conditions
The legal ‘safety net’ for employees – the minimum conditions which should govern
their work – has several components: a minimum wage, National Employment
Standards (NES) set out in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), and modern awards. On
top of these sit, for a substantial minority of workers, enterprise agreements.
The minimum wage is set by the Fair Work Commission’s Expert Panel, taking
effect from 1 July each year. The National Employment Standards are required
by law to be provided to all employees. The NES and minimum wage applies to
all employees as a ‘bottom floor’ set of minimum conditions. The NES includes
provisions regarding:
• maximum weekly hours
• requests for flexible working arrangements
• parental leave and related entitlements
• annual leave
• personal/carer’s leave, compassionate leave, and family and domestic violence
leave
• community service leave
• long-service leave
• public holidays
• notice of termination and redundancy pay
• provision of a fair work information statement to employees.12
Although seemingly detailed and prescriptive, there are loopholes in some of these
provisions, so it is not as robust a list as it might initially appear. Employees who
are employed under a modern award are entitled to minimum pay and other
conditions outlined in the relevant award. Where an organisation has negotiated
an enterprise agreement, pay and conditions for employees will be outlined in
the enterprise agreement, which can be different to the award but should leave
employees better off overall than if they were employed under the award. In
11 Peetz 2016a.
12 Fair Work Ombudsman 2018a.
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addition, employees and employers may negotiate an individual flexibility arrange-
ment (IFA) that can be used to implement more flexible work practices, particularly
on hours of work. An IFA, in theory, cannot be used to erode the minimum rights
of employees. Again, the employee should be better off overall when compared to
the modern award or enterprise agreement that the IFA varies.
Modern awards protect a number of entitlements and these can include:
• minimum wages
• types of employment (e.g. full-time, part-time or casual)
• overtime and penalty rates
• work arrangements (e.g. rostering or variations to working hours)
• annual wage or salary arrangements
• allowances (e.g. for employees required to clean their uniform)
• annual leave loading and arrangements for taking leave
• superannuation
• procedures for consultation, representation and dispute settlement.13
Most modern awards are based on a designated industry or an occupation within
a group of industries of employment. A miscellaneous award attempts to cover all
remaining workers. Any who might not be covered, however, are still entitled to the
minimum wage and the NES.14
The federal dimension
Federal industrial legislation in the 20th century relied on varied parts of the
Constitution. Principally, the conciliation and arbitration power in section 51(xxxv)
of the Constitution was used to encourage the settlement of disputes through
bargaining at the enterprise level. Residual powers rest with the states, so at times
30 to 40 per cent of Australian employees were under state awards. While, in 1993,
the external affairs power (section 51[xxix]) was used to provide for redress against
unfair dismissal and unequal remuneration between men and women, this was
historically unusual. That year, the corporations power (section 51[xx]) was used
to allow the negotiation of enterprise flexibility agreements between incorporated
employers and groups of employees without any representation by trade unions
or employer associations. This use was widened in 2005 to form the basis for the
entirety of the Howard government’s ‘WorkChoices’ legislation. The High Court
validated this, and so responsibility for most industrial relations matters moved
from the states to the federal government. To make this work, it was still necessary
for the states to refer power on non-corporate employers to the federal government,
which all states except Western Australia did. Most states retained the responsibility
for their own employees (such as state employed teachers and nurses).
13 Fair Work Ombudsman 2018b, 4–5.
14 Fair Work Ombudsman 2018b, 4–5.
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After that time, much of the WorkChoices legislation was wound back
(especially regarding dismissal and individual contracts), and the Fair Work Act
that replaced it has itself been amended several times, albeit in mostly minor
ways. Regardless, the federal government has largely maintained responsibility for
industrial relations.
Issues
We now turn to policy matters that have featured in political debates in recent
Australian history. These include matters concerning wages policy, collectivism and
individualism, union power and industrial conflict.
Wages policy, ‘the Accord’ and enterprise bargaining
Through the first half of the 20th century, awards became central to setting pay and
conditions. They provided a framework for employers to adhere to for rewarding
employees with wages and conditions of employment in return for their work
effort. The award system was seen as offering stability to the economy and perhaps
restraining strike activity. The number of awards grew as they covered an increasing
range of industries. The number of award conditions contained within awards also
grew. Furthermore, the government sought to protect local industries and jobs
through tariffs and quotas.
However, by the late 1970s to early 1980s, economic circumstances were
complex and changing. Most countries were experiencing simultaneous high
inflation and unemployment, following oil price rises driven by the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and in Australia neither the Whitlam Labor
government nor the conservative Fraser government had been able to effectively
counter both, with their traditional demand-management policies.
In 1983, the ALP introduced the Prices and Incomes Accord, more commonly
referred to as ‘the Accord’ that had been negotiated with the ACTU. It was a system
of highly centralised wage determination and a means by which state intervention
restructured the industrial relations system. The main logic was for labour to
co-operate with the state to reduce both unemployment and inflation, through
wage restraint (at or below inflation) supported by social expenditures such as
the introduction of Medicare and tax cuts.15 A secondary logic was for labour to
co-operate with corporate management in finding ways of improving productivity
at the workplace level. While productivity growth was quite high prior to the
introduction of the Accord, it slowed substantially in the mid-1980s – firms had
little incentive to engage in labour-saving technology once real wage costs were
falling – and productivity and barriers to flexibility (discussed below) came to be
15 Dabscheck 1989; Hancock 2016; Willis and Wilson 2000.
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seen as the major problem with the industrial relations system. The Accord was
renegotiated several times – initially, in response to wage pressures arising from
a large depreciation of the Australian dollar in 1985 – and subsequent versions
(‘Marks’) of the Accord placed increasing emphasis on localised cost offsets or
productivity gains. The Accord’s creation may have been the last time that national
economic considerations fundamentally drove industrial relations policy.
By 1991, employers, unions and the Labor government had all decided, for
varying reasons, to move away from centralised wage fixing, and this was reflected
in Accord Mark V. In the April 1991 National Wage Case, the arguments of the
parties for this move to ‘enterprise bargaining’ (EB) were rejected by the AIRC,
but by October 1991 it reluctantly endorsed the move.16 This was backed by 1992
legislation reducing the AIRC’s capacity to reject certified agreements and by
wholesale legislative changes in 1993 (the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993
[Cth]).17 These formally established a right to strike in negotiation of a new
enterprise bargaining agreement (EBA) – but nothing else – whereas previously,
strikes had occurred in a legal grey zone with few restrictions. EBAs had to satisfy a
‘no disadvantage’ test, meaning workers on them should be no worse off than they
would be under awards.
This emphasis on bargaining – where ‘the institutionalised arrangements by
which employers and employees determine the terms and conditions of the
employment relationship’18 – starkly contrasted the heavy state involvement (via
the AIRC) in earlier times. In the ideal form, trade unions would bargain for pay
increases and improvements in workplace conditions where profits were achieved
through employees’ efforts, and employers would bargain for further increases in
productivity in return. Once agreement between all parties was reached, these EBAs
would be made legally binding after approval by the AIRC. In practice, many saw
this ideal as being constrained by employers focusing on cost reductions rather
than productivity increases; the parties running out of ways to increase productivity
through this mechanism; employers introducing productivity-enhancing measures
outside the bargaining context; outcomes being determined by muscle, not merit;
employers using the EB process to circumvent unions altogether; and subsequent
changes to the EB law designed to favour the power of one side over the other.
With decreasing involvement in workplace matters, the role of the AIRC shifted
to maintaining an appropriate safety net of minimum award wages and conditions.
Changes in the safety net were meant to take account of inflationary pressures,
the level of workforce participation and productivity growth, industrial action,
broader social objectives and community expectations of fairness. Its first three
safety net decisions in the early 1990s provided low increases ($8 per week) in
award wages in line with the Accord partners’ interest in encouraging workers to
16 Willis and Wilson 2000.
17 Pekarek et al. 2017.
18 Bray 2011, 19.
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move to enterprise bargaining. After 1996, when the Coalition government came
to office and the Accord ended, the parties made divergent submissions to these
safety net cases – eventually, the government stopped nominating a specific amount
altogether – and the AIRC varied in the extent to which its decisions implicitly
endorsed one side’s submissions over the other’s.
Eventually, the idea of setting the safety net at a level low enough to encourage
workers to move to enterprise bargaining lost salience, not least because a large gap
quickly opened up in most industries between award rates and EBA rates, but it
was often the resistance of employers, rather than employees, that held back the
growth of EB. New developments in economic research cast heavy doubt on the
previous consensus amongst economists that minimum wage increases would raise
unemployment.19 Despite the claimed focus on the low paid, the inherently difficult
circumstances of people who relied on award wages at or near the minimum wage
led unions to lodge ‘Living Wage’ claims, seeking a large increase in minimum and
award wages to deal with the problems facing the low paid, albeit with little success.
While increases in award minimum rates may presently be above growth in the
Consumer Price Index,20 wage growth overall in 2018 were historically at very low
rates in Australia and overseas.21
Pay equity
The concept of equity is concerned with fairness, derived from social justice
principles of equal rights and access to, and full participation in, society. The
difference between high and low wage earners is one aspect of pay equity. While
a minimum wage aims to provide some standard of living to safeguard against
poverty,22 other inequities may persist due to other historical, systemic and social
factors. For example, the 1907 Harvester court decision set the male basic wage to
support his wife and five children.23 This social norm of the time viewed the male
as the worker and the female as the homemaker. This has been seen as reflecting
a breadwinner/homemaker model, and perpetuating gender discrimination, mani-
festing in the issue of the gender pay gap.
Even after explicit pay discrimination based on gender was ended by the ACAC,
traditionally male forms of work such as manual and heavy work have attracted
a higher value than female forms of work, which embodied ‘softer’ skills, in
occupations like nursing or child care. Whitehouse and Rooney24 highlight the
undervaluation of work performed by women, and Baird25 reinforces this view,
19 Card and Krueger 1995; Fair Work Commission 2017.
20 Oliver and Yu 2018.
21 Gahan, Pekarek and Nicholson 2018; Stewart, Stanford and Hardy 2018.
22 Ex parte H.V. McKay (1907) 2 CAR 1 (Harvester).
23 Brown 2011.
24 Whitehouse and Rooney 2011.
25 Baird 2016, 85.
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citing that our industrial relations system has had an ‘uncomfortably ambivalent
relationship’ to women, casting women as either ‘ungendered’ workers (or equi-
valent to the male worker ideal type), or the ‘other’ type of worker (encumbered
with care responsibilities outside of work). While this undervaluation affects specific
jobs, other systemic biases also damage a woman’s position. For example, a policy
focusing on promotion linked to length of service may inadvertently discriminate
against women, due to the taking of maternity leave.
Despite a range of state interventions toward providing pay equity, including
a major Convention,26 anti-discrimination and equal opportunity legislation, and
various equal pay decisions by tribunals, the gender pay gap remains at around
at 14 per cent of male hourly earnings.27 Pay inequality also extends to a range
of vulnerable groups in the labour market who are denied access to good quality
and well-paid work experience and less bargaining power, including Indigenous
Australians,28 people living with disabilities,29 youth, and temporary and skilled
migrant workers.30 ‘Neoliberal’ policies outside employment relations appear to
worsen this disadvantage, and increase poverty (especially when we compare
different countries), with little or no consistent gain in terms of productivity.31
Individualism and collectivism
One of the key left–right differences in industrial relations policy is the emphasis on
collectivism versus individualism. For example, statutorily providing for individual
contracts, known as Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs), was a focus of
amendments to federal legislation of the Howard Coalition government, through
the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth). Lack of control in the Senate saw a watering
down of the Coalition’s original intentions.32 However, this changed in 2005 when
the Coalition gained control of the Senate and enacted the Workplace Relations
Amendment (WorkChoices) Act 2005 (Cth), more commonly known as the
‘WorkChoices’ legislation.
The powers of the AIRC were further limited. WorkChoices gave AWAs
supremacy over EB agreements or awards, and moved the role of fixing minimum
wages and casual loadings to the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC). Only
five minimum working conditions needed to be included in awards and AWAs.
The ‘no disadvantage’ test was abolished.33 AWAs frequently reduced penalty rates
(wage premiums for anti-social working hours), overtime and shift allowances.
26 United Nations 1951.
27 Workplace Gender Equality Agency 2019.
28 Birch and Marshall 2018.
29 Werth 2015.
30 Campbell and Burgess 2018; Ressia, Strachan and Bailey 2017.
31 Peetz 2012.
32 McCallum 2011; Stewart 2016.
33 McCallum 2011; Stewart 2016.
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Small and medium businesses (with less than 101 employees) became exempt from
unfair dismissal laws, giving employers ‘greater freedom over the terms of which
they can hire and fire workers’.34 There were publicised examples of people given a
choice between a pay cut and losing their job.35
The issue was central to the 2007 federal election. The unions’ ‘Your Rights @
Work’ (YRAW) campaign substantially helped the ALP return to power at the 2007
election.36 The ALP subsequently reinstated unfair dismissal protections and phased
out AWAs. Its Fair Work Act 2009 re-established the integrity of awards, with some
changes, in particular a reduction in their number and overlap and an increase in
their ability to be varied at the workplace level by ‘agreement’ – hence the new term
‘modern awards’.37 It replaced the AIRC with Fair Work Australia (FWA) – it was, after
all, the ‘Fair Work Act’ – and replaced or renamed several other Coalition-established
institutions. However, not all aspects of WorkChoices were changed. Unions did not
achieve full reinstatement of workplace entry rights.38 In addition, industrial action
by trade unions remained unlawful in many contexts, and requirements for a secret
ballot were modified but largely retained. Good faith bargaining requirements were
introduced for negotiating EB agreements (section 228 of the Fair Work Act 2009). The
Fair Work Act 2009 reintroduced a stronger version of the ‘no disadvantage’ test called
the ‘better off overall’ test, or ‘BOOT’,39 designed to ensure that a worker is better off
overall under an agreement when compared to the equivalent industry award. The ten
minimum NES conditions, discussed earlier in this chapter, must be satisfied. The ALP
also initiated a process leading to the introduction of universal paid parental leave.
Flexibility and insecurity
The basic architecture of the Fair Work Act 2009 had, by 2019, changed little
since its introduction, despite six years of Coalition government from 2013. The
Coalition found it difficult to get radical changes through the Senate, and a broader
agenda had been stymied since 2008, by the 2007 election result.
Nonetheless, pressures for change continued, because of the ongoing employer
urge for flexibility since the Accord days. It was usually controversial because
increased flexibility for employers would be mirrored in increased insecurity for
employees. Over the period from 2013, matters affecting pay and conditions
became controversial, because of actions of institutions promoting flexibility. The
FWC in 2017 decided to reduce Sunday penalty rates in retail and hospitality,
following employer submissions focusing on the need for greater flexibility in those
industries and the employment opportunities it would allegedly create, a report by
34 Stewart and Williams 2007, 33.
35 Peetz 2007.
36 Cooper 2016; Muir and Peetz 2010.
37 Bukarica and Dallas 2012; Stewart 2016.
38 Muir and Peetz 2010.
39 Bukarica and Dallas 2012; Cooper and Ellem 2011.
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the Productivity Commission that made similar recommendations and statements
from individual Coalition politicians favouring such a cut.40
The issue was particularly salient because of its impact on low-income workers
and, implicitly, the potential for eventual flow-on to other workers. Soon, ‘insecurity’
became a major issue, with unions focusing on high rates of casualisation, labour
hire, franchise employment, the use of ‘independent’ contractors, and continuing
growth in underemployment, with academic attention focusing on several of these
issues.41 The emergence of changing business models and the growth of the
‘platform’ or ‘gig’ economy heightened focus on these issues.42 As such, individual
jurisdictions have introduced legislation aimed at specific issues such as labour hire
or occupational health and safety.43
Another controversial institution was the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO),
charged with ensuring compliance with the system. Employers in a range of
industries, but especially horticulture and hospitality, were found (often through
media exposés) to be exploiting and underpaying workers (what the ACTU called
‘wage theft’), and the FWO was frequently criticised for inaction on these issues – in
effect, for allowing employers too much flexibility in the determination of pay and
conditions. In the context of extensive media coverage before the 2016 election, the
Coalition foreshadowed, and eventually introduced, legislation making accessorial,
franchisor and holding company employers liable for certain contraventions of
workplace laws within related organisations.44 The issue continued to have salience,
especially for the most vulnerable workers (migrants on temporary visas), and
in the lead-up to the 2019 election the Coalition government received a report
from the migrant workers taskforce and promised to implement most of its
recommendations.
Unions and industrial conflict
Despite lower density, unions attract a lot of political attention. This is because they
still wield considerable political mobilising ability (few other union movements
would be able to claim the impact Australian unions’ 2007 YRAW campaign had on
an election result), they are the largest organised part of civil society, and they are
formally linked to the Coalition’s political enemy, the ALP. Their influence on Labor
in government is much less now, however, with the relationship having shifted from
one of being an ‘equal player’ during the Accord years, to that of an ‘interest group’
in political negotiations over the Fair Work Act.
After losing status during the WorkChoices years, unions are again recognised
as bargaining representatives within collective bargaining processes, under the Fair
40 Kaine and Boersma 2018; Oliver and Yu 2018; Peetz 2016b.
41 Campbell and Burgess 2018, 51; Healy, Nicholson and Pekarek 2017.
42 Healy, Nicholson and Pekarek 2017; Lansbury 2018.
43 Rawling and Schofield-Georgeson 2018.
44 Barry and You 2018; Fair Work Ombudsman, n.d.; Rawling and Schofield-Georgeson 2018.
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Work Act 2009,45 but both union internal affairs and the undertaking of industrial
conflict are regulated in extensive detail, especially by comparison with almost all
other industrialised nations. Several of the procedures in place create intentional
difficulties for unions (having been introduced under WorkChoices but subject
only to minor changes by the Fair Work Act). Their relevance has sometimes only
been made apparent through some important decisions by courts or the FWC. For
example, one appears to make it easy for employers to terminate an agreement after
its formal term expires (weakening the bargaining power of workers, whose pay and
conditions can technically be reduced from the EB levels to award levels). Another
makes it easy for employers to obtain termination of otherwise legal industrial
action if it is inconveniencing third parties. There is a serious question in Australia as
to whether a genuine right to strike exists.46 These features, and other aspects of the
system that tipped the balance of power away from unions, led to unions running
the ‘Change the Rules’ political campaign in the lead-up to the 2019 election. In
contrast to the union movement’s success in swinging votes in the 2007 and 2016
elections,47 this campaign had limited impact. The level of industrial conflict has
been much lower in recent years than in the 20th century (see Figure 2).
An example of the high level of attention to union regulation in Australia is found
in the building industry. The Australian Building and Construction Commission
(ABCC) was created by the Coalition government in 2005 with wide powers to
monitor, investigate and enforce alleged breaches of industrial law. The ABCC was a
government agency, not an independent tribunal, with extensive powers to prosecute
unions or their officials or members, and to compel the answering of questions, with
much higher fines available than for other industries (including, in some instances,
jail). It restricted union access to worksites when concerns about employee working
conditions arose unless stringent documentary requirements were met. The ABCC
was abolished under the Labor government in 2012 and replaced by the less powerful
Fair Work Building and Construction (FWBC) agency, but reinstated, after several
years of Senate resistance, by the Coalition in 2016, although the latter had already
appointed strong sympathisers to the FWBC anyway.
The government as employer
A quite different aspect of industrial relations public policy is the government’s
role as employer. Sometimes it has led the way in advancing labour interests –
for example, the Whitlam Labor government took a ‘pace setter’ role in increasing
annual leave and introducing maternity leave. As public sector work is highly
regulated, the gender pay gap is lower in the public sector than in the private
45 Bukarica and Dallas 2012.
46 McCrystal 2019.
47 Peetz 2018.
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sector.48 On the other hand, public sector employers also experience the budgetary
cost of wage increases, and so governments at the federal and state level, both
Coalition and ALP, may impose caps on negotiated wage increases or even attempt
to reduce conditions, leading at times to major industrial action.49
Conclusions
Most public policy in industrial relations, particularly since the 1990s, has been
driven by two things: political ideology and each political party’s perception of what
the political environment will permit. For the ALP, there is an urge to improve the
position of labour (and no love of ‘the big end of town’), but it is constrained by
what it considers the business sector and the media will accept. For the Coalition,
there is an urge to improve the position of capital (and no love of unions), but it is
constrained by what it considers the electorate will allow. Occasionally, especially if
an election is near, a party will enact policies that are counter to its traditional base,
because of political considerations. Both sides are also constrained, in terms of
legislation, by what the Senate will allow, but they (particularly the Coalition) have
found that making the ‘right’ appointments of personnel to key positions can be at
least as important as the formal aims of an organisation or its governing legislation.
Industrial relations policies are rarely evaluated in the way of public policies
in several other areas, and if they are it is often for specific purposes, reflected
in the bodies or individuals chosen for the task. A feature of industrial relations
policy is the use of inquiries to justify political positioning, and to provide some
distancing for a government that wants to test public reaction to ideas. Two recent
examples are the Heydon Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and
Corruption, and a Productivity Commission inquiry into workplace regulations.50
Another feature is the use of the rationale of ‘productivity’ to justify changes, even
when the evidence on this is limited or contradictory – the most glaring example
being reform in the building and construction industry.51 That is, even where
the reason is ideology or politics, the stated rationale may be about productivity,
flexibility or economic growth.
Although all areas of public policy are influenced by ideology and politics, this
phenomenon is particularly marked in industrial relations policy. While ‘evidence-
based policy’ may be a phrase that haunts many other areas of public policy, its
ghost is barely evident here.
48 Kaine and Boersma 2018; Peetz and Murray 2017.
49 Gahan, Pekarek and Nicholson 2018.
50 Forsyth 2017; Peetz 2016a.
51 Allan, Dungan and Peetz 2010.
Work, employment and industrial relations policy
739
Fi
gu
re
2
W
or
ki
ng
da
ys
lo
st
pe
r1
00
0
em
pl
oy
ee
s.
So
ur
ce
:A
BS
C
at
.N
o.
63
21
.0
;R
BA
19
97
,t
ab
le
4.
21
.
References
Alexander, Robyn, John Lewer and Peter Gahan (2008). Understanding Australian industrial
relations. South Melbourne: Thomson.
Allan, C., A. Dungan and D. Peetz (2010). ‘Anomalies’, damned ‘anomalies’ and statistics:
construction industry productivity in Australia. Journal of Industrial Relations 52(1): 61–79.
DOI: 10.1177/0022185609353985
Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (various years). Employee earnings, benefits and trade union
membership, Australia. Cat. No. 6310.0. Canberra: ABS.
—— (various years). Industrial disputes, Australia. Cat. No. 6321.0. Canberra: ABS.
—— (various years). Trade union statistics, Australia. Cat. No. 6323.0. Canberra: ABS.
—— (various years). Trade union members. Cat. No. 6325.0. Canberra: ABS.
—— (various years). Characteristics of employment. Cat. No. 6333.0. Canberra: ABS.
Baird, Marian (2016). Policy tensions: women, work and paid parental leave. In Keith Hancock and
Russell Landsbury, eds. Industrial relations reform: looking to the future, 85–104. Annandale,
NSW: Federation Press.
Balnave, Nikola, Janine Brown, Glenda Maconachie and Raymond Stone (2009). Employment
relations in Australia, 2nd edn. Milton, Qld: John Wiley & Sons.
Barry, Michael, and Kevin You (2018). Employer association matters in Australia in 2017. The
Journal of Industrial Relations 59(3): 288–304. DOI: 10.1177/0022185617693873
Birch, Elisa, and David Marshall (2018). Revisiting the earned income gap for Indigenous Australian
workers: evidence from a selection bias corrected model. Journal of Industrial Relations 60(1):
3–29. DOI: 10.1177/0022185617732365
Bray, Mark (2011). The distinctiveness of modern awards. In Marian Baird, Keith Hancock and Joe
Issac, eds. Work and employment relations: an era of change. Essays in honour of Russell
Lansbury, 17–33: Annandale NSW: Federation Press.
Brown, William (2011). How do we make minimum wages effective? In Marian Baird, Keith
Hancock and Joe Issac, eds. Work and employment relations: an era of change. Essays in honour
of Russell Lansbury, 167–77. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.
Bukarica, Alex, and Andrew Dallas (2012). Good faith bargaining under the Fair Work Act 2009.
Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.
Campbell, Iain, and John Burgess (2018). Patchy progress? Two decades of research on
precariousness and precarious work in Australia. Labour and Industry: A Journal of the Social
and Economic Relations of Work 28(1): 48–67. DOI: 10.1080/10301763. 2018.1427424
Card, D., and A. Krueger (1995). Myth and measurement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Cooper, Rae (2016). Consensus in industrial relations policy and politics in Australia 2007–2015. In
Keith Hancock and Russell Lansbury, eds. Industrial relations reform: looking to the future,
66–84. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.
Cooper, Rae, and Bradon Ellem (2011). Trade unions and collective bargaining. In Marian Baird,
Keith Hancock and Joe Issac, eds. Work and employment relations: an era of change. Essays in
honour of Russell Lansbury, 34–48. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.
Dabscheck, Braham (1989). Australian industrial relations in the 1980s. Melbourne: Oxford
University Press.
Fair Work Commission (2017). Annual wage review. Canberra: Fair Work Commission.
Fair Work Ombudsman (n.d.). Accessorial liability – the involvement of others in a breach. Canberra:
Australian Government. https://bit.ly/2BFo70d
——— (2018a). Fair work handbook. Canberra: Australian Government.
——— (2018b). Compliance and enforcement policy. Canberra: Australian Government.
Work, employment and industrial relations policy
741
Forsyth, Anthony (2017). Industrial legislation in Australia in 2016. Journal of Industrial Relations
59(3): 323–39. DOI: 10.1177/0022185617693876
Gahan, Peter, Andreas Pekarek and Daniel Nicholson (2018). Unions and collective bargaining in
Australia in 2017. Journal of Industrial Relations 60(3): 337–57. DOI: 10.1177/
0022185618759135
Hancock, Keith (2016). Reforming industrial relations: revisiting the 1980s and the 1990s. In Keith
Hancock and Russell Lansbury, eds. Industrial relations reform: looking to the future, 16–39.
Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.
Healy, Joshua, Daniel Nicholson and Andreas Pekarek (2017). Should we take the gig economy
seriously? Labour and Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work 27(3):
232–48. DOI: 10.1080/10301763. 2017.1377048
Howard, William (1977). Australian trade unions in the context of union theory. Journal of Industrial
Relations 19(3): 255–73. DOI: 10.1177/002218567701900303
Kaine, Sarah, and Martin Boersma (2018). Women, work and industrial relations in Australia in
2017. Journal of Industrial Relations 60 (3): 317–36. DOI: 10.1177/0022185618764204
Lansbury, Russell (2018). The changing world of work and employment relations: a multi-level
institutional perspective of the future. Labour and Industry: A Journal of the Social and
Economic Relations of Work 28(1): 5–20. DOI: 10.1080/10301763. 2018.1427425
McAllister, Ian, and Sarah Cameron (2014). Trends in Australian public opinion: results from the
Australian Election Survey 1987–2013. Canberra: Australian National University College of Arts
and Social Sciences.
McCallum, Ron (2011). Legislated standards: the Australian approach. In Marian Baird, Keith
Hancock and Joe Issac, eds. Work and employment relations: an era of change. Essays in honour
of Russell Lansbury, 6–16. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.
McCrystal, Shae (2019). Why is it so hard to take lawful strike action in Australia? Journal of
Industrial Relations 61(1): 129–44. DOI: 10.1177/0022185618806949
Muir, Kathie, and David Peetz (2010). Not dead yet: the Australian Union movement and the defeat
of a government. Social Movement Studies 9(2): 215–28. DOI: 10.1080/14742831003603380
Oliver, Damian, and Serena Yu (2018). The Australian labour market in 2017. Journal of Industrial
Relations 60(3): 298–316. DOI: 10.1177/0022185618763975
Peetz, David (2019). The realities and futures of work. Canberra: ANU Press. DOI: 10.22459/
RFW.2019
—— (2018). The industrial relations policy and penalty. In Anika Gauja, Peter Chen, Jennifer Curtin
and Juliet Pietsch, eds. Double disillusion: the 2016 Australian federal election, 519–48. Canberra:
ANU Press.
—— (2016a). Industrial action, the right to strike, ballots and the Fair Work Act. Australian Journal
of Labour Law 29: 133–53.
—— (2016b). The Productivity Commission and industrial relations reform. The Economic and
Labour Relations Review 27(2): 164–80. DOI: 10.1177/1035304616649305
—— (2012). The impacts and non-impacts on unions of enterprise bargaining. Labour and Industry:
A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work 22(3): 237–54. DOI: 10.1080/
10301763.2012.10669438
—— (2007). Collateral damage: women and the workchoices battlefields. Hecate 33(1): 61–80.
Peetz, David, and Janis Bailey (2012). Dancing alone: the Australian union movement over three
decades. Journal of Industrial Relations 54(4): 525–41. DOI: 10.1177/0022185612449133
Peetz, David, and Georgina Murray (2017). Women, labour segmentation and regulation: varieties of
gender gaps. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Pekarek, Andreas, Ingrid Landau, Peter Gahan, Anthony Forsyth and John Howe (2017). Old game,
new rules? The dynamics of enterprise bargaining under the Fair Work Act. Journal of Industrial
Relations 59(1): 44–64. DOI: 10.1177/0022185616662311
Australian Politics and Policy
742
Rawling, Michael, and Eugene Schofield-Georgeson (2018). Industrial legislation in Australia.
Journal of Industrial Relations 60(3): 378–96. DOI: 10.1177/0022185618760088
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) (1997). Australian economic statistics 1949–1950 to 1996–1997.
Occasional Paper No. 8. Sydney: RBA. https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/frequency/occ-
paper-8.html
Ressia, Susan, Glenda Strachan and Janis Bailey (2017). Going up or going down? Occupational
mobility of skilled migrants in Australia. Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources 55: 64–85.
DOI: 10.1111/1744-7941.12121
Stewart, Andrew (2016). WorkChoices, fair work and the role of the ‘independent umpire’. In Keith
Hancock and Russell Lansbury, eds. Industrial relations reform: looking to the future, 40–65.
Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.
Stewart, Andrew, Jim Stanford and Tess Hardy (2018). The wages crisis in Australia: what it is and
what to do about it. Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press.
Stewart, Andrew, and George Williams (2007). WorkChoices: what the High Court said. Annandale,
NSW: Federation Press.
United Nations (1951). Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100). https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/
blog/document/equal-remuneration-convention-1951-no-100-2/
Werth, Shalene (2015). Managerial attitudes: influences on workforce outcomes for working women
with chronic illness. Economic and Labour Relations Review 26(2): 296–313. DOI: 10.1177/
1035304615571244
Whitehouse, Gillian, and Tricia Rooney (2011). Approaches to gender-based underevaluation in
Australian industrial tribunals: lessons from recent childcare cases. In Marian Baird, Keith
Hancock, and Joe Issac, eds. Work and employment relations: an era of change. Essays in honour
of Russell Landsbury, 109–123. Annandale, NSW: Federation Press.
Willis, Ralph, and Kenneth Wilson (2000). A brief history of the Accord. In Kenneth Wilson, Joanne
Bradford and Maree Fitzpatrick, eds. Australia in Accord: an evaluation of the Prices and Incomes
Accord in the Hawke–Keating years, 1–18. Footscray, Vic.: South Pacific Publishing.
Workplace Gender Equality Agency (2019). The gender pay gap. https://www.wgea.gov.au/topics/
the-gender-pay-gap
About the authors
Susan Ressia is a lecturer in the Department of Employment Relations and Human
Resources at Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. Her research focuses on the
job search experiences of independent non-English speaking background skilled
migrants in Australia. Susan’s research interests also include the areas of work–life
balance, managing diversity, intersectionality, equality and social justice issues.
Susan is co-author of Employment relations: an integrated approach (2nd edn. 2018)
and Work in the 21st century: how do I log on? (2017). She has also published in
Gender, Work and Organization and the Asia-Pacific Journal of Human Resources.
Shalene Werth is a senior lecturer in the School of Management and Enterprise at
the University of Southern Queensland. Her research interests include the regulation
of work, workplace diversity and inclusion, and specifically attitudes to disability
and chronic illness in the workplace. Shalene co-edited the book: Work and identity:
contemporary perspectives on workplace diversity (2019), as well as the 'Researching
Diversity' section of Labour and Industry (Vol 29, No. 1).
Work, employment and industrial relations policy
743
David Peetz is professor of employment relations at Griffith University. He pre-
viously worked at the Australian National University and in the then Common-
wealth Department of Industrial Relations, spending over five years in its Senior
Executive Service. He has undertaken work for unions, employers and governments
of both political persuasions. He is the author of Unions in a contrary world (1998)
and Brave new workplace (2006) and co-author of Women of the coal rushes (2010),
in addition to numerous academic articles, papers and reports, as well as articles
for The Conversation. He is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences.
Australian Politics and Policy
744
